http://www.odi.org.uk/pdn/papers/39d.pdf
PASTORALISTS, PARAVETS AND PRIVATISATION: EXPERIENCES IN THE SANAAG REGION OF SOMALILAND
Andy Catley
INTRODUCTION
The civil war in Somalia between 1988 and 1991 resulted in considerable loss of human life and destruction of local infrastructure and government services throughout the country. In August 1991 ACTIONAID, in collaboration with VETAID, visited Sanaag region in the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland. The purpose of this visit was to identify priorities for rehabilitation and development in Sanaag and assess the feasibility of ACTIONAID becoming operational in the region. As a result, ACTIONAID opened an office in the regional capital Erigavo in 1992 and decided to focus its activities in the water and animal health sectors. A veterinarian was seconded from VETAID to manage the
ACTIONAID/VETAID Animal Health Programme (AHP).
This paper describes some of the work of the AHP in Sanaag between 1992 and 1994. The paper focuses on the design of a paravet system. It describes how an evaluation of the AHP led to plans to establish private veterinary pharmacies and encourage links between these pharmacies and paravets. Issues related to the ‘privatisation’ of primary veterinary services for pastoralists in Sanaag and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa are discussed.
BACKGROUND AND PROJECT AIMS
Sanaag is an isolated semi-arid region in the north east of Somaliland covering approximately 60000km2 (Figure 1). The topography of the region is varied and includes a narrow coastal strip, a dramatic mountain escarpment up to 2000m high, and an area of high plains and valleys. Livestock production based on pastoral systems is fundamentally important to the regional economy. Animals are exchanged for grain and the sale of stock (and particularly sheep) to the Gulf states is now well established. In recent years pastoralists around the regional capital of Erigavo have adopted more sedentary lifestyles, shifting from subsistence to more commercialised modes of production. This transition has been encouraged by the
unregulated private ownership of land in the north of the region, where the open plains favour sheep rearing (Prior 1994). Production systems in the southern areas of Sanaag involve greater livestock mobility and rely more heavily on camels and
mixed herds.
Figure 1. Sanaag Region
Between 1992 and 1994 no formal government structures existed in Sanaag. The local community was represented by the quurti, a traditional council of elders representing the lineages of the various clans in the region. In the initial feasibility study, ACTIONAID worked directly with the quurti, who later selected a subcommittee of nine elders to collaborate with the programme. This group of elders, called the NGO Committee, acted as a link between the local community in Sanaag and ACTIONAID. The structure of the quurti and other aspects of social organisation are described by Farah (1993).
Because of disputes between rival clans, the security situation in Sanaag was still unstable in 1992. Disagreements arose due to the mixed clan origins of people in Sanaag and the subsequent struggle for control of rangeland resources (Bradbury 1993). Although many of the disputes were settled during a reconciliation meeting in Erigavo in October 1993, ACTIONAID programme staff were constantly at risk of looting or assault and their work was punctuated by a number of security incidents, forcing setbacks and delays.
When the AHP began in May 1992 its aim was to improve food security in Sanaag by establishing a primary animal health care service based on a network of paravets. The paravet approach was considered to be appropriate because of the relative isolation of the region, the very poor infrastructure, and the absence of Somali veterinarians (although some veterinary assistants were present in the region1). Also, it was thought that a paravet system would best incorporate local knowledge of livestock ailments and would, therefore, be specifically suited to the production systems used in the area.
PROJECT DESIGN
The AHP was based on a network of 30 paravets who were trained and linked to ex-Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MLFR) veterinary staff and facilities. The three district veterinary department buildings in the region were rehabilitated and four ex-MLFR veterinary assistants and other personnel were encouraged to form new District Veterinary Departments. These departments received a monthly grant of US$450 from the AHP and the veterinary assistants were trained as trainers of paravets. Paravets were selected for training by the quurti in Erigavo.
The feasibility study conducted by VETAID/ACTIONAID in Sanaag indicated that herders considered the most important livestock health problems to be caused by helminths (worms) and ticks, and AHP activities focused on the control of these parasites. The project also trained paravets to treat trypanosomiasis in camels, and to use antibiotics for a range of bacterial and other diseases (Table 1). In order to understand local perceptions and descriptions of other livestock ailments, the AHP
formulated a ‘pastoralist dictionary’ for livestock diseases and causal agents (Catley and Mohammed 1995) and documented the use of indigenous disease control strategies and plant remedies.
Distributing medicines to the paravets and monitoring their work was the responsibility of the District Veterinary Departments. Monitoring took the form of monthly reports by the paravets which detailed the name and location of the livestock owner, the number of each species of animal treated, the diagnosis, the quantities of medicines sold and the amount of money collected. ACTIONAID supplied drugs to the District Veterinary Departments.
From the onset of the AHP, livestock owners had to pay for veterinary drugs and the cost of each item was agreed in meetings with the NGO Committee.
this early stage of the project the plan was to create a ‘reserve fund’ from the revenue gained from drug sales but also to support the paravets by allowing them to retain a proportion of the money collected (70 %). The NGO Committee was responsible for the collection and maintenance of money in the reserve fund. In addition to paravet training and supply of veterinary medicines the AHP also collected information on other factors affecting animal health in Sanaag, particularly range management. However, the programme was unable to address these wider issues because of the political sensitivity over control of rangeland at the time.
Table 1. Animal health problems covered by paravet training in Sanaag.
Health problem Local Name Veterinary medicine supplied
Intestinal helminthiasis Caal dabahawiye Levamisole drench and bolus
Oxfendazole drench and bolus
Tick infestation and tickborne
disease
Also physical diseases:
- Skin wounds
- Lameness
- Horn damage
Tick paralysis (camels)
Shilin
Nabar
Boog
Gees
Muglo
1% Flumethrin pour-on
1% Deltamethrin pour-on
Trypanosomiasis - camels Dhukaan
Suuqiye
Gendhi
‘Cymelarsen’ (injection)
Diseases caused by bacteria
and mycoplasmas, including
- Footrot
- Contagious caprine
- Pleuropneumonia
Boog
Sambam
20% Oxytetracycline injection
Catley, Pastoralists, Paravets and Privatisation 5
PROJECT EVALUATION
Six months into the AHP a security incident in Erigavo forced the temporary withdrawal of expatriate staff and prompted an evaluation of the project. At this stage it was already apparent to project staff that they had been unable to monitor the project effectively. For example, although the paravets noted the number of animals treated for each disease in their monthly reports, this information did not directly relate to the aim of the project % i.e. to improve food security. Therefore, a description of the AHP’s achievements had to be based on the numbers of animals treated by the paravets. This information was of limited value in an area where estimates of the livestock population were probably unreliable and data on the incidence of the diseases in question were limited. Although ACTIONAID collected data on livestock and grain prices at local markets, this information could not be related to the activities of the AHP.
In addition to these problems, even ACTIONAID’s basic recording system failed to run smoothly. Written agreements between the project and the District Veterinary Departments detailed the responsibility of the departments to collect monthly reports from the paravets and provide ACTIONAID with accounts. ACTIONAID reserved the right to withhold drug supplies at any time at its own discretion. In practice, these agreements were almost meaningless due to the lack of accountability of the Department staff. For example, when a veterinary assistant absconded with one month’s supply of medicines, neither the NGO Committee nor ACTIONAID was able to recover the loss because the individual concerned was
supported by his clan. Furthermore, the retention of drugs in the AHP stores provoked threats of security incidents against the programme. In this situation, the AHP had to either ignore the irregularities which occurred or withdraw from the area.
When evaluating the cost-recovery system for veterinary medicines used by the AHP it was apparent that in real terms the cost of veterinary drugs to herders was between 42% and 89% of the actual cost (including freight and insurance) depending on the item. Following payments to paravets, the true cost recovery of the system was only 13 % to 27 % of that required to purchase further supplies. By December 1992 a number of important questions had arose regarding the future of the project (Hadrill 1992):
_ How effective was the paravet system in terms of making a basic diagnostic and curative service available to herders?
_ Was the AHP addressing the most important livestock diseases?
_ Could herders afford to buy the medicines being offered by the paravets? How did herders value veterinary services?
2 For example, the sale of one sheep to buy medicine to treat a sick camel was often stated as a fair price for the medicine. One herder explained that this was similar to a local remedy which involved the slaughter of a goat to make broth for a sick camel.
_ How sustainable was the AHP considering the relatively low cost recovery for veterinary medicines achieved by the present system?
_ What were the alternatives, if any, to modern veterinary drugs? In an attempt to answer these questions, a series of data collection exercises were conducted in some of the main grazing areas of Sanaag. An effort was made to contact herders who had access to a paravet and also groups who were not reached by the project. The AHP team travelled on foot and collected information using group discussions (with groups consisting of 20 people or more) and various RRA techniques. For example, livestock disease scoring exercises enabled herders to prioritise disease problems and explain the reasoning behind their decisions (Catley and Mohammed 1994). These exercises indicated how specific animal diseases affected the value of stock and reduced productivity. They also showed how the treatment of such diseases was cost effective even when veterinary medicines were sold at commercial rates. Reduced milk or meat production affected local consumption of these products whereas reduced value of animals hindered the exchange of livestock for rice at the market. Further exercises with brokers at livestock markets showed which diseases were most important in terms of worsening the terms of trade for herders.
In addition to this work, the programme also conducted a study on private trade in veterinary medicines in Sanaag and Somaliland and interviewed livestock traders and businessmen. The main findings from these two studies were:
_ The large demand for basic veterinary services in Sanaag was not met by the existing AHP. The number of paravets and the quantities of medicines supplied to each paravet were insufficient.
_ Herders were willing to pay the full price of veterinary medicines.2
_ For some areas visited, paravet activities were localised around villages. Herders on the range claimed to be unaware of the paravets’ activities; representation of herders by urban-based elders was considered to be poor.
_ Other paravets were found to be working effectively and were much appreciated by their communities. Usually these paravets kept their own animals and travelled on the range.
_ Those herders who did not have access to a paravet produced clear and logical criteria for selecting someone for training. These criteria included Catley, Pastoralists, Paravets and Privatisation 7 honesty, ability to read and write, good livestock knowledge, well known and respected, strong and able to walk long distances and good tempered.
_ Herders also proposed methods for supporting paravets in the absence of direct financial support from ACTIONAID. The two ideas most frequently stated were that paravets could add a service charge when selling drugs or the community selecting the paravet could pay them an incentive or salary.
_ An active trade in veterinary medicines existed in Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao (the three main towns in Somaliland): the main constraints to this trade were the provision of free or subsidised medicines by aid agencies and a lack of knowledge about medicines amongst traders.
These findings indicated that a major redesign of the AHP was required.
REDESIGN OF THE ANIMAL HEALTH PROGRAMME: POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATISATION OF THE PARAVET SYSTEM
The results of discussions with both herders and Somali traders, as detailed above, suggested that the AHP should either move rapidly towards a full cost recovery system for veterinary medicines or aim to replace ACTIONAID with private traders as the main supplier of veterinary drugs.
The final decision over which of these options to choose was heavily influenced by two factors. First, the new district Veterinary Departments supported by the AHP were unable to manage themselves effectively and their staff were involved with the programme for personal gain only. Reporting and accountability were inadequate, and most of the money collected from the sale of veterinary drugs and intended for the reserve fund had disappeared. Although written agreements
existed between the AHP and the Veterinary Departments, neither ACTIONAID nor the NGO Committee were able to recover the lost funds. Furthermore, as the AHP lacked capacity to manage rather than simply advise the district veterinary departments, the involvement of these departments in the project seemed to be increasingly untenable. One of the departments was actually disbanded by the quurti in early 1994.
Second, no qualified Somali veterinarians were resident in Sanaag at the time of this work. Elsewhere in Somaliland, ICRC had organised workshops with local veterinarians and veterinary assistants to discuss the development of animal health services following the completion of the ICRC emergency programme. In particular, these meetings focused on the potential for ‘privatisation’ of veterinary services in Somaliland and the establishment of private veterinary practices. This approach was supported by the National Charter of the new Somaliland Government which advocated privatisation of services.
Considering the AHP’s own studies, the results of the ICRC workshops, and the attitude of the Somaliland Government, the best option available to the AHP was to encourage the establishment of private outlets for veterinary medicines in Sanaag, and link the paravets to these outlets. This work was planned to coincide
with a ‘Veterinary Services Support Project’ coordinated by CARE in other regions of Somaliland.
The redesigned VETAID/ACTIONAID AHP aimed to base its activities on the range and work directly with pastoral communities to select, train and establish support mechanisms for paravets. The programme also aimed to continue to investigate local strategies for animal disease control and treatment, and incorporate this information into the paravet training curriculum. The ‘privatisation’ aspect of veterinary services was addressed by proposing the
establishment of veterinary pharmacies in each district and the offer of training in pharmacy management; the programme aimed to link veterinary assistants with traders to combine technical knowledge of veterinary drugs with business
experience. Paravets would then be encouraged to develop links with the pharmacies. The involvement of the ex-MLFR veterinary assistants in this process was encouraged; the programme avoided the provision of any resources to the District Veterinary Departments in 1994.
Between December 1993 and January 1994 the initial stages of the ‘privatisation’ plan for veterinary services in Sanaag were implemented. Individuals or groups who were interested in this aspect of the AHP had to be supported by the NGO Committee and the following assistance was proposed:
_ The one-time sale of veterinary drugs by ACTIONAID to veterinary assistants/traders at cost price to act as a ‘kick start.’
_ The revenue obtained by the AHP from the above sales to be used to maintain a store of veterinary drugs for use in emergencies.
_ To assist communication between traders and veterinary pharmaceutical suppliers overseas by use of facsimile and E-mail facilities at ACTIONAID Djibouti.
_ To provide information on the quality, quantity, and type of medicines required, together with training in the correct storage and use of medicines.
_ To provide a basic banking facility such as the provision of letters of credit for traders.
_ To organise meetings in Sanaag between local traders and representatives from the major veterinary pharmaceutical suppliers in the region.
_ To arrange workshops for the veterinary assistants/traders and paravets to develop drug supply systems to rural areas.
_ To monitor the privatisation process.
For project monitoring it was decided to focus more on food security issues in relation to animal disease control. RRA work with herders had shown that they considered production factors such as milk and meat production to be important when scoring both livestock species (Mohammed and Catley 1994) and livestock diseases (Catley and Mohammed 1994; Catley and Mohammed 1996). It seemed reasonable to conclude that control of those problems which reduced milk or meat production, skin or sale value, or caused mortality of livestock, might improve food security. Despite ACTIONAID’s requirement for progress reports to be based on quantitative data, during 1993%94 the AHP planned to include RRA exercises (and
specifically livestock disease scoring) in the monitoring process. It was hoped that disease scoring exercises conducted with herders before and after paravet selection would provide information on the effectiveness of the paravet in reducing the incidence of the main animal diseases, and also how these diseases affected productivity.
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS
When considering the AHP between 1992 and 1994 it should be restated that no effective national or local government existed in Somaliland during this period. Local traditional institutions such as the quurti in Sanaag were not accustomed to working with NGOs and considerable time was invested in developing a good relationship between the AHP, quurti and NGO Committee. The resources available to the AHP, both in terms of trained staff and materials, were limited
considering the size of the target area.
Despite these difficulties, the work of the AHP in Sanaag indicated that the establishment of a basic veterinary service involving small private pharmacies linked to paravets was a realistic proposition. Pharmacies selling human medicines already existed in the region. Veterinary assistants involved with the new veterinary pharmacies could provide a secondary/referral service for the paravets in the field. One of the problems predicted with this system was the lack of formal regulation of the importation and use of veterinary medicines and the lack of trained veterinarians in Sanaag. To some extent this concern was offset by the knowledge that news of medicines which were not effective or had been diluted by pharmacies before sale would travel quickly across the range. Also, herders were aware of the advantages of purchasing ‘quality’ products in sealed containers and they were rightly suspicious of unlabelled items or broken packaging. The training
of more paravets in 1994 would improve awareness of correct usage of veterinary medicines and the project already produced and distributed, via the paravets, illustrated leaflets in Somali describing the correct use of the veterinary medicines available in Sanaag. It was anticipated that this activity would be expanded as the new private outlets for medicines emerged.
The work with herders and traders during the evaluation of the project showed that both of these groups were interested in ‘privatisation’ of veterinary services. Even herders with relatively small herds of around 40 sheep and goats seemed ready to purchase medicines at much higher prices than those proposed by the NGO Committee when the project began. This attitude had much in common with that of pastoralists in Bay Region (Al-Najim 1991) and the Central Rangelands of Somalia (Zessin et al. 1993). Therefore, the future activities of the AHP included a complete cessation of the supply of subsidised veterinary medicines to Sanaag. By collaborating with other aid agencies it was hoped that free or subsidised drugs would no longer be available in Somaliland as this situation would undermine attempts by traders to set up pharmacies. A few other points are worth mentioning in connection with privatisation of basic veterinary services:
_ Opponents of plans to liberalise supply of veterinary products are often veterinarians who claim that lessening their control over drug distribution will result in ‘misuse’. A possible failing of this argument is that in developed countries problems such as anthelmintic and antibiotic resistance might be associated with intensification of livestock production systems. At present there is little evidence to suggest that curative or strategic use of
veterinary products by paravets or pastoralists using extensive production systems will result in drug resistance, although the situation will require monitoring.
_ If private paravet-type systems emerge in pastoral areas, veterinarians could be involved in supervision of paravets, monitoring drug usage and the establishment of disease surveillance systems. However, it is not always apparent that trained vets are willing to work outside urban centres.
_ It was likely that in the absence of the AHP in Sanaag, Somali traders with limited technical knowledge would import veterinary medicines for sale to pastoralists; local entrepreneurs recognised that a potential market for these products existed. Training of traders and paravets was a key component of the 1994 AHP plan; paravet training focused on correct use of drugs as their ability to diagnose the main diseases was already well developed.
_ Elsewhere in the region privatisation of veterinary services has been advocated. For example, Wario Godana (1993) called for support of independent paravets in Ethiopia and privatisation of the veterinary drug supply.
The civil war in Somalia was an appalling tragedy and, at the time of writing, the south of the country was still unsettled. Despite this, recovery of trade, markets and livestock in Somaliland and northern Somalia has been rapid and the exchange of animals for grain or hard currency now controls the economy. However, elsewhere in the Horn of Africa the results of prolonged conflict continue to affect pastoralists and may limit their ability to sustain private animal health services based on imported veterinary medicines. In these areas, a more innovative and patient approach to primary veterinary services may be required, including increased recognition of local methods of animal disease control and treatment.
‘Indigenous technical knowledge’ threatens to become little more than jargon in NGO project proposals unless serious efforts are made to not only document local skills, but also test, apply and share them.
CONCLUSIONS
In concluding the privatisation discussion, AHP plans to support the sale of veterinary medicines at commercial rates were based on interviews with pastoralists on the range. In Sanaag, herders recognised the cost-benefit of curative treatment of livestock diseases and even those people with smaller herds were ready to pay for veterinary medicines % the problem was one of availability of veterinary services rather than cost. This approach was supported by both discussions with Somali traders and the National Charter of the Somaliland government.
Regarding the institutional approach of the AHP, plans for 1993%94 included efforts to consolidate the relationship between the project and the NGO Committee. This committee, selected by the traditional council of elders in Sanaag, played an
essential role in establishing the AHP. They explained the work and approach of the project to the local community and helped to safeguard project staff. While continuing to work with the NGO Committee, the AHP also aimed to involve herders more directly in the selection of paravets and identification of local veterinary priorities.
In terms of setting objectives and project monitoring it was felt that the AHP made some progress in understanding the relationship between animal disease and the food security of pastoralists in Sanaag. The project was able to focus on those diseases which both herders and programme staff considered to be important, and could justify this approach by describing the economic and production losses which herders might incur if sick animals were not treated; even minor illnesses could render an animal unsuitable for exchange for rice. For monitoring work the AHP planned to use a more qualitative approach which incorporated herders’ perceptions of animal disease and utilised their considerable knowledge of animal health and husbandry.
REFERENCES
Mohammed, A.A. and Catley, A. (1994) Livestock Species Scoring: An Example from Sanaag Region, Somaliland. VETAID, Edinburgh.
Al-Najim, M.N. (1991) Changes in the Species Composition of Pastoral Herds in Bay Region, Somalia. ODI Pastoral Development Network, Paper 31b.
Bradbury, M. (1993) ‘Livestock are the growing grass’ % Some Questions and Thoughts on Range Management Issues in Sanaag of Somaliland. VETAID, Edinburgh.
Catley, A.P. and Mohammed, A.A. (1994) The Use of Livestock Disease Scoring in the Design and Monitoring of an Animal Health Programme in Sanaag Region, Somaliland. VETAID, Edinburgh.
Catley, A.P. and Mohammed, A.A. (1995) Ethnoveterinary Knowledge in Sanaag Region, Somaliland: Notes on Local Descriptions of Livestock Diseases and Parasites. Nomadic Peoples 36, in press.
Catley, A.P. and Mohammed, A.A. (1996) Use of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Tools for Investigating Tick Ecology and Tick-Borne Disease in Somaliland. Tropical Animal Health and Production, in press.
Farah, A.Y. (1993) Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation. ACTIONAID, London.
Hadrill, D. (1992) Report on the Sanaag Animal Health Programme. VETAID, Edinburgh.
Prior, J. (1994) Pastoral Development Planning. Oxfam, Oxford.
Wario Godana (1993) Veterinary Services in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia: Constraints and Options for Improvement. In: Conference on Pastoralism in Ethiopia. Ministry of Agriculture, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Zessin, K%H., Heuer, C. and Schrecke, W. (1993) The Central Rangelands Development Project (CRDP) % Veterinary Component. In: Pastoral Production in Central Somalia. Deutsche Gessellschaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn.
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/papers/25/384.pdf
25th WEDC Conference, Addis Ababa, 1999
Water Supply in Somaliland
Osman A. Farah, Somalia
THE ISSUE OF the provision of water is a valid and worthwhile endeavor, and presents an enormous challenge to the international aid agencies and the local authorities in Somaliland. Over the past seven years, there have been continuous efforts on the part of the international organizations and the local authorities to meet this challenge.
Many of them who have been involved, have found that a tangible progress in this field is by no means simple and depends on more than just the allocation of funds for the rehabilitation of existing water sources, or the construction of new ones. Problems have been experienced in the selection of appropriate technologies, the operation, and maintenance,
the administration, organizational aspects, finance, and with the achievement of health and other related benefits. Nevertheless, reports from some international agencies some times create highly misleading impressions, as they ignore the large numbers of sources functioning inadequately or not at all. Although consensus on the underlying causes of these problems could be hard to achieve amongst the various actors and stakeholders, I would venture here to point out that the major constraint in Somaliland on the development of water in general, and to the rural water in particular is the “ Lack of proper
Management Organization”. A good example, which could shed some light in the matter, is the experience from a water program funded by the EU and implemented by Caritas Switzerland in the Hargeisa region of Somaliland.
In The Field Of Water/Sanitation Caritas Switzerland (SwissGroup) was operational in Somaliland, from Sep. 95 to March ’97 under Caritas funding. The project concentrated on the punctual rehabilitation of strategic water resources in Sool region and Hargeisa district. The project realized 23 punctual mini-projects comprising of: shallow wells, spring wells, berkads, Balleys, and flood protection rehabilitation, and support to a wells/water technology workshop, and a drought mitigation activity, etc. SINCE May 1997 Caritas have also been implementing a program for the Rehabilitation and Improvements of Shallow, Ground and Surface Water Sources in the Rural Areas of Hargeisa Region - Somaliland” funded by the 6th and 7th European Development Fund. The project was thematically focused to the rural areas of Hargeisa Region, comprising of 40 concrete lined shallow wells for farm irrigation, 53 family owned berkads, rehabilitation of 2 dams, 1 flood protection structure, a masonry reservoir tank and pipes for two cooperative farms, 12 communal shallow wells for agro-pastoralists, 1 spring protection structure, 1
subsurface dam structure, and a support to a wells/water technology workshop (on tooling and training on roof run off harvesting techniques). The project was also having a component of capacity building focused on the institutional development of one partner NGO, skills upgrading, and a water quality surveillance program.
The main aims and objectives being to: a) Increase water security quantitatively in the rural districts of Hargeisa region. b). Ensure that water sources at the rehabilitation sites are protected from pollution. c). Elaborate and develop the local institutional and community framework; i.e. with the final aim to have a sustainable community based rural water Supply.
During the planning period of these project consultations and collaboration has been made with the local government of the region, The Ministry of water and Mineral resources, and the elders of the respective locations. Implementation was done through 3 prominent local NGOs, while supervision was done by SwissGroup. In an agreement with the community elders, their contribution to the project funds was 25% in kind (unskilled labour, water for construction, watchmen, storage of materials etc), and SwissGroup contribution was 75% to cover skilled labour, materials, transport, supervision and
administration costs of the implementing NGO. It was also agreed with the community leaders, that they would be responsible to look after, maintain, and manage the rehabilitated water sources after their completion.
Physically, successful projects have been accomplished, and have been evaluated by an external evaluator, but internally SwissGroup and the implementing agencies have later realized that there have been shortfalls in the sustainable management of the water sources by the respective communities. The ownership, community participation, the operation, maintenance, and other related aspects, which are important for the sustainability of water sources, came into question.
After several field visits, meetings, and discussions between SwissGroup, and the three local agencies, it became clear that the issue of proper community management of water sources is essential for any water project, and needs a strategy for planning, and establishment of a software program, as a component in the rehabilitation programs, so as to achieve a proper community participation, and management, in the rural water projects.
In the light of that, two consultants have been appointed by SwissGroup to conduct an assessment on projects implemented earlier in three villages of the project area. The three locations were selected for their different geographical, social, environmental, and water usage, two locations with Communal shallow wells, and one location with privately owned Berkads.
The assessment focused mainly on the community participation levels during the projects preparation, implementation, and after the completion of water projects carried out in these three village.
The three locations, having their different characteristics in the economical, social and geographical terms, as well as water sources, has been visited by the consultants, to independently meet and discuss with the communities, the technical and the management aspects during the preparation, implementation, and after completion of the rehabilitation works. In particular, the assessment addressed the roles taken in the past by the local NGOs, SwissGroup, and the communities in the overall realization of these projects, and the positive and negative results that has been achieved. The assessment has also looked into the capacities, awareness, and opinions of the community leaders and
their members as beneficiaries, and managers of their water sources.
Findings: The wells were not having sufficient water during the dry season for the villagers and the periodic migrant nomads. Wells dry up quickly in the morning hours, which force people to get water form other nearby contaminated sources. Covers of wells were broken. This was the result of misuse by the nomads and a delicate make, and has resulted children to throw objects into wells and hence contaminate the water. Lack of ownership sense was observed.
Villagers regarded the wells as common sources
to everyone, since it is donated by an organization. The village elders attend to their livestock rearing activities and the wells were left to the mercy of the passing nomads and children. At the well sites, the major problem at the time of conducting the evaluation was malaria; water scarcity was not their major problem. This was contrary to the initial
need assessment, which earlier stated water hardship in the location. The privately owned berkads were fenced, well kept, and repaired by the owners, but were the breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Malaria has been their major problem, and contaminated water was their next problem, due to the use of improper extraction methods, lack of hygiene awareness and the lack of covering for the Berkads.
The Berkads were not sufficient to provide water throughout the dry three-month season. Surface water reservoirs (Balleys) were required as a supplement for watering livestock.
The analysis of these findings clearly showed:
• Resource driven approach used by the NGOs: - It became very clear that the two local NGOs who implemented the shallow wells have used “a resource driven approach”, during the initial project preparation. This is understandable, and is due to short implementation periods from SwissGroup, which forces the NGOs to speed up the works, so as, to finish in the time specified on the contract agreements. Community elders expressed that their needs in general are greater than the provision of several shallow wells - lack of proper and realistic need assessment in the past resulted that their general needs have not been addressed and in particular their water needs have not been considered. In one village the main priority is said to be Malaria, water scarcity is not regarded as a major problem. The water demand for the large nomadic communities, which settle around the villages during the dry season periods, has not been considered. On the other hand the same community one-year ago, has not mentioned these problems during the need assessment.
• Community lacking sense of ownership: -
During the preparation period of the communal shallow wells, inadequate mobilization to the communities has resulted, a very low involvement of communities in the implementation works, and is the major reason that
they could not assume ownership. On the other hand, the lack of proper hand over of rehabilitated sources to the communities has contributed to the lack of ownership sense. Unhygienic extraction methods in use: -
Traditionally the villagers of all the three locations assessed are illiterate nomads, with poor hygiene awareness.
The lack of awareness raising during and after implementation with the lack of introducing appropriate safer extraction methods, has been the case in all the locations.
• In adequate presence and Supervision by the funding agency:
-The village wells have been constructed and completed with the minimum presence and supervision of the funding agency,. An on site representative or supervisor was necessary in both locations. This has
resulted, low quality workmanship, and poor construction of well covers, the wrong siting of wells, the later, resulting less water during the dry season when the water table drops to the lowest.
• Concentration on physical works only: -
The project mainly focused on physical works in all the locations, some degree of community mobilization and involvement is however exercised in the village were Berkads were rehabilitated. This is understandable and is due to the lack of budgets for training. Basic training on operation and maintenance was required in the shallow well projects, and a similar training on hygiene awareness was clearly needed on all locations. This surely would have enhanced the sense of ownership among the communities, as well as the proper operation and maintenance of the water sources.
After the evaluation, and during the time of preparing the proposal for the second phase of the program, the following has been considered as a remedial action to the previously implemented projects and as the strategy for the future ones: -
On Communal shallow Wells: -
Increasing the yield by carrying out any necessary increase of depth, increase of sand storage capacity etc. Installation of hand pumps, in order to protect wells from pollution
- In the case of installing hand pumps, the training of village based technicians, and availing of spares is required. Properly designed and constructed covers to be installed with a lockable mechanism. Awareness raising of the community on participation, and training on safe use of water sources through
hygienic practices is also essential. Advocate for the community on the issues of the water related problems
- informing, and collaborating with other organizations capable in assisting is essential.
On family owned Berkads: - Installation of appropriate covers and improvement to the present extraction methods. Rehabilitation of Balleys in this dry environment, so as to supplement the use of Berkad water, and to separate livestock and human water sources. Awareness raising of the community on participation, and training on safe use of water sources and hygienic practices is required - however, this could only make an impact if the water scarcity in the area is drastically reduced, otherwise the existing situations will continue. Advocate for the community on the issues of water borne and water related problems.
Conclusive Remarks: From the above Points, it is clearly indicated that the success of projects will mainly depend on the careful planning by the funding agency, during the initial preparation period, that is to use “need driven approach”, and “bottom up approach”, by involving and working with communities through a village based (community based) local NGO, or with village committees that are well established. During implementation, presence of a community development worker from the funding organization
to work with the implementing agency and the community is found to be beneficial, such presence is necessary in establishing a closer relationship with communities, conducting training and supervising construction works. After completion of the water project, a systematic hand over of sources to the communities after conducting any required training is essential. Both the donor and the implementers should be able to assist the communities in taking over the operation and maintenance as well as the sustainable management of the water sources - monitoring and ev aluation missions are necessary to be taken at certain intervals after completion. This can only be achieved, by having longer preparation, and implementation periods of projects, and hence more budget allocation from the donors.
The short implementation periods practiced now (one to two years maximum) have shown to be the major obstacle in implementing sustainable water projects. In the nomadic environment, the communities experience different problems at different times of the year, need assessments and monitoring of achievements would therefore require more time than practiced now, and must be considered during planning stages of water programs.
One major reality which existed in post war Somaliland, and which still prevails, is in identifying local institutional frameworks that support sustainable management of small scale community based water supplies. The constraint is that before the war the state central government (The ministry of water & mineral resources with its water
development agency), assumed responsibility for all communal water sources. The new government, here in Somaliland have the unfortunate expectation, but not yet the capacity of assuming similar roles again, whereas evidence elsewhere in Africa suggests that the responsibility for small scale supplies is best assumed by the major stakeholders, i.e., the supply users in collaboration with “technical” agencies. Clearly the sustainability of a project is significantly determined by the maintenance of the structures, but what is important to note here, is that widely accepted approaches, and concepts like community empowerment, community management, and participation, that are practiced elsewhere, can not automatically be replicated in Somaliland, Firstly because there are so many people on the move as nomads whose lives depend on the availability of pasture and water,, secondly, because it is
not the geographical locality, but rather the clan is the binding factor among people, and thirdly, due to the still weak and recovering judicial, and local government administration systems, which could not play a leading role in the equity of resources (interest groups could easily get confronted and assistance could turn easily into a conflict).
Therefore the challenge in the future for SwissGroup and similar organizations working in the field of water is to establish an institutional framework, for the management of rural water sources, that suits the existing environmental, social, economical and political setting of Somaliland.
Berkads : Underground rectangular masonry tanks, for harvesting rainwater (usually constructed in the dry areas).
Balley : A surface water reservoir made of earth embankments, for harvesting rainwater, in the dry areas.
Hargeisa : Capital of the self declared state of Somaliland, former capital of the northwestern region of Somalia.
SwissGroup : A Swiss International organization, working in Somaliland under the mandate of Caritas Switzerland.
Zeinab Aideed and Osman Abdullahi, 1998. Assessment for the sustainable management of water sources - an internal Caritas document.
OSMAN AHMED FARAH, Water Projects Engineer, Caritas Switzerland Rehabilitation Programme for Somaliland.
http://www.vad-ev.de/papers/zierau.pdf
Politics and Economy in Nation-building Processes: Somaliland Republic
Paper presented by Tabea Zierau (University of Hanover), VAD 2002
Several weeks after the Somali state collapsed in 1991, the Northwestern region declared independence. Somaliland Republic has reasserted the separate existence it had as the colony of British Somaliland before independence and union with the former Italian Somalia in 1960. While in Southern Somalia the restauration of peace is still a long way, the Somaliland people created a state from the combination of traditional elders councils and a modern parliamentary system. In Somaliland, peace between hostil clans is given a real perspective. Observers appreciate the political system as a Somali innovation, the country is considered as greatest example for endogenous post-war peace-building. However, the international community is restrained to any acknowledgement. Far away from a legal recognition, the political future of the “quasi“-state Somaliland is doubtful. The international community is trying to suppress the decentralizing processes at the Horn of Africa and stakes on to the restauration of a centralized state in Somalia.
Why did Somaliland declare independence from Somalia? And why does it hold on to independence? I do not believe in a so called “ethnic“ conflict in Somalia: The civil war in Somalia is a social conflict, its roots date back several decades. The secession of Somaliland does not mean a growing ethnicity of the Northwestern Somali people. Behind nation-building
processes you can often find hidden interests. Which social groups profited from the declaration of independence? The economic decay of the Somali state during the 1980s led to political repression and to an informalization of Somali economy - some call it “shadow economy“. The political turn of Siyaad Barre at the beginning of the 80s - from communist to capitalist ideology - went aside with his attempt to deprive the counter-hegemonic elites from their power in Northern Somalia. Because of the nationalization of the most important markets there, the
Northern Somali opposition party „Somali National Movement“ (SNM) got great financial assistance from the export traders who were impeded in their economic activities. This paper argues that the declaration of Somaliland Republic, as a counter-hegemonic project, is a direct result of the formation of elites during the commercialization of pastoralism under British colonial rule. The separation of Mogadishu and the long-term limitation of the Somaliland state-power are both in the very interest of the dominating traders. To secure these economic interests, great
activity is seen to keep state-power marginal. Mainactors in Somaliland are holding on to independence, knowing that international community nowadays favours the model of the European nation-state. Donors are only attracted by state-like structures - even though it is nothing but a façade.
Decay of state institutions and structural adjustment programs lead to the formation of parallel markets. This “informal“ sector helps the little man to survive but also it is used by elites to enhance their prestige and monetary wealth. Many argue that in Africa nowadays only the informal sector grants endogenous economic development. It is expected that from this economy comes the power to rebuild the state. However, believing that civil society is splitted of the state is a european myth: In Somaliland it is obvious that economic mainactors are those disappointed state elites that saw no opportunity to profit from the state system. They concentrated on the parallel economy to reap the benefits from these structures in a fully deregulated economy of a new state Somaliland.
For nowadays, the economy of Somaliland is completely deregulated despite of state institutions that were rebuilt after independence. Informal economic activities are not seen as illegal but are
“legitimate informal“ - to say it with Patrick Chabal. The former president of Somaliland who died at the beginning of this month, Maxamed Xaaji Ibrahim Igaal, introduced a national currency and a national bank. However, mainactors do not trust Somaliland financial policy: National and international companies prefer to change money on the parallel market. The government‘s attempts to support the national financial system failed. An example: In 1995, the government tried to support Somaliland-Shilling by sanctioning foreign exchange operations and by fixing the exchange rate, which caused strong public protest. Many traders threatened the government with moving there activities to Puntland in Eastern Somalia, where there are no restrictions for export trade. Even though the parliament dropped this unpopular decree in 1996, the economy is still very suspicious to state policy. Economic mainactors blame the government for extreme inflation in 1996 as well. For the state tried to compensate enormous budgetary deficite by printing money. The budget of Somaliland state totals round about 30 million US$. This amounts only to 60 percent of actual expenditures. One reason is that the administration of Somaliland sees itself confronted with great difficulties in taxing its nomadic population, like all of its Somali predecessors.
Shortly after the Somali state collapsed in 1991, Berbera port in Somaliland was reopened. There it turned out that foreign trade relations could be reactivated quickly, which confirms Somaliland
economy‘s orientation on trade. Export of livestock is still the biggest part of export volume. But cultivation and trade of khat is the upcoming business: Since the late 60s, livestock trade via
Berbera port increased constantly. Close to arab markets, livestock prices were high. In 1978, about 80 percent of livestock exports left the country through Berbera port. After the port reopened in 1991, this trend continued. Today, Somaliland export traders are successful in controlling the majority of all Somalia‘s livestock exports. Northern Somali descendants of the first national elite are gaining from the state Somaliland, because independence pushed them from periphery to core of power. So the export traders have their own state now. No more rivals, no more fear of Mogadishu‘s hegemony. It is easy to put the government under pressure: The traders‘ menace of turning their activities out of Somaliland which means to minimize the state‘s
tax earnings, is sufficient to keep state power marginal.
Khat is a mild narcotic, mainly cultivated in the highlands of Ethiopia. Its active substance evaporates within days. The increasing consumption at the Horn of Africa and in Yemen makes the cultivation and trade a boom industry - explicitly in Somaliland, which will be shown. Khat chewing is a relatively new phenomenon in Somaliland. It started along with urbanisation and rise of an indigenous elite under British colonial rule. Improvement of transportation led to an increase of consumption of the down-settled young urbans. „Nowadays, it seems that everybody
is chewing khat all day, everyday.“ (Nair 1999) Few wholesalers make a large profit from khat, but increasing consumption means a serious danger for society and national economy. Chewing khat is an expensive activity: It is estimated that the costs of chewing amount to 1500 US$ per year - same as the per capita income. Some argue that chewing khat slows down the productivity and that it leads to an erosion of working morale. I do not believe this is true, for it is obvious that consumption raises with unemployment figures.
Whether you damn the chewing of khat or call it the „food of the holy man“: there is no doubt that the narcotic‘s trade is one of the most productive economic sectors in Somaliland. This is proved
by an UNDP research in 1997. Khat is not criminalized in Somaliland, the administration imposes even a tax on its import. But taxes on khat are lower then any taxes levied on luxuary goods in similar states. UNDP recommends therefore a higher taxation which may be difficult in reality. The wholesalers are members of the clan Habr Awal which is quiet successful in controlling the government. This lobby is setting limits to the power of the state.
Now, what is exactly the role of Somaliland state? Let us think of the European ideal: There, the state guarantees its citizen‘s legal protection. The monopoly on the use of force means protection
against personalized power. Its sovereignty means security for economic actors. The internationally recognized nation-state is a fund-raiser who provides access to the markets. The division of the ruler‘s person and the institution of his rule means that all citizens are equal in law and equally good.
Such concept of the state is pure fiction in Somaliland. The state is not institutionalized at all, nor does it claim the monopoly on the use of force and full control of its territory. The power of the president is fully legitimated inside the country. But he does not enjoy any reputation beyond the borders of Somaliland. But not only missing international acknowledgment weakens the state. Its power is to be marginal, its legitimacy comes from a combination of clientelism and lineagedominated
organisation, basing on networks. This clientelistic system favours a weak state who has no administrative control of its territory. Somaliland state is completely privatised: The political class favours its clients in taxing, assigning goods, placing of public orders. And the clients make available money for demobilization. But the most important role of the state in Somaliland is to maintain an unequal access to the market. Economic tensions have an clan dimension here: The clan next to Igaal, Habr Awal, keeps control over Berbera port and khattrade. And the clans of Garxajis and Habr Jeclo control the most important parts of livestock trade. Trade in Somaliland is such a profitable business, because the administration is used to maintain the balance of the clans‘ economic power.
Trutz von Trotha once said that in Africa, places of power are always places of petitioners (Trotha 1991). But in Somaliland you can notice the opposite: High government officials only draw symbolic salaries. The real income are donations of members of their own clan. The donors know very well that the addressees are obliged to reply to the donation. In return for it, the officials speak up in parliament for their friends‘ tax exemption or turn a blind eye on wildlife trophy traffic. So in Somaliland, few economic tycoons are interested in building a state system whose power is easy to control. This behaviour does not encourage the state‘s consolidation but weakens it on a long-term basis. For the donation cements given inequalities between the different clans. In fact, a national identity or even a polity cannot be constructed because the conditions of reproduction do not belong to the state‘s abilities. In Somaliland, it is a small and influential part of the society who captures the state and not the opposite. One last example which makes quite clear the interdependence of economy and politics in Somaliland: A big success for the wholesalers of former president Igaal‘s clan Habr Awal is a change of the main trade route for khat. Every day, ten tons of Khat leave Ethiopia for the Arab peninsula. When Somaliland was still a part of Somalia, the narcotic with destination Yemen was always shipped in Djibouti. Nowadays, Berbera port is taking the neighbor‘s place. For in the quasi-state Somaliland, taxes and duties are lower, and legislation here is more vague then in Djibouti.
The question now is whether a state like Somaliland can claim its independence on a long-term basis. Will Somaliland ever be a full member of the international community? The construction of national institutions and the nearly successful demobilization, the creation of democratic structures like parliament and national elders council make Somaliland look like a stable and secure partner. The government wants to show that the country is ready for international donors. The lack of international interest is hard for Somaliland. There are many reasons for this worldwide indifference. I want to mention two of them:
Somalia is still a full member of the United Nations, even though its membership is suspended for the moment. As long as there is no government in Mogadishu that accepts Somaliland as independent, there won‘t be any international recognition. Today, there is only little hope that the actual provisionary government of Mogadishu will move in this direction. Abdoulkassim Salat Hassan, interims president of Somalia, is fully accepted by international community. He won‘t let Somaliland go its own way, because Mogadishu needs its tax revenues. In fact, the independent status of Somaliland and the hope for a long-term solution of the Somali conflict which could be a somehow federal state system, is sacrificed in favour of an ad hoc installed provisionary government which certifies for the world that African borders are sacrosanct.
Besides, the international community still favours the European model of the nation-state. There is a great fear in Europe and the United States of so called “failed states“. The world faces them with suspicion and helplessness, it rejects endogenous political developments as processes of “retraditionalization“ who do not fit with modernity. Time will tell, if the world will one day accept human political systems and societies that differ from the European model.
Thank you.
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2001/djeretso2001.pdf
THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES OF DJIBOUTI, ERITREA, ETHIOPIA, AND SOMALIA-2001 12.1
By Thomas R. Yager
Djibouti
In recent years, Djibouti, which is a small East African country, has been known to produce occasionally small quantities of clays, granite, limestone, marble, salt, and sand and gravel. Other mineral occurrences of potential economic interest included diatomite, geothermal fluids and mineral salts, gold, gypsum, perlite, petroleum, and pumice.
In 2001, Djibouti’s gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to about $1.73 billion at purchasing power parity. The per capita GDP at purchasing power parity was about $700 in 2000.
Djibouti’s GDP increased by 2% in 2001 after rising by 0.7% in 2000, 2.2% in 1999, and 0.1% in 1998. In 2000, manufacturing accounted for 7% of the GDP; construction, 8%; electricity, 5%; and mining and energy, about 1% (International Monetary Fund, 2002b, p. 164; 2002a§1, b§).
By the end of 2002, the Government hoped to establish a fiscal, institutional, and legal framework to support the development of domestic natural resources. The Government also planned to promote the use of local materials in construction and public works (World Bank, 2001b, p. 30). In 2000, Djibouti’s production of salt increased to 135,933 metric tons (t) from 127,283 t in 1999 and 82,876 t in 1998 (British Geological Survey, 2002, p. 227). Salt was produced by artisanal miners and exported to Ethiopia.
The International Cement Review (2001a) estimated that Djibouti’s cement consumption increased to 80,000 t in 2001 from 70,000 t in 2000 and 1999 and 60,000 t in 1998. The country had no domestic cement production; most imports came from countries in the Persian Gulf. Djibouti also served as a transshipment center for cement destined for Ethiopia.
Djibouti did not have production facilities for petroleum products; all petroleum demand was met through imports. In 2001, the Iranian Government signed agreements with
Etablissement de Hydrocarbures and Electricité de Djibouti to build an oil refinery and a power station (Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001a). Djibouti also had resources of natural gas.
In 2000, Djibouti produced 223.3 gigawatthours (GWh) from four diesel-fired powerplants. This was an increase from 194.3 GWh in 1999 and a decrease from 225.6 GWh in 1995. In 2001, the Djiboutian Government began discussion of a joint venture between Geothermal Development Associates of Nevada and Electricité de Djibouti to create a 30-megawatt (MW) geothermal plant near Assal. The Government was working on a long-term plan for development of the electrical sector that it hoped to complete by March 2002; power generation was to be deregulated (Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001b; World Bank, 2001b, p. 30; Ministère de l’Economie des Finances et de la Planification, chargé de la Privatisation, 2001§).
Djibouti’s transportation network comprised about 2,900 kilometers (km) of roads, of which nearly 400 km was paved. The World Bank assisted the Government in developing a longterm program to develop the national road network. Initial investment would focus upon road links to Ethiopia to complement the planned increase in capacity at the Djibouti port (World Bank, 2001b, p. 30).
The outlook for Djibouti’s mineral industry is for little growth in the short run; constraints include small domestic markets, minimal known natural resources, and slow GDP growth. The World Bank (2001b, p. 35) predicted that the GDP would increase in 2002 by 1.6%; in 2003, by 2.1%; and in 2004, by 3.1%.
Eritrea
In recent years, the East African country of Eritrea has produced a variety of minerals, rocks, and semi-manufactured goods, which included basalt, cement, common clay, kaolin, coral, gold, granite, gravel, gypsum, lime, limestone, marble, pumice, quartz, salt, sand, and silica sand (table 1). The country also had known occurrences of such metals as chromium, copper, iron, lead, magnesium, nickel, silver, and zinc and such industrial minerals as barite, feldspar, and potash.
In 2001, Eritrea’s GDP increased by 6.5% after falling by 8.6% in 2000 and rising by 1.2% in 1999 and 3.2% in 1998. In 1999, manufacturing accounted for 8% of the GDP;
construction, 9%; and mining and quarrying, less than 1% (International Monetary Fund, 2000, p. 24; 2002b, p. 164). Gold was produced in Eritrea by artisanal miners. From 1997 to 2000, the production of gold declined by nearly 57% (table 1); this decrease may be attributable to the fall in gold prices and the war with Ethiopia. In 2000, the value of gold produced in Eritrea amounted to $1.7 million (Zerefe Awalom, Eritrea Ministry of Energy and Mines, written commun., 2001).
Sub-Sahara Resources NL, which was formed by the merger of Maiden Gold NL and Universal Gold NL, held the exploration licenses for the Debarwa copper deposit and the Emba Derho polymetallic deposit. In 2001, Sub-Sahara engaged in exploration at the abandoned gold mines at Medrizien and Woki Duba. The company also explored for 1References that include a section twist (§) are found in the Internet References Cited section.
copper at Aggiar and Medrizien and for zinc near Adi Nefas; Sub-Sahara applied for a license that contains the Adi Nefas gold and zinc deposits. In 2002, the company planned to continue exploration activities (Sub-Sahara Resources NL, 2002, p. 11-12).
In early 2001, Nevsun Resources Ltd. completed geologic mapping and rock sampling on the Enjahai, the Seroa Mine, and the Tofalebu gold occurrences. Nevsun planned to engage in diamond drilling at Enjahai. Other gold occurrences that have been explored in recent years include Ak, Bisha, Harab Suit, Ketina, Matite, Nefasit, Okreb, Tekeze, and Zara (Resource Information Unit, 2001a, p. 91-94).
The Eritrea Cement Factory, which was the country’s only cement producer, was able to increase output in 1999 owing to upgrades of equipment and employee skills. The war with Ethiopia caused the production of many construction materials to decline in 1999 and 2000 (table 1). In 2000, the value of gravel and crushed rock amounted to $418,000; sand, $367,000; and limestone, granite, marble, basalt, and silica sand, $399,000 (Zerefe Awalom, Eritrea Ministry of Energy and Mines, written commun., 2001).
In 2001, postwar rebuilding efforts spurred a recovery in Eritrea’s construction sector. Numerous projects, which included repairs to the country’s airports, bridges, dams,
railways, and roads; expansion and improvements to ports and water and sewage networks; and the construction of housing units and commercial and industrial buildings, were underway or under active consideration. The World Bank and the Eritrean Government developed a $280 million plan to rebuild Eritrea’s economy.
Salt producers in Eritrea included Alkelder Salt & Affiliates, Assab Salt Works, and Massawa Salt Works. The country’s salt production declined sharply in 1998 and 1999 (table 1). The Government planned to privatize Assab Salt Works and Massawa Salt Works. In 2000, the value of salt produced in Eritrea amounted to $909,000 (Zerefe Awalom, Eritrea Ministry of Energy and Mines, written commun., 2001).
In 2000, Eritrea’s consumption of petroleum products was estimated to be about 2.9 million barrels (Mbbl), all of which has been imported since the closure of the Assab Refinery in 1997. In May 2001, CMS Oil and Gas (a subsidiary of CMS Energy Corporation) signed an agreement with the Government to explore for natural gas and petroleum in the Dismin Block in northeastern Eritrea. The Government was also interested in developing geothermal, solar, and wind energy; geothermal areas occur in the Danakil region (U.S. Commercial Service, 2001§; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002§). The Eritrean Electricity Authority, which was responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, had about 60 MW of diesel-fired capacity. In 1999, Eritrea produced an estimated 206.8 GWh of electricity, which was an increase from 185.8 GWh in 1998 and 154.8 GWh in 1996. Sales of electricity increased to 155.9 GWh in 1999 from 145.6 GWh in 1998 and 127.5 GWh in 1996. Many rural health clinics, schools, and villages used solar photovoltaic power systems (International Monetary Fund, 2000, p. 34; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002§).
Eritrea’s transportation network comprised about 4,000 km of roads, of which nearly 900 km was paved. The railway linking Ak’ordat and Asmara with the port of Massawa was 317 km; only a 5-km stretch in Massawa was operational. Rehabilitation of the remainder was under way. Ports and harbors were Assab and Massawa.
The outlook for Eritrea’s mineral industry is for gradual recovery from the war. Demand for such construction materials as basalt, granite, gravel, limestone, marble, and sand is likely to increase. Further development depends upon favorable global market conditions, the continuation of peace with Ethiopia, and landmine clearing.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia has been a producer of minerals, rocks, and semimanufactured goods, such as brick clay, cement, columbium (niobium), diatomite, feldspar, gold, gypsum and
anhydrite, kaolin, lime, pumice, salt, scoria, soda ash, sand, stone, and tantalum (table 1). Ethiopia’s main mineral export was gold. Other metal deposits included copper, iron ore, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, and zinc. Other industrial mineral occurrences included apatite, bentonite, dolomite, gemstones, granite, potash, quartz, and talc. In 2001, Ethiopia’s GDP amounted to about $39 billion at purchasing power parity. Per capita GDP at purchasing power parity was $590 in 2000. The GDP grew by 7.9% in 2001 after increasing by 5.4% in 2000 and 6.3% in 1999. Mining and quarrying accounted for less than 1% of the GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2002b, p. 164; 2002a§, b§).
The Ethiopian Mineral Resources Development Enterprise (EMRDE) operated the Kenticha columbium and tantalum mine near Borena. In fiscal year 2000-01, EMRDE produced 47 t of tantalum (table 1) and earned export revenues of $5.6 million. For fiscal year 2001-02, the company planned to increase tantalum production to 60 t.
Midroc Gold (a subsidiary of Midroc Ethiopia Ltd.) operated the Lega Dembi gold mine. The company planned to start underground operations and to make upgrades to its processing plant in 2001 that would increase gold production capacity to nearly 4,700 kilograms per year (kg/yr) of gold from about 2,800 kg/yr. Other gold mines that were operating in Ethiopia included the Adola and the Sakaro. Sheba Exploration Ltd. of the United Kingdom was prospecting for gold in the northern province of Tigray. In 2000, gold was the mineral commodity that made the largest contribution to the Ethiopian economy; the value of gold produced exceeded $33.18 million (Gebre-Selassie, 2001; Resource Information Unit, 2001b; Getachew Tesfaye, Ethiopia Ministry of Mines and Energy, written commun., 2001).
In 2001, Golden Prospect Plc of the United Kingdom was granted a 3-year exploration license for platinum at Daleti and Tulu Dimtu. The company was also granted a prospecting license for Yubdo, which had produced 2,700 kg of platinum in the past. Mineral analysis indicated that gold, palladium, and rhodium also occurred at Yubdo. Golden Prospect began negotiations with potential joint-venture partners for further exploration work (Resource Information Unit, 2001b). Abay Natural Resources Development Plc produced fire opal in North Shewa; five other companies were engaged in exploration and mining. Sales of fire opal were concentrated in Asia, especially in Japan. Abay sold its products at the Hong Kong Jewellery and Watch Fair and plans to market some of its product through such international auction houses as Christie’s and Sotheby’s. Cutting and polishing was done in Hong Kong and India; the company planned to develop a cutting industry in Ethiopia that used domestic labor. Other semiprecious and ornamental stones produced in Ethiopia included amethyst, peridot, and rose quartz. Ethiopia also has deposits of agate, aquamarine, chalcedony, chrysoprase, emerald, garnet, jasper, obsidian, ruby, sapphire, and spinel (Henricus, 2002). Salt producers in Ethiopia included Afdera Salt Works
Association, Duck Table Salt Processore Plc, and Palm & Salt Association. In 2000, the value of salt produced in Ethiopia amounted to about $6.84 million (Getachew Tesfaye, Ethiopia Ministry of Mines and Energy, written commun., 2001).
From 1995 to 2000, Ethiopia’s consumption of diammonium phosphate (DAP) fell to 191,493 t from 202,312 t. During the same period, the consumption of urea increased to 98,524 t from 44,411 t. Ethiopia’s consumption of DAP was expected to increase to 240,000 t in 2001 and 320,000 t in 2002. Urea consumption was expected to increase to 128,000 t in 2001 and 168,000 t in 2002. All Ethiopia’s nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers were imported. In recent years, the Geological Survey of Ethiopia has explored for phosphate rock in the western part of the country (Gebre-Selassie, 2000; World Bank, 2001a, p. 3).
In March 2001, Sicor Inc. of the United States signed agreements to develop the Gazoil Ethiopia project at a cost of $1.4 billion. Sicor planned to build a natural gas to liquids plant for the production of about 183,000 t/yr of ammonia. The ammonia would be used in the domestic production of urea. The Gazoil project would also generate electricity and produce diesel, gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuels (Weeden, 2001). At the end of 2001, Ethiopia was totally dependent upon imports to meet its demand for petroleum. In fiscal year 2000- 01, Ethiopia imported 8.33 Mbbl of petroleum products, which was an increase from 7.81 Mbbl in fiscal year 1999-00 and 7.73 Mbbl in fiscal year 1998-99. Automotive diesel oil accounted for 56% of petroleum imports in fiscal year 2000-01; jet fuel, 21%; gasoline, 13%; and residual fuel oil, 10% (National Bank
of Ethiopia, 2001§). The International Monetary Fund (2002a, p. 32) predicted that the value of fuel imports would fall to $236 million in fiscal year 2002-03 from $292 million in fiscal year 2000-01 and then increase to $278 million by fiscal year 2005-06.
In 2001, Ethiopia signed an agreement with the Governments of Djibouti and Sudan in which the Ethiopian Electric Power Company (EEPCO) would export electricity to Djibouti and Sudan. Sudan agreed to supply Ethiopia with benzene and petroleum products (Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001d). In fiscal year 2000-01, Ethiopia produced 1,811.7 GWh of electricity, which was an increase from 1,688.8 GWh in fiscal year 1999-00 and 1,652.9 GWh in fiscal year 1998-99. Hydroelectric sources accounted for 98.8% of power generated; thermal sources, 0.9%; and geothermal sources, 0.3%. At the beginning of 2000, Ethiopia’s hydroelectric capacity was 377.8 MW; thermal, 40.3 MW; and geothermal 7.3 MW (Teklemariam and others, 2000; National Bank of Ethiopia, 2001§).
Ethiopia’s exploitable hydroelectric energy potential could be 162,000 MW. In 2001, Enerco of Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with EEPCO to build three new hydroelectric plants at a cost of $350 million to $410 million. The Genale plant was expected to have a capacity of 162 MW; the Bilbi Moya, 75 MW; and the Awash IV, 40 MW. Bilbi was expected to be operational by the end of 2003, and Awash IV, in 2004. EEPCO awarded a contract to Midroc Ethiopia to build a 150- MW hydroelectric plant on the Gojeb River (Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001c, 2002; World Resources Institute and others, 1996, p. 288).
The geothermal potential of the Ethiopian Rift has been estimated to be 700 MW, which included the central Afar with 260 MW; the Lakes District, 170 MW; the Denkali Depression, 150 MW; and the Southern Afar, 120 MW. The Aluto-Langano geothermal powerplant in the lakes District had a capacity of 7.3 MW; the Government planned to increase capacity at the plant to 30 MW. Other areas of geothermal exploration include Tendaho, which is located in the Northern Afar (Teklemariam and others, 2000).
At the end of 2000, Ethiopia’s transportation network comprised 29,799 km of roads, of which nearly 3,890 km was paved and 25,909 km, gravel. The Ethiopian segment of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad was 681 km. From 1996 to 2000, the Ethiopian Road Construction Authority invested about $700 million and built more than 7,000 km of new roads (Gebre-Selassie, 2001).
The outlook for Ethiopia’s mineral industry is favorable. Improvements in the general economic situation and the need to rebuild infrastructure are likely to increase demand for building materials. The International Monetary Fund (2002a, p. 28) predicted that the GDP would increase in fiscal year 2001-02 by 5.8%, and in fiscal year 2002-03 and fiscal year 2003-04 by 6.0%. Ethiopia’s plans to expand infrastructure may increase the economic viability of its metals and industrial minerals deposits. Favorable conditions in the world minerals markets and the continuation of peace with Eritrea are also important.
Somalia
Somalia was a producer of small quantities of gypsum, salt, and sepiolite (meerschaum). Recent discoveries and artisanal mining of gemstones included amethyst, aquamarine, emerald, garnet, opal, ruby, and sapphire. The country also had deposits of feldspar, iron ore, kaolin, limestone, natural gas, quartz, silica sand, tantalum, tin, and uranium. The minerals industry made only a small contribution to Somalia’s exports and to the economy in general.
Officially reported mineral and trade data have been unavailable owing to lack of a central Government from 1991 to 2000. Somaliland and Puntland (two regions in northern
Somalia) have declared independence from Somalia. The new central Government created in 2000 controlled only a small portion of Mogadishu and faced serious challenges from regional warlords (Washington Post, 2001). The civil war has had considerable adverse consequences for the economy, which included the minerals sector. The war forced the closure of Somalia’s cement plant and oil refinery and halted exploration for natural gas and other resources.
Emeralds were produced at Alihiley and Simodi in western Somaliland. Aquamarine was know to occur near Darburuq, Gebiley, and Lafrug; garnet, near Alihiley, Boroma, and Darburuq; and sapphire, near Gebiley. Mining of Somaliland’s gemstones has been limited by a lack of modern equipment, civil strife, and damage to the infrastructure (Henricus, 2001b). The European Community-funded non-governmental organization Progressive Interventions was working with the Government of Somaliland to exploit local gemstone resources. Issues under consideration included investment in exploration in exploration and mining equipment; training of local miners; organizing the miners and dealers into a mining and trade association; marketing the gemstones; and adding value through cutting and polishing (Henricus, 2001a).
Somalia imported all its cement, most of which was believed to be sourced from Kenya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The International Cement Review (2001b) estimated that Somalia’s cement consumption remained unchanged at 100,000 t in 2001. The Berbera cement plant had a capacity of 300,000 t/yr but needed substantial upgrade work to resume production. In 2000, Somalia’s petroleum consumption was estimated to be nearly 1.5 Mbbl. Since the closure of Somalia’s refinery in 1991, which was run by the state-owned Iraqsoma Refinery Corporation, all the country’s demand for petroleum products has been met through imports. In 2001, TotalFinaElf signed a 1-year agreement with the Somali Government to explore for oil in the southern region of Lower Shabelle and the Juba Valley (Iran Daily, 2001; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002§).
In May 2001, the Government of Somaliland signed an agreement with Rovagold Ltd. of the United Kingdom, Continental Petroleum Engineering Company Ltd. of China,
and China Petrochemical Corporation to explore for oil. Zarara Energy Ltd. of South Africa also signed an exploration agreement with the Government. Chinese firms have been reported to be involved in oil exploration in Puntland (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002§).
Somalia’s installed electricity generating capacity amounted to 70 MW, all of which was diesel fired. The country’s exploitable hydroelectric energy potential could be 50 MW. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica was responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. In October 2001, the Government signed agreements with WorldWater Corp. of the United States to develop such renewable energy sources as solar power. Prior to the civil war, the Government had planned to install wind energy systems in rural areas and turbines to connect to the electricity grid in Mogadishu. The Government of Puntland planned to privatize the electricity sector (World Resources Institute and others, 1996, p. 288; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2002§). Somalia’s transportation network comprised about 22,000 km of roads, of which 2,600 km were paved. Oil pipelines were 15 km. The principal ports and harbors were located at Bender Cassim (Boosaaso), Berbera, Chisimayu (Kismaayo), Merca, and Mogadishu.
The outlook for Somalia’s mineral industry is for little change in the short run. The Governments of Puntland and Somaliland have not gained international recognition, and the central Government in Mogadishu faces serious obstacles to unifying the country, much less repairing the damage from the civil war. Other problems include weak infrastructure and a domestic market that is limited by severe poverty. In the long run, an end to the civil war; investment in education, health, and infrastructure; favorable world market conditions; improvements in mining technology; and other conditions amenable to private foreign investment could lead to greater exploitation of Somalia’s mineral resources.
References Cited
Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001a, Djibouti-Iran in energy push: Africa Energy Intelligence, no. 299, May 23, p. 2.
Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001b, Djibouti-Talks on geo-thermal project:
Africa Energy Intelligence, no. 299, May 23, p. 2.
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Africa Energy Intelligence, 2001d, Ethiopia/Sudan-Oil cooperation pact signed: Africa Energy Intelligence, no. 301, June 20, p. 7.
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Henricus, Jennifer, 2002, Mining deregulation in Ethiopia set to spur more gem exploration: Jewellery News Asia, no. 209, January, p. 50-62.
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International Monetary Fund, 2002a, Ethiopia-Second review under the three year arrangement under the poverty reduction and growth facility, requests
for augmentation of access and for waiver of performance criterion, and second annual program-Staff report and news brief on the executive board discussion: Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, March 26, 77 p.
International Monetary Fund, 2002b, World economic outlook-Recoveries and recessions: Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, April, 225 p.
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(1986 - 2000), accessed March 11, 2002, at URL
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TABLE 1
ERITREA, ETHIOPIA, AND SOMALIA: PRODUCTION OF MINERAL COMMODITIES 1/ 2/ (Metric tons unless otherwise specified)
Country and commodity 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 e/
ERITREA
Basalt 489,686 403,219 251,991 r/ 122,928 r/ 129,000
Cement e/ 60,000 50,000 57,000 r/ 45,000 47,300
Clays:
Common e/ 80,000 80,000 88,476 r/ 3/ 63,427 r/ 3/ 66,600
Kaolin 4,670 3,809 1,138 r/ 943 r/ 990
Coral 96,535 245,112 86,762 r/ 74,130 r/ 77,800
Gold kilograms 612 573 534 r/ 264 r/ 270
Granite 111,062 249,829 162,146 r/ 122,017 r/ 128,000
Gravel 798,055 941,129 152,968 r/ 115,110 r/ 121,000
Gypsum 27 56 1,075 r/ 330 r/ 345
Laterite 585 5,881 2,171 r/ 2,049 r/ 2,150
Lime e/ 7,000 6,000 6,000 r/ 3,000 3,000
Limestone 4/ 5,585 4,077 5,069 r/ 2,690 r/ 2,830
Marble e/ 220,000 200,000 200,000 r/ 100,000 105,000
Petroleum products thousand 42-gallon 3,000 -- -- -- --
barrels
Pumice 754 391 153 r/ 41 r/ 40
Quartz 604 731 730 e/ 600 e/ 630
Salt 252,073 114,137 9,368 r/ 47,498 r/ 49,900
Sand thousand tons 2,097 2,170 809 r/ 1,030 r/ 1,080
Silica sand 27 -- 10,065 r/ -- 10,000
ETHIOPIA 5/ 6/
Cement, hydraulic 752,000 750,000 638,266 879,962 950,000
Clays: 7/
Brick e/ 6,000 6,000 80,865 3/ 224,093 3/ 242,000
Kaolin (China clay) 3,512 378 681 1,654 1,790
Other clay cubic meters NA NA 23,750 23,000 e/ 24,800
Columbite-tantalite, ore and concentrate:
Gross weight kilograms 20,000 20,000 49,630 64,940 78,700
Nb content do. NA NA 4,960 6,490 7,870
Ta content do. 6,500 6,500 29,300 38,800 47,000 3/
Diatomite 150 125 140 140 e/ 150
Feldspar e/ 5,000 5,000 391 3/ 285 3/ 310
Gold, mine output, Au content kilograms 3,000 2,500 4,905 5,177 5,200
Gypsum and anhydrite, crude 120,000 120,000 35,983 46,798 50,500
Lime 2,500 3,000 2,991 3,769 3,800
Pumice e/ 7/ 325,000 325,000 135,400 3/ 156,466 3/ 169,000
Salt, rock e/ 1,000 1,000 56,400 3/ 56,400 3/ 60,900
Scoria e/ 250,000 250,000 281,164 3/ 287,000 310,000
Soda ash, natural 15,000 15,000 4,745 4,745 5,000
Stone, sand and gravel: e/ 7/
Construction stone, crushed thousand tons 750 1,000 3,407 3/ 3,459 3/ 3,740
Dimension stone 8/ 40,000 130,000 130,000 100,000 108,000
Granite NA NA 126 3/ 140 150
Limestone thousand tons 3,300 3,400 846 3/ 1,197 3/ 1,300
Sand 9/ do. 1,600 2,500 1,600 3/ 1,853 3/ 2,000
Silica sand 7,000 7,000 6,061 3/ 5,601 3/ 6,050
Other stone NA NA 10,162 3/ 15,768 3/ 17,000
SOMALIA 10/ e/
Gypsum 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Salt, marine 800 600 1,000 1,000 1,000
Sepiolite (meerschaum) 6 6 6 6 6
e/ Estimated. r/ Revised. NA Not available. -- Zero.
1/ Estimated data are rounded to no more than three significant digits.
2/ Includes data available through March 29, 2002.
3/ Reported figure.
4/ For other than cement.
5/ Data are for year ending July 7 of the year listed.
6/ In addition to the commodities listed, some lignite, semiprecious gemstones, steel semimanufactures, and talc reportedly were produced, and silver and
platinum were reportedly contained in gold ingots from the Lega Dembi Mine, but information is inadequate to estimate output.
7/ When reported as volume or pieces, conversions to metric tons are estimated.
8/ Includes marble. Production of marble was estimated to be 13,900 t in 1996 and reported to be 6,014 t in 1999 and 6,662 t in 2000.
9/ May include gravel.
10/ In addition to the commodities listed, various crude construction materials (e.g., clays, sand and gravel, crushed and dimension stone) and limestone for
lime manufacture and/or agriculture are presumably produced; available information, however, is inadequate to make estimates of output.
http://jrm.library.arizona.edu/data/1968/216/7box.pdf
Range Resources of Somalia’
THADIS W. BOX
Professor of Range Management, Texas Technological College, Lubbock.
Highlight
Livestock production from native rangelands is the most important agricultural enterprise in the Somali Republic. The ranges of Somalia have a potential for much greater
production than is currently realized. Many of the areas described in the literature as desert are grassland savannahs. These areas can support large numbers of livestock if properly managed. The major problems are development of water, use of grazing systems, proper stocking, and application of range management principles.
Livestock production from native rangelands, the most important agricultural enterprise in the Somali Republic, produces most of the hard currency coming into the country. Two major reports (DeIongh, 1957; FAO, 1966), indicate that pastoralism merely sustains the local economy and adds little to world trade. Both these reports concentrated on the cattle industry in southern Somalia, while the country’s important livestock export trade is to the oil-rich states to the north. Here, sheep and goat flocks contribute substantially to the hard currency income of Somalia.
The potential for livestock on Somali rangelands is high. Although the country is arid and rainfall is sporadic, the Somali herdsmen have evolved a system of nomadic rotation dictated by the harsh environment. In addition, pastoralists have an appreciation for livestock developed through the centuries of close association with animals. Both the livestock and the owner have become a part of the range ecology.
Various range and livestock surveys indicate that the Somali range has a potential for double or even triple the amount now being produced (Klemme, 1957; Nelson, 1958; Childs, 1960; Abercrombie, 1961b).
Information on the Somali resources is limited and scattered. The purpose of this paper is to bring together some of the fragmented reports on Somalia and Somali resources. The material for the report was collected during a field assignment as a consultant with FAO in the Somali Republic. Physical Environment and Vegetation
The Somali Republic is located on the horn of Africa from roughly 2” S. to 11 O N. latitude, lying between 30 and 53” E. longitude. The area included is approximately 246,000 miles2.
The northern area, above 5” N. latitude, is mostly arid, with rainfall of less than three inches annually. As elevation increases, rainfall increases and some of the area in the western part receives as much as 20 inches yearly. In the southern part of the country, rainfall is higher with as much as 15 to 24 inches occurring in some areas. The rain
falls in two periods, the spring season (Gu) in April and May and the fall (Dayr) in September and October. However, like most arid areas, annual variation is high.
Two perennial rivers, the Shebelli and the Juba, dissect the southern part of the coastal plain. There are a few perennial springs scattered throughout the northern part of the country. For the most part, water is obtained from wells near the sea, or artificial ponds designed to catch seasonal runoff. Although adequate groundwater surveys have not been made, oil explorations indicate that ground-water may be available in many sections of the country.
No general detailed survey has been conducted of the physical environment of Somalia. Several regional studies have discussed the soils, climate, and the general features (Pichi-Sermolli, 1955; Meigs, 1966). Unfortunately, more detailed accounts are available for only limited areas such as the north (Hunt, 1950) or the inter-river area (ICA, 1961; FAO, 1966). Generalized reports have been written by DeIongh (1957) and Italconsult (1965). Both give only a superficial view of the physical environment.
Vegetation.-Much of the early work on Somali vegetation consists of floristic studies and limited papers on the chemical content of forage. The main contribution of the southern regions are the floras of Chiovende (1929, 1932) and the works of Bettini (1933, 1935, 1936, 1937) and Fiori and Bettini (1941) on the pastures of the former Italian
Somaliland. Knowledge of the northern region is confined almost entirely to reports from the former British protectorate. These include the early surveys of Drake-Brockman (1912) and the later work of Collenett (193 l), Gillett (1941) and Hunt (1950). The check list of trees, shrubs, and herbs of the British-Italian Somaliland (Glover, 1947) includes an excellent map of the ecological communities of the former British area.
Ecological surveys of Somalia are few and limited to two regions-Glover’s (1947) study of the former British protectorate and two ecological surveys between the Juba and Shebelli rivers (Abercrombie, 1961a; Merritt, 1966). Klemme (1957) and Nelson (1958) made reconnaissance surveys of portions of British, Italian, and Ethiopian areas used by the Somali pastoralists. Geographical descriptions have have been attempted by Pichi-Sermolli (1955).
Present Range Conditions
During the summer of 1966, an FAO special survey team conducted a reconnaissance of the rangelands of Somalia. The two areas previously covered by ecological surveys, i.e., the inter-river area and the old British portion of Somalia, were covered by aerial reconnaissance. Landings were made at selected villages in each district. The district commissioner, the veterinary staff, and those stockmen who would agree to participate, were questioned about ranching conditions, method of handling livestock, forage resources, etc. Overland trips were made from each village to examine vegetation.
The remaining portion of the country was first covered by aerial reconnaissance and periodic landings as described above. This was followed by an overland safari from Berbera in the north to Mogadiscio in the south. The country between was crisscrossed in order to examine every vegetative type observed from the air. Local pastoralists were interviewed en route.
We inspected a representative location in each of the major vegetation types. These field notes, plus the works of past investigators, form the basis of this report on the condition of Somali ranges. The ranges of Somalia have a potential for much greater production than is currently being realized. With the exception of small, poorly-watered areas in Migiurtinia, Mudugh, and the Tsetse fly area of the south, the ranges are either overgrazed at present, or show evidence of overgrazing in the recent past. The low successional stage of herbaceous vegetation over most of the grazing areas is probably due to heavy stockings during recent droughts. Limited areas are showing signs of improvement.
Northern Somali Ranges.-The ranges of the former British protectorate are in critical condition. Although the survey was made toward the end of the Gu (spring rainy season) there was little vegetation available to support animals during the normal dry period. A prolonged drought could be fatal to man and livestock.
Although Glover (1947) and other British officers discussed range condition in their reports, it is now difficult to find sizeable amounts of the perennial grasses they listed. Today most of the ranges of the lower elevations are totally lacking in perennial grasses. At the higher evelations, where ranges have been protected, there are relicts
of grasslands that indicate the potential of the area. In the Gan-Libah forest near Sheikh, there is a small exclosure that contains Themada triandra, Chrysopogon aucheri, Bothriochloa insculpta, Hyperrhenia hirta, and other tall grasses. These plants are absent from other areas of the forest.
The high plateau country, or the Haud, is an area of red soils on either side of the provisional national boundaries. Due to insufficient water throughout the year, this area has largely escaped destructive grazing. Perennial grasses such as Cenchrus ciliaris and Sporobolus sp. are present. Areas near water have dense stands of Aristida
kelleri.
The ranges of northern regions are in a vulnerable state. Not only must they support the local livestock, but large market herds pass through almost daily going to the port at Berbera. Urban growth and the inclosure of private grazing land has forced the pastoralists onto marginal ranges. Mid-Somali Ranges.-The area of former Italian
Somaliland has not had an ecological survey. In most of the reports, the ranges of Migiurtinia are seldom discussed. Although the vegetation of Migiurtinia is mostly desert vegetation of low natural potential, these ranges represent an important resource that has not been adequately considered.
The area is typically desert shrub on limestone hills and mountains separated by wide valleys of deep red soil. Forage of the limestone hills is mostly browse (Zndigofera, Acacia, Boscia, etc). Grass vegetation is mostly Sporobolus, Aristida and other hot desert grasses. The browse vegetation makes the area ideally suited for sheep, goat, and camel production. The vast size of the area offers a great potential for sustained production of goats and sheep for the Arabian markets.
The valleys between the limestone hills offer good possibilities for increased range production through water management. Runoff from the hills periodically floods the valleys. Where natural vegetation or dead plant material has slowed down the water, tall grasses such as Andropogon, Cenchrus ciliaris, and plants characteristic of higher
rainfall areas occur. There is a need for water spreading projects to utilize overland flow from the hills.
In general, the ranges of Migiurtinia are not as heavily used as those of the northern regions. The low natural carrying capacity of ranges and low rainfall make the use of vast areas necessary. Any attempt to stop nomadic livestock movement here would lead to further range deterioration.
The area of Mudugh and those portions of Hiran and Benadir, north of the river Shebelli, comprise one of the finest and least known range areas of Somalia. It is naturally divided into three general areas; the coastal dunes, the mixed Acacia brush-land, and the grass-low shrub plains. Two of the areas, the coastal dunes and the grass-low shrub plains, have scarcely been mentioned in previous reports.
The coastal dunes comprise a strip of land lying immediately inland from the Indian Ocean, from Mogadiscio to a point near the Mudugh-Migiur-tinia border. It varies in width from a few hundred yards in the south to more than 30 miles near the center. In addition to the usual rainy seasons, fog or mist occurs during most other months.
Livestock use this area heavily during the dry season because fresh water percolates through the soil and builds up against the salt water of the sea. Shallow fresh-water wells are common. Vegetation of the area reflects heavy livestock use. As much as 50% of the vegetation in some areas is made up of annuals, such as Vicia, Indigoferu, etc. Annual Erogrostis and SporoboZus comprise the main grass cover. Shrubs are scarce.
The grass-low shrub Savannah that occurs on the high plains of the Mudugh are in the best condition of any region visited. Lack of water has prevented severe overgrazing even in the drought-stricken areas. Here vast plains of Savannah grasslands occur. Cenchrus ciliuris, Aristidu kelleri, Heteropogon, Sporobolus and other perennials
show little or no evidence of utilization. Bosciu trees and Acacia shrubs form the only woody cover in a scattered Savannah.
The mixed Acacia bushlands occur in Hiran and the mid portions of the Mudugh. The Hiran bushlands where pastoralists have practiced grazing controls show great promise. The shrub portions of the range are healthy, but the herbaceous portion shows evidence of heavy past use. Aristidu spp. and low-quality plants make up most of the herbage. However, ground cover is adequate for soil protection and there is evidence that the range is improving.
Inter-river Ranges.-Ranges between the River Shebelli and the River Juba have been examined in detail by two recent reports (Abercrombie, 196 1; FAO, 1966). Both studies suggest that the range is not producing to capacity. The most recent (Merritt, 1966), suggests that pastoralism has given way to agriculture in some areas. Cattle
production and brush control have been stressed in both reports. It may be possible that mechanical brush control combined with an increase in goat numbers could improve these range lands. A favorable price structure for goats as compared to cattle and the vast amount of browse throughout Somalia indicates that goat production is a logical tool for improving the range.
Southern Somali Ranges.-The area south of the Juba is cattle country. In addition, game animals remain in some abundance. Rangeland condition is variable according to the proximity of water. The vast flood plain of the Juba is covered with dense stands of high bush (Acacia sp.) so dense that grass is sparse. Wherever the woody canopy is removed, good stands of Sporobolus, Cenchrus and C h Zoris appear.
The grumsol soils could produce several times as much forage as the present production. In areas where grazing has been light, good stands of Cenchrus ciliuris, Heteropogon and Andropogon occur. The lower Juba area has the best wildlife populations in Somalia. At the present time they are not under strict management. In general, the lower Juba area has a high potential for cattle and wildlife production although range improvement, water development, and brush clearing are needed in
addition to strict grazing control if the potential is to be reached.
Lives tack Management
Camels are the most desired form of wealth for the pastoral Somali. Not only are they valuable animals for milk production and as beasts of burden, but they comprise the main source of “dia” or blood money. There are approximately 2 million camels in the country. Camels are herded by young men and boys. The camps may be located
many miles from other livestock camps of the family (Lewis, 196 1).
Large numbers of camels are slaughtered for meat. The price of camel meat equals that of beef. In the export market the price in a letter of credit in Berbera is 800 Somali shillings for a camel compared with about 140 for a steer or a bull (Hartley et al., 1966).
Some of the problems connected with camel raising in Somalia are increasing reproduction rates, changing calving intervals, the influence of pregnancy on milk production, and methods of preserving camel’s milk.
Various estimates indicate that there are some 7 million sheep and goats in Somalia. About two thirds of this number are goats. Sheep and goats are herded together in single flocks. The proportion of sheep to goats may be as high as three to one in the more humid areas, but this proportion decreases as arid regions of the country are
reached.
Sheep and goats are individually owned and provide subsistence for nomad families. They produce milk in season and provide a reserve of animals for cash sale when consumer goods are needed. These are normally tended by women and young children (Mahoney, 1963a, 196313). In Somalia sheep are of great importance in the
economy. They provide the principal item of export for the Arabian markets where Somali Blackheads are preferred over other East African breeds. The only sheep breed kept in Somalia is the Somali Blackhead, a fat rump sheep of ancient origin. It has provided the basis of the breeding stock for the so-called Persian Blackhead of South
Africa.
The most common goat raised in Somalia, a large white animal, is an indispensable part of the economy of the arid and semi-arid regions. It uses browse, forbs, and succulents to provide milk, meat, and skin. It ranks favorably with sheep for export trade.
Unfortunately, goat production has been officially discouraged due to influence of foresters who came into the country stating categorically that goats are the most destructive animals on the range. A favorable price structure for goats and the nature of vegetation are both favorable for increased goat production.
There are an estimated 1.4 million cattle in Somalia. These are of four main breeds: the Boran (Havai), the Jiddu (Suroq), the Gharre (Durra), and the Abgal (Gasara).
The Boran breed is found in the south between the Juba river and the Kenya border. This outstanding African breed of cattle is widespread in northern Kenya, eastern Ethiopia, and southern Somalia. These animals form the basis of the Boran beef breed which has its own registration and breed society.
The most numerous cattle breed in Somalia is the Jiddu, known locally as the Suroq. It is kept mainly by the Jiddu and Tuni lineage groups. It is an exceptionally good dual-purpose breed, and with the Boran, forms the basis of the herds of improved cattle of both dairy and beef types now bred in Kenya.
The Gharra (Durra) cattle, are found primarily in the area east of the Shebelli river and range into the low rainfall countries of the Mudugh. They are smaller than the other breeds and are praised for their hardiness and ability to withstand infrequent watering.
Land Use
The pattern of land use and the social structure of the pastoralists have been described by Lewis (196 1). In general, members of a particular lineage group use a given area. Flocks and herds usually are moved with the rains during the rainy season. It is common for herds to move into areas where groundwater is in short supply during periods of time when runoff water can be caught in open uars. When the water has dimished on the ranges, the livestock and their owners drift back to the areas of permanent water.
During the dry season, large herds are concentrated along the beach areas where fresh water is available at shallow depths. The distribution of livestock in the country depends primarily upon the season of the year and occurrences of rainfall. This has led to a natural deferment system with animals moving from one part of the country to
another throughout the year. To a large extent, this natural deferment system is beginning to break down as bore holes are developed and land is enclosed in private holdings. There is a tendency now for livestock to remain yearlong in a single area.
Conclusions
The potential for livestock production in the Somali Republic is great. Many areas of the country described in the literature as desert are indeed grassland savannahs, capable of supporting large numbers of livestock. The major problems are development of water, systems of grazing control, proper stocking, and application of other
modern management techniques. If these problems can be solved, Somalia can take its place as one of the major suppliers of meat for the North African and Western Asian areas.
LITERATURE CITED
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