The Israelis as a fighting force are over rated, in 1973 the Israeli airforce was able to limit the egyptian gains due to the bottleneck that was the suez canal , Egyptian forces blunded their way towards the passes after learning nothing from the israeli penny pocket attacks against them!
Actually, the Egyptians attempted to expand their bridgehead on the 7th of October, before IDF reinforcements arrived, and failed misrably despite outnumbering their foe. And no, Im not speaking of the Egyptian counterattack which occured later in the war.
further Lets look at Egyptian tank numbers the only tanks egypt posessed able to equal or exceed the 1,300 Israeli Tanks all of which are armed with 105mm guns were the 570 t-62's
1: Those 1300 Israeli tanks had to be split between two fronts, so 650 would be the more accurate number facing the Egyptians.
2: While the 105 mm had an advantage over the T-55 in long range combat, the T-55 had an edge in close range due to its lower profile and thicker frontal armor. Many of the latter battles during the 1973 war were short range tank engagements.
The Israelis entered lebanon and thought they could over awe the Civillian populace and intimidate the Lebanese army into attacking Hizbullah,
False. Though it was hoped Hezbollah would lose popular support, the aim was to intimidate Hezbollah itself, the plan for a massive attack on civilian infastructure was not accepted by the government, and thus, it was severely limited.
This aim was defeated by the Hizbullah Uav attack on the Israeli Missile Boat, and the persistant (and tacticaly and strategicly useless) unguided rocket attacks on northern israel.
It wasnt a UAV attack, it was a C-802 missile. Secondly, what stopped the attack was rather massive international pressure which forced Israel's hand. The persistant rocket attack only gave Hezbollah a semblence of a media victory, because it was the best proof that it "survived" the Israeli attack.
Instead the Israeli strikes on Lebanons Infrastructure did nothing against the Hizbullah for the Shiites of the south were and remain the poor of lebanon, the sunni merchant class and christian elites watched their roads, their resorts, even their cabs burn and be blasted from above, meanwhile Iranian proxies and front organizations working on behalf of Hizbullah/Amal have Bought out much of the sunni and druze hinterlands, thus alienating the poorer classes of druze and sunni muslim, who were dependant on tourism , They sold cheaply I am told....
Quite the opposite. Shia areas were allmost exclusively targetted, and most if not all of the Sunni/Christian/Druze areas were untouched.
The Lebanese army did not even attempt to fire on Israeli aircraft violating its airspace and bombing its civillian areas, It is a totally useless force, unles its use is crushing dissent in palestinian refugee camps....
False. It did fire its AA guns which totally inadaquate.
Now on to Hizbullah The Israelis proved they could still count on body counts of 8-10 to 1 , however Israeli did not plan on their enemy being able to provide indirect fire against their troop concentrations with mortar and recoiless gun nor their enemy being able to provide a degree of secure communications, nor were israelis prepared for direct fire attacks at standoff ranges with 3-5km atgws.
That is correct, Hezbollah was underestimated, but the main hampering factor was ATGM's fired at infantry concentrations, and NOT, as you said, mortars of recoiless guns.
that being said look at the totals were the israelis pushed back, pushed out, defeated? absolutely not.
The offensive tempo remained totally in the israeli hands, the Israelis could begin and end engagements at will.
But as long as we kept treating this as an operation rather than a war, seeing each offensive as a 'raid' rather than an attempt to conquer ground, we would not advance. Units entering towns would clear out a few neighborhoods and then retreat back to Israel, as if the 'mission was complete', rather than stay in and deepen the advance. It was an emulation of the tactics we use in Gaza, which should not have been used in a war.
