http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/lebanon.txt
MARINES IN LEBANON
1958
by
Jack Shulimson
Historical Branch, G-3 Division
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380
Preface
This is a history of the Marine Corps participation in the Lebanon crisis from
July-October 1958. It is published to show the role of the U. S. Marine Corps
in carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country
through a successful show of force. The account is based on the records of
the U. S. Marine Corps and selected records of the U. S. Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Department of State. In addition appropriate published accounts
have been utilized. The comments of and interviews with key participants have
been incorporated into the text. It must be noted, however, that although
this monograph has been cleared for publication by the Department of Defense,
many of the documents cited still retain a security classification.
<SIGNATURE>
W. R. COLLINS
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Reviewed and approved:
DISTRIBUTION: "DA"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Original On-Line
Page Page
SECTION I
The Political Background- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 6
SECTION II
The Military Response--Background - - - - - - - - - - - 7 12
SECTION III
The Landing--D-Day- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 17
SECTION IV
The Move Into Beirut- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16 23
SECTION V
The Continuing Mission and Withdrawal - - - - - - - - - 22 31
<ILLUSTRATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN ON-LINE BOOKS>
Map 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Inside front cover
Map 2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - facing 9
Map 3- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - facing 12
Photo of Landing of 3/6, 16Jul58 - - - - - - - - - - - facing 18
Photo of meeting between General Chehab and
high ranking American officials, 16Jul58- - - - - facing 20
Photo of Marine Motorized Patrol - - - - - - - - - - - facing 27
Section I Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 37 47
Section II Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 38 48
Section III Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39 49
Section IV Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 40 50
Section V Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 41 51
Command Structure American Forces, Lebanon
effective 26 July 1958- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44 54
Command and 2d Provisional Marine Force
as of 19 July 1958- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 45 55
List of Marine Units Eligible for Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 48 58
Section I
<1>
The Political Background
The waning British and French influence in the Middle East after World
War II gave rise to constant strife in this area of the world. The region was
not only stirred by the growth of local nationalism but also by the conflict
between the East and West in the Cold War. Crisis followed crisis as the
newly independent states attempted to adjust to the post war world.
In 1948, after the British had given up the attempt to pacify Palestine,
Jews and Arabs clashed in the short Arab-Israeli War of that year. The
antagonism between the Jewish state of Israel and its Arab neighbors has
become a permanent feature of Middle East relations. This hostility was
intensified by the 1952 revolution in Egypt and the subsequent rise to
undisputed power in 1954 of its strongest figure, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Sparked
by his leadership, there arose a new mutant pan-Arab movement over which Egypt
attempted to gain hegemony. "This Arab Nationalism contributed to a series of
events--the Egyptian arms deal with Russia, the withdrawal of the U. S. offer
to assist the Aswan Dam project, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez
Canal--that culminated in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Israelis attacked
Egypt and the British and French intervened."<2> This intervention, though
blocked by the United Nations, served to reinforce Arab anti-Western
sentiments. The Arab unrest led to civil strife in Lebanon, and the overthrow
of a Western aligned government in Iraq in 1958.
The Western Powers feared the complete disintegration of the peace in the
Middle East and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of the crisis. The
overt American reaction was to send U. S. Marines to Lebanon on 15 July 1958
at the request of that government. This Marine landing was a practical
example of the use of amphibious forces to support U. S. foreign policy by the
application of military strength and mobility.
In historic times, its geographical location at the eastern end of the
Mediterranean made Lebanon the crossroads to Africa, Europe, and Asia. The
country has been an important commercial and trading center since the time of
the ancient Phoenicians. Its mountainous barrier has enabled the nation to
maintain a distinctive identity throughout the centuries. In the 20th
century, the construction of pipelines from the oil fields of Iran and Saudi
Arabia to the Lebanese port cities of Tripoli and Sidon increased the
strategic importance of the country.
1
Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut, occupying an area 120 miles from
north south and 30 to 34 miles from east to west. The country consists of
four distinct regions extending eastwards from the coast: the Mediterranean
lowland, Lebanon Mountains, a fertile plateau called the El Bika and
Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Syria borders the nation on the north and east,
Israel on the south, and the Mediterranean in the west. (See Map 1)
In contrast to most Arab nations, approximately half of the 1.5 million
population of Lebanon is Christian. Christianity in this area had its roots
in the Roman Empire and by the second century A.D. Lebanon was the seat of a
Christian bishopric. In the seventh century A.D., however, Lebanon was
conquered by the Arab Moslems. The process of Islamization or the country was
never fully completed. The mountains of the region proved a sanctury to the
Christians and even to dissident Moslem sects.
Lebanon, today, is a mosaic of various religious factions. There are
Maronites, Chaldeans, and Greek, Syrian, and Armenian Catholics, all in
communion with Rome, but following their own rituals. Other Christian sects
include the Greek and Armenian Orthodox, Jacobites, Nestorians, and
Protestants. Among the non-Christian elements are Jews, Druze, and Sunni and
Shiite Moslems. The National Constitution of 1926 recognized this religious
framework by requiring the allocation of government jobs and appointments on a
religious basis. An unwritten gentlemen's agreement, worked out by Christian
and Moslem leaders in 1943 and referred to as the National Covenant, secured
the organization of the government on this "confessional" basis. The
traditional practices of selecting a Maronite president, a Sunni Moslem
premier, and a Shiite speaker of parliament, as well as allocating
parliamentary seats on the basis of the relative numerical strength of
religious communities in each electorial district, are traceable to this
agreement.
Because of the existence of large Christian population, Lebanon, more
than the other Arab nations in the Middle East, has been influenced greatly by
the western world. Contact between Western Europeans and the Christian
Lebanese dates back to the Crusades. For two centuries: the coastal regions
of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine were occupied by the Crusaders, until they
were driven out by the Mameluke Sultans from Egypt. The area then fell under
the control of the Ottoman Turks, who defeated the Mamelukes in 1517. Through
treaty with the Turks, French Jesuits established residence in Lebanon during
the 16th century. They opened schools and introduced French culture and
customs to the Lebanese Christians. King Louis XIV of France in 1649 declared
himself the protector of the Christian Maronites in Lebanon. This French
ascendency among the Christian Lebanese has been a dominant feature in the
internal history of Lebanon. When in 1860, the Druze, a Moslem sect located
in the mountains of Lebanon and Syria, massacred thousands of the Maronites,
2
French troops landed to intercede on behalf of the Christians. Turkey was
forced by the European powers to grant semi-autonomy to the Maronites in the
Mount Lebanon area under a Christian governor.
The founding of the American University and the French Universite de
Saint-Joseph in Beirut greatly extended Western influence during the 19th
century. After World War I, the League of Nations selected France as the
mandate power for the Levant countries of Lebanon and Syria. The French
cultural ascendency was greatly enhanced throughout Lebanon during the years
1920-1944.
Lebanon became independent during World War II. Since then the basic
feature of Lebanese political and religious life has been the rivalry of the
Moslem and Christian communities. In the unwritten Lebanese National Pact of
1943, the leaders of the two faiths attempted to resolve the basic issues.
They agreed that the Christians were to abandon dependence on France and the
Moslems were to give up fusion with Syria. The Arab character of Lebanon was
to be recognized. A general Middle East conference on Arab unity held in
Alexandria, Egypt from 25 September to 7 October 1944 acknowledged the
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its existing frontiers. The
Lebanese joined the Arab League Pact on 22 March 1945. The country allied
itself with the other nations of the League in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948,
although its military contribution was insignificant.
This precarious unity of the Arab nations disintegrated under internal
and external pressures. After 1952, Egypt under Nasser moved further into the
neutralist bloc of nations and improved relations with the Soviet Union.
Nasserism became synonymous with a strident Arab nationalism opposed to all
non-Arab interests in the Middle East and especially directed against France
and England. The big split in the Arab world occurred in 1955 with the
adherence of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact with Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and
Pakistan. The pact was a defensive alliance directed against Soviet
aggression. Other Arab nations were invited to join, but none did. The Arab
League divided into pro-Western and anti-Western groups; Egypt and Syria on
one side and Iraq and Jordan on the other.
Lebanon, because of her delicate internal situation, attempted to play
the honest broker between the two camps. President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon
stated:
Everyone of us gives due appreciation to the agreements made in
support of the Iraqi-Turkish agreement, on the one hand, and the
objections to its conclusions on the other. What is important to find
is a solution reconciling the opposite points of view, thus safeguarding
the Arab League from the danger threatening it.<3>
3
This attempt at mediation failed. Chamoun, who was the predominant figure in
the jungle of Lebanese politics, came under Egyptian propaganda attack. He
then led his government slowly into support of Western policy.
In 1956, Lebanon refused to break diplomatic relations with Great
Britain and France over the Suez crisis. This stand caused tension within the
Lebanese republic. The Sunni Moslem Prime Minister, Abdallah Yafi, resigned
because of Chamoun's refusal to take action against the two Western powers.
Opposition against Chamoun grew stronger as Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower
Doctrine for the Middle East in 1957. Under this program, the United States
was to send military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern nation threatened
by Communist aggression. Lebanon took a firm step into the anti-Communist
bloc of nations.
Both domestic and foreign pressures on Lebanon increase with the union of
Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic in February 1958. President
Chamoun had been elected in 1952 for a six-year period. According to the
Lebanese constitution, the president could not succeed himself in office.
There were indications, nevertheless, that Chamoun desired to have the
constitution amended so that he could be reelected. The president in Lebanon
is not selected in a general election, but rather by the Parliament. Here,
Chamoun had a large majority. The internal opposition to the Lebanese
President grew more vocal.
The climax to this situation occurred on 8 May 1958. Nassit el Metui,
the editor of the Beirut newspaper, AL TELEGRAF, was killed by unknown
assassins. Metui had strongly opposed Chamoun and his policies. The
opposition forces in Lebanon immediately blamed the government for the
assassination. Disorders broke out in Tripoli on the 9th and rioters burned
the United States Information Agency building in the city as a reaction to
Chamoun's sympathy with the Western powers. On 12 May, the leaders of the
Basta, the Moslem sector of Beirut, called a general strike. The Lebanese
situation developed very rapidly into an armed stalemate. The rebels in
Tripoli under the leadership of Rashid Karami controlled that predominately
Moslem city. Other rebel elements wielded power in the Moslem city of Sidon
in the south and large areas in the El Bika Valley contiguous to Syria. The
Druze under Chieftan Kamal Jumblatt, in the central region of Lebanon, the
Chouf, opposed the government. The insurgents in the Basta area of Beirut
were led by Saeb Salem, a former Lebanese premier. Most of these rebel
leaders had been defeated in local elections in 1957, through the intervention
of Chamoun.<4> Armed civilian partisans of President Chamoun were the main
support of the government. The multi-religious Parti Populaire Syrienne (PPS)
and the Christian Phalange party were the most prominent groups in Chamoun's
defense force. Even though the revolution cut
4
across religious differences in individual cases, the basic divergence was
between Moslem and Christian.
The Lebanese army was a reflection of Lebanese society. General Fuad
Chehab, the commander in chief and a Christian, feared a holocaust between the
two religious factions. He was afraid that any attempt to put down the revolt
by armed force would mean the dissolution of his army into Christian and
Moslem armed cliques. The Army and its commander in chief maintained a strict
neutrality. Chehab intervened only to keep certain essential communications
open and to prevent rebel sorties from their strongholds in Tripoli, the
Chouf, and the Basta area of Beirut.
The threat to Lebanon was not only internal chaos but foreign aggression
as well. There were reports that infiltrators from Syria were entering
Lebanon and aiding the rebel cause with men and materiel. The radio attacks
of the UAR became even more strident against President Chamoun.
On 14 May, the American Ambassador in response to a requests by President
Chamoun for standby aid, stated that:
...although Lebanon should not invoke American assistance
unless its integrity were generally threatened and its own
forces were not sufficient for the protection of the State,
nevertheless, the United States was prepared, upon request
both from the President and the government of Lebanon, to
send certain combat forces.<5>
The American government made it clear that it would not intervene,
however, to insure Chamoun's possibilities for reelection. The U. S. expected
Lebanon to file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and on 6
June, the Lebanese Foreign Minister did so. On the 11th, the council decided
to send a group of observers to Lebanon to report back concerning any foreign
interference. The U. N. group, hampered by lack of transportation and
confined largely to the few principal highways kept open by Lebanese security
forces, was unable to obtain any evidence indicating large-scale intervention
by forces of the United Arab Republic. It seemed as if the Lebanese political
situation would remain in a permanent state of instability. This was all
dramatically changed by the events of the 14th of July in Iraq.
A coup d'etat by Brigadier Abdel Karem Kassem overthrew the Iraq
government. The young Iraqi King, Faisal, was murdered and the Premier, Nuri
Said, was killed while attempting to flee. These violent happenings appeared
to threaten the entire Western strategic position in the Middle East. The
Iraqi revolution destroyed the government of the only Arab member of the
Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan
5
Federation, which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of
Egypt and Syria. King Hussein of Jordan had reason to fear for his own
throne, and in Lebanon, President Chamoun appealed to the United States and
Great Britain to intervene within 48 hours.<6>
The Iraqi Revolution caught official Washington by surprise. Trouble had
been expected in Jordan or perhaps Lebanon, but not in Iraq. The oilfields in
Iraq and the oil pipeline terminating in Tripoli were extremely important to
the economy and military effectiveness of the Western nations.
The first news of the upheaval in Iraq reached Washington about 0300
(Washington time) 14 July. Early reports were fragmentary, but by early
morning the situation had clarified, and President Eisenhower was informed at
0730. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived at his office at 0815 for
an intelligence briefing and a look at the most urgent cables. The President
met with the National Security Council at 0930 Secretary of State Dulles, Vice
President Richard M. Nixon, and General Nathan F. Twining, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined the conference at 1030. The Secretary outlined
the situation in the Middle East and recommended that U. S. military forces
land in Lebanon in response to President Chamoun's appeal. President
Eisenhower agreed that some action must be taken. This meeting lasted until
1230.<7>
At about 1430 the same day, the President met with the Republican and
Democratic leaders of Congress. The President is reputed to have said:
I have discussed this with my people here and in the
National Security Council but I must emphasize that no
decision has been made. I want to give you the pros and
cons. But must also emphasize that a decision must be made
in the immediate future...within the next hour or two.<8>
The President then returned to his meeting with his military and civilian
advisers. They discussed the possibility of British participation, which
President Eisenhower rejected in that he felt "that United States forces would
be adequate, and with the 3700 British troops intact on Cyprus, a reserve
would be available...."<9> General Twining informed him that the Joint Chiefs
were unanimously of the opinion that action must be taken immediately.
According to one source, at 1643 President Eisenhower turned to General
Twining and said "all right we'll send `em in. Nate, put it into
operation."<10>. The assignment to carry out President Eisenhower orders went
to the amphibious units of the Sixth Fleet.
6
Section II
<1>
The Military Response--Background
The Sixth Fleet on 14 July 1958 consisted of 3 carriers, 2 cruisers, 22
destroyers, and approximately 50 other support vessels under the overall
command of Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown.<2> On this date, the 2d Provisional
Marine Force (Task Force 62), consisting of three battalion landing teams
(BLTs), under the command of Brigadier General Sidney S. Wade was the landing
force of the Sixth Fleet.
The reason for the buildup of the Marine contingent stemmed in part from
a November 1957 directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At that time, the
Joint Chiefs advised Admiral James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, Naval
Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM) with headquarters in
London, that there were distinct possibilities of an overthrow of the
Jordanian government and to a lesser extent of a coup d'etat in Lebanon.
Admiral Holloway was directed to plan for limited action in the Middle cast in
the event these contingencies occurred. It was decided that if military
action was required, the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME), with
Admiral Holloway as Commander in Chief, would be activated. His authority
would extend over all U. S. forces in the area.
Headquarters, 2d Provisional Marine Force was established on 10 January
1958 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This headquarters was to plan and
conduct COMBINE II, a combined exercise. COMBINE II was to be a practice
landing operation involving units of the U. S. Marines, British Royal Marines,
and Italian Navy off the coast of Southern Sardinia in the Western
Mediterranean.<3>
General Wade's assignment was abruptly altered on 13 May 1958 when the
riots in Tripoli broke out. Colonel Henry W. Buse, Chief of Staff of Fleet
Marine Force Atlantic, telephoned General Wade to alert him to the dangerous
situation in Lebanon and to inform him that it was necessary to move the
headquarters of the 2d Provisional Marine Force into the Mediterranean area
immediately. General Wade and his staff departed on 14 May 1958.
The 2d Provisional Marine Force at this time was composed of two Marine
BLTs: the 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 8th Marines (1/8) commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley and the 2d Battalion (Reinforced), 2d
Marines (2/2) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd. BLT 1/8 had been
the landing force attached to the Sixth Fleet since January 1958 and was due
for reassignment to the United States. BLT 2/2
7
left Morehead City, North Carolina on 1 May 1958 to relieve 1/8 on 15 May at
Gibralter. Because of the mounting tension in Lebanon, however, it was
decided to keep both Marine battalions assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet.<4>
Previously in 1958, BLT 1/8 had completed a contingency plan for a
possible landing in Lebanon. Much of the plan was based on the intelligence
information gathered by the battalion operations officer, Major Victor
Stoyanow, who had travelled to Beirut incognito and had toured the beach
areas.<5> At the time of the Tripoli riots, the plan was further developed
into a two-battalion assault involving both 2/2 and 1/8. On 18 May 1958,
General Wade and Rear Admiral Robert W. Cavenagh, the amphibious task force
commander, established their headquarters on the MOUNT MCKINLEY, then off the
coast of Crete, and immediately began to draw up a Lebanon landing plan based
on the 1/8 contingency plan and revisions.<6> Wade and Cavenagh had worked
out most of the details by 21 May, when they were joined on board the MOUNT
MCKINLEY, now off the coast of Cyprus, by Brigadier J. W. C. Williams (Staff,
British Middle East Land Forces) and Brigadier John A. Read, Commander of the
British 3d Infantry Brigade, to formulate plans for an Anglo-American landing
in Lebanon. The next day at Cyprus, they were joined by Brigadier General
David W. Gray of the U. S. 11th Airborne Division. According to the latter:
On arrival in Cyprus, I was informed by a staff officer
from Admiral Holloway's headquarters that I was to preside at
a joint U.S./British meeting to develop a plan for combined
intervention in Lebanon and Jordan....During the one-day
conference, a concept of operations was rather easily developed
as it was assumed that the British would go into Lebanon with
either U. S. Army or Marine forces, but not both. The British
were therefore given the missions originally assigned to U. S.
forces in the Lebanon plan and the U. S. Forces, either Army
or Marine Corps, were given the remaining missions....Following
this conference all forces involved---developed supporting plans
for CinCNELM's Operational Plan 1-58 known as BLUEBAT.<7>
The plan called for the simultaneous landing of two Marine BLTs, one
coming ashore northeast of Beirut to secure the water supply systems, bridges,
and the northeastern sector of the city and the other striking across the
beaches south of Beirut to seize the airport. As soon as the Marine BLT had
established control of the airport, a British infantry brigade would be flown
in from Cyprus. When the first brigade units arrived the Marine BLT was to
move into the city and gain control of the port. The brigade was to take up
positions at the airport.<8> The objective of this plan was to support the
legal Lebanese government against any foreign invasion, specifically against
the Syrian First Army located between Damascus and the Israel border and only
a few hours march from Beirut.
8
For the 2d Provisional Marine Force and the Sixth Fleet, the rest of May
and June 1958 were periods of conferring rapid planning, and ship deployment
and redeployment. Preparations also continued for Exercise COMBINE II, which
was not cancelled until 1 July 1958. By that date, it appeared as if the
crisis in the Mediterranean had subsided for the time being. It was decided
to grant the Sixth Fleet a short in-port visit. Only Captain Victor B.
McCrea's Amphibious Squadron 6 (TransPhibRon 6) with BLT 2/2 on board, was to
remain at sea, within 12 hours sailing time from Beirut.
On 25 June 1958, the 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines (3/6),
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, left Morehead City in the
ships of TransPhibRon 2, to replace BLT 1/8 embarked in TransPhibRon 4. On 12
July 1958, Rear Admiral Howard A. Yeager in the USS POCONO, arrived off the
coast of Crete and relieved Admiral Cavenagh as Amphibious Task Force
commander. General Wade transferred his headquarters from the MOUNT MCKINLEY
to the POCONO.
On 14 July 1958 BLT 1/8, just north of Malta, was en route to the United
States; BLT 3/6 was sailing from Suda Bay, Crete to Athens. Only BLT 2/2,
located off the southern coast of Cyprus, was in a position to land on 24-hour
notice. The LSD (Landing Ship, Dock) Plymouth Rock, carrying the artillery
battery, shore party detachment, underwater demolition team, heavy equipment,
and two of the five M-48 tanks of BLT 2/2, was en route to Malta, for repairs.
Another LSD, the FORT SNELLING, carrying a similar load for BLT 3/6, was off
the coast of Rhodes, approximately 400 nautical miles from Lebanon, and was in
a position to furnish support to BLT 2/2 with less than 30-hours' notice.
(See Map 2)
These dispositions of the Marine BLTs in the Mediterranean were an
important consideration when at 0930 Washington time (1430 London time, 1530
Beirut time) on 14 July, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), first notified CinCNELM headquarters of the possibility of intervention
in Lebanon within 48 hours. General Wade's headquarters first received
warning of a possible landing in Lebanon at 1715 Beirut time (1115 Washington
time). Shortly before 1500 Washington time (2100 Beirut time) Admiral Burke
sent to CinCNELM and the Commander of the Sixth Fleet a message advising them
of the imminence of President Eisenhower's decision. TransPhibRon 6 was aware
of the possibility of a landing in Lebanon but did not know whether the
BLUEBAT plan was to be implemented. Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel
Hadd felt it necessary to continue preparation of plans for a possible landing
in the vicinity of the Lebanese city of Tripoli, the stronghold of the rebels.
At 1823 Washington time (0030 Beirut time), Admiral Burke relayed
President Eisenhower's decision to CinCNELM and the
9
Commander of the Sixth Fleet. The Marines were directed to land on Red Beach
near the Beirut International Airport at 1500 (Beirut time) on 15 July 1958.
The mission of the landing team was to seize the airfield and implement as
much of the BLUEBAT plan as possible.<9> Admiral Burke recalled:
I had had several discussions with President Eisenhower
that I needed at least 24 hours' warning. However, when the
time came, he actually gave us...13 hours, before the landing.
I suspected this might happen and asked the Amphibious Force
to stay out of sight from the Lebanon coast--but close. When
I told President Eisenhower that he had cut my warning time
in half, he said, "Well, I know that, but I'm sure you can do
that all right."<10>
Burke signaled Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel Hadd "As you land
you will be writing another chapter in our country's history. I am confident
you will uphold the traditions of the Navy and Marine Corps. God Bless
You."<11>
10
<ILLUSTRATION>
MAP 2
DISPOSITION OF MARINE UNITS 14 JULY 1958
Section III
<1>
The Landing--D-Day, 15 July 1958
TransPhibRon 6 consisted of five ships: the command ship (AGC), the
TACONIC; an Attack transport (APA), the MONROVIA; an attack cargo ship (AKA),
the CAPRICORNUS; and two LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), the WALWORTH COUNTY and
the TRAVERSE COUNTY. Off the coast of Lebanon they were joined by two
destroyers, THE SULLIVANS and the WADLEIGH, which were to furnish direct fire
support if the landing were opposed.
The Marines did not know up to the movement of the landing whether they
would meet any opposition. Saeb Salem, the rebel leader in Beirut, was quoted
as saying: "You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil
of my country, I will regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces
against them."<2> The U. S. command was not too concerned, however, about the
effectiveness of possible rebel resistance. Although the rebels numbered some
10,000 irregulars throughout the country, they were dispersed in bands of 400
to 2,000 men and lightly armed. There was no central leadership of the
anti-government forces and each group owed its loyalty only to its individual
leader. The Americans did not expect any reaction from the regular Lebanese
Army though the danger existed that it might disintegrate into pro-government
and rebel factions. Therefore, the only immediate effective threat was posed
by the Syrian First Army, composed of 40,000 men-and equipped with over 200
T-34 Russian-built medium tanks. This was why it was so important that the
airport and the approaches to the north of Beirut be secured.<3>
Khalde (Red) Beach, the site chosen for the Marine assault was four miles
from the city of Beirut and 700 yards from the Beirut International Airport.
The small village of Khalde was located 1,500 yards south of the landing
beach. On 15 July, the villagers were going quietly about their chores and a
gang of workmen was constructing a beach road. Further along the beach, some
vacationers were enjoying the sun and others were swimming in the
Mediterranean. It was a peaceful scene entirely divorced from revolutions,
coup d'etas, and the troubles of the cold war.<4>
In contrast to the mood of serenity on the beach, a sense of urgency was
present in the offices of President Chamoun, General Chehab, and Robert
McClintock, the American Ambassador in Beirut. Ambassador McClintock knew the
date and time, but not the place of the Marine landing.<5> He had been in
communication with both President Chamoun and General Chehab. The State
Department had ordered the Ambassador to inform
11
President Chamoun of the Marine landing no later than 1200 Beirut time on 15
July.<6> When McClintock told the President of the proposed American
intervention, Chamoun asked the Ambassador to relay this information to
General Chehab.
Ambassador McClintock then visited General Chehab at 1330, only an hour
and a half before H-hour. General Chehab was visibly upset by the news. The
day before he had asked the leaders of the rebel forces to take no action in
the wake of the Iraqi revolt. The general felt confident that the rebels
would not precipitate any new maneuvers against the government.<7> Chehab had
confided to the American Military Attache that some Lebanese Army officers had
proposed a coup to him that morning in order to prevent a landing but that he
had refused. The Lebanese general claimed he could not guarantee that all the
Army would remain loyal to him.<8> He feared the American intervention would
bring about the dissolution of the army and prevent any settlement of the
revolt.<9> General Chehab asked Ambassador McClintock to request the Marines
to remain on board their ships. The ships then could enter Beirut harbor and
two or three tanks and some heavy equipment could be unloaded there. The
Ambassador agreed to transmit this message to the American amphibious forces
since he believed that if "General Chehab decided to throw in the sponge, the
Lebanese army will fall apart."<10>
Ambassador McClintock then attempted to radio the American fleet, but the
radio link between the Sixth Fleet and the American Embassy was broken and the
Ambassador was unable to transmit his message.<11> He had received word,
however, from friends who had apartments overlooking the sea that it was
apparent that the TransPhibRon was approaching the beach area off the airport.
McClintock then sent the Naval Attache, Commander Howard J. Baker, to
intercept the advanced units of the assault force.<12>
At 1430 (Beirut time), a half-hour before H-hour, the seven ships of
Amphibious Squadron 6 were in position, approximately two miles off Red Beach.
Shortly before 1500, the LVTPs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked, Personnel) were
launched. Company F on board the LVTPs spearheaded the Marine landing. The
amphibian tractors reached the shoreline at 1504 and rumbled onto the
airfield. Companies G and H came ashore in landing craft and deployed on foot
to their assigned objectives. Company E followed as the battalion reserve.
The scene on the beach was perhaps one of the most colorful in the long
history of Marine Corps landings. Witnessing the assault were
bikini-clad-sunbathers, Khalde villagers that had galloped on horseback to the
site, and the beach workmen who had dropped their tools and had run to the
shore. As the fully armed Marines charged over the sand, these civilian
observers waved and some even cheered. A few of the young
12
<ILLUSTRATION>
MAP 3
MARINE LANDINGS AND OBJECTIVES 15-19 JULY 1958
boys even attempted to help the Marines in bringing ashore some of the heavier
equipment. Soft drink vendors were out in full force. The Marines were
prepared for any eventuality, but this reception was rather unexpected. As
one Marine said, "It's better than Korea, but what the hell is it?"<13>
Quickly taking control, all four rifle companies of 2/2 and the advance
echelon of the command post landed within 20 minutes. As Company E cleared
the civilians from the beach, Company G secured the airport terminal, and
Companies F and H began to establish their positions about the airfield. The
two destroyers and Navy planes from the aircraft carrier ESSEX stood by to
support the Marine troops ashore. No incidents took place and no shots were
fired.<14>
At 1520 (Beirut time), Commander Baker arrived at the landing beach. He
relayed to Lieutenant Colonel Hadd the wishes of Ambassador McClintock and
General Chehab that the BLT reembark and then proceed to the Beirut dock area
and land only its tanks.<15> It was 0920 Washington time and President
Eisenhower had publicly announced the landing of the Marines at 0900
(Washington time). The Marines were ashore and preparing their positions.
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd decided since he was acting under orders of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States, that he had no choice
but to keep his troops in their present dispositions. He then referred the
commander to Captain McCrea in the TACONIC. Commander Baker who had served a
tour as an operations officer in an AKA (Amphibious Cargo Ship) "...had no
illusions that the landing operation could be reversed after some waves had
already landed and unloaded troops, however it was still considered essential
that the Commodore (Captain McCrea) received the General's (Chehab) message,
as it conveyed essential elements of information concerning opposition to be
expected." The Naval Attache also recalled later: "I must admit I felt a
mite lonely on this particular mission, the only participant making the
landing in reverse!<16>
Captain McCrea received Commander Baker and transmitted the following
message to Ambassador McClintock:
I am operating under orders from Commander Sixth Fleet and
Commander in Chief Specific Command Mediterranean who in turn are
operating under orders U. S. President. All troops have landed
and will remain ashore in vicinity airport until further orders.<17>
The Commander of the Amphibious Squadron then radioed the Commander Sixth
Fleet:
...the Naval Attache came on board and stated Ambassador
did not wish landing of troops to take
13
place and that he wished (the ships to) enter outer harbor and land
only heavy equipment. I am continuing landing as directed.<18>
Admiral Brown replied: "Your action approved....Decision to use beach or
harbor belongs to the commander on the scene."<19>
To complicate the situation even further, reports reached President
Chamoun that he was to be assassinated at 1500, 15 July. He requested
Ambassador McClintock to send a Marine company to guard the Presidental Palace
in Beirut. The Ambassador sent his assistant military attache, Major Melvin
B. Hayes, to transmit this message to the Marine commander. Major Hayes
arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's command post 30 minutes after Commander
Baker had left for the TACONIC. The major relayed the Ambassador's request
and asked for a 100-man detail to guard the palace. Hadd considered that his
battalion was "extended to the maximum and the situation was still too obscure
to risk fragmentizing the command <20> He, did, however, transmit Major
Hayes' request to Captain McCrea and asked for instructions. At 1722, the
battalion commander received word to furnish the detail. By this time,
General Chehab had promised the Ambassador that the Lebanese Army would
guarantee the safety of the President and that the Marines were not needed.
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd, nevertheless, has stated that if the request had not
been rescinded, he would have had to inform Captain McCrea that "the Marines
could not comply with the order...." The battalion had already secured an
extensive defense perimeter and lacked proper shore party support. In
addition, the Presidential Palace was located right next to the Basta, the
stronghold of the rebels, and there was no guarantee that the Lebanese Army
could cooperate with the Marines.<21>
On the beach, Company E, after clearing the civilians out of the area,
began unloading supplies. At the terminal, Company G had halted all incoming
and outgoing air traffic. The other two companies of the battalion continued
to improve their positions about the airfield. The Lebanese airport guards
were replaced by Marines without incident, and the forward command post was
placed, near the north-south runway.
The U. S. Air Attache, Colonel Joseph C. Holbrook, arrived at the airport
at 1640 and arranged for a meeting between Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and the
Lebanese Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Toufic Salem. During this conference,
which concerned liaison arrangements that were to be made with the Lebanese
authorities, Colonel Salem was in communication with Lebanese Army
headquarters by telephone as was Hadd with Ambassador McClintock. The two
officers agreed that the airport guards would assist the Marines in guarding
the Beirut International Airport. Normal air traffic was to be permitted so
long as it was approved by a designated Lebanese air officer and a Marine
14
Corps officer. The Lebanese officials were to clear the terminal of all
civilians, and the Marine companies were to remain 500 yards from the Lebanese
Army barracks in the vicinity. The Marines were not to disturb Lebanese
roadblocks so long as these obstacles did not hinder the Marine mission.
Ambassador McClintock had earlier in the day requested Lieutenant Colonel Hadd
and Captain McCrea to meet with him at the American Embassy in Beirut. Such a
meeting was delayed, however, because none of the three wished to leave his
post. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd wanted to remain with his troops until they had
established their positions; Ambassador McClintock believed that he could not
leave Beirut as he was in constant contact with General Chehab and President
Chamoun; and Captain McCrea, as senior U. S. military officer present in
Lebanon, deemed his place to be on board the command ship TACONIC. Sometime
after 1800, Hadd and McCrea, in separate visits to the Embassy, did meet with
the Ambassador.<22> These two conferences helped to resolve the various
misunderstandings and provided a basis for liaison between the American
Ambassador and the military commanders.
15
Section IV
<1>
The Move Into Beirut
With the successful completion of the landing and the consolidation of
the Marine positions at the airfield, the more dramatic aspects of the first
day ended. Still the difficult task of unloading the ships and establishing
supply dumps ashore remained. This effort was to take the rest of the night.
Red Beach was not the most ideal site for the unloading operation. The
wheeled vehicles were unable to move over the soft sand and a sandbar located
offshore prevented beaching of the LSTs. The information about the coast and
landing beaches of Lebanon available to the amphibious squadrons were not as
complete as it should have been, but the problems that arose could not have
been so all-absorbing if the LSD PLYMOUTH ROCK had been available to the
battalion.
There was need for an underwater demolition team (UDT) to breach the
sandbar. No shore party was present to emplace a pontoon causeway from the
beach to the LSTs and to lay down beach matting to facilitate the movement of
vehicles. There were no cranes to unload the supplies and equipment from the
landing craft. Both the men and equipment of the shore party and UDT
supporting BLT 2/2 were on board the PLYMOUTH ROCK.
The Marines and Navy were forced to improvise. Company E and a hastily
formed shore party from the MONROVIA manhandled the supplies from the landing
craft onto the beach.<2> LVTPs, Ontos, a bulldozer, and five mechanical mules
were used to carry the material from the waterline to the temporary supply
depots inland.<3> The versatile mules proved to be extremely effective in
negotiating the loose sand. They hauled over 75 tons of ammunition during the
first 24 hours ashore.
At 2000, 15 July, the FORT SNELLING, the LSD assigned to BLT 3/6,
arrived. The UDT came ashore immediately and searched for the best site to
beach the LCU (Landing Craft, Utility) carrying the shore party and its heavy
equipment. The LCU became hung up on the sandbar, however, and did not reach
the beach until 0230 the next morning. The shore party disembarked and a
pontoon causeway was emplaced from the beach to the LST TRAVERSE COUNTY.
Immediately thereafter, the trucks and three tanks belonging to BLT 2/2 rolled
off the ship across the floating bridge onto the shore.
The five tanks of BLT 3/6 on board the FORT SNELLING were then loaded
onto the LCU, which carried them to them to the beach. Upon their arrival,
they were attached to BLT 2/2. These tanks arrived short of ammunition.
Because of peacetime safety
16
regulations, the ammunition was not loaded on the LSD. This stowage would
have caused no problem if the FORT SNELLING had been in support of 3/6 as
originally planned. The tank ammunition on board an AKA would have been
unloaded simultaneously with the landing of the tanks. But as this was not
the case, the firepower available to BLT 2/2 was seriously curtailed.
By 0400 16 July, the shore party from the FORT SNELLING was Operating
with sufficient equipment to alleviate the unloading problems. The working
parties from Company E and the MONROVIA were then relieved from the
backbreaking job of removing the supplies from the landing craft by hand.
Wire matting had been placed down on the beach and the task of unloading the
TRAVERSE COUNTY was completed by 0600. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd later made the
observation: "the delay in the beaching of the causeway and the unloading of
the LSTs would have been disastrous if the landing had been opposed."<4> That
statement dramatized the political nature of the Lebanon operation. Military
logistical effectiveness on this first day of the landing had to be sacrificed
in order to meet the time limits of President Eisenhower's announcement.
Speed and surprise were the essential considerations, as the possibility of
organized armed opposition at the time of the landing was remote.
As the supplies were being unloaded onto the beach, the Marines at the
airport were consolidating their positions. By nightfall on the 15th, the
defense perimeter had been adjusted to provide the most effective security.
Liaison had been established with the Lebanese units at the airport and
certain areas there were guarded jointly by Marines and Lebanese. A motorized
platoon from Company E was placed in a standby position with orders to
proceed, if necessary into Beirut to protect the American, French, or British
Embassies. At 2100, 15 July, a member of the U. N. observer team in Lebanon
approached the command post of BLT 2/2. He asked the battalion commander
which side the U. S. forces were supporting. The Marine officer replied that
his battalion was there to give assistance to the legal government of Lebanon.
The U. N. official then implied that the U. S. was backing the wrong side.
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd asked the observer very politely to leave the area.
Small patrols from the Marine companies were sent forward to probe for
any irregular Lebanese armed groups that might be in the immediate area of the
airport. These patrols returned to the Marine lines at 0500, 16 July, and
reported they had made no contact with any hostile forces.
One hour earlier, Admiral Holloway had arrived at the Beirut airport from
London. He went on board the TACONIC after being briefed by Lieutenant
Colonel Hadd at the airfield. At 0615, the amphibious squadron carrying BLT
3/6 arrived off Red Beach. Included among the vessels of this squadron was
17
the command ship, the POCONO, with Admiral Yeager and General Wade on board.
The two officers joined Admiral Holloway in the TACONIC to develop existing
plans of action.
At 0730, the first waves of BLT 3/6 landed across Red Beach. Lieutenant
Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, the battalion commander, relayed to Hadd an order
from General Wade for BLT 2/2 to carry out the operational plan to enter the
city of Beirut. General Wade left the TACONIC at approximately 0800 to see
Ambassador McClintock in the city, stopping off en route at the command post
of 2/2. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd told General Wade that the battalion could be
formed up in a column and ready to move at 0930. General Wade then left with
an official from the American Embassy to meet the Ambassador.
When the general arrived at the Embassy, Ambassador McClintock was
speaking on the telephone to General Chehab. The Lebanese general was asking
the Ambassador to halt the proposed movement of the American Marines into the
city. Both the Ambassador and General Chehab were concerned that units of the
Lebanese Army might resist the Marine column. The Ambassador told General
Chehab that he would speak to President Chamoun about the situation and then
asked General bade to hold up BLT 2/2. General Wade replied that he had no
authority to cancel the order but that he would postpone the troop movement.
He sent an order to Hadd to hold up his troops, and then transmitted a message
to Admiral Holloway on board the TACONIC concerning the new developments. At
0900, BLT 3/6 relieved BLT 2/2 at the airport and attached 11 LVTPs to
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's battalion. Thirty minutes later, BLT 2/2 was
prepared to move out when the military attache at the American Embassy relayed
General Wade's order by phone.
General Wade and Ambassador McClintock, in the meantime, went to see
President Chamoun. The Marine told the President of the plan to enter the
city and Chamoun agreed that the plan should be, executed immediately.
McClintock and Wade returned to the Embassy where the Ambassador then called
General Chehab.<5> Chehab requested that General Wade hold up the Marine
column for another 30 minutes. General Wade agreed and ordered Hadd to
prepare to get under way at 1030.
An aide informed General Wade that a detachment of Lebanese Army tanks
had set up a roadblock on the main road leading from the airport into Beirut.
The general immediately informed the Ambassador of the new turn of events.
Ambassador McClintock replied that he would speak to General Chehab. General
Wade then procured an Embassy car and proceeded towards the airport
accompanied by two interpreters.
On the way, the general's car pulled up alongside one of the Lebanese
tanks, a French-built medium armed with a 75mm gun, parked on the side of the
road and General Wade spoke to one
18
<ILLUSTRATION>
Landing of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines at Red Beach.
18a
of the Lebanese crewmen. In response to a question from the American general,
the Lebanese soldier replied that he had orders to stop any movement into the
city. He also volunteered the information that he had a cousin in New York.
General Wade then asked him if he would fire upon the American Marines. The
soldier replied that he had no such orders but would have to check with his
captain.
General Wade then drove on to the airport. He told Lieutenant Colonel
Hadd that it was his opinion that the Lebanese would not fire at the Marines,
but that the battalion should proceed with caution and be prepared for any
eventuality. At 1030, as the BLT was about to start out a Lebanese captain
approached Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and General Wade. The Lebanese officer
stated that he had received a telephone call from General Chehab. The
Lebanese general and the American Ambassador were in conference and requested
that the Marines wait another 30 minutes before starting towards Beirut.
General Wade agreed to the request and postponed the movement until 1100.
The Marine general then intended to go see Admiral Holloway and advise
him of the situation ashore. As General Wade was about to leave, he received
orders to wait at the airport for Admiral Holloway and Admiral Yeager who
would join him there. Admiral Holloway upon his arrival expressed a desire to
consult with Ambassador McClintock. The general and the two admirals entered
General Wade's borrowed car, which took them towards the city.
At 1100, the Marines of BLT 2/2 boarded their tanks, LVTPs,and trucks,
and moved out in column formation. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd halted his
battalion in front of the Lebanese roadblock, one mile up from the airport.
The guns of the Lebanese tanks were pointed directly at the lead vehicles in
the Marine column.
While Admiral Holloway, General Wade, and Admiral Yeager were heading
into Beirut, the Ambassador's car, with Ambassador McClintock and General
Chehab inside, sped by going in the opposite direction, accompanied by a
motorcycle escort. The American officers' car quickly swerved about and gave
chase. Both automobiles arrived almost simultaneously at the roadblock where
the Lebanese troops and American Marines faced one another.
General Chehab suggested that the American Ambassador, the two admirals,
and the Marine general accompany him to a small schoolhouse located a short
distance from the road to discuss the confrontation between the Marine BLT and
the Lebanese unit. Thus began the conference that was to settle the role the
Marines were to play in Lebanon.
19
As this meeting took place on the main road, a second dangerous incident
occurred in the sector of BLT 3/6. Companies I and K had secured their
objectives, respectively to the east and south of the airport, without
incident. In contrast, Company L was unable to reach its objective, located
two miles due north of the airfield on a beach road, since the position was
occupied by a Lebanese armored detachment. (See Map 3). The Marines had been
instructed to consider all Lebanese Army units friendly unless proven
otherwise. With this in mind, Captain Richard W. Coulter, Commanding Officer
of Company L, halted his troops and advanced towards the Lebanese, accompanied
only by his first sergeant. The two Marines were immediately surrounded by
excited Lebanese troops, who kept their weapons aimed at the two Americans.
Although the captain and sergeant retained their arms, they were escorted
under armed guard to a Lebanese Army barracks nearby. There the captain
discussed the impasse with an English-speaking Lebanese Army major. The
Lebanese officer refused to allow the Marine Company to occupy the position.
He did agree to release the sergeant, who was to bring back the battalion
commander.
Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at the barracks and also was unable to
convince the Lebanese to retire. The Lebanese major finally offered to call
Lebanese Army Headquarters in Beirut to obtain the advice of General Chehab.
The major was told that General Chehab had just left with the American
Ambassador to attempt to resolve the difficulties between the Marines and the
Lebanese Army on the main road to Beirut. Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins and the
Lebanese major then made the decision that Company L and the Lebanese troops
blocking its path would remain in their present positions while the major and
Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins attempted to find General Chehab. Captain Coulter
returned to his company while the other two officers made their way to the
Lebanese roadblock on the main road.
There the conference at the schoolhouse was still going on. General
Chehab asked that the Marines take a different route into the city. General
Wade refused, however, and insisted that the Marine BLT be allowed to complete
its mission. He stated that time was an important factor and there had been
enough delays. Admiral Holloway declared that the Marine column would move
out without any further delay at 1200.<6> Ambassador McClintock resolved the
issue by suggesting that General Chehab, Admiral Holloway, and himself ride
together leading the Marines into Beirut but that they bypass the Moslem
quarter, the Basta. This proposal proved agreeable to all parties and
arrangements for the formation of the column were then ironed out. It was
decided that BLT 2/2 should be broken down into small sections. Each section
was to be led by a jeep carrying Lebanese Army officers. Company H in the
lead, was to be divided into three sections. Each section was to be
transported by three vehicles--a tank and two LVTPs. At 1230, the column
began to move with
20
<ILLUSTRATION>
CONFERENCE AT THE ROADBLOCK. General Chehab stands in the center of the
picture, facing the camera and speaking to Ambassador McClintock, dressed in a
business suit with his back to the camera. Admiral Holloway is to the right
of the admiral. Admiral Yeager is to the left of the Ambassador.
20a
the Ambassador's car leading the Marines towards Beirut.
Once the BLT entered the city, Chehab got out of the lead car and Admiral
Holloway ordered all intervals closed as the movement was bogging down. The
admiral, assisted by Admiral Yeager and General Wade, assumed personal
tactical command...and even directed the units of the column to their
billeting areas from the main gate of the dock area.<7> The Marines took
control of the dock area, protected the bridges over the Beirut River on the
Tripoli road, and furnished guards for the American Embassy and the
Ambassador's residence. By 1900, the BLT had secured its objectives.
After the crisis between BLT 2/2 and the Lebanese troops was resolved,
Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins was able to settle the differences between Company
L and the Lebanese Army detachment on the beach road. Liaison arrangements
were made and Jenkins then returned to his command post at the Beirut airport.
Awaiting him there was a message from the Lebanese commander of the airport,
who requested that the Marine officer meet with him at 1300 to discuss
arrangements at the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at
approximately 1310 at the commander's office. There he was greeted by the
commander's aide, who informed the American that the commander had tired of
waiting and had departed for lunch. The aide then told Jenkins that he should
return in 30 minutes and the airport commander would furnish orders for the
disposition of the Marines. Upon hearing this, the BLT commander stated that
he would return at 1600 with orders for the disposition of the Lebanese troops
at the airfield. The Marine won his point, and an effective liaison with the
Lebanese authorities at the airport was established.
This incident reflected the Marines' conception of their assignment.
They were to be cooperative but firm. The Marines aided by the mediation of
Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab, were able to handle the very
critical situation posed by the Lebanese roadblocks. The harassing maneuvers
of a few Lebanese soldiers ceased, and the Marines were able to proceed with
their mission.
21
Section V
<1>
The Continuing Mission and Withdrawal
The Marines of BLT 2/2 in Beirut and BLT 3/6 at the airport spent a
relatively peaceful night on 16-17 July. The only disturbances were small
probing attacks by Lebanese rebels against forward Marine outposts. At 1800
and 2055, 16 July, groups of four to five Lebanese sniped at the Marine
outpost south of the airfield but withdrew once the Marines returned the fire.
The rebels came fain at 0600, 17 July and retreated once more in the face of
Marine rifle fire. There were no casualties on either side as a result of
these actions.
During the morning of 17 July, two Marines of BLT 2/2 were "captured" by
rebel forces in the Basta area. The two men took a wrong turn in Beirut on
their way to pick up some equipment at Red Beach and entered the Moslem
section of the city. They were immediately surrounded by armed Lebanese
insurgents and forced to surrender their arms. The Lebanese escorted them to
a rebel command post, where they were questioned. The interrogator asked the
two Marines why they had come to Lebanon. The two Americans, not wishing to
provoke their captors, replied they did not know. Thereupon the Lebanese
rebel leader proceeded to lecture them about the "duplicity" of American
foreign policy and the evil of American "imperialism". After an hour and half
of this harangue, the two Marines were released. A Lebanese Army captain
escorted them back to their battalion. Later in the day, the Lebanese Army
returned the Marine jeep and the weapons of the two Americans.
These harassing maneuvers employed by the Lebanese rebels were to become
commonplace. The Lebanese dissidents were attempting to provoke the Marines
into rash retaliation, but were unsuccessful. The Marine forces were under
strict orders to maintain fire discipline, and to shoot only in self-defense.
In order to further Lebanese Army and Marine cooperation, General Wade
visited General Chehab on 17 July, at the latter's quarters in Juniyah, 10
miles north of Beirut. In the course of their conversation, General Wade
indicated that he did not wish to become involved in the Lebanese internal
political situation. General Chehab replied that he understood General Wade's
position and would discuss only military matters. It was not possible,
however, to divorce entirely the military presence of the Marines in Lebanon
from the political implications. Chehab stated that his army would fall apart
if the Marines continued their movements into the city. The Lebanese general
asked General Wade to group the American force: in such a manner that the
Marines would not give the appearance of being occupation troops. The Marine
general agreed to this
22
request. General Wade considered that the most important result of this
conference with General Chehab was the agreement to attach Lebanese Army
officers to the headquarters staff of the 2d Provisional Marine Force and to
each of the Marine battalions.
Lebanese Major Alexander Ghanem, attached to General Wade's headquarters,
proved to be extremely useful to the Americans. According to Colonel Hamilton
Lawrence, Chief of Staff of the 2d provisional Marine Force:
Was there a roadblock someplace manned by oddly dressed
irregulars? Ghanem would consider the problem silently for a
minute while seated by the phone, his fingertips pressed together.
Course of action decided, he would pick up the phone and speak
softly into it for only a few seconds. Fifteen minutes later our
reporting unit would call and say the roadblock had melted away
after a few words from some visiting Lebanese.<2>
The Lebanese officer who was attached to 2/2 requested Lieutenant Colonel
Hadd to withdraw Companies E and F from their positions at the bridges over
the Beirut river and at the eastern approaches to the city. Units of the
Lebanese Army also guarded these locations in the city, and Lebanese Army
officers believed the presence of the two Marine companies at these same sites
would mean a loss of face to the Lebanese Army. The Lebanese feared, in
addition, that the Marines might engage rebel elements that were firing
sporadically at the Marine emplacements in these areas. Hadd agreed to the
withdrawal after consulting with American Embassy officials and moved both
companies into the dock section of Beirut. He made it clear, however, that
these new positions were not satisfactory as a permanent location.
On 18 July, the Lebanese Army permitted the Marines to station Companies
E and F of 2/2 at J'Daide, approximately a mile and a half to the east of
Beirut. From there, both units would be able to move rapidly to the bridges
and to the eastern approaches of the city if the occasion arose.
At 0900, 18 July, the third battalion of the 2d Provisional Marine Force,
BLT 1/8 under Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley, landed at Yellow Beach,
four miles north of Beirut. Companies A and B came ashore in landing craft
and Company C, the battalion reserve, followed in LVTPs.<3> The battalion
fanned out and formed a crescent-shaped perimeter with Company B on the right
flank, Company C on the left, and Company A in the center to protect the
beachhead and the northern approaches to the city. The only problems
encountered were those posed by the usual congregation of Lebanese spectators
and ice cream and watermelon vendors. One or two of the Navy landing craft
had to swerve in order to avoid some children swimming in the water.
23
As one reporter stated, "The whole operation had a smooth picnic look about
it."<4>
The three Marine landings in Lebanon were only part of the American
response to the crisis in the Middle East caused by the sudden eruption of the
Iraqi Revolution. The United States could not be sure how other nations would
react to the American intervention and had to be prepared for any eventuality.
On 14 and 15 July, plans were being made to provide for the assignment of
the entire 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
at Cherry Point, North Carolina to the Mediterranean area. In the Far East,
BLT 3/3 on Okinawa was ordered to load on board an amphibious squadron and
sail into the Persian Gulf and to be prepared to land in Iran or Saudi Arabia
in the event the crisis spread. A regimental landing team, RLT-3 on Okinawa,
was placed on a standby alert status.
The original plan, which called for the airlift of a British brigade into
the Beirut airport, had to be revised in view of the agreement of 15 July
between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan that the
British forces remain in reserve on Cyprus.<5> Subsequently on 17 July,
British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of King Hussein of that
country. The role of the British brigade in BLUEBAT was taken instead by the
European-based 24th Airborne Brigade of the U. S. Army under Brigadier General
David W. Gray. The U. S. Army in Europe had prepared in November 1957 and
revised in February 1958 an emergency plan for the commitment of Army troops
in the Middle East. This plan provided for employment of an Army task force
consisting of two airborne battle groups reinforced with support elements.
Composed of five forces code named Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo, the
task force had been organized to permit deployment in whole or in part. Force
Alpha was comprised of the first battle group and task force command group.
The second battle group made up Force Bravo. The other three elements
consisted of combat and service support units.
At 0330 local time, 15 July, Force Alpha, the 1st Airborne Battle Group,
187th Infantry, was placed on alert. Two hours later the battle group was
ordered to move to Fuerstenfeldbruck Aid Force Base in Bavaria at 1300 for
further deployment to the Mediterranean theater.<6> The U. S. Air Forces in
Europe was to provide the necessary lift.
The Air Force had also been prepared for a Mediterranean operation. On
16 July a Composite Air Strike Force, made up largely of B-57s and F-100s
flown from the United States, was formed at the Air Force base in Adana,
Turkey under the overall command of CinCSPECOMME.<7> Adana, located in south
central
24
Turkey, was also the staging area for the airborne battle group, which arrived
at the airbase on 17 July. The transports carrying the Army troops were then
under the operational control of the Air Force commander, Brigadier General
James E. Roberts, who in turn reported to Admiral Holloway.<8> Force Alpha
was not flown into the Beirut airport until 19 July.
The Marine Corps was preparing its own airlift. The CNO, Admiral Burke,
had decided on the 15th to reinforce the 2d Provisional Marine Force with a
battalion from Camp Lejeune. The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Tillman, had been alerted for possible mount
out at 1915 (Washington time), 14 July. During 15 July, the Marines were
transported by trucks and buses to the Marine Air Station at Cherry Point.
There at 1200 (Washington time), the order came from Admiral Burke to fly the
battalion to Beirut.
Twelve R5D aircraft arrived from the West Coast to augment the 14 R4Q-2
transports at Cherry Point.<9> At 1815 (Washington time) the last echelons of
2/8 reached Cherry Point and at 2210 (Washington time), the first plane was
airborne. The aircraft initially departed at 10-minute intervals, later
15-minute intervals, and eventually 30-minute intervals. The last plane left
at 1535, 16 July. After short refueling stops at Argentia, Newfoundland and
Lajes in the Azores, the aircraft headed for Port Lyautey, Morocco. The U. S.
Naval Air Station near this Moroccan city, located about 150 miles south of
Gibralter along the Atlantic coast, was the main air transport support base
for the Sixth Fleet. From there, the Marine aircraft carrying the battalion
departed every 30 minutes for Beirut. The first plane touched down at the
Beirut International Airport at 0930 (Beirut time), 18 July. The Marines of
2/8 were at first assigned to aid in the general unloading and were quartered
on board the USS CHILTON. The command post of the battalion, however, was
established in the rear area of BLT 3/6.
CONTINUED BELOW....
