BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 17, 2002
EU ready to offer support to "broad-based" government in Somalia
UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, in English 16 Aug 02
Nairobi, 16 August: The EU Council of Ministers has offered financial and technical support to a "provisional, all-inclusive, broad-based" government in Somalia, as successor to the Transitional National Government.
The support would, however, be conditional on a number of requirements, including the functioning of the main infrastructures in the country, such as the port and airport in the capital Mogadishu, the free circulation of people and goods, the launching of a partnership with the country's various regions, and the establishment of harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a statement from the council said. In order to encourage a "bottom-up approach", the EU would support "emerging regional governance" which had effective control of population centres and economic infrastructures, and demonstrated a commitment to peace, the council said.
It would also continue to use declarations and demarches to pass rapid and clear messages to the various Somali and regional stakeholders, as part of its support to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's peace and reconciliation initiative in Somalia.
An EU special envoy could be appointed, the council added, if progress in the peace process so merited. Smart sanctions targeting individuals blocking peace could also be introduced, as well as positive incentives such as targeted financial support.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 17, 2002
Somaliland calls for recognition by interim Somalia government
Radio HornAfrik, Mogadishu, in Somali 0500 gmt 17 Aug 02
Excerpt from report by Somali Radio HornAfrik on 17 August
The Somaliland administration has asked the Transitional Government of Somalia TGS to announce that Somaliland can secede from the rest of the country. For more details on this here is our reporter Ilmi Usman Farah Bonderi:
Reporter Husayn Haji Bood Mogadishu politician , who previously visited Somaliland to participate in the funeral ceremony of the late president of the Republic of Somaliland, Muhammad Ibrahim Egal, has recently returned from a recent visit to Somaliland.
Mr Bood said he had been sent by Somaliland authorities to urge the interim government, to announce recognition of the Republic of Somaliland and that Somaliland can secede from the rest of the country...
Agence France Presse, August 16
Ministers fail to show up for planned meeting on Somalia
NAIROBI -- A meeting of ministers from the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to discuss the Somali peace process failed to kick off as planned on Friday when no one showed up, a Kenyan foreign ministry official said.
"The press will be informed if the meeting is to take place, but definitely there will be no meeting on Friday," said the official, who declined to be named.
It was not immediately clear why the IGAD foreign ministers failed to arrive in time for the meeting, but some observers attribute the failure to political complications and logistical problems. Kenyan Foreign Minister Marsden Madoka had told journalists Wednesday that ministers of the seven-nation IGAD, mediating in the Somali peace process, would meet Friday to endorse a technical committee's proposals for a conference to be held in the western Kenyan town of Eldoret on September 16.
IGAD member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, while its technical committee is composed of Somalia's frontline states of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the IGAD secretariat.
The committee visited Somalia recently and met all warlords, Transitional National Government (TNG) officials and civil society groups.
The TNG was established after an August 2000 conference of Somali clans in Djibouti, but was rejected by most of the armed groups that have held sway over Somalia since dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was toppled in January 1991.
The TNG enjoys some support from the international community, but has been unable to extend its control beyond fiefdoms in the capital Mogadishu.
All parties in Somalia have pledged to attend the forthcoming conference, except the self-declared republic of Somaliland in the northwest, which seceded from the rest of Somalia five months after Barre's ouster. It has yet to be recognized by the outside world.
The planned Eldoret meeting is the 16th major conference aimed at restoring peace in Somalia.
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 16, 2002
Somalia: Puntland administration bans local BBC reporters from working
Radio Midnimo, Boosaaso, in Somali 1030 gmt 16 Aug 02
A press statement issued by the office of the emergency committee of Puntland administration today banned BBC reporters Muhammad Khalif Gir phonetic and Ahmad Muhammad Kismaayo from reporting.
The emergency committee had previously closed down SBC Somali Broadcasting Corporation; a rebroadcasting partner of the BBC in Boosaaso Puntland's main commercial town .
Africa News, August 15, 2002
Somalia; Aid Agencies Uncoordinated in Somaliland
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
International aid agencies lack coordination when dealing with long-term assistance for internally displaced and returnee populations in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia, says a report from the United Nations Coordination Unit/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNCU/OCHA).
"The primary reason is the problem associated with which agency has, or should have, a mandate to assist these communities," said the joint report. Efforts to form a joint committee to sort out this issue had also not materialised, it added. As a result, the "little assistance" delivered to the region to date had been on an ad hoc basis. This meant that the prospect of as many as 80,000 returnees to Somaliland arriving over the next two years was raising "grave concerns" with regard to increased social and economic pressures on both local authorities and resident populations.
UNCU/OCHA recommended that any further assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those in Dima camp in the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, should be conducted with the consultation of the IDPs themselves, as complaints regarding the diversion of relief supplies by local authorities had been lodged. It was also necessary to establish a system of monitoring and evaluating the delivery of any relief supplies.
Specific projects recommended in the report included a food-for-work programme in Dima camp to rebuild roads that were destroyed by floods in 1999, as well as generating employment and improving the nutritional status; the rehabilitation of roads on the outskirts of Hargeysa; and a long-term urban planning programme as local authorities lacked both the capacity and funds to rehabilitate returning IDPs and returnees.
"Given the fact that thousands of more returnees are expected over the next two years, it is vital that international agencies assist in the preparation and planning for the upcoming influx," the report stressed.
[Full report at:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/6418b7c74bc1a57dc1256c0c0044ac89?OpenDocument]
Amal Yusuf, executive director of the Somali Womenís Association, and Farhia Mahad, with son, discuss the
Associationís services. photo by Nancy Conroy
Ryan's gallery.
http://www.hardings.org/photogallery.htm
Addis Tribune (Ethiopia): AAGM, April 12, 2002
"MOGADISHU: ANOTHER FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES"
BYLINE: David H. Shinn
David H. Shinn Statement at the Somali Confederation in Minnesota
I wish to thank the Somali Confederation in Minnesota and especially Mr. Mohamed Jibrell for inviting me to address the Somali community. I speak to you today as a friend of Africa and especially the Horn of Africa. My remarks are personal; they do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government. Rather they reflect the concerns of a private American now teaching at a prominent university who continues to follow closely events in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. They are intended to be constructive. They are aimed both at U.S. policy makers and the Somali community in the United States. It is most appropriate to make this speech in Minneapolis/St. Paul, home to the largest Somali community in the United States. My association with Somalia dates back to the early 1960s when I wrote my Master's Thesis on the Pan-Somali Movement at The George Washington University. This led to a 37-year career in the Foreign Service and an assignment in the U.S. State Department as Desk Officer for Somalia in 1969-1971. This assignment resulted in my first visit to Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa in 1970. I was the State Department Coordinator for Somalia in 1993 during the UNITAF and UNOSOM operations. I then served as the Director of East African and Horn of African Affairs in the State Department until my assignment to neighboring Ethiopia as Ambassador in mid-1996.
These remain difficult times for Somalis around the world and especially in the southern two-thirds of Somalia where there has not been real peace for more than a dozen years nor has there been a government since 1991 that controls the entire country. Some Somalis now living outside the country and perhaps some of you present today would like to return to a peaceful Somalia to live permanently or at least to make periodic visits. At a minimum, you may wish to do something, however small, to help return your country of origin to peace and stability. The remarks that I make today are not a prescription for solving all of Somalia's problems. They do offer, however, some modest suggestions concerning U.S. policy towards Somalia and propose one way that you collectively can have greater influence on American policy towards Somalia.
I will begin with the most timely and controversial issue that has put Somalia back in the news in the American media-terrorism. In the aftermath of September 11, there was much media speculation that Somalia would be the next target of American military activity after Afghanistan. Fortunately, that speculation has diminished considerably in the past month or two. It is, nevertheless, instructive to review in some detail the reasons that led to the media frenzy.
You will recall American and United Nations involvement in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. It began as a humanitarian effort to end a famine but soon turned, for both good and bad reasons, as a hunt for Mohamed Farah Aideed. I want to emphasize that the international effort did end the famine and, as a result, many more Somalis are alive today. American engagement in Somalia effectively ended as a result of the October 1993 shootout portrayed in Black Hawk Down that culminated in the death of 18 American special forces personnel. U.S. forces actually increased in numbers after this battle in order to guarantee security for the remaining U.S. troops until they all left in March 1994. The U.S. State Department maintained a small liaison office in Mogadishu for a few more months. It shut down later in the year. UNOSOM stayed on until 1995.
Once UNOSOM left Somalia, the U.S. continued to fund a small humanitarian assistance program operated out of Nairobi, Kenya, and implemented by international agencies such as the World Food Program and non-governmental organizations. This modest program declined in importance each year after 1995 as a result of difficulties in implementing assistance projects in Somalia and lack of interest by Washington officials in developments there. There has been no on-the-ground American presence and precious few visitors to the southern two-thirds of Somalia since 1994. U.S. understanding of events and intelligence on Somalia has been abysmal at least until interest revived in the country after September 11.
Following the events of September 11, there was an accelerated effort within the U.S. government to learn how Somalia may be linked to the attacks against the United States. There was also concern that al-Qaeda personnel in Afghanistan might try to take refuge in Somalia, a failed state with no central authority to maintain control. The existence in Somalia of al-Ittihad al-Islami (Unity of Islam) and its links to al-Qaeda contributed to American anxiety about the situation in Somalia. President Bush signed an executive order on September 23 of last year that blocked the assets of al-Ittihad on the grounds that it is linked to terrorism.
According to some accounts, al-Ittihad has its origins in the 1980s. The Siad Barre regime arrested several of its leaders, forcing it underground. It reemerged in 1991 immediately after the fall of Siad Barre and had some initial success in Kismayo, where it briefly took control of the seaport. Forced out of Kismayo by Mohammed Farah Aideed, remnants of al-Ittihad regrouped in Bossaso and Garowe in northeast Somalia. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front defeated al-Ittihad in these locations and the movement went to Luuq and Dolo in Gedo Region.
Radical Somali fundamentalists who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s reportedly founded al-Ittihad. Some of its top leaders apparently graduated from Islamic universities in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Al-Ittihad uses religion as a tool to achieve political power. It is influenced by Wahabism, a rigid and puritanical ideology from Saudi Arabia that is in conflict with the predominant Sufism in the Horn of Africa. A mysterious network of private and public organizations that support Islamic charities fund al-Ittihad. Much of the funding seems to come from wealthy families and ruling elites in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Al-Ittihad supports the creation of a Somali state based on Islamic law and the incorporation of Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, and perhaps those in neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, into that Islamic state.
Al-Ittihad's involvement in several hotel bombings in Ethiopia and the attempted assassination of an Ethiopian minister during the mid-1990s is unquestioned; al-Ittihad representatives in Mogadishu even took public responsibility. Ethiopian troops responded sharply with a military operation against the al-Ittihad presence in Gedo Region, forcing them to take refuge in other parts of Somalia. The al-Ittihad attacks in Ethiopia are sufficient to prove that it is an organization that uses terrorist tactics.
During the American and United Nations intervention in Somalia, Mohamed Farah Aideed, who had nothing in common ideologically with al-Ittihad, loosely aligned himself with it in Mogadishu for tactical reasons. Al-Ittihad's role in attacks on U.S. and UN forces in Somalia in 1993 is, however, not clear. U.S. troops announced on one occasion that they had discovered an al-Ittihad arms cache in Merca. Al-Ittihad also launched an anti-American propaganda campaign in Mogadishu and called for a jihad against America. Somali support for al-Ittihad, nevertheless, remained weak.
Even more curious is the alleged role of al-Qaeda in Somalia during the UNITAF and UNOSOM interventions. The British Government recently released information stating that Mohamed Atef, whose al-Qaeda duties included training and organizing military and terrorist operations, traveled to Somalia in 1992 and 1993 to instigate actions against American and UN forces. According to the British information, he reported back to Osama bin Laden after each visit. This account adds that Atef trained Somalis to fight UN forces and that al-Qaeda operatives participated in the October 1993 attack that resulted in the ultimate departure of U.S. forces.
In a November 1996 interview with the Arabic-language newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, Osama bin Laden for the first time took credit publicly for helping Aideed forces in Mogadishu during the UNOSOM intervention. Bin Laden claimed: "The only non-Somali faction to fight the Americans was the Arab Mujahideen brothers who were in Afghanistan. The Americans knew perfectly well that we were fighting them, and announced that there were non-Somali extremist forces fighting-meaning us." Bin Laden's account comes three years after the fact and does not refer specifically to the October 3, 1993, battle characterized in Black Hawk Down.
More important, it was not clear in 1993 that non-Somali forces played a role in the fighting with American and UN troops. Bin Laden's boast may well be after the fact bravado. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that there have been and continue to be links between al-Ittihad and al-Qaeda. Their beliefs and goals are similar and circumstantial evidence ties the groups together.
The critical policy questions today for the U.S. are how significant is al-Ittihad as a terrorist organization and to what extent is it a threat to Americans. Due in part to the strong military response from Ethiopia and a reevaluation by al-Ittihad of its tactics, its terrorist activities in the past several years appear to have diminished. It also seems to have thinned out its support in locations like Merca, Luuq and Ras Kamboni, a coastal town in the southern tip of Somalia near the Kenya border. Al-Ittihad followers now try to meld into Somali communities and engage in more acceptable activities. They support popular social and Islamic educational programs and have close contacts with successful Somali businessmen. Although it has undertaken some terrorist operations in Ethiopia's Ogaden region in recent years, it has probably sub-contracted most of this effort to the militant wing of the indigenous Ogaden National Liberation Front.
Throughout its history in Somalia, al-Ittihad has generally had a Somali agenda, including attacks against Ethiopia with the goal of freeing the Ogaden from Ethiopian control. The only known, possible exceptions to this Somali agenda were the minimal support that it gave to Aideed and perhaps others in attacking U.S. and UN troops and the allegation that it may have assisted the al-Qaeda attack on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. The latter issue remains especially murky. Even a worst case interpretation of al-Ittihad's activities does not elevate it to the same level as al-Qaeda. In addition, Somalia is no Afghanistan. There is no central government in control of the entire country comparable to the Taliban that protected al-Qaeda. There is concern, however, that the Transitional National Government has accepted money from and has the support of some al-Ittihad elements.
That which I have spelled out above is the dilemma facing U.S. policy makers in the aftermath of September 11. The U.S. almost immediately made a major effort to improve its understanding of developments in the country and intelligence on Somalia. It solicited the cooperation of Somalia's neighbors-Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti-both on the intelligence front and on a contingency basis for use of their territory should there be any future military action in Somalia. German, French, British and American planes and/or ships have significantly increased surveillance of the 1,900 mile long Somali coast and Somali airspace with the goal of preventing al-Qaeda members entering Somalia from Afghanistan or elsewhere. The U.S. is putting pressure on the Transitional National Government and Somali political factions that control parts of the country to counter al-Ittihad and to remove any al-Qaeda elements. In my view these are all appropriate responses to September 11 and the international terrorist threat.
The U.S. took an additional step that has probably had the most direct impact on those of you here today. Last fall it froze the assets of the money transfer and telecommunications company, al-Barakaat. The U.S. charged that al-Barakaat served as a conduit of funds to al-Qaeda and that its president, Ahmed Nur Ali Jimale, is an associate of Osama bin Laden. Following this decision, money transfers from the U.S. via al-Barakaat came to an end and AT&T cut off international phone service to Somalia soon after. Al-Barakaat representatives denied any connection with al-Qaeda. An official with the U.S. Department of Treasury is quoted in the Washington Post as saying "we have very, very strong evidence that Barakaat was a significant player in the funding scheme of bin Laden." I am not in a position to confirm or deny the charges against al-Barakaat. I do understand, however, the hardship that the decision creates for Somalis living in North America.
The question now is what does the U.S. do next. In all fairness, the speculation since September 11 that the U.S. might carry the war in Afghanistan to Somalia should be seen primarily as media speculation. A number of senior American officials expressed concern about terrorist links in Somalia and emphasized the U.S. is paying close attention to the situation, but I am not aware of a single official who suggested that a military operation was imminent. In recent weeks, even the media have backed away from such speculation. This does not mean, however, that loose talk about possible American military action in Somalia is finished.
Based on what we know about the situation in Somalia today, what kind of military action would make any sense? A bombing campaign to hit terrorist training camps? It is highly unlikely there are any terrorist training camps functioning today in Somalia. UN personnel based in Nairobi visited the one known al-Ittihad training facility at Ras Kamboni after September 11. There were indications a rudimentary facility had once existed there, but it subsequently had been abandoned. This is not surprising; any al-Ittihad follower with a desire to survive would have long since blended in with other Somalis. One can seriously ask if there are any targets to bomb. I am dubious.
Another military option that has been discussed is a "snatch and grab" of senior al-Ittihad and al-Qaeda officials. This is a possibility if you are sure you can identify the right people and you have a good plan to carry it out in an unfamiliar environment. Most al-Ittihad members are Somalis and it is hard for a foreigner to distinguish one from another. The U.S. record for these kinds of operations in Mogadishu in 1993 was not very good even when the U.S. had thousands of troops stationed in the vicinity. There was just too much bad intelligence, much of it passed on by Somalis who wanted to settle scores. Although it would be easier to track non-Somalis, they are almost certainly few in numbers.
Should the U.S. encourage Ethiopia to cleanse Somalia of al-Ittihad? It is questionable whether Ethiopia has either the inclination or ability to go this far. As you know even better than I do, there is considerable suspicion by Somalis of Ethiopian motives. Ethiopia might well become bogged down in a quagmire for which it has no stomach. Ethiopia has shown in the past that it can conduct quick military forays across the Ethiopian-Somali border against al-Ittihad. But al-Ittihad also learned this lesson and is not likely to hang around the border area in significant numbers.
The military options are not very inviting, especially when the threat to the U.S. from Somalia seems questionable. I believe the U.S. should continue to collect intelligence and monitor the waters off shore and the air space above Somalia for any possible terrorist activity. The U.S. should continue to put pressure on the Transitional National Government and Somali political factions to remove al-Ittihad and al-Qaeda elements. It should work closely with Somalia's neighbors, especially Kenya, to crack down on al-Ittihad supporters who transit Kenya. If there is an opportunity based on incontrovertible intelligence to grab a major terrorist figure, that too would be appropriate. But until intelligence indicates there is a greater threat than appears to be the case now, the U.S. should avoid significant military action in Somalia. In addition, before using military force in the region, the U.S. would be well advised to weigh the impact of its actions on regional stability and local Muslim communities. It does not need the added complications of a well-intentioned but ill-advised military intervention that leads to further conflict and confusion in the Horn of Africa.
I have devoted so much time to the issue of terrorism in Somalia because this has been the focus of the American media since September 11. I am really more interested in talking about the long-term nature of the Somali-American relationship. In fact, if the international community wants to deal meaningfully with the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia, it must look beyond the immediate terrorist threat and focus on steps that help restore stability and reestablish a viable national government.
The United States effectively has been absent from Somalia since 1994, although staff from the U.S. Embassy in Djibouti did periodically visit Somaliland after 1994. As I noted earlier, this situation resulted in a flawed American understanding of Somalia. Any long-term U.S. policy initiative in Somalia is almost guaranteed to fail unless it is pursued in close coordination with key countries in the region, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), America's European allies and the United Nations. It will be difficult to mobilize significant U.S. resources in support of a new policy towards Somalia. There are too many competing priorities, both domestic and international. Some in Congress and elsewhere will argue that the U.S. spent billions in Somalia in 1992-1994, question whether it was worth the cost and be reluctant to reengage if the cost is high. This is one of the reasons why it is important to have domestic agreement on the policy and support for it by key European allies and countries in the region.
Once the U.S. has agreed upon an outline for a new policy towards Somalia, I urge that it be discussed with European allies, especially Italy, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Other European countries that indicate an interest in Somalia could be added to the list. The next set of consultations should include Somalia's three neighbors-Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and IGAD as the organization that represents the region. I would include Egypt, which has long maintained a presence in Mogadishu and injected itself into previous Somali peace initiatives. Egypt also offers a window to the Islamic world. Somalia, like Egypt, is a member of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Congress. Finally, the policy proposals should be discussed with the UN Political Affairs Office.
Normally, one would have consultations at an early stage with representatives of the country under discussion. The absence of a central government that controls all of Somalia and the existence of numerous fiefdoms argue against this until there is broad agreement on a policy by interested parties outside Somalia.
Due to the tenuous security situation, it is premature to assign American government personnel to the southern two-thirds of Somalia. It is important, however, to step up the number of visits to Somalia by American staff based in neighboring countries so as to develop a better understanding of developments there. Eventually, security conditions permitting, the goal should be to reestablish a presence in Mogadishu. This would permit the U.S. to implement its policy more effectively and integrate new information that might lead to refining the policy.
I want to say a special word about Somaliland. I realize that you have widely varying views on the future of Northwest Somalia. Some may favor independence, others total integration in a unified Somalia or some variation such as a federal state that has considerable autonomy in a unified Somalia. The future of Somaliland is for Somalis, not foreigners, to decide. But it is time for the U.S. to deal with reality in Northwest Somalia. If the U.S. is going to assist the country, it needs to have personnel on the ground where security conditions permit. The security situation in Hargeisa and most of Somaliland would allow the opening of a small office to administer assistance and stay in contact with officials on a variety of issues, including counter-terrorism. This would not signify diplomatic recognition or approval of independence. The U.S. should not get out in front of the African Union on this issue. But it would deal with reality and permit American development assistance to move forward with greater efficiency. It might also serve as a wake up call to the southern two-thirds of Somalia that the establishment of peace and stability has positive consequences.
As soon as the U.S. is in a better position to monitor the situation in Somalia, I believe it is important to increase targeted rehabilitation and development assistance. There should be no illusion about the role foreign aid has played in Somalia in the past. Although some of the larger international projects such as the construction of ports in Berbera, Bosasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo were successful, the list of failed aid projects in Somalia is disturbingly long. For the time being, the problematic security situation in the southern two-thirds of Somalia severely limits the ability of the international community to carry out rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and development projects. But it is possible to work with local and international NGOs such as CARE in those parts of Somalia where security is reasonably good. In fact, the successful provision of assistance to such areas might serve as an example and encourage more troubled regions to improve security so that they can also benefit from international largesse.
Assistance will necessarily be limited at first and confined to projects that seem realistic in view of the security situation. Small-scale road and infrastructure repair activities that can use Somali labor and be supervised by NGOs might be a good starting point. The provision of small grants to local communities for reestablishing primary schools that hire local teachers and basic health clinics that can draw on former health personnel is another option. It might be possible to initiate more innovative programs such as funding the transport of donated books collected by organizations such as the International Book Bank. The books could be distributed to communities willing to establish small reading rooms.
The goal would be to build on successes and not repeat failures. In an environment like Somalia, there will be setbacks. From the standpoint of the donor community, the goal of the assistance program should be the starting of a process that creates conditions that allow Somalis to return to a more normal situation. This will decrease interest by Somalis in organizations like al-Ittihad and make it possible to reestablish the rule of law in parts of Somalia. Eventually, it may even be possible to knit these peaceful areas together in some kind of unified territory under a federal or centralized governmental structure so that Somalia can rejoin the community of nations.
After more than ten years as a failed state, it will be difficult and it will take time for Somalia to reestablish stability and central control. There will be disappointments. But if the U.S. and other countries continue to ignore Somalia, the problem will only worsen and Somalia will remain a haven for terrorist elements. Reengagement through rehabilitation and development assistance programs will eventually result in contacts on a variety of issues, including counter-terrorism. Success stories will encourage other donor countries to offer resources and technical assistance personnel. It is simply not in the interest of the U.S. and the international community to allow Somalia to continue as a failed state. The international community can not prevent bad things coming out of Somalia until it reengages and helps reestablish the rule of law.
Resumption of carefully targeted assistance to Somalia, should be supplemented by a sustained public diplomacy program that explains how the U.S. is trying to help Somalis and imparts values that encourage the building of democracy. Although the Voice of America should be a key part of this effort, it will have little impact unless it reestablishes a service in the Somali language. In the meantime, there may be ways to draw on the BBC Somali service, which is widely listened to in Somalia. The U.S. should also explore new options such as financing radio receivers for Somalis and then transmitting carefully tailored messages over the World Space satellite facility. Themes on the VOA or other services should focus on issues such as community development, religious tolerance, rule of law, human rights and gender equality. They should carefully avoid those kinds of stories and news accounts that feed the egos of Somali political factions. The U.S. should coordinate the public diplomacy effort with its key European allies and Somalia's neighbors.
So long as the war on terrorism remains the top American foreign policy priority, U.S. officials need to increase their contacts with a variety of Somalis so that the U.S. is better informed. Counter-terrorism cooperation may even result in situations where the U.S. can help Somalis deal with a threatening situation. The collaboration can begin with the Egal government in Somaliland and the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu and extend to the leaders of the political fiefdoms who are willing to work with the U.S. This should be a two way street so long as U.S. information going to Somalis concerns real terrorist threats and does not enmesh the U.S. in local Somali disputes. While the U.S. should expect to receive a fair amount of information from Somalis that has as its purpose the weakening of an enemy Somali faction, with experience U.S. personnel should be able to separate useful information from that which has an ulterior agenda.
Eventually, the international community must assist Somalia in the reestablishment of security forces under some kind of central authority. The United Nations actually made some progress in reconstituting a Somali police force in 1993. The preoccupation with the hunt for Aideed ended any hope that this undertaking would be successful. Nor is it now an appropriate time to try to rebuild a police force. If, however, security improves, it would be appropriate to begin efforts to reequip a police force, at least in those areas where stability and the rule of law have started to return. Although support for a national defense force is much further down the road, it is not too soon to begin thinking about ways the international community could eventually assist.
My final U.S. policy suggestion concerns a possible role for the Somali diaspora. Many talented Somalis now reside outside Somalia. Toronto has the largest community in North America. Minneapolis/St. Paul and Columbus, Ohio, have the first and second largest communities respectively in the U.S. There are other sizeable communities in metropolitan areas as diverse as Washington and San Diego. Some of you in the diaspora are anxious to contribute to the betterment of your country of origin.
While it is true that Somalis living in the diaspora are about as divided as those in Somalia, except for the financial remittances that you send back to relatives you are an untapped resource. It may be possible to identify an American foundation or NGO that could provide funding to bring together representatives from Somali communities in North America to determine if there are ways they could contribute to building peace and stability in Somalia. Such a forum could also serve to solicit ideas for providing assistance to Somalia and perhaps even reducing or eliminating the terrorist threat.
This leads to the matter of the responsibility of Somali-Americans while they are living in the U.S. Some of you are American citizens. Others aspire to be American citizens. But even if you do not seek American citizenship, you are at a minimum a guest in the United States. It is the responsibility of the Somali-American community to report to local authorities any activity it believes may be illegal and especially something that may be linked to enemies of the U.S.
It is equally important that people outside the Somali community treat you fairly and with respect. Perhaps some of you, especially after September 11, encountered hostility because you are Muslim, dress differently or even look different than most other people in the communities where you live and work. This is, of course, wrong and should also be brought to the attention of appropriate organizations and local officials.
We will all be able to lead more fulfilling and productive lives if we defeat the scourge of terrorism. All of us must do our part to stamp it out. In the case of Somalia, however, this will require a long-term effort that goes well beyond rooting out any existing terrorist cells in the country. It requires assistance by the international community in rebuilding Somalia so that democratic institutions can once again thrive as they did in the 1960s. This more than anything else will neutralize radical fundamentalism and terrorist tendencies.
Can those of you here today do anything to help? I think the answer is yes. In fact, there is something that Somalis living throughout the United States can do. They can make their views known about U.S. policy in Somalia to their elected representatives in Congress. You can write letters or send emails either individually or collectively to your congressional representative and two Senators from Minnesota. It is important, however, to send a similar message. If you all send conflicting messages, you cancel each other out. You must come together as a group and determine where most of you can reach a consensus on common goals. You then need to agree on several important recommendations that impact U.S. policy towards Somalia and hammer home that message. If Somali communities in other parts of the U.S. send a similar message to their congressional representatives, it will have even greater impact. You are now living in a democracy. Take advantage of what it has to offer.
Again, thank you for inviting me to join you today. I wish you every success as you adapt to life in the U.S. and as you seek in your own way to help Somalia. I will be happy to take questions.
Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media. (allafrica.com)
Impact 12/31/2001 p. 13
We have been to Somalia
Situational Analysis
Somalia lies in the horn of Africa with a population of about nine million people. The northern part of the country was a protectorate of Great Britain. It was then called Somaliland and is currently seeking independence from Somalia. Turkey colonised the southern part. Three quarters of the land in Somalia is semi-arid, with the majority of the people practising nomadic pastoralism, agriculture and fishing as major economic activities.
The country is made up of one tribe (Somalis) and the majority are muslims. The country is currently divided into eighteen regions under the control of various clans. The homogeneous country has been divided along clan differences. There have been two distinct periods of upheavals in Somalia namely the popular opposition towards a 20-year dictatorial government that was overthrown in 1991, and the nearly 10-year old civil war among the clans over which each clan struggles to take control of the country.
What we Saw
Somalia has witnessed 10 years of lawlessness, where people have lived without a government since the fall of Siad Barre in 1994. This has resulted in the destruction of infra-structure including roads, schools, telecommuni-cations, electricity, hospitals and water facilities. When we landed at the airport, the sight before us was shocking. Two young gun-wielding boys looking like orphans manually got our luggage from the cabin since there are no civil aviation services. The "airport" was being controlled by the warring faction in control of the area.
There is a high level of insecurity especially in Mogadishu where almost every young and old is armed. Guns are sold everywhere, even in one of the few markets in Mogadishu! For all the time we were in Somalia, we were guarded by armed guards. When we wanted to have a morning walk on the beach in Merka, we had to be escorted by armed guards. It must have been a relief when we left the country without harm, thanks to the gallant boys who spent sleepless nights taking care of our security.
The once beautiful capital-Mogadishu is littered with people who sleep in polythene and paper-covered shacks and the same shelters are along side the highways without any visible form of security to ensure their security.
There is a high rate of illiteracy arising out of the lack of a government for ten years. Some Arabic countries have made some intervention by establishing schools on condition that children adopt an Arab culture fully, but these schools do not meet the needs of the Somalis.
The only hospital in Merka is in a pathetic situation. Its revolting smell can only be tolerated by the desperate. The communities, in collaboration with some humanitarian agencies, have put up some health centres for the community to use.
Challenges of Living Without a Government:
We kept asking women how they were surviving without a government. Their response was, "The Somalis have a rich culture and are very religious. These two factors have ensured some form of sanity." They also indicated that mediation by clan leaders in case of any conflicts is another option that has been used for consensus building and conflict resolution.
The culture of sharing is another way the Somali have managed to survive. A few people bake bread and distribute it to the poor wherever they reside, while others give them money, something not easily found in most countries on the globe!
Although in Uganda we broadly hold the view that Sharia law oppresses women, our visit to Somalia enabled us to understand that the law can also be interpreted culturally and according to the patriarchal control over women. In Somalia Sharia Law has given Moslem women a level of empowerment that their counterparts elsewhere on the continent do not enjoy. For example, women can inherit half of what their husbands own and can even ask for divorce. Men, however, find it hard to divorce women because they would still have to provide for the women. This good practice needs to be shared so that we can use it to advocate for women's rights, especially in areas where women are living under muslim laws.
Women's Peace Initiatives
There were few men doing productive work. Most of the men were sitting in the small trading centres chewing caad-a leafy addictive drug. This inactivity left the entire burden of fending for families in the hands of the women. In addition, women still have to provide the money to buy the `caad'! Men had been used to high profile jobs and therefore found it demeaning to take on `low' profile jobs like digging and selling produce by the roadside. Their attitude has left the economy in the hands of women but with very minimal empowerment.
The 10-year old civil war has created a change of roles in the Somali community. Women have become the major breadwinners. They have formed groups to grow bananas, coconut, mangoes, guavas, maize and rice. One woman in Bulo who owns 50 acres of land has availed it to her group so that they can grow more food for sale and home consumption. The biggest problem encountered is that one of the major channels that provided water was damaged during the war and in the dry season, their crops get destroyed. Though they produce quite a lot, they lack access to markets for their produce since all the factories were destroyed. They only export bananas to the Middle East.
The way women have tried to work at issues of peace is something that struck us. In Mogadishu, some people have repaired their houses and women are encouraging them to come together to discuss peace matters. Somali women have sacrificed a lot, and those who are relatively wealthy share with those in need in the name of peace for Somalia.
We were lucky to have visited initiatives by two strong women's organisations IIDA(1) and the Coalition for Grassroots Women Organisations (COGWO).
IIDA is a women's development organisation formed in 1991 operating in Merka with a branch in Mogadishu. The organisation has played a major role in peace building, conflict resolution and income generation in the new Somalia. One outstanding project by IIDA is the demobilisation of 150 ex-soldiers (between ages 15 and 20), and equipping them with skills in carpentry and agriculture. These young men also participate in sensitising the communities on the importance of peace through music, dance and drama. This to some extent has enabled them to be accepted back into society.
Women have also opened up maternal and child care centres to provide health care and information to their communities. Halima, a midwife, said "We could not leave our sisters and children to die. We had to use the knowledge we acquired before the war to serve the community". The services are paid for in kind like digging in the nurses' gardens.
COGWO is an umbrella organisation of seventeen organisations based in Mogadishu. It works towards the empowerment of women through education, covering topics such as family rights, laws on divorce, marriage, inheritance and the Islamic law. COGWO started off this particular training because of the prevalence of domestic violence that had engulfed their communities during the war. The outcome of the training was that both men and women who attended that training attained some basics on their rights and duties and passed the knowledge on to others.
Despite the hardships that women have gone through, they stilt believe that they have the power to restore peace in their country if they work hard. One woman said, "Why can't we organise a demonstration on the same day and time as African women and denounce war and the manufacture of arms? We are tired of these endless wars".
Is there Hope for Somalia?
In August, 2000, after four months of negotiations in Djibouti that culminated into a national reconciliation conference, an interim government was elected. It is hoped that the international community and activists will make inroads into the country to work hand in hand with the government and women's groups, in the rehabilitative and reconstructive activities of a new Somalia.
Isis-WICCE and EASSI were priviledged to be the first African women organisations to express solidarity with Somali women. All the women's groups we visited in Somalia applauded us for showing concern for our sisters in Somalia. It is time that African women complemented what our sisters in the North have so far done by arranging such visits. These are more than mere visits, they contribute to the healing process of Somali women. It is only through this heating process that we can talk of sustainable peace in our region.
The frustration caused by globalisation can be seen in Mogadishu. Despite the women's efforts in growing food crops, there is some conspiracy where some humanitarian organisations bring low grade free cereals to Somalia at harvest time, which make women's produce unmarketable and their lives more miserable. The same humanitarian groups then purchase a sack of the high grade cereals from the women for an equivalent of only five dollars. This is a high level of violation of these women's right to economic empowerment. Human rights activists need to support the women and question such abuses.
Developmental workers based in Somalia and beyond, should also focus on the empowerment of men so that they can regain their self-esteem if Somalia is to stand on its feet again.
It is our collective responsibility to help the women in Somalia and the society in general. Despite all the efforts that women have put in place, none of their initiatives has been documented and only a few outsiders know what is happening there. It is therefore important that efforts to document women's best practices and experiences during the war are documented and shared with the rest of the world. This will make the realities of the people of Somalis visible, making their voices heard in the global arena and become part of the global women's agenda. An intervention in terms of physical, mental and psychosocial needs is imperative if Somali women are to regain their self-esteem.
We have a lot to learn from Somali women. They are resilient and this has helped them to survive the tough situations they have gone through. Like these women, we need to be proud of who we are and do the best we can on our own. Developmental workers should co-operate with the Somalis, instead of acting as welfare providers for them. They do need our co-operation.
(1) IIDA means celebration and it is the name given to a baby girl born during festivity in Somalia.
copyright Isis-WICCE.
Women: Personal is Political Local is Global
Human Rights & Ecological Health, Helsinki, Finland - 1998 12/10/1998
Ahmed, Zeinab H. Ayan
Facts and Requirement
Before I discuss in detail the importance of Ecology to man kind, I would like to borrow the exact definition of the term "Human Ecology" The branch of Sociology that is concerned with studying the relationship between human groups and their physical and Social environment. So when we talk of ecology, we can't totally forget the word environment. In deeper terms, we talk of cleaner environment; environmental protection, industrial wastes, depleted eco- system and depleted forest. Do you ever really sense anything important in these terms?, have you ever imagined the role you can play in the actual implementation of these words?
So, Ecology is very vital and also our environment is exceptionally important. How do we talk of the seriousness of these terms yet many of us remain indifferent of what is happening in our surroundings. What we are all sure is that no other organism causes damage to the environment other than man. Ironically man is the weakest organism who needs the protection and safe guarding of the very environment she/he is destroying.
Current environmental situation:- World-wide
Today's Global environmental situation is one which can cause terror in the minds of those who care and understand it's meaning. I would like to remind every one of us, as human kind that majority of our world leaders just pay a lip- service in the actual protection of our environment. I wish to stress once again that there is real madness just going on world-wide where the trend is destruction and rush for hollow richness. I feel saddened by the rush to fell large forest trees and use them for economic enrichment of few individuals. All over the world especially developing countries like Africa, environmental degradation through forest destruction is alarming and on the increase.
Environmental Effects in Somalia: Lower Jubba and North- East of Somlia through Charcoal Burning
Among the major disasters in Somalia are:
* The forest destruction through commercial charcoal burning
* The Export of rare species of wildlife e.g. hyenas, lions, wolves and rare birds and Somali monkey
* The discard of toxins and toxic waste in Somalia waters
A lucrative deal is going on between charcoal traders in Somalia and some Arab rich individuals. Without authorities to check this heinous crime against humanity these individual rich merchants get away with the destruction of the volatile forests in these regions. Having visited these regions I was shocked and bitterly angered by the scale of charcoal been exported from these regions. Why have the charcoal burners and the illegal exporters targeted these two regions? Because these regions are a home to large trees some of which are rare in the other parts of the country. Among these trees are: Acacia-(thorn-tree), Qurac, Galool, fulay, and Adaad-geri-(named after the Giraffe) and fruit trees like: Qoolati, waraday, qansah, damal, and others. Today these large trees are a prey to greedy individual traders who employ displaced local farmer herdsmen who lost their livestock during the prolonged civil war. This situation has exasperated the poverty condition and has given new advantage to these merchants of doom in these tropical regions. So far, no agency has attempted to rectify this dangerous situation. Some of these trees are valued in Somalia and it was culturally a taboo to fell them. These trees usually offer fruits to the wild-life species like the monkey and exotic birds.
The report on the Somali Ocean especially in the Lower Juba is not also very pleasing. A research has indicated that large number of unknown ships are stationing themselves at the Coastal zones only leaving at dawn only to return at dusk. Many fishermen reported that these ships carry-out trawling work at the coast of Somalia - deleting the ocean. A high death of sea -cucumbers and other smaller marine life has been observed. strengthening the already assumed suspicion of industrial or nuclear chemical waste seemingly dumped in the shores. So man kind contributes most of the damage to the eco-system through unwarranted over-fishing, forest depletion, poaching of wild-life and industrial waste being dumped into the un- guarded coastal zones of the developing nations.
As women and children are those who are mostly effected by the environmental disasters, Somali Professionals like Fatima Jibrell, Managing Director of Horn of Africa Relief and Dev. Org. who is always concerned about the environmental and human issues has been doing a lot of campaign in and out of Somalia. Fatima is also the Coordinator of Resource Managment Somalia Network an Umbrella organisation in Somalia who are supported by NOVIB of Netherlands. She has sent alarms verbally and in writing to International Organizations: UN, EU, OAU and IGAD to take generous measurments about environmental disasters in Somalia but she hasn't got positive reactions yet for this issue.
My point of view is, for this conference to have a working channel be established and a forum be created to press for viable action against environment degradation. I feel the awareness has been created already, we need action, action, action to force the world community leaders to categorically enforce the existing laws against environmental abuse.
Reported & presented by:
Zeinab H. Ayan Ahmed
Horn of Africa Relief & Dev. Org.
P.O.Box 70331, Nairobi, Kenya, tel/fax254-2-724193
E-mail horn-rel@nbnet.co.ke
copyright Woman and Earth Global Eco-Network
Los Angeles Sentinel 11/14/1996 V.62; N.33 p. A11
Somali Woman Reveals Ordeal of Circumcision
Hamm, Lisa M.
Waris Dirie is a study of sultry eroticism in her modeling portfolio: back bare, face in profile crowned by a sexy tangle of braids; topless, dusky eyes looking into the camera; riding a camel and wearing a leopard-spotted slip dress.
But behind the come-hither glances hides a dark secret - Dirie had her six stoles from her as a child in an ancient African ritual.
"It's like being crippled," says the forthright young woman. "That's it, the rest of your life, crippled, that section of your body."
Where most women have genitals, Dirie, like as many as 120 million other women worldwide, has a scar. But the scar runs much deeper than the loss of her sex organs. The pain is palpable in her voice when Dirie, who thinks she is 28 but doesn't know for sure, talks about the agonizing day that changed her life forever.
She thinks she was 4 or 5 years old, living a simple existence in a small nomadic clan in Somalia that survived by pursing rain across the desert to support its camels. Men were the leaders, and women existed to serve and please them. For both sexes, the ritual of circumcision marked the transition from childhood to adulthood.
Dirie's older sister had been circumcised a year or two earlier, and the newfound respect she commanded made Dirie envious.
"She used to tell me,`Oh, I'm woman now. I'm most a girl anymore," Dirie remembered during an interview in a Soho cafe. I said, `Mama, when are you going to do tome what you did to her? I want to be a woman!"
"Of course, my time came and it wasn't the greatest like I thought it was going to be." She pushed lentils around on her plate. "It was nothing but torture."
The night before, Dirie got a full glass of camel milk at dinner, an unheard-of treat in a clan where an entire family usually shares that glass. Her mother, Fatima, said, "Tomorrow morning, you're going to be a woman."
"I was so excited I could hardly sleep!" Dirie said of the prospect of being initiated into the sorority of maturity as her mother, grandmother and great-grandmothers had been before her.
Dirie's mother woke her before dawn. The two men an old gypsy woman and walked into the desert to a large, flat rock.
"My mother looked at me and said, `I haven't got the strength to hold you down. Don't fight me," said Dirie, her low voice dragging. "She stuck a piece of root between my teeth. She said, `Just hold onto your pain there."
The travelling circumciser took out a small, dull blade. Suddenly Dirie felt a searing pain, followed by seemingly endless agony.
"I didn't move," Dirie murmured, her face a mask of quiet strength betrayed by the tightness with which she gripped her fork. "I just shivered. There was no painkillerm, no anesthesia, no nothing."
Suffering dripped from every syllable. "I don't really know when it was over. I passed out," she said.
Dirie had undergone infibulation, the most severe form of female circumcision, which critics call female genital mutilation.
In a way, she was lucky - she survived. One of her sisters and a cousin dint't. Many girls die from hemorrhaging, shock, infection or tetanus.
In male circumcision, the foreskin is removed by the penis is otherwise left intact. A similar procedure is done in the least severe version of female circumcision: the clitoris, the primary organ of women's sexual pleasure, is nicked or its foreskin is cut off.
But more often the clitoris is amputated. And in infibulation, performed about 15 percent of the time, all of the external sexual organs are scraped away. Then the wound is sewn closed with acacia, thorns, catgut, silk or a homemade glue, and matchsticksized hole is created to pass urine.
Survivors endure a lifetime of aftereffects - difficulty urinating and menstruating, painful intercourse, repeated infections, sometimes infertility. Women are cut or forced open on their wedding night, cut open more to give birth, then sewed up again.
The motivations behind the ritual, which has existed for at least 4,000 years, are multiple and complex. Many cultures mistakenly think it is required by Islam, although some Christians and Jews also practice it.
Circumcision is considered the most important event in a girl's life. Often it's accompanied by a big party, and she is showered with gifts and attention. Families subject their beloved daughters to it because they believe it makes them more marriageable by certifying their virginity, protecting them from their rampaging sexuality and ensuring marital fidelity.
Old wives tales abound that intact female genitals are dirty, that circumcision makes marital sex better, women more fertile and delivery of babies safer. In every case the opposite is true.
But societal pressure is enormous. A good marriage, generally arranged by the father, is a necessity for survival in places where women have no economic power. Men will take only circumcised brides, and uncut women are considered whores.
Dirie went into an almost suicidal depression in the months following her multilation. Herlegs were tied together from hip to ankle for weeks to keep her from ripping open the wound. Urination was excruciating, and she became infected. She couldn't eat a for month.
As she grew older, Dirie refused to accept her limited future as a Somali woman.
When her father, Dahire. arranged for her to marry an elderly man in exchanged for five camels, she ran away from home. Just 13 years old, the skinny girl walked 300 miles across Somalia to the capital, Mogadishu, drinking from camels in the desert to survive.
Once she collapsed under a tree, exhausted, and awoke to find a lion staring into her eyes. She lay immobile, frozen with terror, until the great animal finally ambled away.
In the capital, Dirie found a home with her mother's sister, Harima. Then an uncle who was Somalia's ambassador to Britain came looking for a domestic servant for his London household. Dirie, although she couldn't read or write in Somali and Knew not a word of English, won the job.
In England, the first thing she noticed was that the people all looked pale and very ill. " I never saw white people before!" She laughed.
Then she discovered that her cousins weren't circumcised.
"I figured out that what happened to me wasn't right," she said. She held such thoughts inside but embraced Western culture, listening to conversations and devouring television to learn English.
When her uncle and his family returned to Somalia three years later, Dirie buried her passport in the yard a week before their departure and claimed she lost it so she wouldn't have to go.
Suddenly she was 16, alone and homeless in London. But she met a Somali woman who invited her to share her room at the YMCA, and got a job cleaning the grill at McDonald's. There, a photographer named michael Gross saw her and asked her to pose. The photos showed a beauty with an affinity for the camera, and Gross recommended she try modeling.
Dirie eventually dropped into a modeling agency and was immediately sent out to audition for the prestigious Pirelli calendar. When the photographer asked her to remove her top, she staled out, thinking he wanted to sleep with her. But the agency explained the earning potential of modeling compared to McDonald's so she returned - and landed the cover.
That was almost 10 years ago. Since then, Dirie has traveled the world, lived in Paris, moved to New York, and graced countless ads and magazines.
She has come to realize that her visibility gives her a platform from which to fight the tradition of genital cutting.
"Why am I here today talking to you, from herding my camels in the desert?" said Dirie, clad simply in a white blouse and black slacks, her face devoid of cosmetics. "I know what that reason is it's to do something about it, to speak for those who can't!"
She finally broke her silence this summer, telling her story to Britain's Maries Claire magazine. The deluge of letter and phone calls she has received from readers struck by her courage has strengthened her resolve to act.
Dirie lives every day with the consequences of her own cutting. A doctor in England surgically opened her scar when she started menstruating, but painful periods still send her to bed for days.
She says she has "been chaste all my life," believing sex belongs in marriage, and is engaged to marry jazz drummer Dana Murray. Many cut women, with encouragement from a loving partner, are still able to enjoy sex because the scar area and other parts of the body can be quite sensitive, said Hanna LightfootKlein, a sexologist who interviewed 400 infibulated women in the Sudan in the early 1980s and published a study called "Prisoners of Ritual."
Somalia remains indelibly stamped on Dirie's soul. She wears no watch, telling time by the length of shadows. She sniffs the air to check if it will rain. But she cannot escape the knowledge that something was taken from her in her home and that can never be restored.
"There's nothing I can do but live with it, heal myself," Dirie said after climbing a spiral staircase to her modeling agency's rooftop for a photo session.
She paused, lost in thought, and looked out over the city streets. It seemed her gaze reached across an entire ocean.
"You knew, thinking about, it, looking out, there's little girls it's happening to today, right now, as we're speaking, somewhere," she said, her voice almost a whisper.
"It's definitely got to stop! It's just got to stop."
copyright Los Angeles Sentinel.
Women's dairy cow project
helps Somalis pick up the pieces
In the winter of 1997-1998, the southern part of Somalia was a land under water. Torrential rains that began in October and didn't end until January caused the deaths of more than 2,000 people, destroyed 150,000 acres of crops, and drowned thousands of livestock.
Put on hold were various projects of the American Friends Service Committee's Somalia Program, which has been active in the country since the early 1980s.
One new effort that had to wait until the flood waters receded was a dairy cow project meant to help women lift themselves out of poverty. Now, amid great expectations, that project is finally getting underway.
"The women's groups in the nine villages where this project will take place say this is an economic activity they can easily manage," says Mohamed Abdirahman, coordinator of the Somalia Program. "Feed is naturally available and they can sell different products from the same cow. This project is their top priority."
Increasing women's economic options
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) has one overriding goal in Somalia: to reduce poverty. To this end, AFSC works to increase food security, expand the resources available to heads of households -especially women - and improve families' health and economic status.
Many Somali women find themselves in particularly difficult circumstances. In the past decade, many men have been killed or forced to flee the country because of violent civil conflict. As a result, a large number of women are single heads of households. For these women, dairy cows are a way to generate income and help feed families. Products such as cheese, butter, and milk can be sold at market or used to meet the families' needs.
The project originally was set to begin in 1997. It's now scheduled to start in October 1998 in nine villages.
The project has several components. Community elders will start the process by selecting about 30 women to receive cows provided by AFSC. Selection criteria include the following:
- Is the woman the head of the household?
- How large is the family?
- What is the family's economic status?
Before they get a cow, the women must attend AFSC-sponsored training sessions on monitoring the health of the animal and family nutrition.
However, the project will not end with this initial group of women. Instead, when a cow produces a calf, that calf will be given to another woman, who will in turn pass on the first-born calf to another woman.
In addition to benefiting some of the poorest members of these villages, the dairy project will pay more wide-spread dividends.
"Throughout the life of the project, it's the community elders who must ensure that the process of cow donations continues and that the right beneficiaries are selected from the hundreds of poor families," Mohamed says. "The project challenges the community to exercise management skills, make decisions, diagnose problems, and develop local solutions."
A history of involvement
The women's dairy cow project is just the latest example of AFSC's approach to working in Somalia - an approach that emphasizes self-help and local solutions to local problems.
Early program work in northeast Somalia, for example, helped former nomads improve their farming techniques and control over their water supply. The program's long-term development work was suspended in 1990 because of the country's civil war, but AFSC continued to provide emergency supplies to several schools, orphanages, a hospital, and refugee communities.
In 1993, the program resumed development work in 17 villages in the Lower Shabelle region. Staff helped small farmers develop their agriculture and animal husbandry skills, provided training for women in midwifery and health care, and worked with a small leather-working cooperative. Staff also promoted peace by supporting the work of ethnically mixed groups.
Now that Somalia is recovering from the recent floods, AFSC has resumed work on these projects. And, in addition to the dairy cow project, the program will begin work on the following efforts:
- training and assistance with raising chickens;
- planting trees to prevent soil erosion, retain soil fertility, and for use as windbreakers and firewood;
- constructing latrines;
- distributing seeds;
- creating a grain and agricultural tool "bank" so villagers can borrow these items as needed.
In spite of great obstacles, Somali families continue their daily struggle to survive and improve their lives. AFSC's Somalia Program is helping many of the poorest rural families get back on their feet and reach their goal of becoming self-sufficient.
© American Friends Service Committee
http://www.afsc.org/
e-mail: afscinfo@afsc.org Phone 215-241-7000 Fax: 215-241-7275
National Office: 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102
newafrica.com
Somalia History
Recent History
Britain declared a protectorate over northern Somalia in 1886, with the aim of safeguarding the trade links of its colony Aden and excluding other interested powers (especially France). With the latter objective in mind, Italy established a colony in southern regions in the same period Italian Somaliland became with Eritrea, a base for the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936.The Italian colony was captured by British forces in 1941 and laced under military administration. Although Italy subsequently renounced all rights to Italian Somaliland, in 1950 it e the UN Trust Territory of Somalia, placed under Italian administration for a 10-year transitional period prior to independence. The British protectorate meanwhile had reverted to civilian rule, while most of the Somali areas in Ethiopia had been returned to Ethiopian administration.
The trust territory's first general election on the basis of universal adult suffrage was held in March 1959, when 83 of the 90 seats in the legislative assembly were won by the Somali Youth League SYL). Britain, meanwhile, prepared its protectorate for self-government. British Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960, and on 1 July, having secured its own independence, the former Italian Somaliland united with the former British Somaliland as the independent Somali Republic. The president of the southern legislative assembly was proclaimed head of state and the two legislatures merged to form a single assembly in Mogadishu. A coalition government was formed by the SYL and the two leading northern political parties, with Dr Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmake, a leading SYL politician and a member of the Darod clan, as the first prime minister. Shirmake's government, constituting a balance of northern and southern members representative of the main clans, set the pattern of Somali political life for the next decade.
The problems of merging the administrative systems of the two former colonies were offset to an extent by the shared Somali culture and by the presence of clans straddling the old colonial boundaries. Internal harmony was further encouraged, at the price of external conflict, by the commitment of all political leaders to a policy of extending the boundaries of the state to ?include communities in Ethiopia, French Somaliland (now Djibout) and northern Kenya. Accordingly, liberation movements established for these areas. In the 1964 elections the SYL secured a majority of seats in the assembly However a split within the SYL's Darod leadership, leading to the appointment of a new Darod prime minister, Abd ar-Razak Husein in. left the party seriously divided and culminated in the election as president in 1967 of Shirmake, who formed a new government with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (a northerner from the Isaaq clan) as prime minister. Acknowledging the failure so far of its efforts to promote Somali unification, the government, through Zambian mediation, reached agreement with Ethiopia and Kenya to negotiate a lasting frontiers settlement.
With external pressure on the republic diminished, the smaller constituent units of the traditional political structure returned to the fore, with an upsurge of divisive tribalism. The March 1969 legislative elections were contested by more than 1,000 candidates, representing 68 political parties and the most important lineages and sub-lineages of the Somali clan system. With the resources of the state at its disposal, and with considerable manipulation of the electoral arrangements, the SYL again secured victory, and Egal was reappointed premier. Following the formation of the customary clan-coalition government, all but one of the members of the assembly joined the ruling party. Because of the prevailing political fragmentation, however, the government and the assembly were in reality no longer representative of the public at large. Discontent was aggravated by the increasingly autocratic style of both the president and prime minister, and by the latter's efforts to provide political and administrative posts for northerners (who persistently complained that earlier administrations, dominated by southerners, had failed to serve their interests).
The Siad Barre Regime, 1969-91
In October 1969 Shirmake was assassinated in the course of factional violence. When it became clear that the assembly would elect a new president supported by Egal, the army seized control in a bloodless coup. A supreme revolutionary council (SRC). formed of army and police-officers, announced that it bad acted to preserve democracy and justice and to eliminate corruption and tribalism (clanism) and that the country had been renamed the Somali Democratic Republic to symbolize these aims. The president of the SRC, Maj.-Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, became head of state.Siad Barre swiftly assumed personal control of the government, introducing a policy of 'scientific socialism'. The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established in 1976 under Soviet influence, although it operated more as a mechanism for control than as an ideological vehicle. Most key sections of the economy were brought under government control. In 1975 land was nationalized: farmers received holdings on 50-year renewable leases from the state, but from the outset the system was subject to manipulation and corruption. (Subsequent efforts to recover land became a significant element in inter-clan conflict after 1991.) A mass literacy campaign was launched, building on the adoption of Somali as the official language in 1972, using a modified Roman alphabet.
Somalia suffered from severe drought in the mid-1970s, although a programme of resettlement, accomplished with the help of a massive Soviet airlift, relocated some 140,000 people to farming colonies in the agricultural south and experimental fishing settlements along the coast. During this period, the army's dependence on Soviet equipment and training greatly increased Soviet influence in Somalia. The USSR acquired a variety of military facilities, notably at the northern port of Berbera. Somalia nevertheless emphasized its traditional links by joining the Arab League in 1974, when Siad Barre also acted as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Ethiopia's revolutionary transformation to military socialism in September 1974 at first seemed to offer the prospect of an acceptable accommodation for Somali aspirations to self-determination in the Ogaden. These hopes were soon extinguished, however, and as internal chaos spread in Ethiopia, Somalia saw an opportunity to reactivate claims to the Ogaden and the Somali-speaking regions of Ethiopia. In 1976 Siad Barre restructured the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and allowed it to operate inside Ethiopia. The Ogaden, the main clan in the Ogaden region and within the WSLF, represented a crucial element of Barre's clan support.
New urgency was given to Somalia's intentions by preparations for Djibouti's independence in June 1977 (both Somalia and Ethiopia had an interest in the strategic port of Djibouti and its rail link to Addis Ababa via Dire Dawa-passing through Somali inhabited areas), and by Soviet overtures to Ethiopia's Col Mengistu after he took power in February. (Ethiopia expelled US personnel in May.) Despite Soviet attempts to dissuade him, Siad Barre's forces invaded Ethiopia, unofficially, in July 'in support of the WSLF. Within three months Somali troops had overrun the Ogaden region and reached Harar. The USSR began to supply Ethiopia with weapons; in November Somalia abrogated its treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and expelled 6,000 Soviet advisers and experts. Somalia obtained some financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, but hopes of Western assistance were largely frustrated, and by March 1978 the Soviet and Cuban-led counter-attack had re-established Ethiopian control in the main centres of the Ogaden and the Somali government announced the withdrawal of its forces.
Defeat in the Ogaden war and the break with the USSR led to a gradual strengthening of links with the USA, stemming from US strategy in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. A defence agreement, announced in 1980, permitted the use by US military personnel of the air and naval facilities at Berbera. The USA provided Somalia with substantial amounts of aid during the 1950s, but remained hesitant about supplying it with military aid as long as Somali forces continued to operate in Ethiopia. The US administration also expressed reservations regarding renewed Somali links with Libya after 1985.The Ethiopian government's recovery of the Ogaden and its response to continued guerrilla operations as well as Somali army incursions (together with prevailing drought conditions), resulted in the flight, to Somalia, of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Food aid from Western relief agencies became a significant factor in the Somali economy. There was considerable disagreement over refugee members, with government estimates of as many as 1.5m., in contrast to a figure of 400,000 quoted by some relief agencies. The failure of rains in 1985-86, and the recurrence of famine in 1987, led to further refugee movements. A compromise refugee figure of 800,000 was accepted for the provision of food relief in the later 1980s.
Military defeat, shifts in alliance and ideology, as well as famine and the influx of refugees, had considerable impact on internal politics. Opposition movements began to appear, notably the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), a largely Majerteen-supported group, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), whose support was primarily drawn from the northern Isaaq clan. The Majerteen are a Darod clan living largely in the north-east. Both movements received Ethiopian support. The SSDF took control of two small central Somali towns near the border in 1981 but virtually collapsed with internal divisions in the mid-1980s. In 1988, after a meeting in which Siad Barre and Mengistu agreed to restore diplomatic relations, withdraw troops from border areas, and end support for each other's dissidents, the SNM were ordered to leave their Ethiopian bases. This precipitated a premature guerrilla offensive. In May the SNM seized Burao and captured most Hargeysa, in the north. They were promptly ousted by a full scale armed government response under the command of ( Mohamed Siad 'Morgan' (a son-in-law of the president). uncompromising operations included the systematic bombardment of Hargeysa (by South African mercenary pilots), resulting in an estimated 40,000 deaths and the flight of around refugees into Ethiopia. The brutal suppression of the insurgency resulted in far greater support for the SNM within the Isaaq and other northern clans than it had ever managed to achieve by its own efforts. Siad Barre's response to political and economic difficulty was to tighten his own control, although he allowed the introduction of a new constitution with an elected assembly within the single-party system, in 1979. However, the assembly's lack of power was underlined in November 1984 when effectively transferred all government powers to the president Although seriously injured in an automobile accident in May 1986, Siad Barre (as sole candidate) was re-elected president for a further seven-year term. In 1987 Siad Barre reluctantly agreed to the creation of the post of prime minister, which was occupied by Gen. Mohamed Ali Samatar, formerly first vice president and defence minister.
Descent to Civil War
On announcing its take-over the USC urged all opposition forces to participate in a national reconciliation conference. However, on 29 January 1991, the USC unexpectedly appointed one of the 'Manifesto' group, Mahdi Mohamed, a government minister in the 1960s, as interim president. The USC emphasized that it did not intend to form a permanent government, but other political groups saw the move as an attempt to pre-empt their participation, despite the appointment of non Hawiye to government. In February Umar Arteh Ghalib was appointed prime minister at the head of a new government; other appointments included Gen. Mohamed Abshir, of the Majerteen clan. Umar Arteh, however, was considered to have compromised his position by his acceptance of the premiership shortly before Siad Barre's overthrow, and was unpopular with the SSDF and the SNM. The majority of government posts were allocated to Hawiye clan members, in particular those from the 'Manifesto' group.In the north the SNM, which expelled the remnants of Siad Barre's forces in January-February 1991, convened a series of clan elders? meetings which led to the declaration of an independent 'Republic of Somaliland' in May. The SNM elected its chairman, Abd ar-Rahman Ahmed Mi 'Tur', as president. The secession was denounced by the USC and by the Mogadishu government, In the south, fighting erupted between the USC and elements from the Darod clan as Siad Barre tried to rally support under a Somali National Front (SNF). The move split one Darod clan, the Ogaden, and its political group, the SPM. One faction co-operated with the SNF and forces raised by Gen. Mohamed Siad 'Morgan', who led several advances of SNF forces towards Mogadishu during 1991. The other section of the SPM, led by Col Ahmed Omar Jess, united with the USC to block any attempt by Siad Barre to return. The southern port of Kismayu changed hands several times during the year. Much of the fighting was on a clan basis, between Hawiye (USC) and Darod (SNF or SPM), or between sub-clans of the Ogaden, which supported different factions of the SPM.
In June 1991 President Gouled of Djibouti sponsored the first of two reconciliation conferences. The conference was chaired by ex-president Aclen Abdullah Osman, and included delegations from the USC, the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM, a Rahanwin organization), the SSDF (Majerteen), and the 8PM (Ogaden). Although the SNM refused to attend a second meeting or participate in a transitional government for all Somalia, two additional groups, the Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi), and the United Somali Front (Issa), took part in the second conference, convened in July. An agreement was negotiated, committing all those attending to resist the forces of Siad Barre, implement a general cease-fire, respect national unity, readopt the 1960 constitution, and recognize Ali Mahdi's two-year mandate as interim president. Much discussion was devoted to dividing ministerial portfolios equitably among the clan groups. The Darod groups (the SSDF and the SPM) wanted a Darod prime minister, while others requested a northerner, although not Umar Arteli. Other major difficulties arose concerning Darod demands for the return of property seized after Siad Barres overthrow. Darod and Isaaq clans were estimated to have owned as much as 60% of land and property in Mogadishu before 1989, Most was looted in 1991 and appropriated by Hawiye, who were reluctant to return it. The issues of property and blood debt for deaths in the fighting have since remained highly contentious, and unresolved, problems.
The Mogadishu government's difficulties were compounded during 1991 by a major split in the USC, between the factions led by Ali Mahdi and by Gen. Mohamed Farak 'Aldid' who had been the main USC guerrilla leader. These factions had different origins, but more importantly, they also represented different sub-clans within the Hawiye-Ali Mahdi being from the Abgal, a prominent group in and around Mogadishu; and Gen. Aidid being from the Habr Gidir, who comprise a significant element of the more rural, pastoral Hawiye, living in the central regions of the country. The Abgal provided much of the support for the 'Manifesto' group while the Habr Gidir comprised most of the Hawiye guerrilla forces. Many Habr Gidir felt that the 'Manifesto' politicians had benefited undeservedly, after coming late to the struggle and doing little fighting. Aidid made it clear he felt he had a better claim to the presidency than Ali Mahdi. In July at the third congress of the USC, he was elected USC chairman, affording him a significant power base. When Ali Mahdi failed to award ministerial posts to Aidid's supporters in the reshuffle that followed the Djibouti conferences, confrontation seemed inevitable.The first clash occurred in September 1991, when four days of fighting resulted in heavy casualties. More serious hostilities erupted in November and lasted until March 1992, when a cease-fire was eventually negotiated. Both sides were exhausted, with food supplies short and no international body prepared to intervene until hostilities ceased. Stores of ammunition were also depleted. By then at least 30,000 people had died and thousands more had been injured, with Mogadishu in disarray and divided between the two sides. The struggle was complicated by two other Hawiye clan militias in Mogadishu, the Hawadle and the Murasade. The Hawadle, in possession of the airport, originally supported Gen. Aidid, the Murasade, in control of the port, backed Ali Mahdi.
The March 1992 cease-fire was organized by the UN, which had first investigated the possibility of a UN peace-keeping force being sent to Somalia early in the year. In January a resolution was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia, requesting humanitarian aid and urging the parties to cease hostilities. By the end of the month, hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the conflict were reported by the International Committee of the Red Cross to be in danger of starvation, and thousands of refugees from Somalia were continuing to cross the border into Kenya. Following the March cease-fire a UN technical team arrived to act in a supervisory capacity. In April the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a 'UN Operation in Somalia' (UNOSOM) and the dispatch of 50 observers to Mogadishu. Mohammed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, appointed by the UN secretary-general as his representative in Somalia, arrived in Mogadishu in May to establish a UN presence. Deployment of the UN observers was slow, partly because Gen. Aidid temporarily suspended co-operation with the UN, alleging that UN aid flights to Mogadishu had been used to supply arms and funding for supporters of Mi Mahdi. The cease-fire monitors eventually arrived in July. A further UN Security Council resolution approved an urgent airlift of food aid to Somalia, the dispatch of a technical team and 48 military observers to assess the situation in preparation for deploying 500 UN peace-keeping troops. Agreement was finally reached with Aidid on the presence of UN peace-keeping forces and the first elements of a Pakistani battalion arrived in Mogadishu in September. The UN also approved the dispatch of a further 3,000 troops to Somalia, although this was opposed by Aidid.
The UN's gradual involvement during 1992 failed to interrupt continuing fighting. Although the cease-fire in Mogadishu held, forces loyal to Siad Barre attempted to recapture the capital. These forces advanced to within 30 kin of Mogadishu, only to be halted by Gen. Aidid's forces in a battle at Afgoi in April. Aidid capitalized upon his victory by repulsing Siad Barre's forces, and Siad Barre himself, initially to Garba Harre, where Siad Barre had been based since his overthrow, and then on into Kenya. Siad Barre was refused political asylum in Kenya, and in May he moved to Nigeria, where he died in exile in January 1995. Following his victory over Siad Barre's forces, in May 1992 Aidid's troops, in alliance with Col Abmed Omar Jess of one SPM faction, recaptured the port of Kismayu from the forces of Gen. 'Morgan'. 'Morgan' and his supporters also fled into Kenya. Aidid's military successes and his efforts to establish administrative control of the whole of southern Somalia, generated considerable opposition. He himself formed a coalition, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), comprising his own USC, a faction of the SPM, a faction of the SDM, and the Southern Somali National Movement, a political group of non-Darod clans to the south of Mogadishu. In response to this and to Aldid's recent victories, Mi Mahdi strengthened his links with opponents of Aidid, notably the SSDF, the other SPM faction, and the SNF. After mid-1992 the SNF, although a largely Marehan organization, disassociated itself from Siad Barre, while allying itself with 'Morgan', who became one of its main military commanders. In October fighting again intensified. Aldid's opponents, led by 'Morgan' and Gen. Ahmed Warsame of the SNF, recaptured Bardera, a strategic southern town and advanced towards Kismayu.
The escalation of fighting in October 1992 underlined the serious nature of food shortages in rural areas, particularly in the areas around Bardera. With the country in a state of anarchy, all aid agencies encountered enormous difficulty in ensuring the security of relief supplies and of their own personnel, and many were forced to hire armed guards from local clans for their protection. There were growing differences of opinion between the UN, which wished to secure a general cease-fire with the aid of peace-keeping forces, in order to protect relief supplies from looting, and the relief agencies which identified an urgent need to maximize food distribution as quickly as possible. By mid-1992 it had become apparent that a major humanitarian crisis had arisen in and around Bardera and Baidoa in the south of the country, largely owing to the destruction of food stocks in the area by the forces of Siad Barre in the months before and after their last attack on Mogadishu in April. The failure of Aidid's efforts to establish control in the area contributed to the severity of the problem. It was subsequently estimated that some 300,000 people might have died from starvation in this period. The UN's slow response to the humanitarian crisis was widely criticized. At a conference in Geneva in October, convened for the launch of the UN's 100-Day Programme for Somalia (a relief programme requesting more food aid, and the provision of basic health services- but including the rehabilitation of civil society), Sahnoun was critical of UN agencies, itemizing them as inert and incompetent; he also questioned the continued lack of operations in Somalia of the World Health Organization. Sahnoun advocated local reconciliation and a gradual approach to a national reconciliation conference, and was resistant to the idea of any rapid deployment of UN peace-keeping forces. His criticism of senior UN officials, and his disagreement with the UN secretary-general over future policy, forced his resignation later in the month.
International Intervention
There was a steady deterioration in security after March 1994 with an increase in banditry, abductions of aid workers and attacks on UNOSOM personnel. The World Food Programme suspended operations in Kismayu in April, after persistent threats to its employees. In the same month US $2.6m. of UN personnel salaries were stolen from the organization?s compound in Mogadishu. The creation of an 8,000-strong police force by the end of June was one of UNOSOM's more successful initiatives. However, the force was insufficiently equipped to deal effectively with the factions. UNOSOM's problems were compounded by an outbreak of cholera early in the year. By the time it had been contained (mid-year) more than 1,000 people had died and 27,000 had been affected. In late 1993 the UN had established a commission of inquiry to investigate the violent exchanges which had resulted in the deaths of more than 100 peacekeeping troops and several thousand Somalis (the SNA claimed at the beginning of 1994 that 13,000 Somalis had been killed by UNOSOM). The report, which was extensively leaked prior to its publication, attributed responsibility for some atrocities to Gen. Aidid's forces, but was also highly critical of UNOSOM methods. Among prominent criticisms were those of inadequate training and equipment, and a lack of co-ordination between military and civilian elements. UNOSOM was also accused of having underestimated Somali military capacity, and political advisers were said to have lacked expertise and to have been insensitive to Somali culture. The US was criticized for its premature? withdrawal and for its insistence on retaining command of its own troops. The report suggested that the UN should consider compensation for innocent Somali victims of the conflict. It also concluded that UNOSOM, rather than providing assistance for Somalia, as was intended, 'tried to impose a political solution' inconsistent with the UN mandate. In June 1995 the UN disclosed that of the $70.3m. requested by the organization for emergency relief and short-term rehabilitation projects, only $13.lm. had been contributed to date.
Peace Process and Emerging Problems
Despite considerable support for the peace process during 1997-99, serious domestic problems cast doubt on Somalia's ability to re-establish stability and re-create a nation state system.In December 1997 Egypt announced that 26 Somali faction leaders, including Hussein Aidid and Ali Mahdi, had signed a peace agreement in Cairo. The pact was a precursor of a national reconciliation conference which, as of mid-1999, had yet to be convened. The conference was charged with electing a 13-member presidential council, a premier and a 189-seat legislature. Ethiopia rejected the Cairo accord on the grounds that it failed to include all members of the NSC.
In April 1998 Ali Mahdi, Ali 'Ato', Mohamed Qanyare Afrah and Hussein Aidid met in Nairobi to discuss the establishment of a joint administration for Mogadishu. Kenya, as a member of the IGA.D. organized the talks, which focused on power-sharing and the reopening of Mogadishu's air and sea ports. The four leaders met with President Moi and publicly appealed for international financial assistance to fund the reconciliation conference. After returning to Somalia, Ali Mahdi and Aidid announced their intention to establish a joint administration in the capital; however, progress in achieving their objective remained slow. In spite of efforts to restore stability, inter-clan fighting continued in Mogadishu, Kismayu, around Baidoa, in Gedo region, and in numerous other towns and villages in southern Somalia. As a result of continued clashes in Mogadishu, the UN and several humanitarian organizations frequently suspended or curtailed operations in the capital and elsewhere.
During 1998-99 armed clashes continued unabated throughout Somalia. In Gedo region fighting increased after the collapse of the August 1998 el-Ade peace pact between the SNF and al-Ittihad. The SNF, moreover, split into two warring factions, one led by the uncompromising Haji, and the other by the more moderate Ali Nur, who had been one of Haji's deputies. Each faction controlled three districts in Gedo region and battled for control of Bardhere district. In April 1999, Ali Nur was assassinated, most probably by forces loyal to Omar Haji.
In August 1998 Mogadishu's principal faction leaders including Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aidid and Qanyare Afrah) formed the Banaadir administration for the capital and its environs. Ali Mahdi and Aidid were designated as its two chairmen, and a 29-member regional supreme council (incorporating other faction representatives) and a body of governors (including managers for the port and airport) were established. One of the administration's main aims was to reopen Mogadishu's port and airport. Ali 'Ato', Muse Sudi Yalahow and Hussein Haji Bod immediately rejected the new administration, claiming it was non-representative'. Nevertheless, Egypt, Italy and Libya provided aid to the Banaadir administration, enabling the regional supreme council to unveil plans for the establishment of a 6,000-strong police force, with the help of US.$800,000 and some arms from Libya. However, when the administration held a police graduation ceremony in December 1998, there were only an estimated 2,000 officers, all of whom were former militiamen. Within months the police force had disbanded as a result of the Banaadir administration's failure to pay them. Meanwhile, battles between rival militias continued in Mogadishu, and there were reports of attacks on relief organizations, ships and convoys.
External Relations
Historically, relations between Somalia and Kenya have been close. After the downfall of the Siad Barre regime the Kenyan government declined to express its support for any particular Somali faction striving for power. However, in July 1995 Kenyan police detained Ali 'Ato', who had been in Nairobi to participate at a conference. Kenyan President Moi personally expressed regrets at the arrest when Ali 'Ato' was released the following day. Ali 'Ato' returned to Nairobi in August to attend a meeting sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), resulting in the release of a communique urging Gen. Aidid to renounce violence and to support the national reconciliation process. In June 1996 Kenya hosted a European Commissionfinanced conference regarding political decentralization for Somalia. which was attended by some 30 Somali intellectuals. In October President Moi hosted negotiations between Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi and Ali?Ato?, and additional discussions between the faction leaders were held in Nairobi in April 1998.
After Ethiopia and Eritrea started sending arms to opposition Somali factions, the security situation along the bordor Kenya deteriorated. In June 1999 some 400 Somali militiamen loyal to the pro-Aidid SNF faction attacked a small military camp and police patrol base at Amuma, and stole rifles, ammunition and communications equipment. Kenya immediately increased its military presence in the area and President Moi warned the raiders that if they did not return the goods they would military action. The commander of the SNF faction, Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed, returned unconditionally all the stolen items and indicated that his troops had mistaken the Kenyans an opposing SNF faction. Despite the quick resolution of the incident, Kenya closed its border with Somalia to prevent the further influx of Somali refugees and defeated militiamen. Additionally, five Kenyan navy ships, including three fast-attack craft, continued to patrol the Kenya-Somalia border where they had been deployed after the Somali attack.
Libya provided military aid to Gen. Aidid in the mid-1990s and, after his death, Libya established good relations with successor, Hussein Aidid. In June 1999 Hussein Aidid and. delegation of Somali faction leaders visited Tripoli, where requested Libyan military aid. Aidid, who had benefited Libyan largesse funnelled through Eritrea, also chastized government for supporting Eritrea, claiming that such a policy could widen the war in the Horn of Africa.
Somali-Canadian relations focused on human rights violations committed by Canadian troops who participated in IJNOSOM operations. A Canadian commission of inquiry was established in August 1995 to investigate allegations of abuses committed by Canadian troops in Somalia. In July 1997 the commission concluded that, in March 1993, Canadian troops had murdered a young Somali; as a result, two Canadian soldiers had been imprisoned. Moreover, the commission accused the army's senior leadership of trying to conceal the incident. In September 1997 the Belgian army suspended two warrant officers for three months for assaults on Somalis, and in March 1998 a Belgian paratrooper received a three-month suspended sentence for his involvement in the sexual abuse of a Somali girl. In 1997 Italy conducted two investigations into accusations that its soldiers had tortured Somali civilians. In August the first inquiry acknowledged that such abuses had occurred, but cleared senior officers of complicity. In September the second hearing admitted that senior officers knew about these human rights violations. As a result, two commanders who consecutively commanded Italy's contingent resigned. In January 1998 another inquiry confirmed that Somali civilians had been tortured by Italian soldiers. Despite withdrawing its peace-keeping forces, the UN continued to monitor events in Somalia. In January 1996 the UN expressed concern about the lack of progress towards a peaceful political settlement. While it encouraged all clan factions to work towards this goal, the UN reaffirmed its weapons embargo against Somalia (the embargo, however, failed to prevent weapons, ammunition, and other equipment from entering Somalia). The UN indicated that, until peace was achieved, it would not provide any financial or other support to Somalia. In May Gen. Aidid addressed a letter to Italy's incoming prime minister, Romano Prodi, alleging that Sigurd Illing (the EU representative to Somalia), and UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali were not only conspiring against him but also funding and arming Somali factions opposed to his government. Additionally, he accused the two officials of encouraging the secession of the 'Republic of Somaliland'. In January 1997 the UN Security Council refused an appeal by the NSC to prevent Hussein Aidid from receiving an alleged arms and counterfeit currency shipment from Hong Kong. Shortly afterwards Aidid announced his desire to improve relations with the UN in order to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies to drought-stricken areas of Somalia. However, at a meeting in Rome in May, the Italian government and representatives from the EU and the US Agency for International Development rejected a UN plan to assume control over the Somali Aid Co-ordination body (SACB), arguing that the UN should not become further involved in Somalia and that the SACB should take greater responsibility for co-ordinating international humanitarian aid. In June 1998 the Nairobi-based UN Political Office for Somalia announced that it had launched a new approach to end the fighting in Somalia. Under this scheme, which was supported by the OAU and the IGAID, the UN would provide aid to regions of the country that wanted peace. It was envisaged that the emergence of regional mini-states would form the basis for a new federated state.
The 'Republic Of Somaliland'
The 'Great Conference of the Northern Peoples', convened in May 1991, entrusted the SNM with the task of forming a government and drafting a constitution for the 'Republic of Somaliland'. From the outset the SNM was divided on the issue of independence. Several SNM leaders had expressed opposition to secession from Somalia. In addition, clan divisions arose over the distribution of ministerial portfolios and the allocation of resources. These divisions rendered the government virtually inoperative. However, the major problem for the government, headed by President Ahmed Ali 'Tur' was a shortage of resources. Without international recognition it proved extremely difficult to attract aid, and this in turn meant the government had no means to settle the claims of ex-guerrilla fighters, nor could it afford to demobilize them. Only assistance from non governmental organizations (NGOs enabled the government to begin the work of repairing the war-damaged infrastructure of the region, and some progress vas made in the removal of mines (it has been calculated that there are about 2m. such devices to be cleared).
Progress in reconstruction was hampered by clan fighting that broke out in Burao in January 1992, and in Berbera twice during the year. The conflict, between Isaaq sub-clans )the Habr Yunis, the clan of President 'Tur'. and the Habr Awal) was exacerbated by the grievances of the guerrillas and by government inactivity. Peace negotiations initiated by clan elders brought the conflict to an end in October, though the key economic port of Berbera remained outside government control. With the SNM leadership divided, political power passed into the hands of the national council of elders, who met at Boroma during February-May 1993 in a national reconciliation conference attended by 150 elders from all 'Somaliland' clans, with support from another 150 advisers and observers. Following the SNM's failure to establish a constitution and an effective government, the meeting formulated a national peace charter and a transitional structure of government. This was to comprise a council of elders (an upper house), an elected constituent assembly and an executive council (council of ministers). On 5 May Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (a former prime minister of Somalia during the 1960s) from the Habr Awal clan, was elected president, defeating the incumbent president, Anmed Ali Tur', by 97 votes to 24. However, Egal's election failed to resolve clan differences. In June, following the announcement of Egal's cabinet, the Habr Yunis clan claimed that the appointments were calculated to foment clan rivalry and that assembly seats had been unjustly distributed. Habr Yunis opposition has since continued and a clan conference in June 1994 rejected Egal's government. (Ahmed Ali ''Tur' had publicly renounced secession early in the year.)
'Somaliland' leaders continued to express concern at their relationship with the UN, and they consistently made clear their opposition to the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces in their territory. Demonstrations against the possible deployment in the region of UNOSOM II forces took place in Hargeysa in April 1993. Adm. Howe, as special representative of the UN secretary-general, visited 'Somaliland' after Egal's election and pledged UN support for reconstruction. However, the UN stance at regional and political conferences indicated that it would continue to consider ?Somaliland? as part of Somalia. By mid-1994 the ?Republic of Somaliland? had made no progress in its attempts to achieve international recognition. In July Egal, following an invitation from President Mubarak to visit Egypt, expressed the hope that international attitudes were changing. However, a few weeks later he intimated that the solution for 'Somaliland' might be to reconsider the 1960 independence agreement and adopt a fresh approach to federation. Meanwhile, influential Western nations identified the region's lack of political and civil stability as reasons for their refusal to recognize an independent 'Somaliland', denying the aid and investment necessary to address the region's problems.
In February 1994 Egal announced that a referendum would be organized in the north-western region, in order to ascertain the level of popular support for an independent 'Somaliland'. By mid-1999, however, no such referendum had taken place. In August 1994 Egal expelled UN representatives from 'Somaliland', accusing them of interfering in the country's internal affairs. This was apparently precipitated by talks held between the new UN special representative to Somalia, James Victor Gbeho (appointed in July), and Aimed Ali 'Tur', who was courted by both the UN and Gen. Aidid following his disavowal of secession for 'Somaliland'. In October and November there were violent confrontations in Hargeysa between military units remaining loyal to Egal and those defecting to support Aimed Ali 'Tur'. By mid-December it was estimated that three-quarters of the population of Hargeysa had fled, many thousands of them seeking refuge in Ethiopia. The rebel militias continued launching attacks on government positions in Hargeysa during 1995, although their success was difficult to ascertain. Fighting spread to other parts of 'Somaliland', and in April government forces were in armed conflict with fighters from the Garhadji clan who had recently formed an alliance with Issa militiamen belonging to the anti-secessionist United Somali Front (USF. Fighting between rival factions of the SNM continued south of Hargeysa airport in August. In addition, clashes between 'Somaliland' government forces and Issa militias were reported lust and November near the border with Djibouti. In January 1996 more than 60 people were killed during fighting ,near Burao between troops loyal to Egal and militias apparently Aipporting Gen. Aidid's aim to become president of a unified Somalia. Instability within the territory led the EU to postpone new rehabilitation projects. Egal had retaliated by banning all EU activities in 'Somaliland'; however, in June 1995 the two sides reached an accommodation allowing the EU to resume operations.
Despite Egal's obviously weakened position he persevered with the introduction of a new currency for the territory, the 'Somaliland shilling', which was completed by the end of January 1995. In August 1995 four subcommittees were established to draft a new constitution for 'Somaliland'. A provisional document comprising 183 articles was published in March 1996. In late 1996 the third congress of 'Somaliland' communities began deliberations on the adoption of a constitution and the selection of a new president for the 'Republic of Somaliland'. On 16 February 1997 the congress approved the constitution, which would be effective for a three-year interim period, prior to ratification by public referendum. On 23 February Egal was reelected (by an electoral college) president of 'Somaliland' for a five-year term. However, opposition to the Egal regime contiued to mar efforts to create a national polity. Although the antiEgal United Somali Party and the USF merged into the Northern Somali Alliance in March, the new grouping did little to weaken Egal or to present a viable alternative to his government. Meanwhile, in an attempt to defend the republic's national security, Egal supported the acquisition of new equipment for the 15,000-strong armed forces. During 1996 the military's logistics capabilities were improved by the purchase of numerous vehicles, including tanks. In addition, Egal used diplomacy to facilitate the stabilization process, meeting the Edagale community, an Isaaq sub-clan, in January 1997 to review security issues. The two sides had been at odds since clashes betweeen them erupted in 1994 and 1996. The 120-man Edagale team, led by Sultan Mohamed Abdullahi Galal, pledged to support national reconciliation.
In March 1997 Egal demanded that the UN and its agencies recognize the ?Republic of Somaliland' and appoint a UN resident representative in Hargeysa. He indicated that any agency that refused to meet these demands would have to terminate its activities in the region within three weeks. By mid-1999, however, 'Somaliland' had not received official international recognition and the UN agencies remained in place.
In August 1997 an Eritrean delegation visited Hargeysa, ostensibly to brief the 'Somaliland' leadership about the IGAD summit in Nairobi and the Sodere peace process. Other sources suggested that the delegation wished to determine if there were any Islamist groups based in 'Somaliland'. Relations with Djibouti remained tense, largely because Egal believed that President Gouled had failed to take adequate action against Issa militia units campaigning for part of western 'Somaliland' to be transferred to Djibouti. Additionally, Egal maintained that Djibouti, by supporting a united Somalia, had obstructed his efforts to gain international recognition for 'Somaliland'. Egal opposed the Sodere peace conference in Ethiopia in early 1997, fearing that the establishment of an internationally recognized provisional government in Somalia would hinder the recognition of 'Somaliland'. He therefore supported the third congress of 'Somaliland' communities when it refused to join the NSC.In December 1997 President Egal offered his resignation to parliament; however, in a joint session, the house of representatives and the house of elders voted to reject the offer. Observers suggested that Egal had proposed resigning in an attempt to rally support and increase his powers in parliament. It was reported that in May 1999 Egal agreed to allow the establishment of political parties in 'Somaliland', provided that they were not based on religion or clan-based politics. New parties were to be permitted to participate in forthcoming civic elections, and also in presidential elections.The issue of returning refugees to 'Somaliland' became a serious concern in April 1998 when the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (LTNHCR) appealed for US $24m. to finance the repatriation and resettlement of all Somali refugees in Africa and the Middle East. Although President Egal opposed the mass repatriation of Somalis because of the republic?s economic problems, he agreed to allow UNHCR to repatriate 40, citizens in 1997 and 60,000 in 1998. However, Somaliland' lacked adequate humanitarian programmes to care for returnees, and as a result UNHCR repatriated only some 11, refugees to 'Somaliland' in 1997, mainly from the Hartis camps in Ethiopia. By mid-1998 another 8,000 refugees settled in the north-west. UNHCR anticipated that an addition 60,000 refugees would return from Ethiopia to Somaliland' later in the year, and that some 16,500 would resettle from o countries. UNHCR indicated that the 'Somaliland' authori agreed to resettle some 100,000 refugees by the end of 1998.
'Puntland' Regional Administration
According to Abdullahi Yussuf, 'Puntland' supported the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia, advocating the re-establishment of a federal government in Somalia. The conference also endorsed the creation of a 69-member parliament and a nine member cabinet. The cabinet, appointed in August, nominated the members of the supreme court in September, subject to parliamentary approval. In February 1999 Abdullahi Yussuf presided over the graduation of 500 police-officers, who joined some 700 police-officers already on duty. 'Puntland' planned to establish local and frontier police forces. Meanwhile, cases of piracy in the region escalated. 'Puntland' quickly gained regional stature. In September 1998 German delegation visited President Abdullahi Yussuf to discuss ways to repatriate Somali refugees living in Germany. ?The president indicated that a repatriation programme would e impossible as long as there was instability in 'Puntland'. A Danish delegation also visited the region, and in December an thiopian special envoy arrived in Garowe to assume the position of ambassador. At about the same time Abdullahi Yussuf visited Libya, which had been one of the SSDF's major benefactors during the early 1990s. He continued on to Egypt, where he argued that instead of sponsoring national reconciliation conferences, the Egyptian authorities should support existing de facto regional states like 'Puntland'. While in Cairo, AbdullahiYussuf also met with Arab League officials who promised to consider providing aid to 'Puntland'. In March 1999 a Libyan delegation of diplomats and businessmen arrived in 'Puntland' to explore the possibility of enhancing co-operation in the fishing, livestock and agricultural sectors.
Attempts To Establish 'Jubaland'
In July 1998 Gen. 'Morgan' of the SPM, who had controlled Kismayu since 1993, sought to stabilize the port of Kismayu by forming a police force. However, as in Mogadishu, the police were unable to establish and maintain order. The SPM also battled a unified force of the pro-Aidid USC and the SNA, in addition to the SNF.
In late September 1998 Gen. 'Morgan' announced that he planned to establish a regional administration similar to the one in 'Puntland'. The area, known as 'Jubaland', would include the southernmost regions of Jubada Hoose and Jubada Dhexe. Morgan's plan did not materialize, and violence continued to trouble much of the region under his control. In October fighting began between rival sub-clans in Kismayu, hindering operations at the city's port. Forces loyal to Hussein Aidid and Ali Mabdi also remained active in Kismayu, largely because they opposed Morgan's plan to create a regional administration. In their view, 'Jubaland' would threaten their efforts to reunify Somalia under the Banaadir administration
Pre-Colonial History
Early trade on the coasts
From their connection with the Ethiopian hinterland, their proximity to Arabia, and their export of precious gums, ostrich feathers, ghee (clarified butter), and other animal produce as well as slaves from farther inland, the northern and eastern Somali coasts have for centuries been open to the outside world. This area probably formed part of "the land of aromatics and incense," mentioned in ancient Egyptian writings. Between the 7th and 10th centuries, immigrant Muslim Arabs and Persians developed a series of trading posts along the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coasts. Many of the early Arab geographers mentioned these trading posts and the sultanates that grew out of them, but they rarely described the interior of the country in detail.
Intensive exploration really began only after the occupation of Aden by the British in 1839 and the ensuing scramble for Somali possessions by Britain, France, and Italy (see below The imperial partition). In 1854, while Richard Burton was exploring the country to the northwest in the course of his famous journey from Berbera to Harer, his colleague John Hanning Speke was making his way along the Makhir coast in the northeast. This region had previously been visited by Charles Guillain, captain of the brig Ducouedid, between 1846 and 1848. Guillain also sailed down the Indian Ocean coast and went ashore at Mogadishu, Marka, and Baraawe, penetrating some distance inland and collecting valuable geographic and ethnographic information. In 1865 the German explorer Carl Claus, Baron von der Decken, sailed up the Jubba River as far as Baardheere in the small steamship Welf, which foundered in rapids above the town. Decken was killed by Somali, but much valuable information collected by his expedition survived.
Colonial History
Competition among the European powers and Ethiopia
About the middle of the 19th century the Somali Peninsula became a theatre of competition between Great Britain, Italy, and France. On the somaliacontinent itself Egypt also was involved, and later Ethiopia, expanding and consolidating its realm under the guiding genius of the emperors Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, and Britain's interest in the northern Somali coast followed the establishment in 1839 of the British coaling station at Aden on the short route to India. The Aden garrison relied upon the importation of meat from the adjacent Somali coast. France sought its own coaling station and obtained Obock on the Afar coast in 1862, later thrusting eastward and developing the Somali port of Djibouti. Farther north, Italy opened a station in 1869 at Aseb, which, with later acquisitions, became the colony of Eritrea. Stimulated by these European maneuvers, Egypt revived Turkey's ancient claims to the Red Sea coast In 1870 the Egyptian flag was raised at Bullaxaar (Bulhar) and Berbera.
Britain at first protested these Egyptian moves but by 1877 had come to regard the Egyptian occupation as a convenient bulwark against the encroachments of European rivals. With the disorganization caused by the revolt in the Sudan, however, Egypt was obliged to curtail its colonial responsibilities, evacuating Harer and its Somali possessions in 1885. In these circumstances the British government reluctantly decided to fill the gap left by Egypt. Between 1884 and 1886, accordingly, treaties of protection were drawn up with the main northern Somali clans guaranteeing them their "independence." Somali territory was not fully ceded to Britain, but a British protectorate was proclaimed and vice-consuls appointed to maintain order and control trade at Seylac, Berbera, and Bullaxaar. The interior of the country was left undisturbed, only the coast being affected.
Meanwhile, France had been assiduously extending its colony from Obock, and a clash with Britain was only narrowly averted when an Anglo-French agreement on the boundaries of the two powers' Somali possessions was signed in 1888. In the same period, the Italians were also actively extending their Eritrean colony and encroaching upon Ethiopian territory. Not to be outdone, Menilek took the opportunity of seizing the Muslim city of Harer, left independent after the Egyptian withdrawal. In 1889 Ethiopia and Italy concluded the which in the Italian view established an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia. Arms and capital were poured into the country, and Menilek was able to apply these new resources to bring pressure to bear on the Somali clansmen around Harer. In 1889 Italy also acquired two protectorates in the northeastern corner of Somalia; and by the end of the year the southern part of the Somali coast leased by the British East Africa Company from the sultan of Zanzibar was sublet to an Italian company.
Italy had thus acquired a Somali colony. From 1892 the lease was held directly from Zanzibar for an annual rent of 160,000 rupees, and, after the failure of two Italian companies by 1905, the Italian government assumed direct responsibility for its colony of Italian Somaliland. To the south of the Jubba River the British East Africa Company held Jubaland until 1895, when this became part of Britain's East Africa protectorate. Britain and Italy reached agreement in 1884 on the extent of their respective Somali territories, but the (1896), at which the infiltrating Italian armies were crushed by Ethiopian forces, radically changed the position. Ethiopia, then independent of Italy, was plainly master of the hinterland, and in 1896-97 Italy, France, and Britain all signed treaties with Emperor Menilek, curtailing their Somali possessions. Italy gave up the Somali Ogaden, and Britain excised much of the western Hawd from its protectorate. Although the land and the Somali clansmen (who were not consulted), so abandoned, were not recognized as belonging to Ethiopia, there was nothing then to stop their gradual acquisition by Ethiopia.
Revolt in British Somaliland
These arrangements had scarcely been completed when the British Somaliland protectorate administration found its modest rule threatened by a religious rebellion led by Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan (in Arabic, Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah Hasan). This Somali sheikh (known to the British as the Mad Mullah) of the Ogaadeen clan, living with his mother's people in the east of the protectorate, was an adherent of the Salihiyah religious order, whose reformist message he preached with messianic zeal. He quickly achieved wide recognition for his learning, piety, and skill as a mediator and initially cooperated with the authorities. In 1899, however, Sheikh Maxamed came into conflict with the recently established Christian mission and also was involved in a petty dispute with the administration. With the current European and Ethiopian encroachment and with the example of the Sudanese mahdi, these two incidents provided the seeds that rapidly developed into a major Somali insurrection.
Maxamed assumed the title of sayyid (not of mahdi), and his followers were known as the dervishes. He displayed great skill in employing all the traditional tactics of Somali clan politics in building up his following, strengthening these with the call to national Muslim solidarity against the infidel colonizers. Arms and ammunition, denied to Somali in the past, became easily available through the ports of Djibouti and the northeastern coast, and the dervishes, although opposed by many Somali, who were branded as traitors to Islam, successfully weathered four major British, Italian, and Ethiopian campaigns between 1900 and 1904. The cumbersome British armies, hampered by their supply and water requirements, found the dervish guerrilla tactics hard to combat effectively, and, when in 1910 the British government decided to abandon its inconclusive and extremely expensive operations and withdrew to the coast, leaving chaos in the interior, Sayyid Maxamed seemed to have gained the day. A new policy was subsequently adopted, however, and, with the aid of an increasingly effective camel constabulary (whose founder, Richard Corfield, was killed at the Battle of Dulmadoobe in 1913), the dervishes were kept at bay until 1920, when a combined air, sea, and land operation finally routed them. The formidable dervish stronghold at Taleex, or Taleh, was bombed, but the sayyid escaped, as so often before, only to die of influenza a few months later while desperately seeking to rally his scattered follower.
Copyright c 2000 GG Ltd