Hamas has undertaken a major process of examination and investigation into its deeply flawed performance in the course of Operation Cast Lead, sources say. The review process is aimed at developing a new doctrine for Hamas to enable it to achieve its ambition of rivaling Hizbullah in its abilities. It remains to be seen if the reforms will deliver an improved result in renewed future hostilities with Israel or whether, as with Operation Cast Lead, Israel will once again display an ability to frustrate and set Hamas back on the tactical level.

Hamas carried out the first review of its performance immediately following the conclusion of hostilities. This was followed by a second major investigation in the spring, amid harsh criticism of the group's performance from its Iranian and Syrian sponsors. Izzadin al-Kassam Brigades leader Ahmed al-Ja'abari, and northern brigade commander Ahmed al-Ghandour were particularly singled out for criticism.

The cull of senior Hamas operatives in the course of Operation Cast Lead was heavy. Politburo members Nizar Rayyan and Said Siyam were killed. Senior commanders of the Executive Force, like Salah Abu Shareh (who headed the EF's security apparatus) and Mahmoud Watfah (head of its military wing), also lost their lives. Around 50 explosives experts are reported to have died. Operatives at this level are not easily replaced. But more fundamentally, the defensive doctrines developed by Hamas prior to Cast Lead comprehensively failed the test.


All of its strategically important attempts to kidnap IDF soldiers in the course of the fighting were unsuccessful (at least three close calls were reported). Its failure to score any success against the IDF's heavy armor was particularly noted. This was in stark contrast to the Second Lebanon War in 2006, in which Hizbullah's relative success in damaging a large number of tanks formed an important part of its claim of "divine victory."

The Hamas investigation, according to sources, was particularly focused on probing the failure to repel the IDF's push into Tel al-Hawa - Israel's deepest incursion into Gaza City. The investigation discovered widespread desertion by members of the Kassam Brigades in the face of the IDF advance. It found that many fighters, who had received instructions to withdraw if they feared being overrun, took a liberal interpretation of this, disappearing well in advance of the IDF's arrival. A Gaza rumor has it that 100 gunmen from the Zeitoun area were stripped of their membership in the organization following Cast Lead.


The extent of the Hamas failure can be summed up if one considers the official figures given by the organization on the ordnance fired in the course of Operation Cast Lead. According to Kassam Brigades spokesman Abu Obeideh, Hamas fired 558 rockets, of which 345 were Kassams and 213 were Grads, and 422 mortar shells; 53 sniper attacks were carried out and 79 bombs were detonated. Nineteen pitched battles with IDF forces took place.

The result was the death of six IDF soldiers. If one compares this with the statistics of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 - in which 23 IDF soldiers were killed in a single battle in the Jenin refugee camp - the extent of the failure becomes apparent.


Hamas managed throughout the course of the Gaza war to maintain constant rocket fire on Israel. This was a significant symbolic achievement, but not a great deal more. It constitutes the sole military success of any kind for which Hamas is able to take credit.


Clearly, something went awry for the rulers of Gaza in the fighting. Their patrons in Teheran and Damascus were angry and concerned. The image of success, of having finally found a way to deny the IDF victory and cause Israel setbacks, is an important element in the psychological warfare of the Iran-led regional bloc. This image has taken a series of blows so far this year. The Gaza events rank high among them.


Hamas has therefore engaged in extensive internal discussions intended to lead to the formulation of a new doctrine. According to sources, two distinct orientations emerged from this, corresponding broadly with the growing political divide in Hamas between the veteran leadership of the movement and elements committed to a more extreme al-Qaida style approach. The latter favored the acceptance of a much higher casualty rate of Hamas fighters, through the resumption of direct attacks on Israeli forces, and the reinstatement of attacks on Israel and in the West Bank. This adventurous and probably suicidal approach, however, has not been accepted.


Rather Hamas has adopted a more modest series of reforms. These center on overhauling the movement's tactical doctrine, adopting a new and intensified, externally-supported training program for Kassam Brigades fighters, increased smuggling and upgrading of arms, the building of a new, underground tunnel structure and an attempt to tighten internal security.


Regarding the first issue, Hamas over the summer has been carrying out intensified military training at its various training camps and military academy in the Nuseirat refugee camp. The academy, ironically, is named after the Palestinian ideological godfather of al-Qaida, Dr. Abdallah Azzam. In contrast to the pre-2009 period, when Hamas took great pride in parading its military capabilities, the nature of this training has not been publicized.


The new approach is thought to be more offensive, and is intended to hit at the rear bases of an incoming IDF force. Hizbullah is thought to be deeply involved in the new training program. (This is not a new development. Elements who had trained with Hizbullah in the Bekaa Valley were also involved in the fighting earlier this year).


On the issue of smuggling, Egyptian efforts at cracking down on weapons smuggling into Rafah have increased in recent months. In addition, as reported in the media, there have been the attacks on arms convoys in Sudan which were on their way to Gaza, and the revelation of a Hizbullah-led arms smuggling network in the spring; 49 operatives, led by Hizbullah member Sami Shihab (Muhammad Yousef Mansour) are now on trial in Egypt for organizing this network.


The Egyptians, however, are making no efforts to curb commercial smuggling into Gaza, which now forms a major source of income for the Hamas regime. As a result, Hamas is mixing the bringing in of arms with the import of commercial goods. Part of the levy placed on commercial owners of tunnels is thought to include requiring them at short notice to be ready to bring in arms for Hamas. Extensive redigging of tunnels destroyed in the bombing of the Philadelphi corridor began already in January.

In addition to the extensive tunnel network, seaborne smuggling is also continuing. Hamas claims as a result of these efforts to now have a more extensive array of weaponry than before the war.

Hamas lost a very large amount of weaponry in the course of Operation Cast Lead. Key storage facilities under mosques and public buildings were discovered. The movement blames the presence of Fatah "informers" for its failures in this regard. Hamas believes that Fatah members at street level provided real-time information to IDF forces. The movement settled accounts with a series of executions of Fatah men after Cast Lead.


Improving internal security is now a major task facing the rulers of Gaza.
The picture of Hamas in Gaza that emerges in the post-Cast Lead period is a complex one. On the one hand, its rule survived the operation intact. No concerted Israeli effort to bring Hamas down was undertaken, and Hamas swiftly reasserted its authority after emerging from the rubble, despite the heavy blows it had taken.


On the other hand, the many failures in the movement's performance have tarnished its reputation and accentuated internal divisions. The most important of these splits is between the movement's traditional leadership which wants to continue its current path, and the growing number of Salafi militants concentrated in the Kassam Brigades, who would like to see greater Islamic observance in society and a return to a collision course with Israel.

Operation Cast Lead represented a significant tactical defeat for Hamas and hence, an important though far from decisive setback for the regional alliance which it is part of. The movement has picked up the pieces and engaged in a rethink of the methods that failed it. Of course, Israel too will have sought to learn its lessons from the experience of the Gaza War. As to who drew the better conclusions - this will be answered only in the next round of fighting between these two seemingly irreconcilable foes.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC, Herzliya.


http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1251804542247&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Hamaz trying to rival Hezbollah, LOL!

There are massive differences between those two, Hezbollah ran tral and error with their own lives to defend lebanon against the IDF to see what worked.
Hamaz is based on looking good in front of western TV cameras after Israeli ordnance goes astray.

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Nothing here that couldn't be considered in advance of operation cast lead. The far more interesting question I would like asking and answered is what Israel has learned from this operation. The biggest victory Israel had in this is the fact that so few casualties on Israeli side and although that is certainly an important victory the long term affects for the ability of Hamas to wage war on Israel are both more important and less obvious.

The reasons for starting operation cast lead was political as the attacks from Gaza were politically untenable. That objective has been achieved but in the long term Hamas will learn from this and the next time Israel needs to invade Gaza the going is likely to be more difficult. I don't see a long term strategy in action that will provide a solution to the current situation.

Operation "Cast Lead" was a excuse to test lethal modern weaponry on a civilian population which had no hope of defending itself, to kill and maim women and children, so in that respect the "operation" was a success.

Hamas is nothing more than a militia of private citizens who have decided to never surrender to Israeli demands, the only thing they have is a few home-made firecrackers and few Ak47's and pistols.

Israeli army used their full force but Hamas are still there, its a miracle they even held out against a modern army like the IDF.


If i bench my bodyweight in a Gym i should fight guys my own size, not beat up little kids and claim it a "victory". If i beat up a kid and he still manages to say "F' YOU!" at the end of it then really the "victory" goes to him. This is the example of Israel v Hamas.

//"Operation "Cast Lead" was a excuse to test lethal modern weaponry on a civilian population"//




Yes, beacuse we just 'had' to spend 2 billion $ worth of munitions just for the fun of it.




//"Hamas is nothing more than a militia of private citizens who have decided to never surrender to Israeli demands"//



Organized command structure, political backing, 10,000 payed troops, uniforms (only for parades, they shed them before battle), ammunition depots, training centres. Yeah, your analysis was precise as usual.



//"Israeli army used their full force but Hamas are still there, its a miracle they even held out against a modern army like the IDF."//



They failed to hold out in even one battle. The IDF stopped because the next stage was to reoccupy all of Gaza, and unfortunately, international pressure prevented us from making the nessecary steps that any other country would have taken.

Bolkenstein:


//"Nothing here that couldn't be considered in advance of operation cast lead. The far more interesting question I would like asking and answered is what Israel has learned from this operation. The biggest victory Israel had in this is the fact that so few casualties on Israeli side and although that is certainly an important victory the long term affects for the ability of Hamas to wage war on Israel are both more important and less obvious."//



Since the 2nd Lebanon war, the IDF has virtually restructured most of its ground forces, logistics, command structure, training and equipment. The results showed in Cast Lead.





//" I don't see a long term strategy in action that will provide a solution to the current situation."//




There was a solution, one that is being attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq. We shouldn't have entered Gaza with 5000 troops, but rather with 30,000, called up the reserves, and while gritting our teeth, gone in and occupied Gaza fully, rounding up or killing all of Hamas's top leaders, and then, either bring Fatah back into the fold, or call for a UN peacekeeping force akin to the Kosovo scenario.

You did your best in Gaza, and it still flopped.

Like i said, it was a absolute success when it came to killing civilians, you slaughtered mercilessly the women and kids but still could do dare to venture deep enough just incase somebody fired back with small-arms fire

What you guys did in Gaza was pre-planned mass murder, we saw it, the world saw it, and i guess you took a nice page our of Hitler's book there, so yeah, well done you just ensured another generation will fight you till they die.

//"You did your best in Gaza, and it still flopped."//


Im sure you will be able to elaborate.



//"Like i said, it was a absolute success when it came to killing civilians, you slaughtered mercilessly the women and kids but still could do dare to venture deep enough just incase somebody fired back with small-arms fire"//



A massive urban battle with roughly 1k casualties is stunningly low, when you compare it to pretty much every historical example. Despite Gaza being one of the densest areas on earth, despite Hamas's use of civilian infastructure for its base of operations, and despite the huge amount of ordenance Israel used, the number of civilian dead was lower than in any other urban operation. Remember, at roughly the same time of Operation Cast Lead, the Sri-Lanken army killed 20,000 civilians in a period of two months.




//"What you guys did in Gaza was pre-planned mass murder"//



Considering the fact that in Gaza's urban environment, one errant bomb can kill over a hundred civilians, and considering the fact that we dropped close to 5000 bombes and missiles during the war, then we seem to have utterly failed to 'mass kill' Gaza's civilians.