Quote:In his 2007 book "The Monopoly of Violence," James Sheehan explains why the majority of European nations adore pacifism in a violent world. Exploding social costs and "anti-militarism" cannot go along with the ideology of a Europe that is acting as a global player, whether its role is "hard," "soft" or "smart."
The biggest blow to the idea of a European intervention policy came last August when the European Union decided to send 3,800 soldiers to Chad in central Africa.
Twenty nations debated for months how to handle such a deployment. Finally, 3,000 troops, 50 percent coming from France, which had forced the European cabinets into this rather questionable humanitarian mission, are currently dispatched. This mission, probably without any measurable success, is intended to protect humanitarian aid workers in a number of refugee camps that now hold approximately 300,000 people.
The European Union was not able to resolve even the question of sending a handful of helicopters, and it was archrival Russia that promised to send six to 10 Mi-8s.
This mess was caused by a lack of political will, ongoing public criticism of any participation in any of the numerous African crises, and by the low European defense budgets. Every country sending a small force into Chad has to bear the full costs of transportation and logistics.
Even more devastating for the planners was the fact that none of the six or seven battle groups allegedly ready to be deployed would go because of myriad political and social reasons.
The concept of a European force has a long, troubled history, often pitting European initiatives against broader Euro-Atlantic goals. The original idea goes back to 1947-48, when the Western European Union (WEU) was proposed, only to be pushed aside when NATO was established in 1949.
When de Gaulle separated France from NATO's joint military command in 1965, he kept the WEU alive, but it remained only a paper treaty.
The WEU was back on the agenda shortly after the collapse of the Communist bloc, as a separate European alliance besides NATO and the already defunct Warsaw Pact.
The French saw European army, air and naval forces coming from the member states of the European Community (after 1995 the European Union), fully separated from NATO forces, and led by a European military staff. Paris was quite appalled by the attractiveness of NATO to the states in Central and Eastern Europe, and of the NATO Partnership for Peace.
Two moves were attempted in the 1990s: In 1992-93, Paris strongly recommended a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), which was the operational-technical term for the new European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), emerged beside the Eurocorps.
The original HHG plan included an EU Military Committee and a Military Staff in Mons, Belgium, and required some 65,000 soldiers, an additional 20,000 in the air and naval components, able to be deployed within 60 days by airlift and sealift, up to 4,000 miles "around EU-Europe" (whatever such would include besides Northern Africa). It would include reconnaissance elements and an independent satellite navigation system, and would be sustainable for one year, including at least one rotation.
Further planning indicated a requirement of at least 250,000 men in combat forces and in logistics. This force should have been available in 2003. But the European NATO/EU member states earmarked their reduced militaries for NATO and NATO's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
The RRF became a weak copy of the RDF.
In 2004, the EU made another effort, called "Battle Group," as a cheaper substitute for the defunct RRF. All EU members were approached to participate, and indeed, all did, including the still leftover neutrals Austria and Ireland, plus Norway and Turkey (non EU-members).
Originally, there were nine such battalion-size forces; now, there are 20. Each of these units would have 1,500 to 1,800 troops, and be built like a British regiment around a lead nation with headquarters, and a mix of combat battalion, combat logistics, communications, some engineers, medical support and other elements coming from one to three nations.
But a quick calculation was rather eye-opening. These forces, with one rotation after six months, plus airlift, sealift, fighter cover, surveillance and logistics, would again require 200,000 troops back in Europe. Every mission would require more than one battle group. But there is not much joint training, there is no standardized equipment, and there are language problems.
In more and more European states, the draft was replaced by professional soldiers and manpower figures were reduced. This created problems in filling national and international defense requirements, and international missions are given no priority in some states.
The European Union has sent small forces to the Congo twice and now to Chad, but these are ad hoc formations, not organized battle groups that would require great amounts of additional air and land warfare elements and accompanying transport and logistics.
Friedrich Korkisch is director of the Center of Foreign and Security Policy, Vienna, Austria.
"Korea has not been the only battle ground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba, and Cyprus and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called 'wars of liberation,' to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."-President Kennedy's Address at Graduation Exercises of the U.S. Military Academy, 1962
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"The reason I'll be released is the same reason you think I'll be convicted. I do rub shoulders with some of the most vile, sadistic men calling themselves leaders today. But some of these men are the enemies of your enemies. And while the biggest arms dealer in the world is your boss - the President of the United States, who ships more merchandise in a day than I do in a year - sometimes it's embarrassing to have his fingerprints on the guns. Sometimes he needs a freelancer like me to supply forces he can't be seen supplying. So. You call me evil, but unfortunately for you, I'm a necessary evil."-Yuri Orlov, Lord of War
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"Of all the weapons in the vast soviet arsenal, nothing was more profitable than Avtomat Kalashnikova model of 1947. More commonly known as the AK-47, or Kalashnikov. It's the world's most popular assault rifle. A weapon all fighters love. An elegantly simple 9 pound amalgamation of forged steel and plywood. It doesn't break, jam, or overheat. It'll shoot whether it's covered in mud or filled with sand. It's so easy, even a child can use it; and they do. The Soviets put the gun on a coin. Mozambique put it on their flag. Since the end of the Cold War, the Kalashnikov has become the Russian people's greatest export. After that comes vodka, caviar, and suicidal novelists. One thing is for sure, no one was lining up to buy their cars."-Yuri Orlov, Lord of War
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The only thing I see happening is there was a small levy from each country. Each country contributed XXXX amount of soldiers and each country gave a percentage of their military (or total) budget. This would make it truly European as well as create a central command with its own resources and own equipment. This would firstly be a Rapid Deployment Force with leadership chosen by merit and the standard language being English (simply because it is understood by the most people).
That would be the first proper and viable step IMO. But there wouldn't be a country in the EU willing to do that I don't think.
Siege of Tobruk - One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting." Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners ... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."
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Current Topic - The Irrelevance of European Battle Groups
