http://www.casr.ca/doc-dnd-armour-lav-iii-upgrade.htm
LAV 'Re-Set' The Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade Project
[Hypothetical uparmoured LAV III with RWS - CASR] This DND Backgrounder details the long-expected LAV III 're-set'. When maker General Dynamics Land Systems- Canada (GDLS-C) displayed its new LAV-H "Technology Demonstrator Chassis" to NDHQ in April 2008, there was a widespread assumption that this was the CF's 'next-gen' LAV. Now, from the information available in this DND/CF Backgrounder, it is apparent that there'll be no 'new-built' LAV-Hs. Instead, this is to be a straightforward upgrade for some of the surviving LAV IIIs. The upgraded LAV III may incorporate features of the LAV-H prototype though.
[Hypothetical LAV-H based LAV III upgrade - CASR] So what are those likely upgrade features going to look like? It is possible that weapons upgrades will make a dramatic difference in appearance, with RWS-mounted weapon size determined by roles. Mission-adaptive compartments may speed LAV role changes.[1]
[Up-armed - 30mm Mk44 Bushmaster II turret - GDLS image] Alternatively, larger calibre cannons may simply be substituted for current 25mm M242s in the existing turrets. In this case, upgraded LAVs may be all but indistinguishable from today's model. Protection in the form of thicker armour and, perhaps, the 'V'- shaped rear hull bottom of the LAV-H are a given.
[LAV III suspension - based on a photo by Dan Hay] Suspension changes will probably involve the installation of 28-t Piranha V (or similar) components. Powerplant changes are harder to predict. The Caterpillar 3126 diesel can be uprated from the current 260 kW to 335 kW. The Piranha IVs and Vs have 400 kW MTU diesels but, obviously, that much of an increase in power would dictate major changes throughout the LAV drivetrain. But such is the result of heavier armour and armament.
[1] The idea of a modular 'pickup' LAV was suggested early on. Here we refer only to a possible rearranging the LAV's rear compartment to more readily adapt it to roles other than IFV (eg: Bison ISC and ambulance replacements, direct-fire support vehicles, etc).
DND/Canadian Forces News Release
Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III Upgrade Project
BG - 09.015 - July 8, 2009
The recent experiences of the Canadian Forces and other nations in Afghanistan and other operational theatres...demonstrate the ongoing requirement for a highly protect- ed, yet highly mobile Light-Armoured Vehicle. The use of mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and anti-armour weapons has become more prevalent, posing a greater risk to personnel.
The LAV III Upgrade project will capitalize on existing and evolving technology to improve the protection, mobility and lethality of the LAV III fleet. The [Upgrade] will modernize a portion of the existing LAV III fleet to ensure it remains a highly protect- ed, operationally mobile and tactically agile combat vehicle that will remain the back- bone of domestic and expeditionary task forces, extending the life span of the LAV III to 2035.
The following upgrades will be performed on the LAV III:
Upgrade of mobility systems such as powertrain, suspension, running gear and
brakes;
Upgrade of the weapon system; and
Installation of additional armour, heightening...protection against increased threats.
The LAV III Upgrade project will upgrade 550 vehicles with an option for an additional 80 [upgraded LAV IIIs]. Initial operational capability is scheduled for 2012.
The project will now enter the definition phase to determine the scope of the work to be done. General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada (GDLS-C), the original equipment manufacturer, will be awarded a contract to conduct this definition work and will also be selected to implement the upgrades.
Canada is still operating as part of NATOs ISAF force, as part of a group under British command tasked with the south-western provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan. Canadian Task Force Orion is based in Kandahar, and in 2006 its commander Lt. Col. Ian Hope was quoted by Canadian defence think-tank CASR as saying that:
It is quite possible [this lack of transport helicopters] has cost limbs, if not more, because we have had to sustain [resupply troops in remote areas using vehicles] on the ground, said Lt-Col Ian Hope, who commands [Task Force Orion]. That has produced a risk that would be reduced if we could take helicopter flights. It does not take a military tactician to know this. We have mitigated the risks. Losses have been reduced, but not yet to zero.
Canadas senior logistician in Kandahar Lt. Col. John Conrad added that Canadas Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located along roads and dirt tracks where the Taliban and its commanders in Quetta, Pakistan often send suicide bombers, or places mines and other explosives because American, British, and Dutch Chinook transport helicopters are seldom available for such missions:
The convoys are now in harms way almost daily because supplies have to follow the infantry and we have had to send those supplies by land. We bid on [available coalition helicopter support], but it is like coming to a potluck. Everyone brings a dish and, instead of potato salad, we come with a jug of water. [our allies] help us when they can, but we are at the end of [their priority] list [unless the requirement is close air support or MEDEVAC].
AIR_CH-47_Australian_Dusty_Liftoff.jpg
CH-47 Chinook
Indeed, the governments own June 2006 announcement recognized this when it stated that:
To date Canada has relied on allied or coalition forces to provide this type of helicopter transport while deployed. This limits the Canadian Forces ability to conduct independent operations, and also means when unavailable, troops must opt for ground transportation, placing them at greater risk of ambushes, land mines and improvised explosive devices.
This problem eventually came to a head in Parliament, where Canadas Conservative Party runs a minority government. The January 2008 Manley Report was an independent panel called by the Parliament of Canada, and a key part of their report minced few words:
Despite recent indicators of imminent reinforcements, the entire ISAF mission is threatened by the current inadequacy of deployed military resources. As well, to improve the safety and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in Kandahar, the Government should secure for them, no later than February 2009, new medium-lift helicopters and high-performance unmanned aerial vehicles. Canadian soldiers currently must rely too much on allied forces for both of these necessary assets. If no undertakings on the battle group are received from ISAF partner countries by February 2009, or if the necessary equipment is not procured, the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar.
In other words, to leave Afghanistan.
According to the broad DND announcement in June 2006, The estimated total project cost for this aircraft acquisition is C$ 2 billion (USD $ 1.78 billion then), plus an estimated contract value of C$ 2.7 billion (USD $2.4 billion then) for 20 years of in-service support a contract to be competed by the winning contractor, with work largely to be done in Canada by Canadian mechanics and contractors. As with other contracts in the series, the winning contractor will be expected to provide total industrial offsets equal to at least 100% of the contract value.
The Canadian DND also had a specific platform in mind, as theyre using a competitive process known as an Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN):
The ACAN process permits the Government to identify an intended contract award winner (in this case, the Boeing CH-47F Chinook) based on the mandatory capabilities and detailed market research conducted by the Department. Industry is then given the opportunity to respond, should they feel they have an aircraft that meets this criteria. If no supplier submits a statement of capabilities that meets the requirements set out in the ACAN during its posting period of 30 calendar days, then the competitive requirements of the governments contracting policy have been met and the governments choice is bought. If a valid statement of capabilities is received then a fully competitive process will be run.
So, what are those required capabilities?
* Internal Cabin space to accommodate an infantry platoon (30 soldiers) with full combat equipment, including weapons, body armour, rucksacks, rations and communications (4,763 kg/ 10,550 lbs.).
* External Lift multiple loads, including a lightweight field howitzer (Canada recently bought the M777) and associated equipment (minimum of 5,443 kg/ 12,000 lbs.).
* Hot and High Accomplish the lift and range parameters defined above, at altitudes and temperatures up to 1,220 m/ 4,000 ft above sea level and 35 C / 95 F degrees.
* Range Minimum of 100 km/ 60 miles with either the internal or external load described as above and at the temperatures and altitudes defined.
* Aircraft certification Aircraft must be certified to aviation certification standards recognized by Canada by the contract award date.
* Fleet size Minimum fleet of 16 aircraft, sufficient to sustain a minimum of three deployed helicopters in addition to maintenance, test and evaluation, and training at two main operating bases.
* Delivery Delivery date of first aircraft must be no later than 36 months after contract award and final aircraft delivery no later than 60 months after contract award.
The Canadian Department of Public Safety is also part of the purchasing process, as they expect the aircraft to be used to respond to natural or man-made disasters. This is not exactly a vote of confidence in their current EH101/CH-149 Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopters, though that fleet of 15 is a small number for a country Canadas size.
The need for the CH-47 was simple: none of Canadas existing helicopters were up to the job. Its CH-146 Griffons (Bell 412s) cant carry useful loads in that environment, though they were repurposed and deployed as light armed reconnaissance helicopters. Its ancient CH-124 Sea Kings are falling apart, its CH-148 Cyclones (H-92 Superhawks) are ordered but not yet manufactured, and its 14 new search-and-rescue CH-149 Cormorants are few in number, are based on the EH101s civil model rather than its military model, and were consuming spares at a torrid rate before suffering through a fleet-wide grounding period due to maintenance & safety issues.
The big issue for the CH-47F was also simple the RFPs clause re: delivery. With troops on the ground who need these capabilities right now, delivery in 36-60 months will not meet the needs of Canadas fighting men and women in harms way. A need their commanding officers have openly stated as a priority. Contrast Canadas approach to Australias more proactive stance, for instance.
Worse, the DND found that delivery of the CH-47F Chinooks would not arrive until 2012 at the earliest, after Canadas Afghan mission is supposed to end.
Shortly after the RFPs release, Canadian defense think-tank CASR began pointing out that 2 potential solutions exist to this dilemma. One is the possible solution discussed during November 2005 coverage of Canadas emergency purchases for Operation Archer: buy Mi-17 helicopters, the same type flown by East European NATO allies and by the Afghan Air Force. A Russian trade delegation made that precise offer during their March 2006 visit to Canada, and a Canadian company named Kelowna Flightcraft is already cooperating with the Mil factory in Kazan to produce Mi-17KF Kittiwakes with fully Westernized avionics and rear loading ramps.
AIR_MI-17.jpg
Mi-17KF
Mi-17s arent a substitute for the Chinook. Their load is 24 fully-equipped troops at best, with an external sling load of 3,000 kg, vs. the stated Canadian requirement of 30 troops and 5,443 kg. On the other hand, their cost is about 1/8 that of a new CH-47 Chinook, and deliveries would be rapid. They would create a temporary solution, one which could be repurposed later to other military roles, given away to the Afghans, or even given civilian rescue or disaster-related roles as Chinooks become available.
The second potential solution is advocated by Lt-Col James Dorschner (US Army Reserve, Ret.), a Special Correspondent for Janes Defense Weekly, in 2006. The deal involves Boeings CHAPS (Cargo Helicopter Alternate Procurement Strategy) program, which is associated with the US Armys new CH-47F buy:
...the CHAPS program allows third parties to buy US Army CH-47Ds (already earmarked for remanufacture into advanced CH-47Fs) for roughly US $15 M each. This amount is about half the price of a new-build CH-47D and much less than a new-build CH-47F. This more modern Chinook, is selling for about US $35 to 40 million each.
Under the CHAPS arrangement, the money from US Army CH-47D-model aircraft, sold by Boeing, can be used to top up the Army funding which has already been budgeted for CH-47F remanufacture. The added revenue will allow the Army to buy a brand new CH-47F for each D sold. An aircraft purchased under CHAPS will, of course, be overhauled and upgraded to the latest CH-47D-model standards by Boeing prior to delivery. all Third Party purchases are handled as a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS), rather than the usual Foreign Military Sale (FMS).
Canada CH-47Ds Kandahar
CF CH-47Ds, Kanadahar
(click to view full)
In other words, much faster, less complicated, win/win for both militaries. Dorschner notes that Egypt was the first customer to sign up for CHAPS CH-47s, with Australia* expected to follow shortly. The Netherlands*, Spain, Italy*, and Great Britain may follow; countries with asterisks have already ordered the CH-47F as of August 2009.
Using CHAPS as a starting point, Dorschner contended that Canada could field a small force of 4-5 Chinooks to Afghanistan before the end of the current NATO deployment, eventually growing its CHAPS fleet to 9-12 aircraft before the new Chinooks arrive in numbers. At that point, the CHAPS Chinooks could be sent back to be refurbished as CH-47Fs themselves. The question was, could CHAPS be invoked by a country that doesnt already have earlier-version CH-47s and if they dont, are any airframes available on the global market?
Either near-term option could work. As Canadas Manley Report issued an ultimatum to either deploy helicopter support or leave Afghanistan, it became clear was that the usual bureaucratic response of an inch an hour progress or snarling at critics wouldnt be enough. Unless some kind of near-term option was found and implemented, Canadas Afghan mission and the USD $4.2 billion CH-47F program both faced the inevitability of death.
In the end, Canada worked out an arrangement for 6 US Army CH-47Ds, which were deployed to Afghanistan in early 2009. Read Lets Stay Engaged: CH-47D Chinooks for Canadas Afghan Mission for more. Whether they return for CHAPS conversion at the end of Canadas Afghan mission in 2011 remains to be seen.
Aug 25/09: Danish defense firm Terma A/S announces that Boeing has picked its AN/ALQ-213V Electronic Warfare Management System (EWMS) for Canadas CH-47Fs, pursuant to a March 2009 Memorandum of Agreement on industrial cooperation. The development and subsystem integration work will be lead by Termas U.S.-based Airborne Systems team in Warner Robins, Georgia and supported by Terma in Denmark.
The AN/ALQ-213V will integrate the helicopters warning systems against radar, infrared, and laser guided missiles, then feed combined threat awareness displays and coordinate countermeasures. The firms AN/ALQ-213 family and related Advanced CounterMeasures Dispensing System (ACMDS) products are installed and are operational on over 1,000 U.S. A-10 and F-16 aircraft and more than 700 international F-16s, C-130s, AH-64s, F-111s and CH-47s.
Aug 10/09: The Canadian government signs a US$ 1.15 billion contract with Boeing for 15 new CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, modified to meet Canadas local requirements, and able to transport more than 21,000 pounds/ 9,525 kg of cargo. These CH-147s will be produced at the Boeing Rotorcraft Systems facility in Ridley Township, PA, with deliveries expected to begin in July 2013 and extend into 2014.
In addition to purchasing 15 helicopters, this project will involve a 20-year in-service support and maintenance contract valued at approximately C$ 2.2 billion, with an option to extend the contract all the way through the helicopters service lives. This performance-based in-service support is expected to include aircraft maintenance, training systems and services, engineering support, supply chain management, and other expertise. A full through-life support contract is estimated to be worth up to C$ 5 billion.
In line with Canadas Industrial & Regional Benefits policy, Boeing will match every dollar spent by the Canadian government in acquiring its CH-147 fleet by partnering with and issuing contracts to companies in Canada, where Boeing is already a major aerospace presence. Contracts worth more than C$ 500 million have been signed against this commitment, and are being implemented by companies across Canada. Canadas DND cites an independent analysis that cites about 5,500 direct jobs and an opportunity for up to 15,000 indirect jobs across the country. Canadas DND: Backgrounder | Announcement || Boeing | Globe and Mail | Ottawa Citizen | Halifax Chronicle Herald re: industrial offsets | Seeking Alpha re: Canadian aerospace.
Dec 15/08: Quebecs Le Devoir reports [Google translation from French] that negotiations are nearly complete, and a Canadian contract for CH-47F helicopters can be expected early in 2009.
The report mentions the strong support for this purchase within the Canadian Forces, but the delays have created a situation in which political problem may kill the deal. Canada has committed to leave Afghanistan by 2011, but the helicopters would not arrive until 2012. This removes one of their biggest raisons detre, and makes them vulnerable to cancellation. The other issue is the status of Parliament, which is currently prorogued until January 2009. When it returns, it may dissolve on a motion of no confidence, a move that is very likely to precipitate another election. Parliamentary dissolution would be likely to stall any contract until mid-2009, and if the government changes, it could easily decide to cancel the purchase altogether.
Sept 24/08: Canadas Globe and Mail newspaper adds to reports that Canadas Chinooks will not be standard CH-47Fs, and claims Canada is offering Boeing a limited risk-reduction contract to build a couple of prototype aircraft. A contract is expected by the end of 2008.
The helicopter variant Canada wants will reportedly add more armament, defensive systems, additional range via larger tanks and/or aerial refueling, and combat search and rescue equipment. The result would be a mix and match between the CH-47F, the special forces MH-47G, and the HH-47F that initially won the USAs first CSAR-X combat search and rescue competition. Globe and Mail via The Torch.
April 21/08: Canada makes a separate official request for 6 CH-47D Chinooks from the USA, with a total price tag of up to USD$ 375 million. See Lets Stay Engaged: CH-47D Chinooks for Canadas Afghan Mission.
April 7/08: Canadas Ministry of Public Works and Government Services announces a March 2008 RFP to Boeing for 16 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, plus 20 years of associated in-service support (ISS), with an extension option for the life expectancy of the aircraft. The Government expects to award a contract for the medium-to-heavy lift helicopter in fall 2008, and the usual rules concerning 100% industrial offsets apply.
In the wake of Parliamentary reports and political pressure, Canadas ongoing involvement in Afghanistan is predicated in part on the acquisition of medium battlefield support helicopters. The CH-47F Chinooks delivery time will not meet that need, however, and so the release adds that:
This procurement is not being undertaken to meet the governments short-term requirements in Afghanistan this is being done through a separate process but rather to re-equip the Canadian Forces over the longer-term.
April 1/08: Flight International reports that:
A contract is expected to be signed with Canada by year end for 16 new-build helicopters. These are expected to be a unique configuration combining features of the F and the G, although Canada is negotiating for accelerated delivery of an initial six aircraft by taking US Army-standard CH-47Fs straight off the assembly line. These are urgently needed for operations in Afghanistan.
On April 21/08, it became clear that the initial 6 aircraft would be taken from serving US Army CH-47Ds. Conversions to Canadas CH-47F/G configuration may be possible later, as the US Armys CH-47F orders are a mix of new-build and remanufactured helicopters.
March 20/08: Janes Defense Weekly reports that Canada has negotiated the purchase of 6 ex-US Army Boeing CH-47D Chinook medium-lift helicopters for use in Afghanistan, but has no way of supporting the aircraft in theatre. The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) declined to comment on the acquisition negotiations, stating only that the department is currently examining a number of options.
July 16/07: Defense Minister OConnor is interviewed on CFRA radio, and sates that he expects a contract for CH-47Fs within a couple of months. The Torch.
June 28/06: Canadas government announces the Medium-to Heavy-Lift Helicopter initiative. DND release.
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