Editorial
The Mistral Problem
Mikhail Barabanov
The Russian Defense Ministry's talks with France to purchase a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship (Landing Helicopter Dock, LHD) have caused a lot of controversy in Russia by putting into stark relief a new trend in its defense procurement policy. Previously, the military had insisted that Russia should be completely self-sufficient in terms of defense technology, opposing even the use of the odd foreign-made component in the military equipment supplied by Russian defense contractors. But now it has made a complete U-turn on that policy. The precedent was set a couple of years ago with the purchase of the French-made Thales Catherine FC and Sagem Matiz thermal image cameras for Russian armored vehicles. More recently, Russia also bought several unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems from Israel Aerospace Industries corporation. But all those contracts were portrayed as routine imports of the latest military technology with the purpose of localizing or cloning it. Which is why news of the plan to spend at least 500m euros on a large (21,300 tons) helicopter-carrying LHD came as a shock.
Then came the reports that the Russian Defense Ministry is showing interest in a whole range of foreign-made military equipment. That includes the French future infantry soldier system FELIN developed by Sagem; wheeled armored vehicles (reportedly of the mine resistant ambush protected MRAP type, with South Africa companies apparently being seen as the preferred supplier); and the new German Type 212A or Type 214 conventional submarines (or at least the Siemens fuel cell air-independent propulsion system for those subs).
The Russian media have been extremely critical of the plans to buy a Mistral-class ship, and we fully share those criticisms. The key arguments against the idea are these:
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Buying a new LHD is not a priority requirement for either the Russian Navy or the Russian armed forces in general.
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The Russian Navy will not be able to operate the French-made ship properly.
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There has not been a proper competition for the supply contract, and the Russian defense industry is not involved in the project in any way.
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Russia will not gain any of the new technologies it needs as a result of the project.
Considering the real tasks the Russian Navy is going to face in the foreseeable future, and also the role of the Navy in Russia's military capability in general, buying a large ocean-going ship designed for expeditionary duties and interventions across the globe does not seem such an overriding priority. The Navy itself, the Air Force and the Army in particular, are facing acute shortages of almost every single type of modern military equipment, which is not being procured in adequate quantities. Even the very basics are in short supply, including new helmets, various munitions and supplies, auto transport, helicopters, etc. There is not enough money even to repair the existing equipment. Given all that, splurging half a billion euros on what would obviously be a luxury item for the penny-pinching Russian army seems absurd.
There are also serious doubts that the Russian Navy will be able properly to maintain and operate such a large and modern warship, foreign-made and completely different in its design and specifications from anything Russia already has. Training the crew will be another major problem. The Russian Navy has earned itself a sorry reputation for wasting its large warships - suffice is to recall the unenviable fate of the Soviet Kiev-class heavy aircraft carrier cruisers, Kirov-class heavy nuclear-powered guided missiles cruisers and the Project 956 destroyers. Even now the Navy is unable to maintain the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier in proper working order - the ship still isn't completely finished. Operating a Mistral-class LHDs will be an even greater challenge. Even the Navy Commander himself, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, who is thought to be the main proponent of the idea, said in September that "the infrastructure for such a ship has not been built yet. Serious preparations will be required before we can put the helicopter carrier into service"1 . The obvious question is, what has been stopping the Navy from building such infrastructure for the Admiral Kuznetsov, which was put into service 20 years ago?
After buying the ship, the Navy is hoping to build three of four more in Russia itself under a French license. The ambition is quite remarkable, given that right now, the Defense Ministry does not have enough funds to place an order even for the relatively small mass-produced Project 20380 Steregutchy class corvettes or attack boats.
Recent reports suggest that the Russian Navy is planning to invite bids for the supply of a small amphibious vessel. Apart from the French with their Mistral, bids have come from the Dutch (apparently they are offering their 16,000-ton Johan de Witt type assault helicopter landing dock ship) and from the Spanish. The nature of the Spanish offer has not been made public, but presumably it is the BPE amphibious assault ship design developed by Spain's Navantia shipyard. One ship of that type, the Juan Carlos I, is already being built for the Spanish Navy, and Navantia has won an Australian contract to build another two LHDs. It must be said that at 27,000 tons, the Juan Carlos I is a much larger and more expensive ship than the Mistral. It can launch VSTOL combat jets, so it can be used as a light aircraft carrier. Meanwhile, the Dutch Johan de Witt is much smaller than the Mistral - under the Russian classification it is termed an assault helicopter landing dock ship rather than a amphibious assault ship. It has a much more limited assault landing and aircraft carrying capability, and it is less suitable to serve as part of a squadron. In our opinion, all the talk of inviting bids from the Dutch and the Spanish are just a smoke screen designed to produce a semblance of competition when the choice has already been made in favor of the Mistral.
Notably, no attempt has been made to involve Russian shipyards or design bureaus in the project. It appears that the Russian defense industry is being entirely ignored by the top brass, who do not even bother to try to explain the situation. All they say is that Russia does not have the right experience of designing or building such ships. They should be reminded that the Nevskoye design bureau has exactly the right experience - it has designed large amphibious assault ships with docking hangars. One of its designs is the Project 1174 large landing ships of the 1st rank (which was in fact a 14,000-ton assault helicopter landing dock ship). Three ships of that design (Ivan Rogov-class) were built in 1974-1989 at the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad. And in the 1980s, Nevskoye design bureau developed Project 11780 for a full-blown 30,000-ton amphibious assault ship, which was never used because the former Soviet Union did not have any available shipyard capacity at the time. It should also be noted that all the Ivan Rogov-class ships were squandered by the Navy, who did not provide timely repairs or maintenance. The last ship of the class, the Mitrofan Moskalenko, had never been taken to sea on active duty - it was essentially allowed to turn to rust in Vladivostok after arriving there from the shipyard in 1990. Ironically, the Defense Ministry had announced that two of these ships had been sold for scrap shortly before airing the idea of buying a Mistral-class LHD.
The argument about the transfer of technology - touted as one of the key benefits of the Mistral deal by its proponents - also deserves careful study. The French media have cited government sources as saying that "the transfer of latest military technology under the deal will probably be fairly limited"2 . The Russian Navy commanders are waxing lyrical about the Mistral's potential as a command ship, its highly automated systems, and its sophisticated communication and command-and-control suit (the vessel can be used as a command ship for a combined force). But it is hard to imagine that the ship sold to Russia will actually be fitted with all those wonderful systems. The French will hardly be prepared to part with their latest SENIT 9 combat data system (a version of the SENIT 8, which is fitted onto the French Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier) or the SIC-21command system for joint operations, which is integrated with the latest NATO communications systems. As for the Mistral's other technology wonders, such as its all-electric propulsion and the Mermaid azimuth pods, all of them were developed by the civilian shipbuilding industry, and absolutely nothing stops Russia's own shipbuilders from acquiring that technology on a commercial basis. What is more, the Russian Navy already operates an all-electric ship, designed by the Vympel bureau and built in Russia itself: the Project 19910 Vaygach small hydrographic survey ship, which has been in service since 2008. Several auxiliary ships equipped with an all-electric propulsion system are now being built, including the Project 21300C Igor Belousov large search and rescue ship (developed by the Almaz design bureau).
It seems therefore that the "latest technology" Russia is buying is nothing more than a self-propelled hull built using simplified civilian standards (widely used in the Mistral design to cut costs). Cobbling together such a hull is a piece of cake even for the Chinese or Eastern European shipyards, let alone Russia's own. Large sections of the hull for the Mistral and its sister ship, the Tonnere, were subcontracted to Polish shipbuilders, while the entire hull of the Dutch Johan de Witt (the Mistral's ostensible competitor in the upcoming "bidding") was built at the Galati shipyards in Romania. It is therefore safe to assume that the fabled technologies the Russian Navy and shipyards will lay their hands on thanks to the Mistral deal are nothing more than a propaganda trick. In terms of the acquisition of modern military technology, the deal appears next to useless - which is probably why the French had so easily agreed to talk to the Russian buyers in the first place.
Russia's true goals in this strange affair are not entirely clear. It appears that the deal had been given the green light at the very top, in an apparent attempt to thank French President Nicolas Sarkozy with a large contract for his friendly stance on a number of foreign policy issues important to the Kremlin. In similar situations, China makes its appreciation known by purchasing a large batch of Airbuses assembled in Toulouse. Russia has decided instead to make use of the pet project of its Navy Commander, Admiral Vysotskiy, to buy a large warship.
The Commander's own agenda, meanwhile, appears to be largely political. He was clearly trying to draw the Russian leadership's attention to the state of affairs in the Navy, and to resolve at least some of its problems. State funding for new ships has long dried up, and even finishing those few that are now in the shipyards takes much longer that necessary due to funding shortages. The only exception is the building of a series of Project 955 (Yuriy Dolgorukiy class) strategic ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarines, which the Government has designated as a national priority. The project receives proper funding - but that is what the bulk of the Navy's procurement budget is being spent on. As a result, the rest of the Navy continues its slow decay. Given all that, buying a large ship "from Sarkozy" seems like a perfectly acceptable solution. The Navy itself might have preferred to buy something else from France, such as the latest Horizon or FREMM frigates, or Aster SAM systems, but the French are unlikely to oblige.
As I have already mentioned, the new trend in Russia's defense procurement policy started two years ago, when the Defense Ministry bought French thermal image cameras. The trend reflects Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov's proposed policy of importing from abroad what cannot be supplied quickly and cheaply by Russia's own defense industry. In addition to his apparent disappointment with that industry, the minister seems to be pursuing a purely economic approach to running the armed forces.
In our opinion, such an approach can be dangerous in the long run. The Defense Ministry and the top brass cannot ignore the needs of Russia's own defense industry, and disclaim all responsibility for keeping it afloat. In the developed countries, the armed forces and the defense industry are intricately linked together. By refusing to support the industry in some areas, albeit very specific, the Defense Ministry is running the risk of facing the degradation of this industry in other related areas, and of finding itself unable to rely on Russia's own defense contractors even for the very basics. Another thing to remember is that neither the French nor our other foreign "partners" will ever sell Russia any really serious technology - the only source of that technology will be our own defense industry.
The Mistral story has laid bare once again the absence of any coherent strategy in the Defense Ministry and among the top brass (primarily in the Navy) on Russia's long-term defense technology policy. And this absence really shows - despite the abundance of various programs, doctrines and the apparently long term national State Arms Program for 2007-2015 (GPV-2015). That program has already been overtaken by events, following the launch in the fall of 2008 of the new stage of reform of the Armed Forces, and the new strategy of their "remodeling". And by the way, was the purchase of a Mistral-class ship part of GPV-2015? The one thing obvious here is that Russia's defense technology policy remains subject to vacillations, U-turns and personal whims.
1Statement by Vladimir Vysotskiy for the ARMS-TASS news agency, September 11, 2009
2La Tribune, August 3, 2009
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2009/item1/article1/--------------------------------------------
