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Africa's socio-economic potential is reemerging
By THABO MBEKI
Cape Town - A great moment is at hand: a chance for developed countries to make a sound investment while helping to break the cycle of African underdevelopment. This prospect now seems as obvious as it was previously elusive.
The Group of 8 conference of industrialized nations that begins this final week of June 2002 in Canada comes as we plan for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa in September. It follows significant commitments made by the Bush administration and the European Union at a United Nations conference earlier this year in Mexico to increase development aid. The common thread here is the renewed determination among political leaders and civil society to build a humane world of shared prosperity.
The idea gains its momentum not from the desire to provide charity. Nor is it premised merely on fears in highly developed nations of new immigrants or of poor regions becoming so volatile as to pull the rest of the world into instability. The momentum for sustained development, in partnership with the private sector, is based on a recognition that it is possible to revive poor nations, particularly in Africa, through investments for mutual benefit. There is an unprecedented resolve on the continent to turn away from the begging bowl and engage in new efforts to build a better life.
The fact that most African states have held multiparty elections in the past decade is relevant. So is the imminent formation of the African Union, out of the Organization of African Unity, which will occur at a summit in South Africa early next month. Such developments have helped reveal a socioeconomic potential previously obscured, and they have given strength to a new realism.
In this great effort, we Africans seek, and need, partners. On offer to the investors from the highly developed economies are sound prospects in countries whose infrastructures &emdash; limited telecommunications systems, poor roads, rail and port facilities, sometimes dilapidated cities &emdash; hold the promise of exponential improvement. Where others are approaching saturation, Africa offers rapid growth.
Such cooperation will reward the many African nations prepared to improve political and economic governance. But there could be broader spinoffs. This partnership of equals may lead to new introspection among the citizens of developed countries about themselves; it may rekindle that humanism that should lie at the foundation of global relations.
Such might be the outcome, if the developed nations work with Africans in redefining assistance, fashioning a fairer trade regime and treating Africa as an investment destination. Group of 8 leaders and other statesmen will gather in a remote spot in the Canadian Rockies to hear more about the New Partnership for Africa's Development. African leaders will arrive with concrete proposals on how to get this partnership off the ground.
A central feature of the new partnership is ensuring democracy, human rights and good governance. It sets out independent mechanisms for peer review, with provisions aimed at foreseeing problems and working to prevent their spread -; rather than just censuring and punishing when things go wrong. If programs in manufacturing, agriculture, education and health are to succeed, Africans in their millions must take an active part.
Most important, it is Africans who have done and will continue to do the planning. As George C. Marshall noted in proposing his famous plan to rebuild Europe half a century ago: "It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans." And so it will be for Africans now.
Mbeki, president of South Africa, succeeded Nelson Mandela.
Finance & Development, A quarterly magazine of the IMF March 1999, Volume 36, Number 1
An Agenda for the 21st Century
Alassane D. Ouattara
Africa is at a crossroads. Will it continue to open up its political systems to broader participation and reform its economies to integrate them more fully into the global economy, or will it revert to political and economic practices that have delayed its integration into the economic mainstream?
AT THE DAWN of the twenty-first century, Africa must quickly select the path it wishes to follow. On the one hand, it could allow the forces of implosion and ethnic warfare to become the masters of its fate, to the advantage of a few potentates lacking in vision or warlords with transient alliances. Thus, history would repeat itself, with all the suffering that this entails, and this old continent would be at the mercy of all types of corruption. Africa would be stripped of the wealth of its soil and the promise of its youth and left marginalized, adrift in the wake of history.
On the other hand, it could say no to marginalization and fully integrate itself into the great global village that the world has become in this internet era. This would mean that its youth could build a future brimming with hope and every man and woman could participate in developing their nations, thereby ensuring both transparency in the management of public affairs and a sense of a common destiny. These are the foundations of a stable, inclusive, and predictable environment.
Since the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the region on which this article is principally focused, have been implementing sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms to raise real per capita incomes, reduce inflation, and narrow financial imbalances, thereby changing the economic landscape dramatically. But despite these reforms, poverty remains widespread, private investment is subdued, and most African countries continue to depend heavily on external assistance. Moreover, macroeconomic imbalances are still sizable, and most countries remain highly vulnerable to changes in external conditions.
Today there is a widespread consensus, both within Africa and among its international partners, that intensified efforts are required to increase growth by fostering private investment through more open markets and trade and by ensuring a more secure environment through economic, political, and judicial reforms.
Africa's economic recovery
Sub-Saharan Africa has made substantial progress toward macroeconomic stability during the current decade through sound financial policies and market-friendly structural reforms. The IMF has often supported these efforts by providing technical assistance and making financial assistance available under various facilities, most prominently under its highly concessional Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
After years of stagnation, average real economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from an average of 1.0 percent during 1992-94 to about 5 percent during 1995-98 (see table). Strong growth has been seen in an increasing number of countries, and real per capita GDP has started to rise. Forty out of 47 countries are now showing increases in their annual per capita incomes. There has also been considerable success in bringing down inflation and reducing internal and external financial imbalances. For the region as a whole, average inflation (as measured by the consumer price index) declined from a peak of more than 60 percent in 1994 to some 10 percent in 1998. The region's external current account deficit, including grants, fell from an average of 7.0 percent of GDP in 1992 to 5.5 percent in 1998, while the overall fiscal deficit was cut from about 8 percent of GDP to 5.5 percent over the same period.
(Figure omitted)
Meanwhile, the restructuring of many African economies has been gaining momentum. Government intervention in economic activity is on the wane. Administrative price controls are being removed, and agricultural marketing has been widely liberalized. Most countries have made considerable strides in opening their economies to world trade by eliminating multiple exchange rate practices and nontariff barriers and also lowering the degree of tariff protection. In most countries, the process of restructuring and privatizing state enterprises has been under way for some time, though it has proceeded with varying speeds and has enjoyed varying degrees of success. Labor markets are also progressively being liberalized. Fiscal reform is gaining ground: African countries are taking steps to rationalize their tax systems, reduce exemptions, and enhance their administrative efficiency while reorienting expenditures away from wasteful outlays and toward improved public investment and spending on key social services, particularly health care and primary education. On the monetary front, most countries have made progress in establishing market-determined interest rates, eliminating selective credit controls, and introducing indirect instruments of monetary policy, such as reserve requirements and open market operations. Greater attention is also being paid to rehabilitating weak banks and promoting healthy and competitive banking sectors. Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank have recently launched a joint initiative to help heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) that pursue sound policies to tackle their external debt burdens, including their large multilateral debts. So far, five African countries-Burkina Faso, C“te d'Ivoire, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda-have become eligible under the HIPC Initiative.
Need for faster growth
The recent achievements in Africa are undoubtedly encouraging, but are they sufficient to make a real dent in poverty? African countries would need to achieve sustained real per capita annual growth of 8-9 percent to attain one-half of today's real per capita income levels in industrial countries within a generation, and growth rates of 6-7 percent would be needed just to keep up with the expected increase in Africa's labor force. The remarkable fact about such numbers is not that they are high, but that they fall within a range that an increasing number of policymakers would consider feasible. If Africa is to sustain such growth rates, however, it urgently needs to become a better place to save and invest, first and foremost for Africans themselves but also for foreign investors.
Toward economic security
The basic objective of the "second generation" of reforms before us, in IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus's words, is "to expand the scope for private investment by promoting greater openness in domestic and external trade and creating a more secure environment." Meanwhile, it is essential that the progress made to date in maintaining macroeconomic stability be consolidated and extended. Let me spell out this agenda before discussing how it may be advanced.
Appropriate regulations and their evenhanded implementation are necessary to support free trade, which is critical for a better allocation of resources and the spread of know-how and innovation. This requires the following actions:
A redefinition of the role of government away from direct involvement in production and toward the provision of essential public services is critical.
A faster and more transparent privatization process is needed to create scope for the private sector. In support of these efforts, a comprehensive and well-defined privatization strategy-covering not only management responsibilities but also ownership, and involving local as well as foreign investors-should be developed and implemented. The establishment of an appropriate legal framework, along with effective regulatory policies and institutions, is another essential step in promoting a transparent and predictable environment for investors, reducing the fear of expropriation, and fostering healthy competition.
Financial sector reform that would strengthen savings mobilization and intermediation and promote the soundness of banking systems, together with the correct sequencing of reforms, is vital, as the Asian crisis has amply demonstrated. Sub-Saharan African countries will have to move decisively to deepen and broaden their relatively weak financial markets, establish independent and efficient banking supervision agencies, open their banking sectors to healthy international competition, apply best practices in bank management, and improve the legal framework for banking activities and contract enforcement. At the same time, they need to develop institutions and instruments dedicated to long-term savings mobilization-stock exchanges, pension funds, insurance, and other contractual savings systems-and make domestic financing facilities accessible to small investors, including farmers.
Notwithstanding the substantial progress in trade liberalization sub-Saharan countries have made since the mid-1980s, their trade regimes remain complex and restrictive compared with those of most other countries. They therefore need to speed up trade liberalization and tariff reform to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of their domestic producers and help them become more fully integrated into the world economy. These efforts should include the elimination of all significant nontariff barriers; a substantial, phased reduction of tariff levels; and the reduction or elimination of export taxes. The benefit of trade liberalization would be enhanced if the process were supported by properly sequenced and paced liberalization of capital flows, in order to create scope for an increased contribution of foreign direct and portfolio investment. Moreover, trade liberalization and tariff reform should be well publicized and undertaken as part of a comprehensive medium-term tax reform program. The industrial countries could also make an important contribution to achieveing this goal by eliminating the barriers that limit the access of African producers to their markets.
Ensuring economic security is critical for eliciting the participation of each and every individual in developing the nation. The steps needed to achieve this goal include the following:
The transparency, predictability, and impartiality of the regulatory and legal systems must be guaranteed. This should go well beyond ensuring respect for private property rights and the enforcement of contracts to include the elimination of arbitrariness, special privileges, and distortionary ad hoc exemptions.
Achieving good governance is very important, and national authorities should spare no effort in tackling corruption and inefficiency and in enhancing accountability. In July 1997, the IMF's Executive Board, recognizing the importance of good governance for macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth, adopted guidelines to ensure that the IMF pays greater attention to these issues.
Well-defined property rights are a key element of economic security for small landholders and informal entrepreneurs; they are also a key requirement for deepening the financial system. Meeting this need requires imagination and a close coordination with stakeholders-simply duplicating the legal instruments of advanced economies in developing countries with diverse cultural and administrative backgrounds will not work. A variety of instruments is available to support free trade and advance economic security, including the following:
A capable and efficient civil service is a key ingredient of sound public administration. In many countries, however, limited skills, overstaffing, and deteriorating remuneration in real terms have contributed to low morale, weak incentives to improve performance, and illicit activities in the civil service. For many African countries, a key step will be overhauling their civil services. The substantial progress already made in reducing internal and external financial imbalances has resulted from fiscal consolidation, which has come primarily from compressing public expenditure, while in many countries the revenue base remains inadequate. Revenue efforts should focus on broadening the tax base and strengthening tax administration-there is little room for higher rates. A comprehensive medium-term approach to tax reform is needed to optimize the composition of revenue and take into account the impact of the tax structure on investment incentives and income distribution. Expenditure levels will continue to be constrained by available resources. The efficiency of outlays thus remains the key to successful fiscal adjustment in the short term. Making further improvements in the composition of expenditure by reducing unproductive expenditures and increasing the shares of education, health, and infrastructure will also be essential.
Forging a partnership with civil society to build a consensus on reforms, as well as to provide checks and balances, is essential. To succeed, African governments need to actively encourage the participation of all segments of civil society in economic policy debates and do a much better job of explaining the short-term costs, as well as the medium- and long-term benefits, of policy options.
With closer economic integration, each African country has an interest in ensuring that its partner countries follow appropriate policies. Virtually all African countries are now members of regional organizations. Increased regional cooperation and coordination of national policies would allow African countries to overcome the disadvantages of their relatively small economies and geographic limitations and, by providing access to larger markets, make it possible for them to realize economies of scale. Enhancing trade links among African countries naturally also strengthens their ability to participate in trade on a global scale and could lead them to make further progress toward nondiscriminatory multilateral trade liberalization. The challenge of the future will be to ensure that these regional organizations establish common regional objectives and are perceived as effective vehicles for the integration of African countries into the world economy, providing mutual support to their members in their reform efforts. The pace of progress toward this end should be what is feasible, not what is comfortable for the slowest member.
Conclusion
Economic security, good governance, and a better dialogue with civil society to build a social consensus for reforms should be the key concerns of African policymakers in the future, in addition to implementing sound macroeconomic policies and bold structural reforms.
As I consider Africa's agenda for the twenty-first century, I am struck above all by its hopeful character. All approaches converge on the single objective of building institutions to release and support the initiative of each and every African. But I am also all too aware that African news headlines often tell a different tale, one of terrifying ethnic strife, cynical corruption, and widespread misery and disease. How can this hopeful agenda be reconciled with these stark realities? The answer lies in the power of human creativity, once it is released in a secure environment.
An African renaissance is unfolding before our eyes. Most countries, through most of their years of independence, have been ruled by autocratic leaders-autocratic because, whether enlightened or not, they stood above the law. Today, the rule of law is asserting itself. More than ever before, Africans are demanding accountability and honesty from their leaders, freedom from repressive governance, and the right to participate in influencing and formulating public policy. The growing demands for more participatory systems of political representation are overdue and will enable African governments to build popular consensus behind their economic and social policies. Ethnic strife and widespread misery can be resolved only under the rule of law, which is the foundation of peace and prosperity-initiative, investment, and saving cannot flourish without it.
A new partnership is needed to support sustainable growth and development in Africa. International support should be-and is-focused on those African countries that have the will to break clearly with the past and that are ready to implement far-reaching economic and political reforms. It is in the interest of the international community for democracies to spread and market economies to develop in Africa.
Let there be no mistake: the fight for economic security is political. It is a fight for the substance of power. A new basis of power exists in Africa today in all the men and women who are struggling to establish a new order. In their hopes lies my hope for a more humane Africa.
An earlier, expanded version of this article was published in the Winter/Spring 1998 issue of the Brown Journal of World Affairs.
Alassane D. Ouattara is a Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.
Daddieh, Cyril K. Beyond Governance and Democratization in Africa: Toward State Building for Sustainable Human Development. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 1(1), Mar. 1999. Aug 17, 2002,.
http://www.kzoo.edu/africa/SUSFINAL2.html.
Description: For nearly four decades, African states have been buffeted by popular pressures to live up to the ideals of democratic governance and the promise of economic development that were the implicit as well as stated assumptions undergirding the struggle to attain an independent political kingdoms. The post-war generation of African leaders had mobilized masses of people into a formidable nationalist coalition that succeeded in wresting political control from European rulers in the 1960s. The apparent success of this nationalist effort generated goodwill and even effusive adulation for the nationalist leaders not only because they had proved their leadership mettle, but also because of the instrumentalist conception of independence as only a prelude to material progress and social welfare.These preliminary observations suggest that quite early on, a performance and participation criteria had been woven, implicitly at least, into an African social compact on the basis of which new leaders could legitimately claim the right to rule, the failure of which could result in an equally justified forfeiture of that right.
"Beyond Governance and Democratization in Africa: Toward State Building for Sustainable Human Development."
Cyril K. Daddieh
Introduction
For nearly four decades, African states have been buffeted by popular pressures to live up to the ideals of democratic governance and the promise of economic development that were the implicit as well as stated assumptions undergirding the struggle to attain an independent political kingdoms. The post-war generation of African leaders had mobilized masses of people into a formidable nationalist coalition that succeeded in wresting political control from European rulers in the 1960s. The apparent success of this nationalist effort generated goodwill and even effusive adulation for the nationalist leaders not only because they had proved their leadership mettle, but also because of the instrumentalist conception of independence as only a prelude to material progress and social welfare.These preliminary observations suggest that quite early on, a performance and participation criteria had been woven, implicitly at least, into an African social compact on the basis of which new leaders could legitimately claim the right to rule, the failure of which could result in an equally justified forfeiture of that right.
Drive Toward Political Enclosure
To be sure, future performance in the economic domain was complicated by two vexing realities: (1) the fragility of the captured post-colonial state, with its woefully limited administrative capacity for policy formulation and implementation due in part to the dearth of relevant socioeconomic data and partly because of the scarcity of skilled manpower; and (2) the social pluralism of African societies. The answer to this vexing combination of problems was found in the notion of state building, the attempt to forge national unity among disparate ethnic, regional, and religious groupings at different levels of socioeconomic and political development (Mengisteab and Daddieh, 1999).
In order to facilitate this process, African leaders made eloquent pleas for maximum political and social peace. Some even argued that a degree of authoritarianism was necessary to contain the centrifugal forces inherent in the ethno-regionally and culturally divided societies over which they presided (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, 1999). It was necessary as well to meet popular "expectations of independence" (Ajayi, 1982). To that end, they insisted, as in Achebe's poignant invocation, "that all argument should cease and the whole people speak with one voice and that any more dissent and argument outside the door of the shelter would subvert and bring down the whole house" (Achebe, 1967:37).
Thus, employing a combination of charisma, new national symbols, cajoling, political pressure, and outright coercion, African leaders attempted to secure acquiescence to ongoing efforts to shrink the political arena (Kasfir, 1976). This narrowing of the scope of political participation and competition or, more to the point, this thinly disguised re-channeling of participation into state-controlled institutions began, as the Ghanaian effort illustrates, rather innocuously enough with the promulgation of legislation prohibiting the formation of political parties along narrow ethnic, religious or regional lines. This was followed by a backing away from the constitutional provisions mandating decentralized government, coupled with the gradual expansion of presidential powers, the elimination of constitutional checks on the executive branch of government, culminating, finally, in the imposition of one-party rule.
With the one party system reasonably well entrenched, strenuous efforts were made to incorporate all previously autonomous organizations into state structures in order to bring them under tighter political control. In C“te d'Ivoire, for instance, all civil servants were compelled to become, willy nilly, card-carrying members of the de jure one party. Various laboring and professional classes - from farmers, fishermen, bakers, and transporters, to doctors, lawyers, secondary school teachers and university professors - were all subjected to unrelenting pressure to join up with the state-sponsored federation of Ivoirian workers, known as the UGTCI (Daddieh, 1996; Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, 1999).
Democratic closure in Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, reached its apogee under military regimes which invariably ruled by decree, disbanded national parliaments, banned political parties, made strike action by workers and professional bodies illegal, shut down independent newspapers or promulgated draconian libel laws designed to muzzle the press or to compel journalists to practice self-censorship. Moreover, ordinary citizens were sometimes detained without probable cause and trial or were tried in extra-judicial or kangaroo courts (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, 1999: 127). Whatever their actual merits, such measures robbed the African masses of their right to meaningful political participation and undermined their capacity to hold the new rulers accountable through the electoral and other decision making processes and democratic institutions. But, as the popular African saying goes that "No Condition Is Permanent," since the beginning of the 1990s, African states seem to have come full circle, embracing multiparty competition, citizen participation in elections that are intended to be "free and fair", conducted in a climate that is nominally "free from fear" of political reprisals, within a framework of nationally-approved democratic constitutions. In short, Africa is currently experiencing a second independence, with all that implies for a revival of democracy.
The foregoing reflections focus our attention on a number of important questions: why did African states jettison inherited democratic constitutions and institutions in favor of authoritarianism? why has authoritarianism, in turn, been roundly repudiated across the continent in favor of democracy? Can democracy now do for Africa what authoritarianism had failed so miserably to accomplish? Can it contribute to the achievement of the expectations of Africa's "second independence"? To put it differently, is it possible to assert a linkage between democratic governance and development in a way that trumps the linkage between authoritarianism and development in the African context? These are some of the critical questions that the balance of this article will seek to address. In the penultimate section of the article, we return to the preoccupation of the nationalist leaders. We suggest that the preoccupation was as relevant then as it is today. However, we reformulate their problematic in light of their performance experience and current problems of state disintegration and social fragmentation by making a strong case for linking current efforts at democratization with genuine state building as a way of improving access to resources especially among the vast impoverished peasantry, conciliating ethnic, gender, class, and other cleavages and thereby sustaining human development.
Post-War Political Activism and Colonial State Reactions
As indicated above, Africa came of age in the decade of the 1960s when broad nationalist coalitions waging anti-colonial struggles triumphed over European colonial rule. With few exceptions, notably in the settler colonies of Algeria, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa as well as the Portuguese colonies, the process of decolonization was remarkably straightforward and devoid of major violence. For the most part, it was characterized by piecemeal reformism rather than radicalism on the part of nationalist groups who resorted to letter writing campaigns, deputations to London, Paris, Lisbon, etc., protest marches and rallies, boycotts of certain European merchants and goods, civil disobedience, etc.). The response of the colonial state was equally remarkable for its gradualism, reflected in the ceding of political ground by allowing groups to organize into competing political parties, registering voters, staging multiple competitive elections to fill positions in local, municipal and national legislatures or, as in the case of francophone Africa, to elect representatives to the French National Assembly, followed by internal self-government and finally independence).
Although the process was relatively benign once, as in much of Anglophone Africa, the colonial power accepted the inevitability or the legitimacy of self-determination, colonial administrators were not averse to using baton-wielding, gun-totting and grenade-throwing police regiments to disperse demonstrators and haul leaders to jail to try to moderate their demands, to protect their interests in the colony and control the pace of the reform process. Nevertheless, these evolutionary political processes eventually culminated in the transfer of power to nationalist parties and leaders that succeeded in capturing legislative majorities in winner-take-all (majoritarian) pre-independence elections and the subsequent hoisting of new national flags, one of the three palpable symbols of national sovereignty in post-colonial Africa.
The departing colonialists bequethed to the new African leaders freshly minted liberal democratic constitutions with the usual guarantees of civil and political rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right to political participation through voting and the holding of political office. As well, they left behind Westminster-type parliamentary institutions for Anglophone countries and, for Francophone states, presidential systems. In both cases, emerging legislatures consisted of a governing party and opposition parties in considerably weakened positions especially under the more presidential model of francophone Africa. Despite the preference for centralized systems of governance, some measure of decentralization was also introduced into new constitutions primarily through local government provisions.
The democratic forms of governance that were inherited by African states at independence were not only of the minimalist variety (Mengisteab, 1999), but they were remarkably short-lived. As soon as politically feasible or practicable, they were dismantled and replaced by authoritarian alternatives. The emerging African version of authoritarianism took the peculiar form of neo-patrimonial rule, characterized by personalization of authority, institutionalized relations of loyalty and dependence or construction of patron-client networks, systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual, a stubborn refusal to delegate, let alone share power, the cultivation of a cult of personality and aristocratic effects in both lifestyles and physical appearance, preferably stomachs protruding from "too much eating" (Bayart, 1989), supplemented by appropriation of various honorific titles (praise names), and self-serving representations of leaders as father figures who knew what was best for their extended national households, etc. (Daddieh, 1988; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Forrest, 1998).
The Rise and Fall of the Authoritarian Project
It is noteworthy that one ostensible reason democracy was abandoned was its perceived inability to produce desperately needed developmental outcomes. In fact, the two were regarded as antithetical in the African context. The apparent nationalist disdain for democracy grew out of a rather peculiar understanding of democracy as disputatious or inherently conflictual rather than as a mechanism for mediating competing claims to institutions and resources. During a critical juncture when nation building was a priority goal and time was considered of the essence, especially given Africa's unenviable inheritance at independence, democracy was considered a luxury the continent could ill afford. It was certainly an irritating inconvenience. Rather than allowing African leaders the latitude to cut through the chase or being permissive of timely responses to serious societal problems, democracy was bound to hamstring them through endless, time-consuming, and fruitless debates. Thus, democracy was considered inefficient.
Moreover, given that African societies were riddled with ethnic divisions with the potential for real and grave conflict, they needed to be governed with a firm and steady hand. According to nationalist formulation, democratic liberties would only inflame ethnic rivalries, stimulate ethnic subnational revendications, as had happened in several countries during the runup to independence, and pose a danger to nation-state building or national integration (Ake, 1993; Daddieh, 1998; Ottaway, 1999). The authoritarian alternative proved appealing for another reason. By fostering national integration and maintaining domestic tranquility, African states expected to be spared the ruinous financial and manpower expenses of trying to put out ethnic fires once they had been lit by democratic liberties. The savings could then be used to respond to pressing social needs. The irony is that one looks in vain for evidence of sustained material progress and associated political stability.
Furthermore, it was suggested that democracy was alien to, hence incompatible with, traditional African political culture in which the chiefs or councils of elders embodied the collective interest and decided for their people. While Africa's social pluralism and inherited development deficits make some of these arguments seductive, the latter, in particular, conveniently glossed over Africa's own rich democratic tradition of consensual problem-solving through many hours of discussion or palavers in village squares or in chief's compounds (Daddieh, 1998; Mengisteab, 1999). As the late Claude Ake, one of the most eloquent and persistent voices against authoritarian rule in Africa, had argued:
Traditional African political systems were infused with democratic values. They were invariably patrimonial, and consciousness was communal; everything was everybody's business, engendering a strong emphasis on participation. Standards of accountability were even stricter than in Western societies. Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters, chiefs could be required to go into exile or 'asked to die' (Ake, 1993: 72).
Even if we accept the proposition that Africa's social pluralism poses a serious threat to governance, the antidote, as suggested earlier, is more, rather than less, democracy because, as Ake rightly asserted, "democracy implies precisely the assumption of differences to be negotiated, to be conciliated, to be moved into phases of higher synthesis. If democracy means anything at all, as a form of relationship, that is precisely what it means. If there is social pluralism, that is in fact an argument for a democratic form of governance" (Ake, 1990: 4). Furthermore, it is worth recalling the felicitous phrase of Chinua Achebe that "the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership" (Achebe, 1983:1). Similarly, Ake insists that there is nothing inherently conflictual about ethnic differences. He assigned blame to elites whose manipulation or politicization of ethnic differences in their quest for power and political support has inflamed ethnic passions. According to him, leaders gain an additional advantage from exploiting ethnicity: "Having incited ethnic-based conflict, they then use the threat of such conflict to justify political authoritarianism. Some African leaders enlist this spurious defense to rationalize one-party rule" (Ake, 1993:72).
Ake was at his eloquent best when he remarked that "Somehow these leaders cannot see that repeating this argument after 30 years is precisely its refutation. A treatment applied for 30 years that continues to worsen the illness cannot be right" (Ake, 1993: 73). What is more, Ake argues that Africa's participative culture is incompatible with the authoritarian model. The organic nature of African societies has created a situation in which the burdens and rewards of citizenship are shared, in which nothing is private, not even marriage, not even death. Everything involves the participation of everybody. He concluded, then, that "authoritarianism was much against the grain of African culture and has simply led to dissociation, confusion, and the phenomenon of withdrawal" (Ake, 1990: 3).
That authoritarianism has few defenders in Africa today speaks volumes about its spectacular failure to produce either the developmental outcomes it had promised or the national unity or integration it had sought through the nation building project. Indeed, forty years of authoritarianism had failed to produce a single case of authoritarian developmentalist regimes (growth with development) … la Taiwan, Korea, and China or even authoritarian growth regimes (growth without development or welfare) … la Brazil under the military junta. Instead, about all African neo-patrimonialism managed to do was to nurture authoritarian state elite enrichment regimes (ASEEs), of which the kleptocratic Mobutu state was only the most celebrated example. The latter type of authoritarian regime produced neither growth nor welfare; its main aim was the enrichment of the elite with monopoly control of the state. It was often based on erratic autocratic rule by a supreme leader whose actions may not have made much sense when judged against the standards of formal development goals proferred by the state but are perfectly rational from the perspective of patron-clientelist politics (Sorensen, 1993: 74-80).
Moreover, patron-clientelism as a model of governance is expensive to administer because it relies heavily on state capacity to distribute economic and symbolic goods, combined with careful calibration of bureaucratic and political appointments along ethnic and regional lines in order to maintain loyal support. Thus, the longer term viability of a strategy of distributive politics hinges on a robust economy and the generation of increasingly expanding economic resources, enabling the state to broaden its distribution of economic and job opportunities as well as facilitating the co-optation of key political actors such as heads of corporatist groups and real or imagined dissidents with various offers they could not easily refuse (Woods, 1998).
By the late 1980s, instead of continued economic growth, Africa had been reeling from a decade or more of bad policies, bad government, bad luck (devastating drought and bush fires in the 1970s) and a double whammy of external shocks - unfavorable world market conditions for primary commodities and two devastating oil price hikes at both ends of the 1970s. The resultant economic failures and political instability pushed African states into international receivership, making the continent ripe for external co-optation of its policy making by the international financial institutions, most notably the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, virtually all African countries have been forced to embrace a new economic ideology which represents at the same time a fundamental shift in economic policy making from commandism (state ownership and central economic planning) to neoliberal economic orthodoxy, in a last ditch effort to arrest the deteriorating economic situation. The new policy framework, called structural adjustment programs or SAPs, had been mandated by the Bretton Woods institutions in return for balance of payments and other policy supports.
This package of economic reforms can be summarized as consisting of devaluation, deregulation, and desubsidization, destatization. More broadly, SAPs revolve around the twin conditionalities of trade liberalization and privatization of investment and production aimed at facilitating exports while constraining imports, especially of non-productive consumption goods. They have targeted government finances, aiming to bring them into balance or eliminate chronic budget deficits by subjecting national currencies, considered grossly overvalued almost everywhere, to massive and repeated devaluations as well as establishing more realistic exchange rates, the tightening of money supply, the dismantling of government price controls and import/export regulations, streamlining bloated bureaucracies and unburdening the treasury by retrenching the number of employees on government payrolls, some of whom were simply "ghost workers" while seeking to trim government expenditures through a combination of elimination of government subsidies for basic necessities as well as for education and health care and their replacement with "cost recovery measures" in the form of "user fees" for public services. SAPs have also aimed at not only reducing the size of the state but diminishing its economic role through privatization initiatives (that is, the liquidation of entire state-owned industries or parts thereof and other government assets by auctioning them off to private investors). In sum, SAPs had been designed to discipline a predatory and unruly state, shrink its size and diminish its involvement in the economy, unleash market forces that create incentives for private entrepreneurship, stimulate competition, channel investments into more productive rather than consumptive activities and make African economies more competitive internationally (Daddieh, 1995).
While the IMF and World Bank insist that SAPs have stimulated economic recovery in countries such as Ghana, the model adjusting country since 1983, that have summoned the necessary political will to stay the course, critics have questioned the wisdom and efficacy of adjustment. SAPs imposed short term hardships in anticipation of future economic and social recovery or development. However, critics have charged that the programs have not produced the hoped for panacea. Instead, they have increased the burdens and misery of long suffering vulnerable groups such as children, women and the laboring poor (Olukoshi, 1998). Rather than restructure African economies away from their roles in the international division of labor and toward new and higher forms of production, they have merely reinforced Africa's traditional role and low power status while producing, as Zimbabweans have quipped, "Suffering for African People" (Nyang'oro and Shaw, 1998: 30). It is arguable that given the lacklustre performance of African economies beginning in the seventies and absolute declines in standards of living in the lost decade of the 1980s, African states had little choice but to turn to these International Financial Institutions (IFIs).
At the same time, the programs and the associated external co-optation of African policy making have provoked charges of a re-colonization of Africa and renewed debates about alternative and appropriate frameworks for dealing with Africa's economic problems (ECA, 1989). Given the high stakes involved, it is hardly surprising that the pressures on the states mounted and became more sustained for a new governance alternative (Daddieh, 1996; Olukoshi, 1998).
The Case for Democracy
Whereas the earlier generation of African leaders had viewed democracy and development as antithetical, associated democracy with ethnic conflict resulting in a wastage of limited resources, new African elites and organizations in civil society have taken to the barricades to demand democracy not only for its own sake but for its instrumental value as well. In contrast to the intellectual consensus and state practice of the earlier era, a strong linkage between democracy and development has been vigorously asserted in the post-Cold War era of superpower disinterest and withdrawal (Ake, 1990; 1993a; 1993b; Anyang' Nyong'o, 1987; 1990; Bates, 181; 1990; Holmquist, 1989; Mengisteab and Daddieh, 1999; and Sklar, 1987).
According to the persuasive formulation of Ake (1990: 2), the persistence of underdevelopment is related to lack of democracy in Africa. While democracy is desirable in itself, Africa needs democracy because it would greatly enhance the prospects for development. He attributes the failure of the development project in Africa to political authoritarianism. By engaging in political repression African leaders turned politics into warfare. They then found themselves besieged by a host of hostile forces they had unleashed through their coercion. This resultant state of siege distracted African leaders from paying attention to development which they relegated to a very low priority. Secondly, African governments became disconnected from their people and governed without accountability. "As a result of this, public policy is completely dissociated from social needs and even from developmental relevance. We live in a world of humans not angels. In this very human world, people will not automatically act out the public interest unless they are constrained to do so" (Ake, 1990: 2). Furthermore, the trauma of repeated subjection to arbitrary and coercive rule has turned African societies into a
hostile force to be feared, evaded, cheated and defeated as circumstances permit. They turn their loyalty from the more ecumenical level of the state and localize it in community groups, kinship groups, ethnic associations, or even religious organizations. What is happening in Africa now is in effect the strengthening of the process of the localization of loyalties. We might say that as a result of political repression, we are witnessing, not nation building, not development, but in fact, the dissolution of society (Ake, 1990: 2).
Finally, Ake goes on to argue that repression has caused Africa's human resources, the very engine of development, to be squandered. At the level of the community, it has undermined the peoples' traditional capacity to cope, leaving many of them at different stages of confusion, withdrawal, despair, or silent revolt. The resultant human toll can be seen in the growing multitude of refugees. As many elites have voted with their feet by migrating outside, African countries have lost the bulk of their most capable and talented people. Lamentably, those who have stayed behind have been denied opportunities and room to cultivate their talents for the development of their countries (Ake, 1990: 2-3).
The case for democracy in Africa goes beyond its potential development payoffs. There is a humanistic case to be made for democracy as well. Ake has testified to the horrors of human rights violations perpertrated by the autocratic rule of Nigeria's military. He recounts the fate of a passenger who had the misfortune of jostling a Nigerian military officer in a rush to get on board a plane. The poor soul was beaten mercilessly by aides to the officer, then made to crawl on the tarmac and drink from small pools of accumulated rain water. Then he is kicked repeatedly. At a certain point, one of the two aides beating the man places his shoe on the victim's face,
hands proudly akimbo as he looks around for any murmur of protest. Now this is a common occurrence. I have not talked about the shootings, nor about mass torture chambers, and the dehumanizing punishment and the excruciating pain, trauma and the silent despair of our prisons, of the many who languish and suffer for months and years in pain and agony for charges that are never even made (Ake, 1990: 4).
It has been suggested that the fact repression has not led to rapid rates of growth may only have shown that a particular form of repression is not sufficient and perhaps even not necessary for capitalist accumulation. In itself, the failure of one form of repression does not establish the proposition that democracy might be better. It could be that there are other "structural constraints" that would thwart accumulation in a country regardless of the political regime. Besides, some authoritarian states such as Kenya, C“te d'Ivoire and Malawi (among non-oil producing countries) may have actually produced reasonably stable periods of accumulation since independence, as evidenced by high growth rates almost throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Mkandawire, 1990: 10). In the first place, this oft-repeated assertion mistakenly equates economic growth with development. Secondly, these economic performers also happen to be instances in which the states had exhibited greater accountability to their social base - however narrow this is - when compared to the other one-party regimes and military dictatorships. This confirms the prima facie case made by Robert Bates nearly a decade before Anyang' that where there has been more respect for democratic practices (however minimal) higher rates of growth and more successful models of accumulation have been ensured along with better terms of trade for the peasant producers (Anyang' 1990; Bates, 1981).
Thus, notwithstanding these apparent counter-factual cases that reveal that the authoritarian presidency may have actually produced high growth rates, they cannot be presented as evidence that existing personal rule need only be replaced by more developmental types of personal rule or by the Latin American model of "bureaucratic-authoritarianism", based on a dominant coalition of high level technocrats, senior military officers, and powerful Multinational Corporations(MNCs) in partnership with local entrepreneurs (Mkandawire, 1990: 9). Significantly, political stability, a sine qua non of sustainable development, has eluded them as well. It has been suggested that the inherent brittleness of the authoritarian presidential system gives rise to intra-bourgeois conflicts that are then settled very violently. While such violence has not resulted in a complete rupture of the system, there is no guarantee that this good fortune will continue unless meaningful systemic change occurs, preferably through some democratic opening (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990: 13). Moreover, perhaps because of their brittleness, Anyang' contends that such systems are incapable of promoting such developmental values as equity, social justice, human creativity, etc. Their lack of accountability leads them to misappropriation of public resources and hence low levels of accumulation and development. Were they to have more sense of accountability they would be less likely to impose such models of political repression and economic disaccumulation. Thus, Anyang' concludes that part of the "foundation of every true humane society" is "democracy"; and the "foundation of social creativity" or the "foundation of development" in the modern world must, of necessity, be found in democracy" (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1990: 14; Ake, 1990).
State Disintegration and Nation-State Building: an unfinished nationalist project
The search for structural solutions to the African crisis that are permissive of progressive expansion of civil society, popular or genuine participation, equitable distribution and access to critical economic and social resources, and protection of minority rights brings us full circle to a reexamination of the nationalist project of nation-state building. My colleague and I (Mengisteab and Daddieh, 1999) think that unfinished project is that important and that relevant. And in seeking to nurture sustainable democratic development in Africa, we must be wary of the anti-state ideology that pervades neo-liberal orthodox thinking. An important factor that necessitates state building is the worrisome dangers associated with the state's collapse or disintegration. The civil wars and the shocking human tragedies of Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda occurred with state collapse. Such tragedies can reoccur since many African states are "verging on dissolution" (Zolberg, 1992). Many attribute the failure of state building in Africa to the nature of the state. Presently, the African state is generally considered to be highly centralized, authoritarian, self-serving or serving the interests of what Keller calls "the state class" (Keller, 1991), which includes, the reigning political authorities, the central bureaucracy and its regional functionaries, the top echelons of the military, and members of, where it exists, the dominant political party. The capabilities of the African state in responding to social needs and interests, even when the political will is present, are also limited. Jackson and Rosburg (1982) have, in fact, described African states as states de jure but not de facto. The failure of the state to advance social interest by providing health care, education, and basic infrastructure, and so forth and the increasing surrender of its policy making powers to external agencies have clearly weakened it and undermined its legitimacy among its constituents as well as in the eyes of the global community. Its chronic failure to provide minimum security and to correct the prevailing gross inequalities among ethnic groups has also led to an increase in interethnic conflicts, which, in turn, threaten to bring about the disintegration of the state.
As Shaw (1994) notes, there may be some cases where state disintegration may lead to a more homogeneous and relatively more peaceful small states. However, dividing states along ethnic lines is not feasible since ethnic groups often cohabit. Independence for the Oromo people in Ethiopia or creating independent states for Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi are, for example, unlikely to lead to peaceful coexistence. The decoupling of Eritrea from Ethiopia ended in an apparently peaceful settlement, only to be pulled into an ugly intercine border war recently. Even then, Eritrea is a special case that cannot be easily replicated. In the first place, the Eritrean conflict was not an ethnic conflict. Eritrea also had boundaries clearly demarcated by the colonial state. Although its self-declared independence has not received international recognition yet, Somaliland (the former British Somaliland) also has boundaries delineated by the colonial state.
The collapse of the Somali state also provides a useful lesson that, as long as the root or structural causes of conflict such as uneven access to resources, and uneven distribution of power, are not carefully addressed and mechanisms for economic, political, and social integration of different social entities are not developed, separation of ethnic groups does not prevent conflict (Peck, 1998). Even genuine nation states are likely to experience conflict along regional or even clan lines. Ethnic, religious and cultural homogeneity did not prevent clan conflict in Somalia.
The Dangers of Fragmentation
State disintegration, even if it could be attained peacefully, would also have another problem. In most cases, African countries are already economic midgets. Fragmenting them further through disintegration is likely to worsen the prospects for their economic development. Fragmentation would further weaken their resource base. They are also likely to be too small to support any meaningful industrialization, to attract foreign investments, or to be of any consequence in the emerging global order, although in the long run, state boundaries may gradually cease to be serious obstacles to economic development, if openness is fully attained.
To sum up then, the general crisis confronting Africa has threatened the survival of African societies. It is highly unlikely that their survival and development would be assured without a strong organization locally, regionally and at the level of the state. It must be recalled that it is multiethnic patriotic struggle that liberated Africa from colonial rule. The same kind of struggle together, coupled with a real commitment to new regionalism/functionalism (Lavergne and Daddieh, 1997; Nyang'oro and Shaw, 1998), is absolutely essential now in liberating Africa from its present crisis in the emerging global order. However, the state cannot be strengthened without transforming its nature from self-serving to one that advances social interests. Strengthening the state also requires developing mechanisms for accommodating the interests of different ethnic groups and integrating them politically, economically, and socially. Such interethnic accommodation and integration are prerequisites for broad based mobilization of resources to overcome Africa's general crisis.
Relations Between Democracy and State Building
Given the anti-state ideology of the new global order, the inequalities globalization generates, the built-in economy of affection, nepotism, and corruption that characterize African countries, and the ethnic and religious tensions that are rampant throughout the continent, state building is certain to be a difficult process in Africa. Historically, state building preceded democratization and was generally accomplished by coercive means through conquests or resistance to conquests. Referring to nationalism and state building in nineteenth century Europe, Lewis Namier (in Schwarz, 1995) notes that "states are not created or destroyed, and frontiers redrawn or obliterated, by arguments and majority votes; nations are freed, united, or broken by blood and iron, and not by a generous application of liberty." Economic interdependence, homogenization through education and administrative penetration, and democratic arrangements have, however, consolidated state building. In the African case, the colonial state imposed the boundaries of states without creating the economic, political and social conditions for the consolidation of the state or for homogenizing national entities. The post-independence state attempted, as former president Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (in Neuberger, 1994: 235; see also Ottaway, 1999) noted, "to create nations from the sprawling artifacts the colonialists carved out." It is clear that the post-independence state has failed in this nationalist project. In a number of countries, such as the Sudan and Zaire, the state is even proving to be too weak to maintain the colonial creations by means of coercion although colonial boundaries have not yet disappeared. The current global democratization and growing concerns with human rights violations and refugees has also made the option of state building by means of coercion less viable. As a result, state building has become fused with democratization.
This fusion has serious implications for the manner in which the process of state building can take place as well as to the nature of democracy. In regards to state building, it implies that integrating the disparate groups and determining the relations between them and the state can only be accomplished through collective decisions of all the parties involved. Democracy entails empowering the general population to control decision making. As such, it implies that integration of ethnic groups with each other to form a state would need to be on voluntary basis and on carefully negotiated terms that are acceptable to all of them. It also implies that if such agreements are not reached, the option of secession is available to ethnic groups. For this reason democratization may involve the risk of accelerating state disintegration (Ottaway, 1995). However, few ethnonationalist movements in Africa have demanded to form their own states (Scarritt, 1993). Even movements such as the Sudan's People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the Sudan and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia have not sought secession as the only solution to their cases. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in South Africa has also clearly rejected independence. Thus, democratization appears to pose much less risk to state building than not democratizing.
The process of state building through the affirmation of the rights of nations may be viewed as reinforcement of national loyalties which may undermine the effort towards building "nation-states" (Neuberger, 1994). However, the aim of building a nation-state out of a multination state is an unrealistic goal. The countries that were believed to have succeeded in this process have not been all that successful. The United Kingdom, France, and Spain, for example, can hardly be regarded as nation-states (Connor, 1994). The aim of state building should thus be a realistic one that integrates different nations to form a workable and peaceful multination state. Its aim should not be to transfer the loyalties of citizens from the nation to the state but to minimize conflict between the nation and the state and among nations.
The fusion between state building and democractic development also implies that the nature of democracy is subject to the outcomes of the agreements and negotiated compromises among the disparate groups. The levels of centralization/decentralization of power, the question of how to manage the relations between minority and majority ethnic groups, and what electoral systems to adopt are highly contentious issues. The demarcation between the spheres of the private and public decisions, for example, how much state intervention in economic activity is acceptable is also a difficult issue that has to be settled by agreement among the different parties to state building. This suggests that African countries may have to invent their own version of democracy as Sklar (1987) notes. The forms of democracy that exist in other countries, such as those of the West, are unlikely to be suitable for their conditions. This does not suggest that democracy is to be reduced to power sharing among ethnic groups or establishing other mechanisms that govern relations among ethnic groups. It also establishes rules that govern relations among social classes.
While democracy does not equalize the influence of different social classes on the state, it mitigates the domination of the state by the elite by providing the lower classes a collective voice. Democracy also governs relations among individuals and protects citizens from excesses by the state. In other words, democracy can be organized in such a way that rights of nations can be safeguarded without subjugating the rights of individuals and social classes, just as much as rights of states and those of individuals can be reasonably maintained simultaneously. The elections that are currently taking place in different African countries are important. However, if they do not quickly address the issues of state building and the type of democratization compatible with it, they are likely to advance neither state building nor democratization, especially in the countries where ethnic tensions are high.
The specific arrangements that deal with the contentious issues of democratization and state building are likely to vary from country to country since the balance of power among ethnic and social classes in African countries differs considerably. However, given the similarities of the ethnic problems and malintegration of economic sectors that these countries face, the approaches that deal with these problems are not likely to be very dissimilar.
As we ( Mengisteab and Daddieh, 1999) concluded in our recent collection of essays, there is agreement that democracy and state building have become closely intertwined and fused with development, not just economic growth. It is, for example, strongly shared that democratization makes the state more transparent and transforms its nature to become more responsive to social needs. This transformation, in turn, strengthens the state both by enhancing its legitimacy and by integrating different national entities. And so we end where we began. As Holmquist (1989: 53) has noted, the apparent exhaustion of authoritarian routes to the developmental state has brought us back to where we started, to democratic forms of accountability and transparency as the only means to disciplining unruly ruling classes and regimes.
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40. Nleya, P. T. Improving the Computer Literacy of Young People: The Case of Botswana. T.H.E. Journal Online 25(6), Jan. 1998. Aug 17, 2002,.
http://www.thejournal.com/magazine/vault/A1989.cfm.
The piece outlines the goals of the revised National Policy on Education, which seeks to prepare Botswana, located in south-central South Africa, for the transition to an industrial economy driven by information technology.
Dr. P.T. Nleya is an engineering professor in the Department of Educational Technology at the University of Botswana.
Computers are becoming more and more common in all aspects of life. More jobs require applicants to be familiar with computers. As this technology achieves prevalence in everyday life and in the workplace, the use of computers has gained in importance. Botswana, like other countries, has recognized the need to increase the technological background of its people to better compete in world markets.
The revised National Policy on Education is designed to prepare Botswana, located in south-central South Africa, for the transition to an industrial economy driven by information technology. Computers - when used in education - encourage the development of problem solving, analytical and research skills. The National Policy on Education therefore calls for the inclusion of a Computer Awareness programme in all Community Junior Secondary Schools and tertiary institutions.
Information Handling Skills
The introduction of the programme within the Education Structure ensures a basic level of computer competence for most, and in the long run all, young people throughout Botswana. Tomorrow's world is one where information handling skills will be necessary to improve the standards of learning and living. The Computer Awareness programme aims to incorporate a section on Telecommunications later, so that students can communicate with others via the giant electronic network known as the Internet.
The development of the Computer Awareness programme for the Community Junior Secondary Schools was prompted by recommendations made by the National Policy on Education of 1994. Consultants reached out to a variety of stakeholders to define a comprehensive syllabus. The programme seeks to acquaint pupils to the use of computers as tools to increase productivity and automate tasks commonly found in the workplace. For example, unlike a typewritten document, a word-processed document can be corrected without retyping it. The programme intends to provide basic computer knowledge and literacy, not immediately produce computer experts. As a result, students could pursue future studies in computer science without being intimidated.
Ten-Year Basic Education Programme
Rather than offer a stand-alone programme, schools infuse Computer Awareness into other subjects in the curriculum, organized into the following modules: Word Processing, Spreadsheets and Databases. These Productivity Tools are not taught during specified times but presented over a period of time. Upon completion of the Ten-Year Basic Education Programme, students are expected to have acquired or developed:
- Competency and confidence in the application of computational skills in order to solve day-to-day problems.
- An understanding of business, commercial transactions and entrepreneurial skills.
- Critical thinking, problem solving, interpersonal and inquiry skills.
- Desirable attitudes towards different types of work and the ability to assess personal achievement and capabilities realistically in pursuit of appropriate career opportunities and/or further education.
- Knowledge of food production and industrial arts for self-reliance and self-sufficiency.
- An awareness of significance of computers in the workplace.
- Respect for the environment and information about preserving and utilizing natural resources.
- Familiarity with their culture including languages, traditions, ceremonies, customs and social norms.
- An ability to express themselves clearly in English, Setswana and a third language, both orally and in writing.
- Basic knowledge of science and the laws governing the natural world.
- Good moral and health practices that will prepare them for responsible family and community life.
- Special interests, whether these be related to physical strength, intellect or artistic talents.
An appreciation of technology and technological skills.
Government Supports Efforts
The Task Force responsible for the Computer Awareness syllabus identified the Macintosh computer as the most appropriate system for education. Four geographical zones were established to provide maintenance.
To date, the Faculties of Social Science, Humanities and Education have implemented courses that contain Computer Awareness modules. Recent policies from the government of Botswana indicate strong support for the these efforts to improve technology literacy among the population.
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