The audaciousness of these Americans...

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Americans Advise Russia to Give Far East Away to China.

PRAVDA.Ru
Vasily Bubnov
Translated by Vera Solovieva


Russia is, as well known, a big country. It is still big even after the USSR collapse. As for its population, it is not the biggest in the world. In this field, China occupies the leading position. Moreover, it has the longest border wit Russia. So, the Chinese actively master Russian territory, legally and illegally.

Why am I saying all this? I explain you, why. Recently, Russian Far East fate became the subject of concern of such a respected edition like Wall Street Journal. It easily found a solution of the complicated problem of Chinese migration to Russia. I am surprised, why Russian authorities have not came yet to this decision! According to the Wall Street Journal, Moscow should do with the Far East what Great Britain has done with Hong Kong. In other words, Russia should cede a part of its Far East to China.

The essence of the WSJ argumentation could be expressed in several items. First, today’s Chinese migration to the north is a natural factor. In southern Amur River bank, there is 50 times bigger density of population, than in the northern one. On Russian side, there is a big amount of fertile lands, which are not tilled. Second, in globalisation conditions, Russia could keep the Far East only, if it fully realises the region economical potential, while this is possible with Chinese assistance only. If Russia closes from its southern neighbour, Beijing certainly will put pressure upon Moscow and will most likely win a victory. Third, if Russia opened its Far-Eastern frontiers for China, it would become the basis of the region prosperity. Khabarovsk and Seaside Regions would become more attractive for Russians from other regions and from CIS countries. With developed infrastructure, investments would be made into the region economy. Mastering of rich natural recourses would bring profits into the country budget. While the Chinese would become a guarantor of Russian laws stability in the Far East. This is the role the Chinese play in many other countries, while being one of the most disciplined nations. Though, to reach this prosperity, Russia must, according to WSJ, to overcome xenophobia which rains in its society.

Nobody would dispute against the fact that the Far East (as well as any other Russian region) needs investments. And co-operation with China could be very fruitful in this sphere. Though, this issue should be considered from another view. The question is that at the moment, China is economically more powerful, than Russia. So, if Russia follows the WSJ prescription, there will be all conditions (especially taking into account massive Chinese migration to Russia) for the Far East seizure from Russia. If even it will not happen de jure, it will certainly happen de facto.

Moreover, other countries’ example is not fully correct. The US is separated from China with a natural obstacle – with ocean. This however did not hindered Chinese goods from penetrating to US market. Probably everybody remembers that comical episode a month ago, when President Bush, who made a speech, calling to support of US firms, stood against the background of some boxes with inscription “Made in China.” So, if the US cannot resist to Chinese intrusion, what could Russia do?

The question is not about xenophobia. The question is about sovereignty, which has not been abolished yet. And if the Far East belong to Russia, it must belong to Russia. There could be enough people, including that ones in China, who are not satisfied with 50-year-old agreements. While there are enough people in Mexico, who still remember to whom Texas and California belonged in the 19th century.

These issues are to complicated and specific to be solved with universal prescriptions. Too many factors must be taken into account. Both Russia and China have many troubles, different troubles. And they do not need to have one more in their relations, like “big unassimilated territory – big population.”

And one more remark. It is probably not by chance that articles like that one in the Wall Street Journal (and not only in this edition) started to appear on the threshold of a big Far-Eastern tour of US Secretary of State Colin Powell. February 23, he is arriving in China…

China in surprise move on Russian ports.

Asia Times Online
By John Helmer

MOSCOW - In a move that threatens to transform competition in the lucrative Pacific coal market, the Chinese government has proposed taking over two Russian far eastern ports on long-term lease.

The Pacific ports, Posyet and Zarubino, are close to the Sino-Russian border, and plans to upgrade them as an outlet for Chinese exports across the Pacific have been under discussion by Russian, Chinese and US transportation officials for several years.

Those talks were focused on creating what participants called an "East by West" corridor to enable mostly container cargoes to move out of China's northeastern province of Jilin to export markets in Japan and the west coast of the United States. Changchun, Hunchun and other Jilin production centers are closest by rail and road due eastward to the sea outlets at Posyet and Zarubino. Harbin, in Heilongjiang province, is closer to the much larger Russian ports of Vostochny and Vladivostok, to the southeast. To the south, however, the Chinese port of Dalian is much farther away.

Chinese officials have wanted to spur exports of light industrial and consumer goods from Jilin and Heilongjiang to enable the regions to move away from the heavy industry concentration they had developed in the 1950s. The US west coast market was viewed as the primary target, and easing transit through Russia was viewed as the optimum way of dispatching containers in both directions.

However, Chinese frustration at Russian inaction, and Russian concern with Chinese trade competition, especially for the lucrative Japanese and North American coal markets, have now led to the unprecedented bid to change national management of the ports.

The proposal was tabled by Chinese representatives at a recent session of the inter-government commission on economic cooperation that meets every six months. China said it wanted to manage the ports for export of various products, notably coal, from the Tunangan economic region. Intended markets for these port shipments are Japan and the US.

The proposal is officially still under study, and the inter-government commission has yet to discuss it formally. But already, Deputy Transport Minister Chingiz Izmaylov told Asia Times Online, the Russian Ministry of Transport is opposed to the leasing scheme.

Izmaylov said that as the national transportation authority, the Transport Ministry "advocates the use of existing port facilities by Russian companies and doesn't see the need to rent out port terminals to foreign companies, when Russian companies can provide the transportation services and develop port facilities". Izmaylov added that he would consider negotiating alternative proposals from the Beijing government for export operations through the ports, on condition that there would be no change in legal management.

The Chinese government-to-government move has taken Russian commercial port interests by surprise, because both Posyet and Zarubino are owned by private Russian joint stock companies. Posyet is controlled by the Moscow-based MDM Group, which holds a controlling 65 percent stake in the port, and has announced its own plan to expand Posyet for transportation of coal and metals produced by companies MDM also controls. Zarubino is controlled by Universe-Holding.

A spokesman of SUEK Baikal-Ugol, a coal company affiliated with the MDM Group, told Asia Times Online that MDM has so far received no approaches from the Chinese government regarding a leasing scheme for Posyet. He added that "in principle the company is ready to discuss business proposals for transportation of Chinese coal through Posyet". But he also conceded that his company was likely to turn it down, as Chinese coal would be competing for the same export markets as Russian coal produced by MDM's units.

"It doesn't make sense to assist natural competitors," a source said, "or help Chinese coal producers to get better access to export markets of coal. We have our own large coal production, and plan to further develop our own coal exports through Posyet." He noted that in 2002 the company doubled its throughput of coal through the port and is now considering a capital expenditure program for further expanding the port's coal capacity. SUEK Baikal-Ugol has also been a vocal opponent in the past of proposals from China to build rail access for their coal exports to the Trans Siberian (Transsib) rail network and thence to the larger Russian far eastern ports of Vladivostok and Vostochny. Frustration at this commercial lobbying by Russian coal companies may have prodded Beijing to seek direct approval for the port scheme from the Kremlin.

In 2002, Posyet reports that it increased the volume of its cargoes to 614,500 tonnes, a jump of 120 percent on the 2001 level.

Officials from Prikorsky Krai, the regional government, and maritime industry sources said the owners of Zarubino port have been in discussions with Chinese counterparts for a 49-year leasehold at Zarubino that would facilitate coal shipments from China. The talks, which must be approved by the federal authorities in Moscow, have yet to reach an outcome. The region says it favors joint ventures with the Chinese, but it is flatly opposed to any deal with the Chinese that would give them port control.

The Chinese move comes at an awkward time, as Russian rail executives claim that, as a result of war in Iraq and rising insurance premiums, charter rates and shipping risks, a significant diversion of container shipments is taking place right now from Asia to Europe through Transsib.

Russian rail officials said that the latest figures for the first quarter ending March 31 show that container volume has more than doubled, as shippers in Japan, Korea and Vietnam opt for the land route instead of by sea, through the Suez Canal. The volume of transit container traffic through Transsib was 18,320 large-size containers, an increase of 175 percent compared with the same period last year. In March the jump was even more dramatic - up 270 percent compared with March 2002.

Federal rail sources told Asia Times Online that they have added an extra third container train per day from the Nakhodka-Vostochnaya railway station alone, while officials are considering going up to five trains per day if demand continues to rise. The daily norm is two trains. The chief of the far eastern railway division, Valery Yakhimovich, has said publicly that the war in Iraq is driving cargo shippers in Asia to stay as far away as possible from seaborne shipping and the conflict zone.

Rail Ministry sources say that the Transsib system has a capacity for transportation of 250,000 large-size containers per year; in 2002 Transsib carried 48,000 twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs). The dramatic growth in the volume of container transportation through Transsib is also confirmed by stevedoring sources who report that orders for box movement through Vostochny port will be well up this month over March. The main reason for that, a source close to Vostochny port said, "is that the war also results in increased premiums for insurance of vessels against war risks, which in turn drives the charter rates up".

This may be too much of a good thing for the Russian rail system, however. Rail sources in Moscow admit that the far eastern division is short of railcars for the new container volume, and has placed an urgent order for conversion of multi-purpose railcars to accommodate the box trade. To ease the congestion at Russian far eastern railheads, Moscow rail administrators have assigned 20 additional locomotives to the east. Vostochny International Container Service (VICS) has also announced the launch of a new container line between Ningbo and Vostochny; the first delivery of the Chao Yang Shipping Lines' vessel Ginter Star with 302 TEUs was made on March 24. Russia's Far Eastern Shipping Co (FESCO) has also increased its Vostochny-to-Korea service (KSDL - Korean Soviet Direct Line) to twice a week, as of April 2.

The volume of China shipments to Russia is also rising fast. According to the federal Rail Ministry in Moscow, total volume of cargo transportation between China and Russia was 15.4 million tonnes last year, and is expected to top 22 million tonnes this year. In order to handle the increased box trade between the two countries, an additional direct container train between Beijing and Moscow via Zabaikalsk has been launched. The border crossing at Zabaikalsk, in southeastern Siberia, is reporting that container traffic this past month was up 37 percent compared with March 2002. This month's increase is projected to be 71.5 percent compared with April of last year.

Some book where China becomes imperialistic to secure its huge energy demands, and invades Russia's far east...could it happen?

http://beta2.epinions.com/book_mu-3728084

The Bear and the Dragon.

By Tom Clancy


The story begins in present-day Russia; Sergey Nikolay'ch Golovko, the Chairman of the SVR (the former KGB), is on his way to work in his souped-up Mercedes-Benz. While pondering the social and economic growing pains his country currently endures, Golovko notices a second car -- identical to his own -- pull up alongside. Suddenly, a man holding an RPG (a hand-held missile launcher) emerges from the rear of a near-by garbage truck; before Golovko or his driver can react, the man fires his weapon at the other car, killing its occupants instantly. Now the question arises: Was Golovko the intended victim?

Meanwhile, Russia scores its first good luck in years. Two discoveries in Siberia are made: One is an enormous oil field; the other is an equally sizeable gold mine. Together, these new resources will drastically change the scope of the dilapidated Russian economy...and make other nations jealous in the process.

Also, a CIA spook stationed in Beijing -- who's posing as an employee with the computer company NEC -- establishes a relationship with the young female secretary of Fang Gan, one of the China's senior ministers. Shortly, detailed accounts, direct from Fang's office, of dirty politburo scheming will be available for Ryan's perusal.

These -- and several other occurrences -- are the building blocks for what will soon develop into one heck of a light show. While The Bear and the Dragon is fiction, the casual reader becomes convinced of the situation's plausibility. Is the Russian relationship -- not to mention our own -- with China as unstable as The Bear and the Dragon suggests? Well, this reviewer can't say for sure, but that's Clancy's power and appeal: multi-faceted, high-stakes thrills with an engrossing and convincing insider feel.

http://www.washington.edu/uwpress/search/books/THORUS.html

Russia's Far East - A Region at Risk.

Edited by Judith Thornton and Charles E. Ziegler


The security environment of Northeast Asia is increasingly affected by developments in the Russian Far East, including a longstanding economic crisis, changes in Russia's military policies, and the devolution of power to regional governments. Continuing poverty in the Russian Far East, the pervasiveness of organized crime, and weak state authority have provided a fertile breeding ground for illicit activities that may prove harmful to Russia's Pacific neighbors. Hopes that resource development and integration into the Asia-Pacific economy would fuel regional recovery have been frustrated by poor infrastructure, a difficult business environment, and Russian concerns about becoming a "resource appendage" to the developed world.

Russia's Far East: A Region at Risk comprehensively assesses the relationships among the economic collapse of the region; the post-Cold War role of Asia in Russia's security policy; trends in Russia's center-regional relations that impact tax collection, resource extraction, the military, and other issues; Russia's ability to manage potential areas of conflict like the maintenance of the nuclear fleet, nuclear dumping of radioactive materials in the Sea of Japan, and illegal migration from China; and the shifting balance of power in Asia.

An interdisciplinary team of specialists from the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and Korea discuss the historical, political, and economic contexts, as well as the strategic implications, of these developments. The contributors address the vital questions of how to achieve a stable political order in the Russian Far East, how to develop economic growth in the region, and how to promote efforts to link Russia and the Asia-Pacific powers into a cooperative framework of diplomatic relations.

Judith Thornton is professor of economics at the University of Washington. Charles E. Ziegler is professor and chair of political science at the University of Louisville.

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Quotes:
"The post-Soviet transition of Russia has no clear destination, nor does it follow stable or coherent rules. What are the implications of this reality for Russia's Far Eastern territories? Some of the most astute observers of the current scene in the Russian Far East offer penetrating and insightful analyses of a rich array of issues, including national and regional perspectives, balance of power concerns and financial and economic problems, resource sectors and defense industry, Chinese migration and regional political mentality, and relations with the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. Russia's Far East: A Region at Risk is essential reading for all who are interested in Russia and its role in Asia." - Tsuneo Akaha, Monterey Institute of International Studies

"The immense size and natural resources of the Russian Far East, and its crucial geopolitical position, assure it a prominent place in the interests and concerns of Russia and the other powers of Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim, despite its small population. This splendid book offers a comprehensive analysis of the region, during the Soviet period and since, that covers economic, social, and political conditions and the role of the region in the foreign and security policy of Russia and other regional states. The book brings together an impressive array of scholars and practitioners who provide unprecedented depth and breadth in their analysis of post-communist change." - Herbert J. Ellison, University of Washington

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Table of Contents:

Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION
The Russian Far East in Perspective
The Balance of Power and U.S. Foreign Policy Interests in the Russian Far East
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF MARKET REFORMS
Influence of the 1998 Financial Crisis on the Russian Far East Economy
Social and Economic Differentiation in the Russian Far East
The Russian Far East's Competitive Position in Northeast Asian Markets
SECTORAL CASE STUDIES: FISHERIES, ENERGY, AND AGRICULTURE
The Crisis of the Region's Fishing Industry: Sources, Prospects, and the Role of Foreign Interests
Sakhalin Energy: Problems and Prospects
Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Productivity in the Russian Far East
THE MILITARY, THE PACIFIC FLEET, AND DEFENSE CONVERSION
Russian Reforms: Implications for Regional Security Policy and the Military
Russian Nuclear Regionalism: Emerging Local Influence over Far Eastern Facilities
Security Implications of Defense Conversion in the Russian Far East
INTERNATIONAL RELATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE REGION
The Regional Dynamic in Russia's Asia Policy in the 1990s
Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East: Security Threats and Incentives for Cooperation in Primorskii Krai
Peculiarities of the Region's Political Mentality
THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
China's Threat Perceptions and Policies toward the Russian Far East
The Dynamics of Russian-South Korean Relations and Implications for the Russian Far East
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION
The Japanese Economic Presence in the Russian Far East
Economic Relations between South Korea and Russia
Index
About the Editors and Contributors

http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1999/06dt-gv/default.asp?n=toc.asp



Perspective of the Far East Region - published by Moscow Carnegie Center (1999) , in Russian.

Перспективы Дальневосточного региона.

В основу издания легли материалы конференции "Миграция и рынки труда на Дальнем Востоке России: межрегиональные и межстрановые взаимодействия", состоявшейся 10-11 июня 1998 г. в Хабаровске. Конференция была подготовлена и проведена при финансовой поддержке Фонда МакАртуров в рамках проектов "Миграция и гражданство" и "Внешняя политика и безопасность", реализуемых в России Фондом Карнеги за Международный Мир. В Хабаровске партнером по организации конференции был Институт экономических исследований Дальневосточного отделения РАН.

В представленных статьях анализируется ситуация на Дальнем Востоке, в том числе в связи с развитием интеграционных процессов в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе, а также осуществляется поиск решений имеющихся здесь сложных проблем, путей взаимоприемлемого партнерства Дальневосточного региона с соседними странами.

Дата выпуска: июнь 1999 г.

http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/USSURI.HTM

Historical Background of the Amur Conflict:



First Russian eyewitness account of China (Petlin expedition)

There is a natural tendency to view Sino-Russian relations the perspective of the past twenty years, when Communist regimes have ruled in both countries. In historical fact, however, the greatest proportion by far of the Sino-Russian relationship has fallen in the imperial stage of the two countries, during the respective rules of the Manchu (1644-1912) and Romanov (1613-1917).

First direct contact of Russia with China dates back to the beginning of the 17th century, when Mericke, the English representative of London's Moscow Company became interested in the Ob (Russian Siberian river) as early as 1611. He requested, in addition to general privileges for English merchants in Russia, specific permission for Englishmen to travel to Persia through the Volga and to seek a route to China and India through the Ob. The Russians refused him but offered to ask the Siberian voevodas (commanded the troops, supervised the construction and defense of the new towns and blockhouses, and administered both civil and military affairs) to obtain information concerning the Ob.

On April 6, 1617, Tomsk voevodas under the direction of Ivashko Petlin were send on this mission, its expenses came from the state fur treasury. Ivashko Petlin left a detailed account of his journey and his impressions of China written in 1619. The expedition followed the Great Wall for ten days, during which it met no one. Peking impressed him most of all. He reported that it was a very great city, white as snow, around which it took four days to travel.

More important was Petlin's description of his activities in Peking and of the diplomatic and court ceremonial he observed. Although he had been given no political tasks and was merely to travel and observe, he appears to have been received by the Chinese as a tribute-bearing mission. This supposition is supported by the fact that he was lodged in the "Great Embassy Courtyard" (may have been the court of the Li-pu - The Board of Rites - were tribute missions were traditionally lodged), and that the question of yasak(tribute - definition) was raised in his discussion with various Ming officials, whom he failed to identify.

Four days after his arrival at Peking the court approached him as to the purpose of his visit. He claimed that he had been sent to China by the tsar "to make inquiry as to the kingdom of China and to see the tsar (the Chinese emperor)". Since his statement was unsupported by his written instructions, which he had certainly read, one can only suppose that it was curiosity, not policy, that prompted his request for an audience with the emperor. Nevertheless, his inability to present "gifts" from the tsar to the emperor as "tribute system" of China required prevented his admission to an imperial audience. The lack of "gifts" or tribute goods can be explained in two ways. First, although he had received furs enough for wages for two years and supplies enough for one, he may not have been given sufficient furs for use as gifts since his nondiplomatic status did not require them. Second, as an interpreter along the frontier, Petlin was undoubtedly acquainted with Central Asian diplomatic usage and the tribute system. Aware of the significance of such gifts, Petlin may have refrained on his own volition from presenting any to the Chinese court.

Although charged with no diplomatic tasks and excluded from imperial audiences, Petlin's mission had one curious political by-product: receipt of an invitation to the tsar to trade with China, written in the form of a letter allegedly by the Ming emperor Wan-li, but more likely penned by a minor official in the emperor's name. Although Petlin brought the letter to Moscow, the Russians were unable to find anyone to translate it until 1675: in the meantime its contents remained totally unknown. (This letter with three others was given Milescu to take back to China for translation. Of the four letters, two were in Chinese, which he was able to have translated at Tobolsk, while the other two, in Manchu, remained untranslated until he arrived at Peking). The letter appeared to be a clear expression of the tributary relationship. The author of the letter used the words "up and down" to describe the exchange of communications between Russia and China. The expression meant "the exalted station of the Chinese emperor and the inferior one of the tsar". Whereas the opening phrases of the letter referred directly to trade, the writer continued, "bring the best you have, and I in return, will make you presents of good silk stuffs". These comments, together with remarks concerning China's custom of never sending ambassadors abroad and the inability of her merchants to travel to foreign markets, gave a close description of the tribute system , which reached a high point of development in the late Ming.

The First Sino-Russian Conflict:

The territorial dispute between the former Soviet Union and China in 1960's was an extension of a long existing conflict, that can be traced back to the 17th century. It broke down when in 1628 the Russians invaded the territory inhabited by the Buryats, a Mongol People living west of Lake Baikal. A series of expeditions established blockhouses, while other expeditions were drawn further into eastern Siberia, beyond the lake, by rumors of fur, gold, and silver, Fur was in fact quite plentiful in eastern Siberia, and gold and silver could be had from Mongolia in exchange for pelts, but climatically the area was inhospitable, and the Russians were sorely pressed for food. The earliest arena for Russo-Manchu confrontation was the Amur River Valley. The appearance of the Russians there in the 1640's was a logical development in the rapid expansion of Russian power across northern Asia. It posed the problem of Russia's relation to the Ch'ing tribute system. The result was determined partly by the aims and methods of Russia's eastward expansion.

Poyarkov Expedition.

The colonists received their first definite information about Amuria (the Amur watershed) after the establishment of Yakutsk in 1632. Using the new settlement as a base of operation hunters followed the Lena River to its mountainous source and at the same time discovered the Shilka and the Zeya, two streams lying beyond the mountains and outside the Lena river system. On the banks of these rivers they met natives who told of fertile grain fields along the Amur to the south. Maxim Perofilliev, an early expedition leader, made one of the first such reports to Yakutsk in 1641. He had met a Tungus, a member of an eastern Siberian mongoloid people related to the Manchus, who had visited the country of the Amur, observed its population, and noted its agricultural and mineral resources. But no one reported that the inhabitants of this distant unknown region had already been drawn within the power penumbra of the Manchu international order in East Asia.

The first attempt to collect direct information about the rumored riches of the Amur was made in 1643. The voevoda (war worrier) of Yakutsk was in perpetual need of outside grain supplied. He appointed Vasily Pyarkov leader of a new expedition. According to Poyarkov's instructions, he was to proceed up the Lena, the Aldan, and one of its branches, whence he would cross the mountains to the source of the Zeya and sail down it to the Shilka. He was also to inquire into the relations between the natives and China, determining whether and for what purpose Chinese officials visited the region.

The Poyarkov expedition was significant in several respects. First, it provided the first Russian eye-witness information about the Amur and its resources. Second, it alienated the local inhabitants along the Amur and warned the Manchus of the Russian approach, enabling the Manchus to take steps to stop the barbarian invasion. Third, the expedition demonstrated that the Aldan-Zeya route was not suitable for mass Russian immigration to, or grain transportation from, the Amur region. If the resources of the area were to be exploited, the problem of geographical access had to be solved. Khabarov's expeditions to (See the map):

The second important attempt to conquer the Amur was made by Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov. First expedition from Yakutsk, he followed the Olekma route and reached the Amur with little difficulty in May, 1650. By the summer of 1650 Khabarov had equipped a new expedition and returned to the Amur. For four days the expedition passed through destroyed or deserted settlements, until they reached a village named Guigudar. Here, evidently for the first time, Khabarov encountered several Manchus, who refused to fight, claiming that they were under strict orders to avoid conflict with the Russians. On September 7, Khabarov Boarded his boats and sailed out of the country of the pastoral Duchers and Dahurs, who were vassals of the Manchus past the mouth of the Sungari River, and into the country of the Achans, a fishing tribe. The Achans at first appeared friendly, but a combined Achan-Ducher force numbering between eight hundred and one thousand men attacked the Russians on the night of October . Superior arms gave the Russians the victory. The Manchus apparently understood neither the nature of their enemy nor the fact that the campaign was not simply a raid on their territory but the forerunner of a concerted Russian colonization attempt.. Khabarov himself reported that his men had killed 676 Manchus; he lost only ten Cossacks (Russian army troops) killed and seventy-eight wounded.

The battle at Wu-cha-la was only the first step in the development of a Manchu military response to Russian incursions into the Amur River basin. The initiation of an active Manchu policy changed the situation in Amuria, forcing the Russians to develop new tactics and concentrate on a concerted approach to actual settlement. Reports to voevodas began to state that the presence of Manchu troops in a given region prevented the Cossacks (Russian army troops) from venturing far into hostile territory. The effects of the withdrawal of the Manchu forces before achieving victory were mitigated, it would seem, by the restrictions that the new situation placed on Cossack movements.

Khabarov's departure marked the end of the period of raids on the Amur and the beginning of a period of attempts at permanent settlement, based on the realization that only thus would the Amur be incorporated into Russia's territories. But the situation in Amuria in the forties and fifties of the seventeenth century was significantly different from the situation in Siberia fifty or sixty years earlier. The defeat of the Khanate of Siberia between 1579 and 1584 had eliminated any element capable of opposing the spread of Russian power from the Urals to the Pacific Coast of northeastern Siberia. In the Amur Valley the situation was more complex. To the south of the river was the Manchu Empire, just reaching the height of its power, whose domains included, even if only nominally, those areas occupied by the natives of the Amur basin. The tactics employed by Poyarkov and Khabarov, which had earlier worked so well in Siberia, could only rouse the Manchus to further action to protect their subjects and their interests. Attempts for Russian settlements at Amur basin:

The Manchus now made further preparations to push the Russians from the Amur. Peking's preparations for the struggle continued apace, and on June 30, 1658, a conflict took place on the Amur just below the mouth of the Sungari. The Manchu victory was due largely to their use of water forces and the evacuation of the natives, which increased the supply difficulties of the Russians at Kumarsk. The Manchu victory of 1658 cleared the Amur of official Cossack bands as far as Nerchinsk (See the map).

The Russians were at first reluctant to return to the area from which they had been expelled, and their inactivity in Amuria encouraged the Manchus to sink back into inaction. Thus, a favorable situation was created for the return of the Russians in greater force with ideas of a more permanent settlement.

The influx of outlaws further strengthened the Russian hand. The most significant outlaw group was established in Albazin. In late 1665 Polish exile in Siberia killed their guard voevoda and to avoid punishment, the Pole crossed the mountains to the basin of the Amur. There they reached Albazin, the former capital of Albazi. Albazin was build in the form of a square: each side was 120 paces long, with one side facing the Amur. The settlement prospered as a gathering place for Russian adventurers and outlaws. In 1671 Ivan Olukhov was sent from Nerchinsk to take command at Albazin.

Despite their initial success, the Manchu inability to carry their campaign through to its logical conclusion - complete destruction of the Russian presence in the region, including Nerchinsk - enabled the Russian government to reestablish its authority in the Amur. Expansion in the Ussuri and Sungari regions, made further conflict between Russians and Manchus inevitable.

The Manchu withdrawal after the battle of 1660, their failure to garrison the Amur, and their reluctance to push for total victory in the mid-sixties were the results of lack of proper preparation and consequently a shortage of supplies.

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War along the Amur 1682-1689:

Russians on the Eve of war.

Positive Manchu policy toward the Russians had to await the stabilization of the Ch'ing dynasty's power inside China. With relative ease and speed the Manchus had entered China in 1644, but at least a generation passed before they succeeded in extending their control throughout the former Ming domains and beyond.

The financial and personnel drain on Manchu resources during the struggle for total control of China was sufficient to prevent the Ch'ing court from developing its northern defenses and opening an anti-Russian front in the Amur Valley. The Manchus then faced two problems to the north. First, the security of the dynasty's territorial base in Manchuria must be maintained, as was impressed upon them by their difficulties with the Chinese rebels. They therefore prevented Chinese colonization of Manchuria until the end of the nineteenth century and made efforts to secure their homeland from Russian incursions. Second, as the new occupants of the dragon throne, the Manchus needed a free hand in Central Asia, particularly in Mongolia and Sinkiang, because Central Asian nomad invasions and raids were a constant threat to any dynastic power in China. As the Russians in southern Siberia maintained close contract with the Mongols and were in a position to intervene in Central Asian affairs at will, Peking needed Russia's neutrality in Central Asian politics and recognition of her own primary role in the region.

Moscow could not be dealt with within the framework of traditional East Asian diplomacy. There existed the unfeasibility of combining the question of trade, which Moscow wanted, with the question of Russian withdrawal from the Amur, which Peking wanted. As early as the 1670's the Manchus indicated that they were prepared to exchange commercial privileges for Russian evacuation of the Cossack settlements along the northern frontier, but since Moscow could not control the Amur Cossacks at that time, it had to insist on treating the problems of trade and frontier separately.

The Russians were aware of Manchu intentions at least as early as March 1681. The Manchus demanded to know why a Russian fort had been built on the Zeya River, at a location used as a portage by Manchu officials when collecting tribute from subject tribes. In August an official arrived from the capital with an imperial edict that constituted an ultimatum for Russian withdrawal from the Zeya. The Cossacks returned to Nerchinsk with their report at the beginning of October 1681. These events marked the beginning of Russian efforts to create some kind of defense in the Amur Valley.

In 1682 the Russian position grew worse. The beginning of the construction of the Manchu base at Aigun prevented the Cossacks from sailing down the Amur in search of food and tribute. The Manchus also made a minor attack on a detachment of Albazinian Cossacks, captured some prisoners, and destroyed a series of small Russian ostrogs (define as a ford) along the Burya, Khamunua, Zeya, and Selima rivers.

Moscow's apparent determination to defend the Amur against Manchu attack could not overcome the multitude of problems involved in building a military machine in the face of the scarcity of able-bodied men in Siberia and the impossibly long command and logistic lines. The apparent lack of interest shown by other Siberian voevodas in the Amur crisis made any success even more improbable. By the time of the Ch'ing attack on Albazin in 1685, neither population nor military supplies had increased sufficiently to allow for more than a brave but vain Russian resistance.

Albazin: 1685-1686

After the completion of last-minute preparations Ch'ing forces attacked Albazin in the early summer of 1685.

On June 23, 1685, Pengcum led three-thousand soldiers in an attack on Albazin. First he read to the Russian defenders the emperor's edict demanding their surrender. During the surrender negotiations at least six hundred and probably almost all of the Russians requested permission to return to Nerchinsk. K'ang-hsi, the emperor of Munchuria, received the news of the victory on July 5, 1685, during an imperial progress in Manchuria.

On August 20, 1685, the emperor extended his clemency policy to the four helpless prisoners by abrogating their death sentences and sending them home with a final communication to the Russian authorities, which requested the return of a certain fugitives and demanded that the Russians never again invade China's frontiers.

On July 10, 1685, Shortly after Albazinian refugees arrived at Nerchinsk, they petitioned the voevoda, Vlasov, for permission to return to Albazin to harvest the crops they had sown in the spring and to reestablish the settlement. The voevoda permitted 669 men to return to Albazin, under Tolbuzin's leadership, arming them with five cannon, powder, lead, and other supplies, and assigning eight newly-conscripted soldiers to accompany them. Albazinians arrived at their former home on August 27 and proceeded to harvest the grain. With Albazin reestablished, Vlasov pursued a policy of extending Russian influence and control to its pre-1685 limits. On March 7, 1686, Tolbuzin sent a fore of three hundred men down the Amur to the Khumar River to collect yasak. Upon receipt of the report on the Russian presence, the emperor decided to initiate military action immediately. Langtan was instructed personally by K'ang-hsi to try to persuade the Russians to surrender peacefully; failing this, he was to threaten the Russians with death. He was further instructed that after the capture of Albazin the Manchu forces were to march on Nerchinsk to put a final end to the source of the difficulties on the Amur.

K'ang-hsi was anxious that the impending negotiations with the Russians begin under the most favorable circumstances. The Russian survivors of the siege were notified that the Manchu troops were evacuating the area because of the arrival of the tsar's envoy to discuss peace. In this way K'ang-hsi hoped to avoid a third Albazin crisis. Vlasov learned of the Manchu departure in October 1687, and the new ambassador received a letter from Peking in January 1688 confirming the news. The military phase of the Amur confrontation between Russia and the Manchu Empire was now ended. It remained to seek a final solution at the peace table. The Russians claimed the Amur by right of colonization, a principle generally accepted in the West; the Manchus claimed it by virtue of their suzerainty over certain native tribes, a principle valid in the East Asian international system. Whereas the Ch'ing dynasty was prepared to grant Russia sufficient trading rights to take the persistent edge off Russian commercial hunger, it demanded in return Russian neutrality in Central Asia. Between the time of his appointment in 1686 and the opening of the Manchu-Russian conference at Nerchinsk in August 1689, Golovin received three sets of instructions. The ambassador was given maximal and minimal positions regarding the delimitation of the frontier. He was to begin by demanding that the Amur be made the border between the two empires. Yet if necessary, he was permitted to accept Albazin as the frontier, with the settlement remaining in Russian hands and the Russians retaining trading privileges throughout the Northern Manchurian river system.

The Manchu emperor issued his own instructions on May 30, 1688. According to them, Nerchinsk was the original camping-ground of the Mao-ming-an tribe, a Manchu tributary. Albazin was another tributary to the Ch'ing. Consequently, those areas were neither Russian nor uninhabited; they rightly belonged to the Manchus. The Amur River was even more important, however, than the immediate disposition of Nerchinsk and Albazin. As the upper and lower reaches of the Amur and all its tributaries were considered Manchu territory, "we cannot abandon them to Russia".

First, the Amur and its tributaries were of strategic importance to the Manchus because they constituted one great river system providing access directly into the heart of Manchuria to the south and the Pacific to the East.

The final delineation of the frontier was a compromise more favorable to the Manchus than to the Russians. As K'ang-hsi authorized in his second set of instructions to Songgotu, the Russians kept Nerchinsk, and the frontier was drawn between it and Albazin. The inclusion of a clause dealing with the handling of fugitives and criminals in the future implied that Sino-Russian contact would increase. The treaty also made careful provision for the conduct of trade, stipulating that either empire's subjects were permitted to cross the frontier and carry on commerce provided they held proper passports. This point was a Manchu concession to the Russian.

The frontier was delimited, and the problem of fugitives was settled, and the Russians were forced to withdraw from their advance positions. Manchu control of the Albazin region meant strategically that they controlled Russian access to the Amur River system. Nerchinsk became the chief emporium on the Russian side. The distance from Moscow to Peking was over 5,900 miles, and the trip there and back lasted no fewer than three years.

The Treaty of the Bura and Kyakhta.

Almost simultaneous succession crises in the Ch'sing and Romanov dynasties increased the need for stability along the Sino-Russian frontier in the third decade of the eighteenth century. The new Ch'ing emperor, Yung-cheng, and the new tsarina, Catherine I, were both deeply involved in retaining their thrones and in achieving success on the international stage in those areas of primary importance to each: Yung-cheng in Central Asia and Catherine in Europe. In Russia Sava Vladislavich was named an ambassador on June 18, 1725. Vladislavich had some questions on frontier problems and insisted on meeting to conclude a frontier agreement at the Bura River near Selenginsk on June 14, 1727. The Manchu delegation to the frontier sessions of the Sino-Russian conference consisted of Tulishen, Tsereng, and Lungkodo.

On the day that he signed the frontier agreement, Vladislavich sent a report to the Senate and the College of Foreign Affairs giving his explanation of the agreement's speedy conclusion.

The Treaty of the Bura was a detailed description of the frontier agreed upon by the frontier commissions, but the line itself had to be drawn and marked with frontier stones to a greater degree of exactitude than was possible on paper, given the knowledge available to the negotiators. Joint Sino-Russian frontier survey commissions were therefore formed to define the frontier's precise location at all important points. The first commission completed its work on October 12, 1727, when it exchanged documents describing in detail the frontier between the Kyakhta and Shabindobagom rivers. The second commission exchanged protocols defining the frontier between the Kyakhta and Argun rivers on October 27.

Appended to each protocol was a register of the precise definitions of the boundary, area by area, and sixty-three "beacons" were set up as border stones at vital points, with a description of the border inscribed on each in Russian and Chinese. A neutral strip of land, "according to the comfort of local conditions", extended on either side of each marker. The way was now open for concluding the definitive Sino-Russian treaty itself, covering political and economic as well as frontier affairs

The Treaty of the Bura, the instrument that Peking required before it would sign any other agreements with Russia, was itself incorporated into the Treaty of Kyakhta. The Treaty of Kyakhta consisted of eleven articles, ranging over all aspects of the Sino-Russian relationship. Articles I and XI declared eternal peace and friendship between the two empires and discussed the language and ratification of the instrument. The other nine articles, constituting the Sino-Russian settlement itself, dealt with six specific problems: demarcation of the frontier (III, VII), exchange of fugitives (II), commercial relations (IV), a Russian religious establishment in Peking (V), forms of diplomatic intercourse (VI, IX), and settlement of future disputes (VIII, X). Article II delineated the entire frontier on the basis of the Treaty of the Bura, with the exception of the territory along the Ob River, east of the Gorbitsa, which according to agreement would be demarcated in the future "by ambassadors or by correspondence". The heart of the settlement was the commercial system, which according to the preamble to Article IV was specifically established in return for the frontier and fugitive settlements, that is, for Russian neutrality in Central Asia.

Two regular Sino-Russian frontier commercial emporia were to be crated, one at Kyakhta on the Selenga River, the other at a spot near Nerchinsk. Probably the most important element in the development of Sino-Russian stability was the "cultural neutrality" of the institutions of the Kyakhta treaty system. The Treaty of Kyakhta obviated the inevitability of conflict by creating institutions that in and of themselves lacked cultural implications and avoided precisely those forms of contact in which intellectual or institutional conflict had already taken place. Questions of titles and form were avoided by instituting correspondence between officials other than the tsar and the emperor. Russian caravans in Peking were not required to perform tribute ceremonials. The treaty itself provided specific punishments for certain crimes.

The Boarderland Establishment is Finalized - Treaty of Aigun of 1858.

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We are following Sino-Soviet conflict over Amur border to the mid-nineteenth century, when the entry of Japan into contact with the outside world, the seeds of great change had been planted in East Asia, as Vasili Golovnin earlier in the century had suggested might happen.

In 1855, Putyatin was rewarded for his services in the mission of fixing the boundary between Russia and Japan by being made a count; three years later, he was given the navel rank of admiral. He would return to the Asian scene, for he had proved his diplomatic worth to the empire.

In 1858 Putyatin proceeded to send the Grand Council of Peking a supplementary statement proposing that the Amur and Ussuri rivers should constitute the boundary between Russia and China. This was an advance beyond anything the Russians had suggested before. The Manchu Courts stubbornly rejected the exigent requests of the "barbarian” envoys. In its replies, delivered at Shanghai, it directed that the British, French, and American representatives should undertake any negotiations with the Canton viceroy, while Russia should deal with the Amur commissioner. The Court also instructed I-shan to refuse Russia's request that the boundary be fixed on the Amur and Ussuri rivers.

The new Chihli viceroy, T'an T'ing-hsian, together with Ch'ung-lun and Wu-erh-kun-t'ai, in late April met with Putyatin at Taku, only to find that he still wanted to discuss the matters of boundaries and entry into Peking. The Court directed T'an to refuse the Russian demand for border demarcaition and to tell Putyatin, once more, to return to the Amur and negotiate there with I-shan, Amur commissioner, but Putyatin was already effectively negotiating the boundary question.

On the Amur, in the absence of Putyatin, I-shan in May of 1858 sent the assistant military governor, Chi-la-ming-a, to seen Muraviev, who assumed his powers in the field of foreign affairs in 1848, and urge him to discuss border matters. On My 23 and 24, Muraviev met with I-shan at Aigun. Muraviev proposed the signature of a new treaty fixing the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the common boundary between the two states. I-shan rejected the proposal, whereupon Muraviev withdrew from the conference in feigned anger, and Russian gunboats on the Amur cannonaded during the night. The following day I-shan sent a representative to mollify Muraviev to the end that he would resume negotiations. Muraviev graciously consented to return to the conference table, and on May 28, 1858, the two sides signed the Treaty of Aigun, by virtue of which the Amur River from the Argun to its mouth was accepted as the boundary between the two countries. Only vessels of the two countries might ply the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari. The agreement provided further that, for the mutual friendship of the subjects of the two states, mutual trade of the subjects of both states was permitted along the three rivers. This gave the Russians the right of trade (and navigation) on the Sungari - a Chinese inland river. As for the region east of the Ussuri, it would remain under joint dominion of the two countries pending future determination of the common frontier in that region.

The established then border remained unchanged all the way into the 20th century, but it remained open for a dispute every time Sino-Soviet confrontations escalated.

The Sino-Soviet Amur conflict of 1960's (Khrushchev vs. Mao Tse-tung).

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In 1960's the relationship between China and Russia was the most tense since the end of the 19th century. The major confrontation between Soviet Russia and Communist China had for some time been not in the Communist councils of the world, but in the Sino-Soviet borderlands. Two great nation-state, one Asian and the other Eurasian, faced each other in belligerent mood, as they had often done in the past along 4,500 miles of frontier.

Mao Tse-tung, in an interview of July 10 with a group of visiting Japanese Socialists, gave some confirmation of the scope of Chinese territorial desires. He said that, after World War II, the Soviet Union occupied "too many places", in Eastern Europe and in Northeast Asia as well. Moscow had brought Outer Mongolia under its rule, and Peking had raised this question with Khrushchev when he visited China in 1954, but he refused to discuss it. "Some people", Mao said, had suggested that Sinkiang should be included in the Soviet Union. "China has not yet asked the Soviet Union for an accounting about Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other towns and regions east of Lake Baikal which became Russian territory about 100 years ago." He offered a sop to his visitors by voicing support for the return to Japan of "the northern islands" (the Kriles). Krushchev observed that Chinese emperors, as Russian tsars, had engaged in wars of conquest and voiced a warning: "The border of the Soviet Union are sacred, and he who dares to violate them will meet with a most decisive rebuff on the part of the peoples of the Soviet Union."

In May, 1966, foreign minister Ch'en yi reiterated the Maoist theme in an interview with a group of visiting Scandinavian journalists: the Russians, he said, were thieves who had annexed one and a half million kilometers of Chinese territory in the nineteenth century and even afterward. In October, as the Revolution swirled around the gates of the Soviet embassy in Peking, the Moscow press charged that Chinese troops had begun to fire indiscriminately at Russian ships plying the Amur, and Occidental correspondents in Moscow reported that, according to a Soviet source, organized Chinese "people's" movements in the Amur region and Sinkiang were calling for the return of "lost territories".

Clash over the Damanski Island of Ussuri River:

On March 2, 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces clashed on obscure Damanski (Chen Pao) Island in the Ussuri River, and the Soviets suffered thirty-four killed. Given the heavy Soviet casualties, and the circumstance that only a Soviet border patrol was involved, logic leads to the conclusion that, as charged by Moscow, China initiated the attack.

The Chinese claimed victory, but the evidence indicates that the Soviets brought up reinforcements and reoccupied the island. Then, in a note delivered to the Soviet embassy and published in Peking on March 13, the Chinese charged new Soviet aggressions in the disputed sector - as if building up a case. Soviet Defense Minister Lin Piao made a tour of inspection to the Damanski sector. On March 15, there was a new, and much bigger, armed clash on that battleground.

A diplomatic exchange followed. On the day after the clash, the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the Soviet embassy at Peking charging that a large number of Soviet forces accompanied by armored cars and tanks had penetrated Danamski Island "and the region west of that island". Chinese stated immediately that the Soviet government must bear the entire responsibility for all the grave consequences which could result from this.

The Soviet government on the same day addressed to the Chinese government a note which, referring to the clash, stated that this new provocation by the Chinese authorities is heavy with consequences. The message contained a plain warning: "the Soviet government declares that if new attempts are made to violate the integrity of Soviet territory, the Soviet Union and all its peoples will defend it resolutely and will oppose a crushing riposte to such violations."

No detailed report was made by either side. But what appears to have happened was that the Chinese had again attacked the Soviet position on Damanski Island. The Soviets effected a withdrawal, thus leading the Chinese to mass in the Damanski sector, whereupon the Soviets, who had anticipated the attack, opened up on the Chinese along a front several kilometers in length with artillery, missiles, tanks, and air power. Chinese lost 800 men as compared with about 60 Soviet dead. Soviet circles seemed assured that the "lesson" had gotten across to the Chinese.

On March 29, 1969, the Soviet government delivered the declaration to the Chinese embassy in Moscow regarding Sino-Soviet relations. The declaration began with a consideration of recent events on the Ussuri. It gave fewer details regarding the second clash than about the first. More significantly is stated with respect to the question of the Ussuri boundary that: "In 1861, the two sides signed a map on which the frontier line in the Ussuri region was traced. Near Damanski island, that line passes directly along the chinese shore of the river. The originals of those documents are held by the Chinese government as well as by that of the U.S.S.R.

When Moscow at the end of the declaration invited the government of the Chinese People's Republic to abstain from all action along the frontier that "would risk bringing about complications", and called upon Peking to resolve any differences "in calm and by means of negotiations", through the prompt resumption of the border negotiations undertaken at Peking in 1964, it was assured of an audience at the ninth congress. Symbolically, low-lying Damanski Island would about this time have been submerged by the spring floods on the

Peking in its April report to the congress acknowledged receipt of the Soviet offer and said that "our government is considering its reply to this".

On May 12, Peking announced that it had sent a message to the Soviet Union accepting in principle the Soviet proposal for resumption of the work of the mixed commission for the regulation of traffic on the border rivers and proposing that the date be fixed for mid-June. Moscow agreed, naming June 18 as the exact date. A few days after that exchange, on May 18, the Peking, as if to demonstrate that there had been no Chinese surrender, denounced the "new Soviet tsars" policy of naval expansion.

The Sino-Soviet frontier issue was still pending. The Chinese government complained that Soviet gunfire on the Ussuri had continued as an evident attempt to force negotiations, but in the end it agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal, suggesting that the date and place of the projected negotiations regarding the Sino-Soviet frontier be discussed and decided by the two parties through the diplomatic channel.

Goldinski Island incident of 1961:

On July 8, shortly after the prognostication of war, the Chinese charged that the Soviets had violated chinese territory by intruding into Goldinski (Pacha) Island in the Amur near Khabarovsk. Moscow described the incident as a Chinese violation of the existing frontier and charged that the Chinese had staged a "malicious provocation" with the aim of sabotaging the Khabarovsk talks. In an address of July 10, Soviet Foreign Minister voiced a warning to China : "We rebuffed and we shall rebuff all the attempts to speak with the Soviet Union in terms of threats or, moreover, weapons. What happened in March of this year near Damansky Island on the Ussuri River must make certain people consider more soberly the consequences of their actions"(New York Times, July, 1969).

The next development seemed to bear out the Moscow charge that the Goldinski Island clash was a "provocation" designed to abort the river-navigation negotiations. The Chinese delegation at Khabarovsk on July 12 broke off the talks. But on the following day the delegation reversed itself and informed the Soviet side that, contrary to its statement of July 12, it has decided to remain in Khabarovsk and agreed to the continuation of the commission's work. Interestingly enough, nothing more was heard of the Goldinski incident.

An agreement was signed at the Khabarovsk conference to govern navigation of the border rivers in the current year, and provision was made for holding further talks regarding the matter in 1970.

On October 7, 1969, it was officially announced by Peking that there is no reason whatsoever for China and the Soviet Union to fight a war over the boundary question. The Chinese government, the statement said, had "never" demanded the return of territory annexed by tsarist Russia "by means of the unequal treaties", and had "always" stood for the settlement of existing boundary questions in "earnest all-round negotiations". The provisions of the "unequal treaties" of the nineteenth century were not the prime issue at the negotiation of 1970.

The shattered Chinese leadership was undertaking the long, arduous road toward adjusting to the world, instead of remaking it immediately in Maolist design. In accordance with the principle of peaceful coexistence, it had at last manifested a readiness to accept a measure of reconciliation with Moscow.

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Archives:

The Bura Treaty, August 20, 1727

Of the Russian Empire Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of State, Acting Councilor, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich,

And of the Middle Empire Councilor and General, State Administrator and brother-in-law of the Khan, Tseren-van.

And Chief of the Chamberlains, the Dariamba Besyga,

And of the Military Department, the Askhanema Tuleshin,

Have agreed on the division of land of both empires and have fixed the frontier.

From the north side of the Kyakhta river [where stands] the guardhouse of the Russian Empire, [and] from the south side where the guardhouse sign of the Middle Empire [stands] on Orogoitu hill,

Between that guardhouse and [that] beacon [i.e., sign], the land must be divided equally. The first demarcation mark will be placed in the middle. And there the frontier merchantry['s activities] of both countries will take place.

From there commissars will be sent in both directions for the determination of the boundary.

Beginning on the left side of the extreme summit of the Burgutei hill furthest to the south, [the frontier shall run] along the mountain chain to the Keransky guardhouse

And the frontier shall be a small part of the Chikoi river from the Keransky guardhouse [to] Chikta, [and] Arakhudar, up to Ara Khadain-Usu directly along those four guardhouses and beacons.

From Ara Khadain-Usu to Ubur Khadain-Usu to the guardhouse and the beacon.

From Ubur Khadain-Usu to the Mongolian guardhouses and beacons of Tsagan Ola is the possession of the subject peoples of the Russian Empire. The Mongolian guardhouses and beacons belong to the Middle Empire, [and] all empty land will be equally divided between them as it has been done here on the Kyakhta.

If in the vicinity of the territories of the subject peoples of the Russians there are such hills, mountain chains and rivers, those hills, mountain chains and rivers will be considered as the frontier.

If near the Mongolian guardhouses and signs there are such hills, mountain chains and rivers, they also will be considered as the frontier.

And where there are no hills, mountain chains or rivers, but there is contiguous steppe, it will be divided equally in the middle, and markers will be established, and it will be considered as the frontier.

From Tsagan Ola, from the guardhouse beacon, to the Argun river, to the bank, there are Mongol guardhouses and beacons, [and] along the guardhouses and beacons, in the vicinity, several people will go, agreeing to set up signs, and it will be considered as the frontier.

To the right side, starting from the first marker which is between the Kyakhta and Orogoity, the border will be across Orogoit Ola, Tymen Kudzuin, Bichiktu Khoshegu, Bulesotu Olo, Kuku Chelotuin, Khongor Obo, Yankhor Ola, Bogosun Ama, Gundzan Ola, Khururaitu Ola, Kukun Narugu, Bugutu Dabaga, Udyn Dzoin Norugu, Doshitu Dabaga, Kysynktu Dabaga, Gurbi Dabaga, Nukutu Dabaga, Ergik Targak Taiga, Toros Dabaga, Kynze Mede, Khonin Dabaga, Kem Kemchik Bom, [and] Shabina Dabaga.

They will adhere to the tops of those mountain chains, which will be divided in the middle and will be considered as the frontier. If any mountain chains cross between them and rivers adjoin, the mountain chains and rivers will be cut in two and divided equally.

In accord with all the above-described division, from Shabina Dabaga to the Argun, the north side will belong to the Russian Empire, and the south side will belong to the Middle Empire.

Lands, rivers and markers will be written down [and] entered by name on a map, and the emissaries of both Empires will exchange letters [with this information] among themselves and will take them to their superiors.

During the establishment of the frontier of both empires, if some people ignorant of recent [developments] surreptitiously migrate and erect their yurts inside [the other country's territory], whoever they may be, they shall be earnestly sought out [and] each [country] will bring [them] back to its side.

People of either Empire who err by their migrations, whoever they may be, shall be justly and earnestly sought for, and each side shall to itself take its own and settle them inside [its territory], so that the border may be equally clear.

The Uriankhy [people], to whichever side they pay fur sables of yasak, on that side they shall remain and continue to pay [the yasak].

Those Uriankhy [people], however, who paid one sable to each side, from the day the frontier is established, will never again be required [to pay it]. Thus it was established by agreement.

The last project [was] presented by the Russian Ambassador in Peking on March 21, and in the second month of this year according to the moon [i.e., lunar calendar], [the treaty] consisting of ten articles and an eleventh article about the frontier. Everything that was written in the ten articles was agreed to in Peking, and to these ten points the frontier treaty will be added, and it will have to be sealed and affirmed in Peking by chop and brought hither for exchange. And then the entire treaty consisting of eleven articles shall be in force.

This treaty has been signed by the hands [of the representatives] of both countries, and they exchanged [it] at the river Bura in the year of Our Lord 1727, the month of August, the 20th day.

The original at the exchange was signed thusly:

Seal. Count Sava Vladislavich

Secretary of the Embassy Ivan Glazunov

Translator: Foma Rozanov, who read a copy.

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The Treaty of Kyakhta, October 21, 1727.

By decree of the Empress of All the Russias, etc., etc., etc., the Illyrian Count Ambassador Sava Vladislavich, who was dispatched for the renewal and greater strengthening of the peace which was formerly concluded between both Empires at Nipkov [Nerchinsk], agreed with the appointed dignitaries of the Emperor of the Empire which is called Taidzhin, [who were] Chabina, dignitary, Royal Councilor, President of the Mandarin Tribunal and Director of the Chanber of Internal Affairs; and Tegute, dignitary, Royal Councilor, President Director of the Tribunal of External Provinces, and Lord of the Red Banner; and Tuleshin, Second President of the Military Tribunal. They agreed as follows:

I

This new treaty was especially concluded so that the peace between both Empires might be stronger and eternal. And from this day each government must rule and control its own subjects, and, greatly respecting the peace, each must strictly gather and restrain its own so that they do not provoke any harmful affair.

II

Now, consequent to the renewal of peace, it is not fitting to recall previous affairs between both Empires, nor to return those deserters who had fled before this, and they will remain as they were. But henceforth, if anyone flees and cannot be restrained in any way, he will be diligently sought out by both sides and caught and handed over to the frontier people [i.e., frontier authorities].

III

The Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich agreed together with the Chinese dignitaries:

The boundaries of both Empires are an extremely important matter, and if the locations are not inspected, they [the boundaries] will be impossible [to settle]. Therefore, the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, went to the frontier and there agreed with Shusak-toroi kun vam khoksoi Efu Tserin, general of the Chinese State, and with Besyga, dignitary of the Royal Guard, and with Tuleshin, Second President of the Military Tribunal, and the borders and territories of both Empires were established as follows:

From the Russian guard post building which is on the river Kyakhta and the Chinese stone guard post which is on the hill Orogoitu, the land lying between those two points was divided equally in two, and a beacon was erected in the middle as a sign of border demarcation, and a place of commerce for both states was established there. From there commissars were sent in both directions for boundary demarcation.

And beginning from the aforementioned place [and going] to the east, [the boundary was drawn] along the summit of the Burgutei mountains to the Kiransky guard post, and from the Kiransky guard post along the Chiktai, Ara Khudara, and Ara Khadain Usu, [and] opposite these four guard posts a part of the river Chikoi was made into the boundary.

As was decided at the place called Kyakhta, from Ara Khadain Usu up to the Mongolian guard post beacon of Ubur Khadain Usu, and from Ubur Khadain Usu to the Mongolian guard post beacon of the place Tsagan Ola, all empty places between the lands possessed by Russian subjects and the beacons of the subject Mongols of the Chinese kingdom were divided equally in two, in such a manner that when mountains, hills and rivers occurred near places inhabited by Russian subjects, they were made into a sign of the border; conversely, when mountains, hills and rivers occurred near the Mongolian guard post beacons, they too were made into a sign of the border, and in flat places without mountains and rivers [the land was] divided equally in two, and boundary markers were erected there.

People of both states who have traveled from the guard post beacon of the place called Tsagan Ola up to the bank of the Argun river, after inspecting the lands that are located behind the Mongolian beacons, unanimously approved this boundary line. And beginning from the frontier beacon which was erected as the border between the two places Kyakhta and Orogoitu, proceeding to the west, [the boundary runs] along the mountains of Orogoitu, Tymen Koviokhu, Bichiktu Khoshegu, Bulesotu Olo, Kuku Chelotuin, Khongor Obo, Butugu dabaga [i.e., pass], Ekouten shaoi moulou, Doshitu dabaga, Kysynyktu dabaga, Gurbi dabaga, Nukutu dabaga, Ergik targak, Kense mada, Khonin dabaga, Kem kemchik bom, Shabina dabaga.

A division was effected along the summits of these mountains, in the middle, and it was considered as the frontier. Those ranges and rivers which lie across them [i.e., the summits], such ranges and rivers were cut in two and equally divided in such a manner that the north side will belong to the Russian State, and the south side to the Chinese State. And people sent from both sides clearly described and traced the division, and [they] exchanged letters and drafts among themselves and took them to their own dignitaries. During the affirmation of the frontiers of both Empires some base people deceitfully migrated, having taken possession of lands, and they erected their yurts inside [those lands]; they were sought out and brought back to their own camps. Thus the people of both states who fled thither and hither were sought out and forced to live in their own encampments. And thus the frontier area became cleared.

And those Uriankhy [people] who paid [yasak of] five sables to one side will henceforth be left as before with their leader. Bur those who gave [yasak of] one sable will henceforth [and] nevermore have it taken from them, from that day when the boundary treaty was completed. And thus it was decided, about which it was confirmed by written witness and delivered to each country.

IV

Now with the establishment of the boundaries of both states, it is not necessary for either side to retain deserters. And consequent to the renewal of peace, as was decided with the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, trade shall be free between the two Empires, and the number of merchants, as we already established before this, will not be more than two hundred men, who every three years can go to Peking once. And because they will all be merchants, therefore they will not be given provisions, as was done previously, and no duty shall be taken, neither from sellers nor from buyers. When the merchants arrive at the frontier they will write and announce their arrival Then, upon receipt of the letters, mandarins will be sent out, who will meet and accompany them for the purposes of commerce. And if the merchants desire to buy camels, horses and provisions along the road and to hire workers for their own maintenance, then they shall buy and hire. The mandarin or leader of the merchant caravan shall rule and administer them, and if any quarrel arises, he shall settle it justly. If that chief or leader is of noble rank, he is to be received with respect. Things of all descriptions may be sold and bought, except those that are forbidden by decrees of both Empires. If someone desires to remain secretly [on the other side] without official consent, it will not be permitted him. If someone dies of illness, whatever remains of his, whatever may be his rank, it shall be given over to the people of that state, as the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, decided.

And in addition to [this caravan] trade between both States, another convenient location shall be chosen on the frontier for lesser trade at Nipkov (Nerchinsk) and on the Yyakhta [river in the egion of ] Selenginsk, where houses shall be built and enclosed with a fence or with a stockade, as occasion may require. And whoever desires to go to those places for trade, he will go there only by direct route. And if anyone, straying, leaves it [the direct route], or goes to other places for trade, then his merchandise shall be confiscated for the Sovereign. From one side and from the other, an equal number of soldiers shall be stationed [there], and officers of equal rank will [be in] command over them, who will guard the place as one man and will settle disagreements, as was decided with the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich.

V

The koen or house that is now at the disposal of the Russians in Peking shall be for Russians arriving in the future, who will themselves live in this house. And what the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, recommended about the construction of a church, it was done in this house with the aid of the dignitaries who have supervision over Russian affairs. On lama (priest) who is at present in Peking will live in this house, and three other lamas (priests), who will arrive, will be added, as was decided. When they arrive, provisions shall be given to them, as are given to him who arrived earlier, and they will be established at that church. The Russians will not be forbidden to pray and o honor their god according to their law. In addition, four young pupils and two of older age, who know Russian and Latin and whom the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, desires to leave in Peking for the learning of languages, shall also live in that house, and provisions shall be given to them on the royal account. And when they have completed their studies they will be free to go back.

VI

Sealed passports are absolutely necessary for communications between both Empires. Therefore, whenever gramoty are sent from the Russian state to the Chinse state they will be given to the Chinese tribunal in charge of external provinces secured with the seal of the Senate of the Russian tribunal and [with the seal] of the governor of the town of Tobolsk. And likewise, when letters are sent from the Chinese state to the Russian state, from the tribunal in charge of external provinces, they will be sent sealed to the Senate or to the Russian tribunal and to the governor of the town of Tobolsk. If letters are sent from the frontiers of from frontier places about deserters, thefts and other similar matters, then the heads of the towns on the Russian frontiers and those on the Chinese frontiers, Tushetu-khan, Ovan dzhan torzhi, and Ovan tanshin torshi, will mutually exchange such letters signed with their own hands and secured with a seal for attestation. And when the Russians will write to Tushetu-khan, Ovan dzhan torzhi and Ovan tanzhin torzhi, they, likewise, will write to the above-mentioned in turn. All couriers who will carry such letters will have to go by the Kyakhata road exclusively. But if some important and great affair occurs, then it is permissible to take the nearest route, If anyone should willfully take a short[er] route (because the Kyakhta route is far away), then the Russian town authorities and commandants and the Hinese frontier khans are to exchange letters among themselves, and each will punish his own in accord with the explanation of the affair.

VII

Concerning the river Ud and places around it, the Russian ambassador Fedor Alekseevich [Golovin] and Samgutu, a dignitary of the Internal Chamber of the Chinese Empire, agreeing together, said: this point will remain unsettled for now, but it will be settled in the future, either through letters or through envoys, and thus it was written in the protocols, Therefore, the dignitaries of the Chinese Empire said to the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich: because you were sent from the Empress with full power to settle all affairs, we can negotiate about this point too, for your people ceaselessly cross the frontiers into our place called Khimkon Tugurik. If this point is not settled now, it [the situation] will be very dangerous, for the subjects of both Empires who live along the frontiers may provoke quarrels and disagreements among themselves. And since this is extremely detrimental to peace and unity, it must be settled now.

The Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, answered : as for this eastern land, not only did receive no instructions from the Empress concerning it, but even I have no authentic information about that land. Let it remain still, as was decided before. And if any of our people shall across the frontier, I shall stop and forbid it.

The Chinese dignitaries answered to this: if the Empress did not authorize you to negotiate about the eastern side, we shall no longer insist, and so we are compelled to leave it for the present. But upon you return, strictly forbid your people [to cross the frontier], for if some of your people come across the frontier and are caught, they will undoubtedly have to b punished by us. And then you cannot say that we have broken the peace. And if any of you people cross your frontier, you punish them likewise.

Therefore, because negotiations about the river Ud or other local rivers cannot take place now, they shall remain as before, but your people can no longer be allowed to take possession [of our lands] for settlement.

When the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, returns, he should clearly report all this to the Empress and explain in what manner it is necessary to send together there people informed about those lands, who could together there people informed about those lands, who could together inspect and decide something, and this would be [a] good [course to follow]. But if this small matter remains [unsettled], it will speak poorly for the peace of both states. A letter was written about this point to the Russian Senate.

VIII

The frontier authorities of both Empires will have to decide quickly and in fairness each matter under their jurisdiction. And if there is a delay for selfish interests, then each State shall punish its own according to its own laws.

IX

If a low or high envoy is sent from one Empire to the other for official business, when he arrives at the frontier and announces his business and [his] status, he will wait for a shot time at the frontier until someone is sent out to meet and accompany him. And then he will be given fast carts and provisions and will be guided [to his destination] with diligence. Upon his arrival he will be given lodging and provisions. And if an envoy arrives in a year in which trade is not permitted, merchandise will not be admitted with him. And if one or two couriers arrive for some important matter, then, having shown sealed passports, the frontier mandarins will give them carts, provision, and guides immediately and without quibbling, as the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, decided, and as it was confirmed.

And since communications between both Empires through letters or through people is very necessary , it is not to be delayed for any reason. And if in the future letters or messengers are delayed and no rebuke is given, or if they procrastinate with loss of time, since such acts are not in accord with peace, envoys and merchants will not be admitted but for a time both envoys and merchants will be detained until the matter is explained, and upon clarification they will be admitted as before.

X

In the future, if any one of the subjects of either State deserts, he shall be executed on that spot where he is caught. If armed men cross the frontier plundering and killing, they too shall be punished by death. If someone armed likewise crosses the frontier without a sealed passport, although he may not have killed or robbed, still he shall be punished adequately. If one of the serving people [i.e., soldiers] or anyone else, having robbed his master, flees, if he is Russian, he will be hanged, and if he is Chinese, he will be executed on that spot where he is caught, and the stolen things will be returned to his master.

If someone crosses the frontier and steals beasts or cattle, he shall be given over for judgment to his chief, who shall fine him ten times [the amount stolen] for the first theft, for the second twice as much, and for the third he will be given [the] death [sentence]. If someone hunts not far from the frontier and the other side of the frontier for his own profit, his produce will be confiscated for the Sovereign, and that hunter will be [further] punished after a judge's inquiry. Common people who cross the frontier without a passport shall also have to be punished, as the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, affirmed.

XI

The instrument for the renewal of peace between both Empires was thus exchanged from both sides.

The Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich entrusted for preservation to the dignitaries of the Chinese state [a copy of the treaty] written in the Russian and Latin languages, [signed] by his own hand and secured with a seal. Likewise, the dignitaries of the Chinese state entrusted for preservation to the Russian Ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sav Vladislavich, [a copy of the treaty] written in the Manchu, Russian, and Latin languages, with their own signatures and secured by a seal.

Printed copies of this instrument have been distributed to al frontier inhabitants in order that the matter be known

In the year of our Lord 1727, the 21st day of the month of October, in the first year of the reign of Peter II, Emperor of All the Russians, etc., etc., etc. Exchanged in Kyakhta on June 14, 1728

The originals exchanged were signed thus:

[The Russian copy:] (seal) Count Sava Vladislavich Secretary of the Embassy Ivan Glazunov

[The Chinese copy:] Yung-cheng 5, the 9th month, the 7th day Chabina, dignitary, Royal Counselor, President of the Mandarin

Tribunal and Director of the Chamber of Internal Affairs; Tegute, dignitary, Royal Counselor, President-Director of the Tribunal of External Provinces, and Lord of the Red Banner; In the absence of Tuleshin, the Second President of the Military Tribunal, Ashan

Skhematicheskaia karta Amurskoi oblasti
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl?data=/gmd7/g7323/g7323a/mf000011.sid&style=mtfront&itemLink=r?intldl/mtfront:@field(NUMBER+@band(g7323a+mf000011))&title=Skhematicheskaia+karta+Amurskoi+oblasti+/+

http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/china-agreement-971113.html

Russian, Chinese Agreement on Use of Border Islands, Nov. 13, 1997 - English translation.

Document Source: Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 13 Nov 1997 p 6 \ FBIS-SOV-97-334, 30 Nov 1997

RF Government Decree No. 1392, dated 7 November 1997, Moscow: "On Concluding an Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Guidelines for Joint Economic Use of Individual Islands and the Water Areas Adjacent to Them on Border Rivers"

The RF [Russian Federation] Government decrees:

That the draft of the Agreement between the RF Government and the PRC Government on the Guidelines for Joint Economic Use of Individual Islands and the Water Areas Adjacent to Them on Border Rivers, presented by the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by the RF Ministry of Defense, the RF State Customs Committee, the RF Federal Security Service and the RF Federal Border Service, as well as by the organs of executive authority of Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Amur and Chita oblasts, be approved (it is attached)*.

That the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct negotiations with the Chinese side and, upon achieving accord, that it sign this Agreement on behalf of the RF Government, having been permitted to enter changes and additions, which are not in the nature of a principle, into the attached draft.

That, in order to conduct negotiations with the Chinese side on preparation of the Protocol for the Agreement between the RF Government and the PRC Government on Guidelines for Joint Economic Use of Individual Islands and the Water Areas Adjacent to Them on the Border Rivers, an RF delegation of the following composition is to be approved: Rozhkov, A. N. (RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the delegation), Kulik, A. B., Pimkin A. V. (secretary) and Pinaev, S. I. (RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Golub, N. A. (RF Ministry of Defense), Kulga, V. N. (RF Federal Border Service), Voronov, D. I. (RF Federal Security Service), Telkova, G. N. (RF State Customs Committee), Stomatyuk, E. S. (Primorskii Krai Administration), Tevelevich, V. M. and Khmelnitskii, S. A. (Khabarovsk Krai Administration), Salyutin, D. E. and Darizhapov, V. N. (Chita Oblast Administration), Ozhigibesov, A. G. (Amur Oblast Administration), Gurevich, V. S. (Jewish Autonomous Oblast Administration).

Up to five advisers and experts from the appropriate federal organs of executive authority, as well as technical personnel of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are to be permitted to be enlisted in the work of the delegation.

Expenditures to organize the negotiations in the city of Moscow (making facilities available for the negotiations, assigning transport, carrying out representative and cultural measures) are to be made through allocations allotted to the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs for these purposes. Expenditures to send the representatives of Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and Amur and Chita oblasts to the city of Moscow on the mission are to be put down to the budgets of the organs of executive authority of the appropriate components of the Russian Federation.

Expenditures to organize the negotiations in the indicated krais and oblasts (making facilities available for the negotiations, assigning transport, carrying out representative and cultural measures) are to be put down to the budgets of the organs of executive authority of the appropriate components of the Russian Federation.

If negotiations are conducted in the cities of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita, Blagoveshchensk or Birobidzhan, the expenditures for the mission-related travel of members of the RF delegation to these cities are to be put down to the governing federal organs of executive authority, as well as to the budgets of the organs of executive authority of the appropriate components of the Russian Federation.

Expenditures involved in sending the RF delegation to the People's Republic of China, including in foreign currency, are to be put down to the mission-related federal organs of executive authority and the organs of executive authority of components of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, RF Government Chairman

* Published in a supplement to the RG "Ekonomicheskii Soyuz."

http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1999/04dt/default.asp?n=toc.asp

Russia's China Problem - by Dmitri Trenin (Moscw Carnegie Center, 1999)


I. Whither China and what it means for Russia
Russia’s China problem stems from the fact that today China already significantly surpasses Russia in aggregate national power. Such a radical change from previous patterns of relations based on Russia’s strength and China’s weakness necessitates a fundamental rethinking of all aspects of Russian-Chinese relations-from economic to demographic to defense policy.

Economy: Living Next to an Economic Colossus
The World Bank estimates show that in terms of purchasing power parity, China has the world’s third largest GDP behind America and Japan. This is equivalent to some 35 percent of the U.S. level.[1] In contrast, before the crisis struck, Russia ranked 16th in GDP, rather far behind such Asian countries as South Korea and Indonesia. A decade ago the situation looked very different, with China still lagging behind the USSR. The proverbial "overtaking and surpassing" happened remarkably quickly. By the mid-1990s, data show that China’s PPP GDP was four times the size of Russia’s,[2] making this one of the most dramatic about-faces in the history of international economic relations.

The 1:4 ratio is unlikely to last long, however. China has been demonstrating a phenomenally high growth rate-an average of 9.1 percent a year for the past 25 years.[3] According to some data, Chinese GDP increased 12 times from 1950 to 1997.[4] In the absence of reliable statistics there are certain doubts among specialists regarding the scale of the Chinese "economic miracle." It is also worth keeping in mind that the absolute world record in economic growth rate after World War II belongs to Taiwan.

Of course, past growth rates cannot be extrapolated into the future. As Chinese reforms deepen, it will be harder to sustain high rates of growth. Extensive development will be limited ever more stringently by the lack of cultivated land, the paucity of energy resources, and enormous environmental pollution. The need for deeper economic reforms in China, a gradual yet painful transition from extensive growth factors to greater use of intensive ones, and, finally, the overall development of Asian financial markets will determine the slowdown in the growth rate of Chinese GDP. Thus, past over-optimistic forecasts of China’s becoming the leading economic power in the world by the early 21st century need to be adjusted. As with similar predictions in regards the Soviets in the 1950s and the Japanese in the 1980s, the "Chinese challenge" to America’s economic position may never materialize.

It looks more likely that the United States will maintain its economic leadership much longer than was believed until recently, but the gap between the sizes of the economies of China and Russia will likely increase. Even if we assume that the Chinese growth rate soon drops to 6 percent and Russia starts an economic rise in the near future at the level of 4 to 6 percent a year, within 10 years the gap between the two countries’ GDP levels may increase tenfold.

But what if reforms in China fail? This spells nothing less than a national disaster for Russia. Not only will Far Eastern and Siberian regions be deprived of their principal source of food and consumer goods, Russian authorities will probably find it impossible to contain the migration of huge masses of unemployed and hungry people from across the border.

But then the population of China is 1.2 billion, and growing, while Russia’s population is only 146 million, and declining. The qualitative indicator of per capita GDP has always been the source of national pride for the Russians in their dealings with the Chinese. At the time of the Chinese-Soviet confrontation the difference was sevenfold. Even now, Russia continues to stay ahead of China in this area although the gap has significantly decreased-China’s per capita GDP is about 60 percent of Russia’s[5] while many coastal cities in China have already surpassed the average Russian level. By the beginning of the 21st century China may already have overtaken Russia in this sense, as well, although the differences in the volume and quality of the accumulated national wealth will continue for a longer period of time.

A major limitation to China’s economic growth is its insufficient resource base. Many sources of extensive development have been exhausted or are nearly exhausted. In the 1990s it became obvious that China depends on imports of not only advanced technologies but also of food and energy. The stress that has been put on the soil and the environment has exceeded acceptable levels. In these conditions every new step forward will require more efforts from China than before. Natural resources, especially energy, are among the few areas where Russia seems to be securely superior to China. The terms for China’s access to those resources will be one of the key problems in future Russian-Chinese relations.

Another serious problem is environmental pollution in China. Losses due to the pollution of water and air amount to 3 to 8 percent of GDP. As a neighboring country, Russia inevitably feels the consequences of this large-scale environmental catastrophe.[6]

Social Problems
Addressing China’s social problems is no less daunting than its economic problems. Some experts even hold that the essence of what they call the "Chinese problem" is the fact that roughly one-fifth of the population of the globe "has been shifted away from its traditional ways of work and life and toward individualism and consumer society values that destroy traditional society."[7] Leading Russian Sinologists[8] conclude that the situation in which everybody stood to gain from reforms is nearing its end. Ironically, the mounting difficulties are the direct consequence of the basically successful development of the country over the past 20 years.

Despite the unequivocal desire of the authorities not to allow serious shake-ups, the forthcoming reform of state-run enterprises, including privatization of the bulk of them, will create large social groups that will clearly be on the losing end. The number of unemployed in the country already amounts to 150 million, slightly more than the entire population of Russia; the pension system covers only a small sector of the population; the housing problem remains acute; and education and medical care are at a primitive stage. In the past China managed to funnel social pressure into creating millions of small factories and shops and holding back the growth of personal income in order to make a huge economic leap. Future economic reform and development will prove more costly to China as groups within its population who are negatively affected by those reforms grow and become more vocal.

China’s social problems may affect Russia directly, for example in the form of mass migration into Russian territory. Assuming that a mere 5 million people out of the expected 200 to 300 million internal migrants become desperate enough to cross the Russian border in search of better opportunities, Russia faces the possibility of new arrivals equaling the entire population of the Russian Far East. Admittedly, China itself has vast unoccupied territories with difficult natural and climatic conditions that are being put into use, following the Soviet example, on the basis of CPC vouchers; however, this does not rule out the scenario in which Russian territory becomes attractive to Chinese economic migrants. The Primorski Region (Primorie) and the Amur area (Priamurie) would offer such migrants living and economic conditions not too dissimilar from those prevailing in Chinese Manchuria, an economically depressed area. Another channel for the spillover of Chinese social problems into the Russian territory is the possible influx of various Chinese criminal groups, including those engaged in smuggling, drug trafficking, and racketeering.

Political System: CPC - the Last Dynasty?
The legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is no longer rooted in revolutionary ideology; more and more, it is becoming a function of economic growth. Slower growth and the ensuing mass frustration of the population may bring into question the right of the party to remain in power.

So far, the emerging bureaucratic capitalism in China is based on a CPC whose officials accumulate shrinking political power and the unfolding economic opportunities in their own hands. Today, the CPC is both a conduit and obstacle for political change. In the future the party leadership will hardly be able to maintain complete control over the process. Leaders of the CPC may want to use the modern experience of this recent adversary, the Kuomingtang party in Taiwan. Final, successful modernization of the political regime, however, is not at all guaranteed. The procedures for a change of power in the country are less and less appropriate given the changed situation. The demand for democratization, moving from below upward, will grow with time. The authorities will easily handle individual dissidents but their actions may prove ineffective in the case of massive strife of the rural or urban lower classes. In any case, the Communist Party of China has the chance to become the "last dynasty" in the history of the country. The question is who its heir will be.

For China’s neighbors and partners, including Russia, the gradual fading of the communist authoritarian regime has indefinite consequences. On the one hand, a democratic China would undoubtedly become an important factor for peace and stability in Asia and in the world at large. On the other hand, democratization of Chinese society would be a lengthy process requiring an entire epoch and would not be without negative consequences. The experiences of post-Soviet states reveal a link between the process of democratization and the growth of nationalism and outwardly directed aggressiveness. If such a relationship holds for China, as well, many Russian pragmatics would prefer Chinese liberal communists as their partners. The composition of the Chinese leadership, however, will be beyond the control of outsiders, least of all Russians.

A change of generation in the current Chinese political leadership will mean that the last of the leaders who studied in the USSR and speak Russian will have retired. Although neither Jiang Zemin nor Li Peng can be regarded as being "soft" on Moscow, their successors, starting with the new Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, will have no such personal connections to Russia. On the contrary, the number of graduates of Western, and above all, U.S. colleges among Chinese leaders will increase. Thus, the relations between the Chinese and the Russian elites may grow more distant.

The role of the Chinese army, which remains among the most important pillars of the ruling regime and of national unity (along with the CPC personnel policy) will change significantly. With time the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will gradually turn into a professional military organization owing its allegiance to the state rather than the party.

Although in the long-term the authority of the central government of China is weakening compared to the other power centers, the present Chinese leadership appears to be well focused and the Chinese state seems so far to be operational. Both the former and the latter are clearly in contrast with the situation in Russia. Post-communist Russia has not yet taken any definite shape. The Russian state displays obvious weakness at all levels. In foreign policy this leads to an uncoordinated doctrine and a large number of independent or quasi-independent players looking after their vested interests (from government agencies to private economic agents to regional administrations, etc.).

Chinese communities engaged in business, including illegal business, have already appeared in various parts of Russia. Residents of the invisible "Chinatowns" in Moscow[9] and other cities live in a parallel world that rarely makes contact with Russian society. Making use of the corruptibility of many Russian officials, they manage to secure the patronage of the authorities.

Regional Development Vector
A serious problem for China is its deepening stratification into prosperous, stagnating, and depressed regions. Now that regions have three to four times more financial resources than the central government (of the 10.8 percent of GDP that the Chinese state can use, the share of the central government is only 2.4 percent) much will depend on whether the regions will be able to agree among themselves as well as with Beijing. All sides have incentives to do just that.

A collapse of the People’s Republic of China is often dismissed as improbable. After all, 93 percent of the population are Han Chinese. Furthermore, when the Communist Party arrived in power, it refused to follow the ill-fated Soviet model of carving out "constituent republics."

Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet were given the status of autonomous regions without the right to secede, and their population was consistently Sinicized. Such institutes as the CPC and PLA continue to perform important integrating functions. Finally, the regionalism of local elites will be compensated by centralist trends of the more depressed regions and also by growing nationalism. Still, it would be wrong to close one’s eyes to the growing differentiation of China’s regions.

Of special importance for Russia are the status and prospects of the Chinese regions just across the border. North-Eastern China, once the base of the nation’s heavy industry, is now a clear laggard in terms of economic dynamism, with a high unemployment rate (7 to 8 million people out of work). Although it is sometimes argued that the slow pace of development of China’s North-East makes it a poor base for economic expansion into the Russian Far East and Siberia, massive unemployment there may lead to an increase in cross-border migration. The similar climatic conditions in Manchuria and Primorie or Transbaikal make such expansion all the more likely.

Inner Mongolia appears docile for the time being, but any resurgence there of pan-Mongolian nationalism will have repercussions not only in the neighboring Republic of Mongolia, but in the Russian regions such as Buryatia and Tuva whose population is of Mongolian stock.

The situation in China’s North-Western provinces that border on Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan represents a more serious political and ethnic problem. The indigenous Uighur population has not forgotten the centuries-old resistance to attempts by China to consolidate its control of the area. Of special significance is the more recent experience of the 1940s when an independent republic of Eastern Turkestan was proclaimed and many local Chinese were massacred. There is hardly any doubt that the Chinese government would use its army and police to put down Uighur separatism. The issue is unlikely to go away any time soon.

Beijing will probably find it easier to control Tibet, but the Tibetan cause has much stronger international support than the Uighur one. In Russia itself, the republics of Kalmykia, Tuva and Buryatia whose indigenous population is Buddhist can be regarded, at least potentially, among those concerned with respect to what happens in Tibet.

Communist Ideology Is Temporal, Chinese Civilization Is Eternal
Nationalism in China is growing not only among the elites but among common people as well. For the first time since the 1910 revolutionary events, the Chinese feel as one nation. The elites are invigorated and rejoice at the feeling. Following a century and a half of humiliation on the part of Western countries, Russia, and Japan, they have begun to feel proud of their national and cultural heritage.

The return of Hong Kong put a symbolic end to the era of Western superiority. China has returned to the international arena as a powerful independent factor while the British Empire has ceased to exist and the successor to the Russian Empire, the USSR, has collapsed. Russians must realize that the Chinese associate them with the European imperialists and that their historical claims include unequal border agreements, colonization of Manchuria, suppression of the Boxer rebellion in Beijing as well as more recent Soviet attempts to dominate China from the vantage of an "elder brother" in the socialist camp.

Paradoxically, the Chinese-the only people who have maintained continuity of their civilization for more than 25 centuries-face the problem of shaping their modern identity. The process of defining the modern Chinese identity will be informed by two notions of "the nation." First, the nation of China, which embraces all those living in the territory of China (including ethnic minorities). Second, the Chinese as such (Han), irrespective of the country they live in. The former is important in view of the inevitable reaction by authorities to separatist aspirations of the non-Han ethnic elites while the latter is significant in light of the possible reaction by Beijing to the status of ethnic Chinese minorities abroad. In recent history, for instance during the 1965 anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia, Beijing adhered to a rather restrained position, and even three decades later there are few signs that the policy toward their "countrymen" has fundamentally changed. In the future, however, the growth of nationalistic feelings in China may cause spontaneous popular solidarity protests. Given the growth of the Chinese diaspora in Russia, however gradual it may be, Russia will have to keep this eventuality in mind to an ever-greater degree.

The threat to Russia and the world at large of growing Chinese nationalism, however, will be limited in the future by other social and political forces. Rising nationalism is paralleled by another phenomenon-China’s economic dependency on other world economies. Furthermore, increasing individualism among the Chinese people undercuts the traditional cultural norms that would ostensibly become the basis of a nationalist movement. Still, the situation in China is in sharp contrast with the pessimism and lack of confidence that is so widespread in post-Soviet Russia.

The Middle Empire and Its Periphery
Today, China is concentrated on itself even more than is Russia. Beijing’s foreign policy is strictly subordinated to the policy of economic and social transformation within the country. As a result, China is often seen as a country interested in maintaining the international status quo. This conclusion appears to be somewhat imprecise. China is a country in the process of satisfying its ever-growing needs. As things stand now, it is definitely not satisfied. Starting from establishing control over Tibet in 1950, Beijing has been expanding the territory it effectively controls. Hong Kong is to be followed by Macau, Taiwan and the Spratlys. The Chinese, however, regard all these acquisitions not as expansion, but as a return of Chinese territories to the mother country. Any attempt to forestall this process would be regarded as outside interference and aggression. As China’s power grows, the status quo will change, as well, and in China’s favor.

Beijing describes its foreign policy as both mature and non-ideological in nature and stresses China’s restraint and desire for dialogue and cooperation with all countries, above all neighboring ones. Indeed, China needs a peaceful environment. China has numerous neighbors, including such major states as Japan, Russia, India, Indonesia, and the United States through its presence in Asia. Nothing shows that Deng suffered from the "nightmare of coalitions," as did Bismarck. The heirs of the patriarch of Chinese reforms, however, need to keep in mind the hypothetical scenario of China being surrounded by the United States, its allies, partners, and clients. Beijing is fully aware that, in principle at least, there exist in East and Central Asia and in the West Pacific conditions for the use of the balance-of-forces mechanism and the formation of a coalition aimed at restraining the growth of China’s power. During the Cold War, the United States kept Red China at bay by means of its bases in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Guam. The Soviet Union, through its links to or presence in Mongolia, India, Vietnam and Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, practiced semi-containment of the People’s Republic. These precedents should call for vigilance.

A new factor in China’s foreign policy is its growing economic dependence on the outside world, above all on the West. For China to continue its economic rise, fuel and energy are needed, much of which will have to be imported, including from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia. Thus, China’s policy of good-neighborliness is not charity or a goodwill gesture but rather an absolute necessity.

The Chinese leadership represents a group of mostly traditionally thinking officials for whom the state and raison d’?tat appear to be the ultimate value. Viewed from this angle, Beijing’s foreign policy is quite "normal" and predictable. The essence of China’s current foreign policy strategy is no secret either; it is an attempt to gain the time needed to accumulate forces and in the end to make China a first-rate global, rather than only Asian, power. Russian defense analysts see China’s strategic goal to be the "creation in the 21st century of a powerful state (derzhava) that has vast zones of influence and that is capable of securing a dominating role in the Asia-Pacific region, and to lay claim to global leadership."[10]

Call it a pursuit of hegemony, domination, or just the desire to occupy a worthy place in the system of international relations, Beijing’s strategic aims will probably be as follows:

unconditional recognition by the international community of China’s territorial integrity (Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang);
international recognition of China’s special rights in the South China Sea;
achieving dominant influence in South-East Asia, from the Philippines to Burma, and consolidating China’s influence on the Korean peninsula;
expanding China’s influence in the energy-rich countries of former Soviet Central Asia;
assuring neighbors’ support of China’s positions in disputes with the U.S. and the West as a whole;
practical recognition of "special relations" between China and Mongolia;
prevention of the formation of anti-Chinese coalitions in military confrontations with China;
trade and investment policies in other countries, that will be friendly to China; possibly the creation of a yuan currency zone;
securing unimpeded access to energy resources, in particular in the Middle East and Central Asia, potentially also in Russian Siberia and the Far East;
recognition of China’s leading role in the region (in the form of informal but virtually mandatory consultations with Beijing before important decisions are taken);
readiness by other countries to receive Chinese immigrants;
ensuring civil rights for Chinese minorities and nationals abroad and recognition of Beijing’s right to protect them;
promoting the use of the Chinese language in Asia and achieving bilingual status in regions where ethnic Chinese live.[11]
To reach these goals, Beijing is unlikely to use traditional military force. Beijng’s current behavior is not aggressive and China is quite capable of influencing the will of others through its sheer weight. In the future, Beijing will be trying to win without entering an open fight, to divide potential competitors without joining alliances that will tie it down. Typically, its leaders will insist that they are only after what is in all fairness China’s very own. This concentration on itself, however, is becoming less absolute. One of the lessons of the 1997 financial crisis for Beijing is the realization of the fact that, in an interdependent world, China and other countries share important common interests. Yet, China’s basic interests are clearly more important for Chinese leaders than the interests of the international community.

Using economic power as the main instrument of its foreign policy, Beijing, if necessary, is quite capable of also using military force.

In its relations with the West, China takes a contradictory stance. On the one hand, Beijing does not completely reject the former position of the informal leader of the "world’s poor" while on the other it is delighted to be a candidate member of the "world government." The West continues to have doubts as to whether China has already become a "system player" or, once allowed inside the system, will play against it.

Furthermore, in their rhetoric the Chinese refuse to accept the present global order, insisting that it was created without their participation. A typical feature of their behavior is that they do not offer any general schemes for the restructuring of that order except very general phrases about multi-polarity and non-acceptance of hegemony. In practice Beijing limits itself to bending existing rules and obtaining exceptions and exemptions. In fact China wants to have its cake and eat it, too. While raising its status Beijing wants to retain both the freedom of action and the benefits "for the poor." Entering international institutions, China will have to follow, however, the norms existing there in the future. It is reasonable to hope that its well-known pragmatism and enlightened egotism will ultimately breed a sense of responsibility. What this may look like has been demonstrated recently by China’s successful passing of the "Hong Kong test" as well as its behavior at the height of the Asian financial crisis.

An important question arises as to which of the two "nations" should be regarded as the actual political actor-the People’s Republic or the so-called "Greater China", which in addition to the PRC (and Hong Kong) includes Taiwan, Macau and the Chinese diaspora of South-East Asia? Those are the economies that to a large extent supplement each other. Despite all the cultural and lifestyle differences between the mainland Chinese and Westernized diaspora, ethnic and linguistic unity create the basis for massive penetration of the diaspora’s capital into mainland China. A large part of foreign investment in China consists of investments by Taiwanese or by huatsao. China, in turn, is very active in developing economic relations with South-East Asian countries.

It would be an oversimplification to view "Greater China" as the Asian analogy of the European Union. In the former vastly different relationships prevail. It was the family-owned diaspora’s banks that became the driving force behind economic development in China’s coastal provinces. So far there is no clear-cut answer to the question of which is the leading political force in "Greater China," but the growing activity of the diaspora is obvious. China pleads for and receives investment money from the diaspora at conferences similar to, but far less publicized than, the World Economic Forum in Davos. This has to do not only with the best possible conditions for capital to be invested in mainland China’s economy. Beijing, for instance, has often lowered its voice in the dispute about the ownership of the Spratly Islands; during the 1997 financial crisis it provided assistance to its neighbors. The potential thus set in motion is colossal. China’s exports total $147 billion, Taiwan’s $130 billion. The diaspora, estimated to be about 50 to 60 million people, altogether controls $2,500 billion.

Of all countries, the United States occupies by far the most important place in Chinese foreign policy. The Tiananmen epoch in the relations between the two countries finally ended in 1997. President Clinton’s visit in the summer of 1998 represents a symbolic watershed. Pragmatic advocates of the friendly involvement of China into the U.S.-led system of international relations have prevailed over both the more conservative advocates of containment of China and the liberal upholders of human rights. The growing dependence of China on the United States as a vast market and a unique source of technology acts as a powerful stabilizing factor. Washington is proposing a constructive strategic partnership with Beijing, which with time may become one of the most important trends in global politics. The Chinese value very much their improved relations with the United States. They are clearly flattered by the status of a new member of the Big Two although they realize that their capabilities are limited and tend to act cautiously-for instance in the crises around Iraq. It is very interesting to contrast Beijing’s position to that of Moscow. Both governments are highly critical of Washington’s policies, but while Moscow huffs and puffs, which only emphasizes the paucity of resources it still has, Beijing keeps calm, while obviously gathering strength. There are numerous contentious issues in U.S.-Chinese relations but even on the most acute of them-Taiwan-Beijing and Washington are virtually united in the maintenance of the status quo on the island in the near future. If anybody is capable of being a source of tension, these are the advocates of complete independence in Taiwan itself.

China, of course, entertains no illusions that the Americans, having admitted that it is impossible "to stop China," will now further the power of their potentially most serious competitor. In developing its relations with Washington, Beijing will probably seek to limit or reduce American influence, first of all in East Asia. Conceptually such actions are based on the notion of the multi-polar world, which entails "countering hegemony."

This concept is the official basis of the Chinese-Russian relations. Beijing publicly sided with Moscow regarding the expansion of NATO, even though its criticism was much more muted. It seems this is not simply a quid pro quo in response to Moscow’s support of Chinese positions-say, on Taiwan. If in the long-term relations between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance become more amicable, it will complicate China’s strategic position. Institutionalized Russia-NATO confrontation, or at least the continuation of the present deadlock in those relations, serves as a barrier against the encirclement of China by the West. It serves China’s interests perfectly to underline Russia’s disagreements with the United States in Europe and in the Middle East and invite Moscow to pay more attention to those areas. On the other hand, it becomes ever more obvious that Beijing, unlike Moscow, is concerned not with the accession of Central European countries to NATO but with the intensified activities of the Alliance and the U.S. in Central Asia. China’s strategic interests are concentrated in precisely this region, which is rich in fuel and energy resources so much needed in China and which at the same time serves as a potential hinterland for Xinjiang separatists. Beijing takes no joy in seeing how instead of the weakening Russian influence in this Chinese periphery the economic, political, and military influence of the West, above all the U.S., is growing.

China, the U.S., and Russia have abandoned the triangle model of relations that was advantageous to the U.S. Although the U.S. remains the most important partner and counteragent both for China and for Russia, the triangle has virtually collapsed or at least is no longer a rigid construction.[12] At first glance, it may even seem that diplomatic actions of the three countries positively stimulate each other. In reality Russia is turning from an equal "cornerstone" into a factor, albeit an important one, in the wider U.S.-Chinese arrangement. The U.S. and China much more often speak about a different triangle-a regional one with the participation of Japan. But in so doing Beijing infers that this figure has only two genuinely full-scale cornerstones and that Tokyo’s status is much lower. The Chinese purpose is obviously to weaken the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, if this happens Tokyo will have to either accept Beijing’s hegemony or to ensure its defense and independence on its own, which raises the inevitable question of revising the well-known non-nuclear principles of Japanese policy.

Relations with Russia form for Beijing part of China’s policy aim at establishing a favorable external environment. Its main goal is to remove any potential threat from the North and, thereby, the prospects of a political-military confrontation. In the early 1990s Chinese leaders were still apprehensive of what they termed Russian imperialism or militarism. During the short-lived honeymoon in Russian-U.S. relations they became even more worried at the prospect of Moscow becoming Washington’s junior partner. Initially, the Chinese were apprehensive about Boris Yeltsin, but their worries were put to rest as the first Russian president emerged as the architect of an amicable relationship with Beijing. Currently, China may be satisfied-there is no threat to it on the part of Russia in the foreseeable future. The essence of strategic partnership with Moscow is to ensure that this favorable situation continues. Partnership will guarantee that Russia will not participate in any potential anti-Chinese coalition. No matter how relations between China and the West develop in the future, the isolation of China will ever be complete thanks to the Russian "safety valve."

The material results of recent Russian-Chinese relations is the border agreement between Russia, China, and Central Asian states. The positive significance of the 1991, 1994, 1996, and 1997 agreements can hardly be overestimated. For the first time the entire length of the border is not only accurately defined (except for three islands) but is also marked, except for small sections. Confidence-building measures and limitation of armaments in the 100-kilometer zone on both sides of the border reinforce political and military stability. The settlement of the problem of the former Soviet-Chinese border made an enormous contribution to security in East and Central Asia.

Russians, though, should not forget that Chinese continue to regard the 1858 and 1860 treaties that underlie the present state and territorial delimitation between the two countries as unequal and imposed by tsarist Russia on Qing China. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping’s behest contains clear indications that all consequences of the imperialist policies by European countries toward China must be overcome in the future. The big question is how does this apply to Russia? It seems it would be more appropriate for Russians to consider the latest agreements as the regulation of the present borderline rather than as the "final" border treaty. One cannot preclude that in future the entire problem will be raised again in order to be solved on the basis of "rationality and fairness."[13]

So far, however, Chinese leaders have behaved nearly impeccably as regards Russia. China is one of the few countries that continues to spare Russia’s injured pride. Beijing especially emphasizes the equal nature of relations with Moscow and echoes Moscow in speaking about a multi-polar world and unacceptability of hegemony. One could conclude that the Chinese are confident that their northern neighbor is suffering temporary difficulties and that in the future Russia will inevitably become one of the poles in the new international construction. Such a conclusion would be, however, too optimistic for the Russian Federation.

Clearly, new serious troubles in Russia or, worse still, the collapse of the country would represent a source of serious danger for China. In hopes of bolstering support for Russia’s federal government, Beijing rejects direct relations with individual Russian regions, such as Sakha (Yakutia), strictly limiting such ties to the inter-regional level. Yet, while China is interested in Russian stability, it does not wish for Russia to become considerably stronger. Beijing does not seek to include Moscow in the China-U.S.-Japan triangle in North-East Asia nor in the quadripartite (China, U.S., and the two Koreas) talks on Korea. Although Chinese leaders have learned to play up to the remnants of Russian greatness, they are not convinced Russia is really capable of becoming an independent "pole" in the system of international relations. Instead, Beijing watches to determine with whom Russia will side as a junior associate (united Europe, America) and to delicately attract it toward China.

Apart from its geopolitical and geostrategic significance Russia is important to China as a source of energy and raw materials, although it is not the only one and is probably less attractive than the Central Asian countries. China believes that Russia is still capable of playing a stabilizing role regarding the Central Asian countries, including countering pan-Turkish tendencies and Islamic political movements that threaten Beijing’s control over Xinjiang.

China is not interested in Russia yet as an economic partner, with the significant exception of military-technical cooperation. In view of their rather high quality and relatively low cost, Russian arms seem the optimal means for modernizing the Chinese army. China will not, of course, buy Russian arms in massive quantities. It is more interested in purchasing technology to organize its own production.[14] Another potentially promising direction is organizing, with Chinese funding, development of advance weapons systems jointly with Russia. If this happens, China will be able to achieve a qualitative shift of the military balance in Asia in its favor.

"Dragon’s Teeth"
China depends on its economic potential, and not its current military might, as a basis for its aggregate national capacity. Following the demise of the USSR, Beijing believes that a large-scale war has become a remote possibility. Military modernization is not the first priority in the general plan of turning China into a modern state; the process began only in late 1980s, ten years after economic reform. It is obvious at the same time that the growing economic potential of the country implies greater resources that can be directed for defense needs. Beijing is believed to be spending between $30 billion and $40 billion for that purpose. It could spend even more without jeopardizing China’s economic and social development since military expenditure equals less than 2 percent of the nation’s GDP. Russia, whose FY 1999 federal budget amounts to only $20 billion at the current rate of exchange, allocates just about $8 billion on national defense, of which less than $6 billion are likely to be spent.

Beijing presents the modernization of the Chinese defense sphere as justified and long overdue. Indeed, the military arsenals of China’s neighbors contain today greater numbers of modern military equipment. It is urgently necessary to turn the PLA into a smaller but more professional military organization. In view of the growing potential for domestic turmoil, Beijing, while reducing the armed forces, is building up the People’s Armed Police, already 1 million strong. Despite growing military spending, the scale of the task is such that the pace of military modernization can hardly be called accelerated. China obviously expects a long break during which a major war, especially a nuclear one, is unlikely. Officially China does not consider any state as its potential adversary and remains the only state that has declared it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Some Russian China-watchers considered the notion of a "China threat" a myth created by the American propaganda campaign.[15] Russian military analysts are also unanimous in their opinion that in the next 10 years China’s political-military aspirations will not be directed against Russia.

At the same time Russian observers have doubts. China, in their view, is not yet ready for close cooperation in the sphere of international security and comprehensive arms control.[16] The Chinese defense establishment continues to be closed to the outside world. Despite the publication of defense white papers, the military budget, the PLA’s personnel strength, armament, location of units and formations are still top secret. Weapons and technology purchases from abroad, including from Russia, are made under a cloud of secrecy.

Little is known about China’s military doctrine because it is not openly discussed either inside China or during international exchanges. It may be assumed that it is based on the principle of asymmetrical steps and is partially similar to the traditional Chinese acupuncture. It may also be said that the use of military force (both inside the country and on the periphery of the state border) is routine for the Chinese. The CPC came to power in China as a result of nearly two decades of civil war against the Kuomingtang and the liberation war against Japan. The power of the Chinese communists, indeed, grew out of the barrel of a gun. Starting from 1950 the PLA has been engaged in combat in Korea, Tibet, the Taiwan Strait, Vietnam, Xinjiang, on the South China Sea islands, and on the borders with India and the USSR.

At present China’s defense establishment is oriented toward providing the wherewithal for a military solution of the Taiwan problem should peaceful reunification fail. By 2010 the PLA should be capable of carrying out a landing operation to take over the rebellious province. The Chinese government officially does not exclude the possibility of the use of force against Taiwan and warns other countries not to interfere into this Chinese internal affair. Another potential direction for the projection of China’s military power is the South China Sea area, which on Chinese maps is also shown as belonging to the People’s Republic. The 1997 crisis has in particular demonstrated that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) cannot play the role of an anchor of security in South-East Asia. Beijing could not have missed the point: ASEAN is incapable of resisting China’s ambitions. A prudent strategy for China would be to freeze the situation temporarily in order to strengthen its global position and to raise contentious issues only when in a position of superiority. The fact that the Chinese military has less influence on Beijing’s foreign policy than they once did should not lead to the conclusion that they are out of the loop altogether.

Military d?tente with Russia ensures a reliable rear frontier for China in the North and a certain measure of stability in the North-West. The priority given to developing rapid deployment forces, the Navy, and the Air Force rather than the ground forces indicates that Russia is not yet seen in China as either a potential aggressor or as the most likely theater of a future war. Thus, Beijing has the opportunity to concentrate on strategic directions that are more important to it-the Southern and South-Eastern ones.[17] So far Russia’s relative military weakness guarantees a strategic break for China for a minimum of 15 years. China is developing nuclear systems, however, with multiple re-entry vehicles, even as Russia is obliged to phase them out pursuant to the START-II treaty. Somewhere between 2010 to 2015, parity in the number of nuclear warheads may emerge between the PRC and the Russian Federation at the level of 700 to 1,000 warheads,[18] after which China can conceivably take the lead. China’s strategic geography is such that this capability will have a stronger impact on the military balance with Russia than on the Chinese-U.S. equation.

Many Russians traditionally believe that the Chinese-owing to their specific culture-are intrinsically incapable of catching up with Russia in terms of military technologies and that they only can copy obsolete Soviet equipment. With such an approach the Russians can easily fall into the mistake of self-complacency.

Preliminary Conclusions
The two decades of Chinese reforms were on the whole successful for the country. In the future China will probably rise further. It is virtually impossible to hold back or reverse this process. At the same time, the further China proceeds along the road of reforms the greater difficulties it will have to face in the economic, social, and political spheres. Although chances are that China will overcome those difficulties and avoid catastrophes, one cannot disregard the possibility of "volcanic activity" in the society. The transfer of power from Deng Xiaoping to the new generation of Chinese leaders was smooth and well organized but this may not be enough to protect China from chaos in the future when problems that surfaced in the course of reforms worsen.

China’s international weight is significantly increasing but at the same time the dependence of the country on the global economic and financial systems grows, too. In the medium-term, approximately for the next 10 years, Beijing will probably conduct a rather "frugal" foreign policy involving self-limitation and avoiding conflicts with other countries. But by the early 21st century this semi-isolation will most likely give way to a more active policy aimed at gradually creating not only a China-friendly but also to a large degree pro-Chinese East and Central Asia. If this comes true, the basis for future Asian stability may well be not a multilateral security system but a version of Pax Sinica.

The gentlest one will not seem to be too burdensome-other countries will only have to treat China the way it wants them to, i.e. with maximum respect and taking Chinese interests into account.

In the 21st century China or rather the Chinese factor, both given the favorable as well as the unfavorable development of the situation in China itself, will influence Russia’s foreign, defense, as well as domestic policy, economy, and the development of demographic processes more than any other state. Both the elite and society in Russia are unprepared for this eventuality.

At the same time the answer to the question of "what kind of China Russia needs?" is quite obvious. Russia is interested in a prosperous China that can increasingly satisfy the needs of its huge population and that will open its market to, among others, Russian goods and services. The multitude and vast scale of problems in China cannot serve as a consolation to Russians. The Chinese dragon is not made of paper. Even if it takes a long time for China to be able to compete with the U.S. on an equal footing, it will decisively surpass Russia. A number of potential problems of the neighboring country (acute shortage of resources, explosions of social tensions) may have disastrous influence on Russia. Chaos in the Celestial Empire may turn into a nightmare for its neighbors. In this worst-case scenario, armies of Chinese migrants can easily swarm into the Russian Far East and Siberia. However, in more benign scenarios, development of relations with China will provide vital opportunities.

II. Prospects for Russian-Chinese Interaction
Despite obvious difficulties, China is gradually returning to its traditional status as a leading international economy. Although it will require much time and effort for China to catch up with and surpass America, with success being anything but assured, Russia will be left far behind. In terms of overall GDP China exceeds Russia several times over and can surpass it in per capita terms in the near future, as well. Russia will find itself for the first time in decades with a smaller domestic economy than China and poorer per person.

Despite the commitment of a significant part of the Russian elite to the old-fashioned geopolitical vision of the world and its weakness for such formulas as a multi-polar world and strategic partnerships, the most important prospects for future Russian-Chinese interaction lie in the economic, scientific, technical, and information spheres.

Russia’s vital interests in the region "to the East of the Urals" consist in maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federation, achieving economic and cultural prosperity, and integration into the world economic system, above all with countries of Asia and the Pacific. Maintaining a monocultural identity and unchanged ethnic composition can hardly be considered a vital interest.

Unfortunately, these general interests are often incompatible with the private interests of individual players in Russian urban centers and in the regions. Numerous governmental bodies, regional administrations, some sectors of the economy, and individual oligarchies have their own, often competitive, agendas in their relations with China. Furthermore, even Russia’s officially proclaimed goals do not always correspond to its reduced capabilities.

Economy
China is important to Russia first of all as a vast market capable not only of consuming Russian raw materials but also industrial production and services. China will also serve as a source of human and financial resources necessary for the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia.

After exuberant but chaotic development in the early 1990s, economic ties between the two countries have entered a period of stagnation.[19] The volume of trade in 1997 amounted to $6 billion, which is still far from the declared goal of $20 billion by the year 2000 and ten times less than that between China and the U.S. The main items exported by Russia into China are still weapons and military equipment. In 1997 Russian companies were surprised when they did not receive the order for energy-producing equipment for the Three Rifts hydropower station project. In the same year the United States removed unilateral limitations on the supply of nuclear power station equipment, becoming a powerful competitor to the Russian nuclear industry.

For Russian interests regarding China to be realized, Russia has to become not only more attractive economically but also must adjust its current attitudes significantly. Russia should not consider China as a market capable of consuming goods that are intrinsically non-competitive in Europe and America. Russian producers compete with Western as well as Japanese goods in the Chinese market, the important difference being that the competitive terms on Chinese territory are more beneficial for Russians than in the competitors’ own markets. It is time Russia gave up hope that China will make good on its political loyalty with lucrative industrial orders. Expectations of large-scale modernization of China’s heavy industry, built with the help of the USSR in 1950s, are a pipe dream; China seeks far more advanced equipment than Russia has to offer today. Modernization based on current Russian technology would provide the Russian military-industrial complex with orders, but is clearly a dead-end for China, and the Chinese are unlikely to opt for it. The frequently repeated thesis about the mutually beneficial nature of the Russian and Chinese economies needs detailed study: sometimes such a complementary relation exists (Russian resources plus Chinese workforce) whereas sometimes it is only a myth.[20]

In dealing with Russians, the Chinese not only note the muddle at the state, regional, and local levels but also the fact that Russian business lacks a coherent strategy, and tends to want everything at once and at super-high prices. Russians, for their part, note the ability of the Chinese to use Russian weaknesses and difficulties to buy certain goods, technologies, and know-how for peanuts.

On the one hand, Russia stands a chance of occupying-but not without competitive struggle-its own niche in the Chinese market in such areas as nuclear energy, hydroelectric power, and the aerospace industry. To take advantage of this opportunity Russian industrialists and financial players need to be physically present in the Chinese market, to constantly monitor its needs, and fight for their place in the market. Russian politicians would do better by learning modern methods of lobbying for the interests of domestic producers. Thus far Russia has only managed to gain a foothold on the Chinese weapons market.

On the other hand, Russians must realize that if they cannot ensure development of the Far East and Siberia, Russia will lose those territories one way or another and somebody else will then develop them. A no less obvious truth is that Russia alone will not be able to boost its Asian provinces in the foreseeable future. In principle, the required investment can be obtained from various sources, including Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, but the workforce to a large degree will have to be imported from China.[21] Large-scale use of the Chinese labor force, both cheaper and far more disciplined than the local Russian one, may become a key to the development of the Far East and regions to the east of Lake Baikal.

At present regional economic ties between Manchuria, the Maritime Region, and the territory east of the Baikal remain at a primitive, "shuttle-trade" level. They are hundreds of times inferior to China’s coastal provinces.

The Prospects of Political Partnership
Close relations with China are not a luxury for Russia but an absolute and long-term necessity. In 1991-1992, as the USSR disintegrated, links with China-barter trade in food and industrial goods-literally kept the Far East alive. For at least the next 15 years, Moscow simply cannot afford a confrontation or even tense relations with China. Russia has to a considerable degree lost its former military power-the only serious basis for its position in Asia. Despite its new membership in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Russia is still economically and commercially absent from Asia and the Pacific. Given this situation, Russia’s privileged political relations with the rising continental and world power could expand its possibilities for political maneuvering. With the fear of finding itself isolated in its increasingly frequent opposition to Washington, Moscow feels more confident when acting in the UN Security Council within the framework of an informal coalition with Beijing and Paris. This has a positive spin-off effect in Asia as well; the development of Russian-Chinese relations has already made Tokyo put forward an initiative in 1997 for improving relations with Moscow.

While Russia and China certainly share a number of parallel interests, they are not likely to work together to achieve those interests. The desire to limit U.S. influence in the regions of the world that are important to Moscow and Beijing has already been mentioned, however the possibilities for joint or coordinated "anti-hegemony" actions are rather narrow. Both states are interested in stability in Central Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, as well as in the continuation of the peaceful and "non-armed" foreign policy of Japan. In relation to Korea, it is already clear that China is not prepared to use its influence to allow Russia to participate in negotiations. China appears to regard Korea as a former and future backyard. At the same time Russia and China mutually support each other’s territorial integrity and do not question each other about the methods of warfare in Chechnya or the stabilization of the situation in Xinjiang. The Russian government prefers to pay only minimal attention to the problem of human rights or the persecution of ethnic or religious minorities in China, while public pressure on the Russian authorities currently ranges from too weak to non-existent.

Despite assertions to the contrary by Russian policy-makers and officials, there is no real possibility of a stable bloc or a political alliance between Moscow and Beijing. China feels no need for alliances, especially with a weak and unpredictable Russia, and will never agree to Moscow’s leadership. The building by Russia of various "axes," be it Moscow-Beijing-Delhi, or Moscow-Beijing-Teheran, or any others, is little more than a relic of Russian political thought. More significantly, Russian policies are not consistent in nature. Moscow easily proclaims far-reaching goals, but has few resources, or the political will, or even the sustained interest, to work toward implementing them.

The military-strategic aspect of Russian-Chinese relations is less prominent than it appears. Moscow strategists do not see China among Russia’s potential military allies. Statements by then-Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, who in December 1996 mentioned China among Russia’s potential adversaries, obviously reflect collective apprehensions of the General Staff rather than simply a personal opinion of the head of the defense establishment. Military cooperation with China is not included as a separate item in the documents on the Russian military reform, unlike cooperation with the CIS states, NATO, even Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the agreement on mutual non-targeting of strategic nuclear missiles and the regime of military transparency in the border area, the degree of trust between the Russian and Chinese military is lower than it was in Central Europe at the end of Cold War. Bilateral military-to-military contacts are probably less profound than those between the Chinese and U.S. militaries.[22] Supplies of Russian arms to China, the basis for not only military but also economic cooperation between the two countries, are of a forced nature, and are mostly driven by commercial considerations.[23]

In general, the Russian-Chinese political agenda looks very narrow and is basically limited to traditional geopolitical issues, to the virtual exclusion of foreign economic, monetary, financial, and environmental problems. Although Russia and China are on the verge of joining the WTO, this momentous issue is not included in their relationship. Unlike their U.S. and European colleagues, Russian politicians in their communications with Chinese officials are content to limit themselves to the symbols of "high politics" and summit declarations and largely do not descend to the "low politics" of commercial contracts. This is understandable-Russian foreign policy continues, essentially, the archaic practice of overemphasizing geopolitical and geostrategic themes.[24]

Human Bridges
Contacts between the Russian and Chinese peoples have never been so close and free as in the 1990s. Ideological barriers have been removed. The possibilities for private visits along with the opportunity to earn money during such trips have risen. Several million persons on both sides have already visited the neighboring country. Russian researchers and specialists once again work in China, and Chinese communities have appeared in many Russian cities, including Moscow. Even taking into account the fact that this explosion of contacts has acquainted not the best part of Russian society with not the best part of Chinese society, it is obvious that contacts have had some positive influence.

At the same time Russians seem to lose numerous opportunities. Past experience is more of a hindrance than a help to them. The Russian-Chinese Committee for Peace, Friendship and Development established in 1997 resembles a Soviet-era friendship society. Russia has not yet got away from a residual superiority complex regarding its neighbors. Russians do not show any active interest in China, its language, and culture, and prefer that the Chinese learn their language. The Russians do not quite understand the image that the Chinese have of Russia. Russian imperialism for the Chinese is not a propagandistic clich? but part of their history. Contacts between officials, be they government or military, are shallow in nature. Exchanges at the sub-cabinet level are infrequent and when they do happen it is on China’s initiative or in China’s interest. Finally, many Russians are terrified at the prospect of a significant Chinese population appearing in Russia. During the existence of the Far Eastern Fortress for three-quarters of a century they have forgotten that, prior to World War I, according to various estimates, from 300 to 500 thousand Chinese lived in the region. The tolerance of Russian Far Easterners toward Chinese as well as Korean immigrants is exceptionally low, which in the future may not only slow down the development of the region but also become a source of real danger.

III. Threats and Challenges for Russia
The main danger for Russia in connection with the rise of China is to believe in the reality of a "yellow peril." If this happens, politics, the economy, and the informational sphere in Russia will be so deformed that the damage to national interests will be irreparable, irrespective of China’s reaction to such a turn of events.

No less dangerous is the "quiet," gradual withdrawal of Russia from the Far East and Siberia in the form of reduced interest in the region on the part of the central authorities, the exodus of the remaining population, growth of separatist trends in the territories and republics, and their re-orientation toward Asian power centers, above all to Beijing.

Politically, Russia could become economically and politically dependent on China to such an extent that Moscow would lose the freedom of maneuvering in foreign policy and to a certain extent in domestic policy, as well. Such dependence would in no way be a consequence of the growing difference in the weight of the two countries, but rather from unskilled policies. Russia has been accustomed to acting from a position of strength, and recently has been losing out more and more often. It has yet to learn to act from a position of relative weakness and, in doing so, attempt to gain benefits, especially since the stakes are seldom zero.

Russia should be wary of becoming a raw-materials appendage to China and of certain regions of the country (e.g., the Primorski and Khabarovsk territories, or the Transbaikal) becoming exclusively oriented toward the Chinese market. There are fears that China can use its superior financial and economic resources to gain control over the Russian defense industry in the Far East and Siberia and integrate it into China’s domestic military industrial complex.[25] Another major area of potential Chinese-Russian rivalry is competition for energy resources, especially as Russia, too, may soon become a net oil importer.

In the demographic sphere the danger is not so much the "demographic overlapping" of Chinese provinces over the Russian Far East, which cannot be eliminated in any case, but the inconsistent or inefficient immigration policies of the Russian authorities. Indeed, major flows of Chinese migration are oriented toward the south rather than the north. Yet only a relatively small portion of Chinese migrants will suffice to upset completely the current ethnic and political balance. Integration of significant groups of Chinese and Koreans in Russian society is necessary and, maybe, inevitable. Some analysts forecast that by mid-21st century there will be 7 to 10 million Chinese living in Russia who thus will become the second largest ethnic group in Russia after the Russians themselves.[26] This possibility alone should revolutionize Russia’s way of thinking and mobilize the will of the authorities. Given these conditions, the lack of clear and consistently implemented immigration policies virtually guarantees inter-ethnic frictions that may easily lead to violent clashes between the local Russians and the Chinese immigrants, which in turn could escalate to an inter-state conflict between Russia and China.[27]

Such a conflict may result in a resumption of the Russian-Chinese military standoff, but this time on terms much less advantageous for Moscow. Both the Russian military forces and presence in Asia are decreasing.[28] Having left Mongolia Russia has lost even the theoretical possibility of repeating the Manchurian operation of August 1945 that arguably formed the foundation of strategic planning throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when Soviet tank crews kept city maps of Beijing in their vehicles. As the Russians know too well, the defense of their Far Eastern provinces involves enormous difficulties. The combat potential and readiness of Russian armed forces are at their lowest level in the past 50 years.

Facing Chinese superiority in conventional forces and the potential for Chinese nuclear deterrence, and in view of China’s military-geographical advantages, Russia is evidently ready to adopt a strategic concept similar to the one adopted by NATO in the 1970s. Moscow will have to rely on its nuclear weapons-both strategic and tactical (mostly air-based) in the framework of the concepts of expanded deterrence and escalatory domination[29] - and develop the capability for transcontinental redeployment of reinforcements to the Far East in case of conflict with China.[30] The attempt to carry out this dual task will require enormous investments that are not readily available. It is increasingly doubtful whether Russia will be able to keep much of its nuclear arsenal even after START II reductions. As the U.S. did in the case of the Soviet Union, Russia might provoke China into a massive increase of its nuclear potential resulting in a strategic parity between the two countries and Russia’s losing its current advantage.

Fir Ruusisa’s China a potentially serious problem is developing in Central Asia, where obscure, growing ethnic, religious, and clan-based disputes over borders, water-use, and natural resources may surface in the next 10 years and provoke conflicts and outside interference. The states that have formed following the collapse of the Soviet Union managed to survive but remain rather weak, and the transfer of power in any of them may lead to serious upheavals. In this respect China is probably interested at the very least in strengthening its influence in a region so rich in energy resources, while Russia wants to keep Central Asia as a strategic buffer. Beijing is successful in promoting its interests, economic and political, when it comes to Astana and Bishkek, Moscow’s two closest partners in the CIS states of Central Asia.[31] Some Moscow analysts already now foresee the possibility of a Russian-Chinese clash in Central Asia and propose that the territorial integrity of the CIS countries be ensured with the help of a Russian nuclear umbrella.

As for other possible threats related to China they are much less important for Russia. A solution to the Taiwan problem by armed force would probably not raise objections from Moscow, which could even try to gain some benefits from the tension between Beijing and Washington (although a direct China-U.S. clash appears unlikely).[32] The conflict in the South China Sea as well as tensions in the Taiwan Strait area would naturally distract the Chinese leadership’s attention from its northern borders and would even present the possibility for opportunistically minded Russian leaders to gain advantages through increased Russian arms supplies to all the potential parties of the confrontation: China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

Russia will try to close its eyes to any internal conflict in Xinjiang, but it will be more difficult for it to do so if Beijing, turning desperate in its opposition to Turkish and Moslem separatism, tries to interfere directly in the territories of the Central Asian countries that Russia considers to fall within the zone of its vital interests.

Mongolia is a separate issue. Since gaining independence in the early 20th century, the country has been a faithful ally of the Soviet Union-first against Japan, then against China. The presence of 75,000 Soviet troops in the territory of Mongolia gave the USSR a real opportunity to organize a powerful offensive against the Chinese capital in case of war with China. Communist Mongolia was so closely tied to the Soviet Union and its allies that its elites considered themselves more Eastern European than Asian. The present Mongolia for the first time in its history enjoys real political independence. It is trying to establish relations with third countries (the United States and Japan) to avoid falling under the tutelage of its two historical hegemonic powers. The Chinese are accustomed to seeing Mongolia, however, as its historical vassal, a part of the historical Chinese Empire. Stronger Chinese positions in the region may lead to the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia in one form or another. Mongolia’s transition to the Chinese orbit cannot present a threat to Russia as such; the situation would become threatening, however, in the case of Chinese military occupation of Mongolia, i.e. a mirror-like repetition of the situation that existed throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

IV. Strategic Options for Russia
So far, Russia, unlike China, does not have any definite strategy for the development of relations with the neighboring country. Moscow’s policy regarding China results from activities of various forces that usually cater to their short-term interests. How will Russian-Chinese relations develop in the future? The official policy of optimism insists on the mutually advantageous peaceful partnership of the two power centers in a multi-polar world. "Realists" hope that everybody, including China, the U.S., Japan, needs a strong Russia as a stabilizing force in international relations.[33] Pessimists predict inevitably growing discord between a weakened Russia and ever more up-and-coming China and a resulting conflict between them. Sensible analysts, who do not like to be mistaken, prefer saying that China is both a prospective partner and a potential adversary for Russia. In their view Russia would not initiate any transition to hostility, although one may be provoked by certain Russian activities.

In our view, the fundamental and instrumental factor is the growing gap between China and Russia in major indicators of national capacity and the gradual increase of Chinese influence on various aspects of the life of Russian society. It is this factor rather than ideological, geopolitical, or cultural concerns of elite groups (anti-communist-minded liberals, patriots fearing the Chinese threat, communists sympathizing with China, or pragmatists constantly balancing between the West, South, and East) that will set the framework of Russia’s Chinese policies. Finding itself in this situation, Russia might choose one of two basic strategies: side with the strongest or find a new balance of relations with the neighbor who becomes stronger.

This strategy of taking sides could have two outcomes-the "vassalization" of Russia or the so-called vampirization of China. The former would mean Russia’s agreement to become China’s junior partner and, hence, its association with "progressive Asia" against "the rotten West." In so doing Moscow would retain sovereignty over Siberia, and already there are advocates of such partnership in Russia. In the future the pro-Chinese lobby will definitely grow, yet chances that the vassalization option is implemented are slim. First, because full submission to another country, especially one that differs so greatly in its form of civilization, would be rejected by the majority of Russians. They would see such a union with China as another version of the Mongolian yoke. Secondly, while advocates of submission to China want to hurt the United States more than anything else, the struggle with the U.S. and its allies-for which Moscow, supposedly,[34] would offer a nuclear umbrella to China-would not necessarily form the basis of Beijing’s policies, which would thus inevitably cause disappointments. Third, China is unlikely to accept a formal alliance with Russia in the future even if it guarantees a leading role to Beijing. The logical final result of vassalization would be Moscow’s "voluntary" acquiescence to Beijing’s dominating influence in the territory east of the Urals.

Vampirization would mean a purely temporary and pragmatic closeness with China in order to receive necessary "sustenance," for instance, in developing the Far East and Siberia. When that goal is achieved the policy would be sharply reversed. To an extent such an option would repeat the situation during the 1950s-except that Moscow and Beijing would be swapping roles. The flaw of this strategy is that it implies a sharp shift from "eternal friendship" to an acute and prolonged conflict. The cost of the latter would most likely overshadow the benefits of "friendship." Apart from everything else, it would be much more difficult to repatriate Chinese workers, farmers, and traders than was the case with Soviet engineers and technicians in the past.

There are several possible options as well for the search for balance. The traditional strict option involves containment of China. Russia itself does not have and will not have this possibility. As such, Russia would need to join an anti-Chinese coalition, optimally led by the United States. Confrontation, however, breeds confrontation with all its inherent crises and conflicts, and Russia’s place in this arrangement would be on the frontline. Thus, prevention turns into self-fulfilling prophecy, helping create a threat: it has been said time and again that whoever wants China as an enemy, will have it as one. Another problem is that historical processes cannot be reconstructed. The U.S. and China do not aim at confrontation, and although in principle a conflict between them in the future cannot be ruled out, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which China would play the role of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Russia the role of postwar Western Europe, and a future U.S. president the role of Harry Truman. Hence, there will be no new "Marshall Plan," either.

A strategy based on managing the asymmetries within a non-zero-sum balance offers a better chance of success. The key elements of such a strategy would include: giving priority to the development of the Far East and Siberia involving private Russian and foreign (Western, Japanese, Asian) capital and an imported workforce (some from the CIS countries, but mostly from China and Korea); creating a system of economic and scientific and technical interdependence with China; and comprehensive development of relations with Japan, Korea, other Asian and Pacific countries, and the United States. This policy is based on the understanding of market forces, globalization, interdependencies, etc., but it doesn’t leave everything to the market. Without a conscious decision by the Russian leadership to develop Asiatic Russia it will continue along a downward spiral. In the end, a major international crisis may ensue.

Thus, the Russian federal government must realize not only that the stakes are extremely high, but also that old recipes will no longer work. Having stopped the subsidies and opened up the region, Russia now has to go even further. The broadest possible internationalization of the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia would not only accelerate the process but will prevent unilateral sinicization of the territories. In other words, to keep what it has Russia should change its ways; if it tries to maintain hold of everything it now has without any fundamental changes it will lose everything in the end.

It is clear, however, that only masterful leadership, one able create and maintain a national consensus, can manage the internationalization strategy. Russia has yet to prove that it can play an active role in northeast Asia. To implement such a strategy a number of prerequisites are required.

First of all, the elites, and then society, need to realize that the main challenges for Russia in early 21st century lie in the country’s eastern regions. How Russia meets these challenges will determine the future of not only the Far East region but of the country as a whole.

Russians have yet to demilitarize their way of thinking, to move away from a besieged-fortress paradigm (geopolitical, cultural, demographic, etc.) and not only embrace the ideas of interdependence but put them into political practice. Russia will manage to preserve itself only if it agrees to significant changes in its external behavior and in its internal structures-in particular its ethnic structure and the cultural diversity of the population.

The imperial model of Russia’s rebirth is doomed to failure, especially in northeast Asia, where Russia currently is and for the foreseeable future will remain the weakest power, if the term power is appropriate at all here. An intellectual, businesslike, and open Russia could bring it success, but will entail fundamental changes in thought and practice. Historically, Russia’s fundamental goal has been expansion of its territory. This has resulted in a unique conglomerate of nations and cultures that did not dissolve into a super-ethnic group yet has become accustomed to cooperation and interaction. In the future this ethnic and cultural diversity, which has become a natural state for Russia, may help it adapt to new realities and integrate more successfully into the outside world. In other words, the imperial heritage may assist in the development of a fundamentally new post-imperial model of Russia. If Russia manages to turn its Far East into a site of active interaction with its close and remote neighbors it will take its place in Asia; if not, it will be pushed to the periphery of the region at best or outside the region at worst.

The solution to Russia’s China problem begins at home-in the Far East and Siberia. Until the late 1980s the area had been effectively isolated from the rest of Asia. During the first post-Communist decade this region has become an even more backward part of the country than it was under the USSR. An equivalent of an economic boundary has been traced, cutting the country roughly in half, with Western Siberia "joining" European Russia, and Eastern Siberia and the Far East effectively abandoned to their fate. At the end of the 20th century Vladivostok seems to be ever more distant from Moscow, while Moscow seems even further removed from Vladivostok.

Part of the solution lies in Moscow offices and headquarters. Traditional Eurocentrism, remnants of an imperial mentality, and a new vogue of geopolitics harkening back to the 19th century are the first stumbling blocks. More significant obstacles include the nearly complete domination of private and group interests in the Russian elite and the lack of consolidation at the top, which breeds the alienation of an atomized society from a practically non-existent state that has been divided up into "privatized" sections.

Economically, Russia must take measures to turn Russia’s Eastern region into a territory that is attractive for Russian and international business. Such measures include offering customs and tax breaks, curbing corruption, limiting administrative abuses and muddle, and creating the necessary transportation, financial, economic, and telecommunications infrastructure. Relying exclusively on its own resources, however, Russia will not be able to cope with the tasks it has before it. A consistent policy of attracting and encouraging foreign investment is required as the main instrument of development.

Russia traditionally prefers large-scale international projects-development of huge oil fields, building transcontinental gas pipelines, establishing transport corridors. There have even been proposals to turn the Svobodny space-launching site into an international port. Much less attention however is paid to creating favorable conditions for medium and even small-scale projects that can dramatically change the business atmosphere in the region.

Other solutions include demographic initiatives aimed at making the region more attractive in the eyes of its inhabitants and potential immigrants from the former Soviet republics. If the new arrivals are offered a significant package of benefits and the present population of the Far East is guaranteed employment the negative demographic trends of the past decade could be stopped and reversed. Of course, a new "Stolypin appeal," an attempt to repeat the successful policies of the early 20th century Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, who engineered a massive immigration drive to the Far East and Siberia from central and southern Russia, will not work. Of the approximately 3 million people who might permanently move to the Russian Federation from other post-Soviet states, the Far East will be able to accommodate no more than 10 to 15 percent (so far this share is two or three times lower). Moreover, the overall population of Russia will probably continue to decline and, according to UN forecasts, could decrease to 130 million people by 2050 (17 million fewer people than at present), so fellow countrymen from Central Asia and other regions of the former Soviet Union alone could turn out to be insufficient not only for addressing the new tasks, but also restoring the balance to the former level.

Therefore, the demographic initiative must be supplemented by an immigration policy.[35] Russia of the 21st century may become a country of immigration. Immigrants from East Asia-China, Korea, and Vietnam-could form the majority of the new permanent settlers. Spontaneous development of the process may lead to instability and conflicts while skilled management may considerably increase Russia’s resources. A detailed system of quotas and immigration requirements, developed on the experience of the U.S., Canada, and Australia, might provide both highly needed workers as well as future active and loyal citizens. Such a Russia would not be seen as alien in Asia for it would be linked to other countries of the region by a human bridge.

In order successfully to integrate new citizens into Russian society and acquaint Russians with Asian peoples, a large-scale educational and cultural initiative is urgently needed. On the one hand, efforts to train Sinologists, experts on Japan, Korea, etc., who could help Russian elites and the more active groups of the emerging middle class to gain a better understanding of Asian countries, should be expanded. On the other hand, Russia needs to think seriously about its image in the eyes of Asian elites.

In the sphere of international relations Russia needs a consistent Asian policy along the lines of its traditional European one. This implies a better coordination of policies vis-?-vis China with policies regarding other countries of the emerging geo-economic, geopolitical common space, from Tokyo to Delhi, from Astana to Jakarta. Within this space Russia will have to play from a position of relative weakness, using various interstate balances and multilateral institutions as supports, and learning to act as a team player.

This inherent weakness calls for reappraising the role of an American presence in Asia. Russia stands to benefit from the U.S. role as counterweight to the ambitions of China and as guarantor of Japan’s transformation into a "normal country" with an independent security policy and military forces. If there is a case for a U.S.-Russian regional security partnership, northeast Asia presents one.

In its Chinese policy Russia could check the instruments of influence remaining in its inventory and concentrate on energy diplomacy as well as winning and maintaining niches in China’s markets. Implementation of oil, gas, and electric energy projects in Siberia and the Far East as well as in Central Asia (with the participation of Russian companies) might help Russia to acquire instruments that will partially balance China’s influence.

Economic ties between Russia and China should not be limited to the Far East and Siberia, i.e. Russia’s underdeveloped regions. Today, when geographic proximity no longer plays a decisive role in choosing economic partners Russia would do well to stimulate contacts of its major industrial and research centers with China. In the field of sales of arms and military technologies Russia urgently needs stronger export controls that would preclude unauthorized supplies of arms, technologies, and know-how.

In considering arms supplies it is in Russia’s interests to apply an overall statewide approach, not to succumb to the lobbyist influence on the part of producers and sellers of this or that type of weapons, of banks servicing those deals, etc. The question is not whether to sell or not to sell but which weapons categories and systems may be sold to China and which may not. Naturally, it would be ill advised to sell the newest equipment to the neighbors.

Since China is seeking not so much weapons supplies as access to technology that opens the way to starting its own production Russia should be especially vigilant in the transfer of technology. Yet, the situation in this sphere is even less clear than in the area of arms sales. Short-term and even long-term advantages to the military-industrial complex are not the only factor worth considering. Russia may lose its military technology edge on China, which so far is its most important advantage in the field of defense.

Military and technical cooperation in its present form is more in the interests of China than Russia. Russia helps China modernize its armed forces in exchange for a relatively modest economic compensation which, in any event, cannot save, much less modernize, the Russian military-industrial complex. Russia could use, however, its virtual monopoly in the Chinese arms market gradually to involve China in a bilateral dialogue on military aspects of security. For starters, joint seminars that promoted exchanges between professors and students of military academies and researchers could usefully be organized. In the course of such contacts with the Chinese, Russians ought to seek, on a mutual basis, greater transparency of security policy, military doctrine, and trends in the development of armed forces in China.

Later on, Russia might directly begin shaping strategic relations with China, intertwining them, in particular, with elements of the START treaties-beginning, for instance, with mutual notification of ballistic missile launches.

Both Russia and the international community at large are interested in counterbalancing China’s growing power with Beijing’s greater international responsibility whereby it will take upon itself obligations in the field of international security similar to those the U.S. and Russia have taken. Moscow might assist in involving China in the multilateral process of control over nuclear and conventional weapons. Passing from the category of near pariah-states to the ranks of the international establishment, China cannot be interested in further proliferation of nuclear arms and missile technologies. China’s adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to the Wassenaar agreements on the control of transfers of conventional arms becomes part of the agenda. No matter what Russia’s problems are in the sphere of conventional arms it would be insane on its part to provoke China into a nuclear arms race that Russia most likely will lose.

Relations between Russia and China will be all the more balanced the more successful Moscow acts in the direction of Korea and Japan.

Lacking developed relations with Japan, Russia will be unable to integrate into the "future-oriented Asia." The inflow of Japanese capital and technology is decisive for the rise of the Far East and Siberia. Neither the United States nor for that matter South Korea can replace Japan in this respect for Russia. But for Japan as well, which at the turn of the century is facing a number of new challenges, relations with Russia may prove to be useful at a minimum and, in certain instances, vital. Trying to keep a balance of power, Tokyo and Moscow, for the first time in history, seriously need each other as a support in the new Asia. Thus, working out a formula for the solution of territorial problems in the framework of a future peace treaty is of the utmost importance. There is absolutely no substitute for such a solution. If the islands problem again becomes an insurmountable hurdle for the transition to stable partnership between the two countries it will not only testify to the near-sightedness and provincial mentality of the ruling Russian and Japanese elites and their inability to lead. Lack of progress will mean a real regression in the relationship. It should be emphasized that Moscow does not need to make a choice between Tokyo and Beijing; to maintain stability Russia needs stable relations and broad interaction with both countries.

While Russia and China are both interested in the peaceful development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Moscow’s influence cannot compare to Beijing’s. Since Russia "adjusted" its Korea policy in 1991-1992, it has had very little to offer the Koreans, south or north of the DMZ. This situation is unlikely to change. Some opportunities, however, may emerge for Moscow in the future. The Russian Federation and united Korea, being the two weakest countries in North-East Asia, which, if only for that reason, need not be afraid of each other, can profit from stronger and closer contacts, provided that these do not alienate Moscow from Beijing and Tokyo. Russia may become a kind of a "safety valve" for Korea, squeezed between China and Japan, but Moscow will have to tread with care. It should be less interested in geopolitics and concentrate on harnessing the "Korean factor" to the development of its own Far East where the Koreans may partially offset China’s and Japan’s increasingly growing influence.

Russia and China are unlikely to confront each other in Korea where their capabilities are too unequal. Mongolia and especially Central Asia countries are a different matter.

After the collapse of the USSR Mongolia, the former unannounced "sixteenth republic" of the Soviet Union, ceased to be of any interest to Moscow. Such disregard is shortsighted from the standpoint of Russian interests. Given the growing influence of China on its former vassal territory the strengthening of the political independence of Mongolia requires Russia’s interaction with the U.S. and Japan.

In Central Asia, where Russia’s opportunities are declining steadily, Moscow could reasonably concentrate on developing partnership relations with Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Here, Russia has long-term interests and is still capable of maintaining a more or less significant influence; furthermore, the two countries, and in particular the former, have a great influence on how relations between Russia and China will develop in the region. Partnership with Astana and Bishkek in the economic and security fields could go hand in hand with Moscow’s support for regional cooperation within the Central Asian Union and with the development of Russia’s bilateral relations with Uzbekistan and other countries of the region. Not least of all, Russia could make use of the opportunities for cooperation offered by international organizations-such as the OSCE and NATO (including within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program). Joining those multilateral activities, rather than suspiciously ignoring them, is the right option for Moscow’s statesmen.

In view of the changing situation in South, Central, and East Asia it would be appropriate for Moscow to conduct an inventory of both the opportunities and problems in the Russian-Indian "strategic partnership." At the moment, that relationship continues to be based on the memories of a different historical era and in practice is limited to the supplies of Russian arms and technologies to India. Now that India and Pakistan have joined the ranks of nuclear powers Russia has to define its interests in the region; its main objective should be to promote regional stability through mutual restraint and increased responsibility on the part of India and Pakistan. Russian interests will in no way be served if Russia and India find themselves in one camp while Pakistan and China are in the opposite one.

While a "strategic triangle" involving Russia, India, and China appears unlikely, it is certain that relations among Eurasia’s three largest countries will contribute much to shaping the international system in the early 21st century. Given that Beijing and Delhi are both aspiring to more important world roles, Moscow, through its amicable relations with both capitals, could contribute to stability within the process of change. The military balance between India and China is a case in point. So far, Russia has been careful not to sell China more advanced weapons than those it provides to India. Such restraint is ultimately in Russia’s own interests.

Finally, Russia must not forget that the United States is its immediate neighbor across the Pacific. In the Bering Strait the distance between the two is less than 100 miles. In the next century Russian-U.S. interaction in Asia may be more intensive than in Europe. In any case, Asian security is going to become a more acute subject than security in Europe. It is only natural that any Asian security model will differ from the European one. What is important is that political Asia will grow out of the multitude of relations between pairs of states and a few multilateral institutions. Not only Russia’s capabilities but its will and aspirations will determine the role it will play there.

Conclusion
Is it realistic to expect that the Russian elite will turn to the East while not relinquishing the general trend of moving closer to Europe? There is more than enough reason for doubts on this score. Russia is deep in its first comprehensive and major crisis since the fall of Communism. The prospects for Russia solving the numerous problems of economic, political, and social transformation are bleaker today than they were, say, in 1997. Russia’s ruling class in the center and in the regions (for instance, in Primorie) shows a phenomenal propensity for self-destruction. This is a country that has yet to form its "national political team" and that, as a consequence, has not yet determined its basic interests and priorities, let alone a strategy for attaining them. A significant part of the political elite and society at large are visibly rigid and unprepared for change while nationalist tendencies are intensifying among economic circles. The corruption of power and criminalization of everyday life are unprecedented in scale.

Nevertheless, Russia’s short post-Soviet history indicates something else, too. Russians-from above and below-have turned out to be more flexible and capable of adaptation than traditionally believed. The weakness and lack of consolidation of the Russian State, and, finally, its sheer size, which creates a natural basis for plurality of interests in the new economic conditions, provide a chance for civil society gradually to take root and grow stronger in Russia. The Russian middle class, whose premature birth and phenomenal false start created so much disappointment, is a thing of the future, not of the past. The idea of Russia as a centralized military-ideological empire is dying; it is telling that such an idea is being replaced not by a new "Russian idea" (liberal democratic or philosophic and religious) but a diverse reality of development of ever more autonomous Russian regions. This Russia is unlikely to be torn into multicolored shreds; rather, it will acquire, through competition and rivalry, but also cooperation and interaction of the "lands," an important impetus for self-development and new integration.

What we call Russia’s "China problem" is both a challenge and a chance for Russia. That challenge can serve to concentrate the will of the people and stimulate changes necessary for Russia’s survival and development. Successful and timely changes in Russian relations with China will in their turn make it possible for Russia to integrate into global processes not only in the West but in the East, as well.

Notes
[1] The estimate of experts from the Institute of Economic Analysis is significantly higher: in 1996 the GDP of China, calculated on the PPP basis, amounted to $3,700 billion compared to $7,000 billion for the U.S. (in 1993 dollars). Andrei Illarionov, Oral Presentation at Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC) Seminar, 21 October 1997.

[2] See L. A. Friedman, China in the Outside World: On the Issue of International Comparisons, Speaking Notes for Seminar at the CMC, 21 October 1997, p. 5.

[3] The Economist, 7-13 March 1998. Some Russian authors doubt that. Prof. Gelbras believes that the real growth of the Chinese economy in the period from 1979 to 1995 amounted to 5-6 percent a year. But even that author thinks possible that China might double its GDP in ten years-by 2007. See V. G. Gelbras, Where Is China Moving?, Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 21 October 1997, pp. 5,7.

[4] Estimates by Director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, Andrei Illarionov, Presentation at Seminar at the CMC, 21 October 1997.

[5] Based on the PPP criterion, Russian per capita GDP amounted (in 1995 dollars) to $4,480, for China-$2,920 or 65 percent of Russia’s level. See The World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 213-214.

[6] Publications on this subject are, so far, rather infrequent in the Russian press. For some recent publications, see “NG-Regions,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 April 1998, p. 1.

[7] Prof. V. G. Gelbras, written comments on author’s Kitayskaya problema Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1998). Author’s Copy.

[8] For example, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Mikhail Titarenko.

[9] The number of the Chinese living in the capital of Russia, often illegally, is estimated to be 20-40 thousand persons. See V. G. Gelbras, “Kitay-gorod,” Vlast, No. 8, 2 March 1999, p. 7.

[10] Yuri Dubov and Yuri Morozov, “Rossiya mezhdu tsentrami sily,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozrenie, No.38 (112), 9-15 October 1998, p. 4.

[11] See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 230-231.

[12] Not everybody, of course, agrees with this statement. A part of the Russian governing circles believes that Washington “cannot allow a stronger link between Russia and China.” See, for example, V. Kuzar, “Rossiya i Kitay na rubezhe tysyacheletiy,” Krasnaya zvezda, 6 November 1997, p. 3.

[13] Thus, Prof. Galenovich concludes that “treaties termed unequal and unjust in China can and should be repealed under the pressure of the will of the Chinese nation when that nation becomes strong enough and when conditions are ripe for this or that step.” See Yu. M. Galenovich, Foreign Policy of Jiang Zemin’s “New Era,” Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 6 November 1997, p. 3.

[14] In the opinion of some researchers, large supplies to China of the newest Russian military technologies may become a material basis for undeclared unity between China and Russia. See V. F. Li, Interaction Scenarios in the Framework of the Quadrangle for Ensuring Security in North-East Asia in the 21st Century, Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 25 November 1997, p. 2.

[15] Mikhail Titarenko, ed., Kitayskaya narodnaya respublika v 1995-1996 gg. (Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1997), p. 211.

[16] See A. S. Zarubin, Contemporary Military Doctrine of China and Prospects of Its Evolution, Resume of Presentation at the CMC, 15 January 1998, p. 5.

[17] See Colonel Sergei Repko, Military Power of China in 2010 and Its Influence on Russia, Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 15 January 1998, pp. 2-3.

[18] See Alexei Arbatov, “Reality of the Multi-Polar World,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, Issue 11-12, 1997, pp. 124-127.

[19] This is also recognized by the Russian Foreign Ministry. In the words of the Head of the First Asian Department of the Ministry, “defense alone will not take you far.” See L. Moiseyev, The Results of the Fifth Russian-Chinese Summit, Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 25 November 1997.

[20] The Chinese Ambassador to Russia has frankly recognized that the current level of economic cooperation of the two countries approximately corresponds to their level of economic development. (Presentation at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 4 December 1997.)

[21] Between 1992 and 1997, only 11,200 forced migrants from the CIS and Baltic countries resettled to the Far East-about 1 percent of their total number. See Zh. Zaionchkovskaya, “Vynuzhdennaya migratsiya iz SNG i Baltii v Rossiyu,” Mir Rossii, Vol. 6, Issue 4, p. 29.

[22] For the latter, see, e.g., The China Initiative (Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1998). Project leaders Joseph Nye and Robert Blackwill.

[23] For further details about Russian-Chinese military and technical cooperation, see Pavel Felgenhauer, “An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales,” in Andrew Pierre and Dmitri Trenin, eds., Russia in the World Arms Trade: Strategy, Policy, Economy (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997); Steven Blank, “Dynamics of the Russian-Chinese Arms Trade,” in Dmitri Trenin, ed., Rossiysko-kitayskie otnosheniya glazami americantsev, Occasional Papers, Issue 20 (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1997), pp.23-51; Pyotr Vlasov, “Osobennosti rossiyskogo exporta obychnyh vooruzheniy v Indiyu i Kitay,” Export obychnyh vooruzheniy (PIR-Center, 1997) No. 10-11, pp. 10-18; Konstantin Makienko “Opasno li torgovat oruzhiem s Kitaem,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-57.

[24] In the fall of 1997 when comparing the Russian-Chinese and China-U.S. summits, a Moscow newspaper ran the following headline, later quoted by the Ambassador of China to Russia: “Beijing-Washington: Cooperation without Sentiments; Beijing-Moscow: Sentiments without Cooperation.”

[25] Dubov, Morozov. Op. Cit.

[26] Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, “Vozmozhno li organizovat pereselenie na Dalniy Vostok?” Migration, No. 3, 1997, pp. 13-14.

[27] An alarming symptom is greater activity of neo-Nazi groups in Moscow and other Russian cities that have declared a “war on Asians.” From beatings of Chinese and other Asian students, neo-Nazis have turned to threats of murdering them. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 and 21 April 1998, p. 2.

[28] The strength of the Russian armed forces (2.5 million troops in 1992) decreased by a factor or two in five years, including in the Far East-from 500 to 200 thousand troops. In the future Russia will possibly be able to have no more than 700-800 thousand troops. In view of financial difficulties Russia is considering reducing the number of troops located in Tajikistan (to 22-23 thousand), Kazakhstan (to 23-25 thousand), Kyrgyzstan (to 2-2.5 thousand). See Yuri Golotyuk, “Rossiskoy armii prikazano otstypat,” Russki telegraph, 9 April 1998, p. 2.

[29] Alexei Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 95.

[30] See “Voyennaya reforma v Rossii,” Tezisy doklada Soveta po vneshney i oboronnoy politike, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozrenie, No. 25 (12-18 July 1997), p. 1, 4-5.

[31] Noticeably, in April 1998 Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev chose not to change the previously agreed upon dates of his visit to Beijing and was absent at the Moscow CIS summit.

[32] See A. G. Larin, The Taiwan Problem: Prospects and Options for Solution, Speaking Notes for Presentation at the CMC, 25 November 1997, p. 4.

[33] From the standpoint of U.S. “realists,” for instance, it does not matter who specifically will control the resources of the Russian Far East and Siberia; the important thing is that this “someone” is not China. On the other hand, from the point of view of the United States, an international conflict over the control of resources of Asian Russia must be avoided.

[34] See Dmitri Minin, “Tsunami pered nami,” Zavtra, No. 218, February 1998, p. 5.

[35] Alexander Lomanov, “Na periferii stolknoveniya tsivilizatsiy,” Pro et Contra, Vol.3, No.3 (Winter 1998), pp. 20-21.

Link,
http://www.slavweb.com/eng/Russia/foreign-e0.html

09:59 2002-08-23

Putin says migration to Far East should be stepped up.

RBC

The Far East of Russia should develop rapidly, Russian President VladimirPutin said at the opening of a meeting dedicated to the issues of thesocial and economic situation in the Far East Federal District. Therepresentatives of the Russian government, state authorities, the SpecialPresidential Envoy's Office in the Far East, heads of the regions of thedistrict participated in this meeting. The Russian President pointed to the fact the transport infrastructure waspoorly developed in the Far East. The railroad network penetration is lowerthan the Russian average by 3.5 times. The highway network is poorlydeveloped, too. Foreign workers are forcing out Russians from the labormarket. According to the Russian President, it is necessary to step upmigration, while so far more people leave the region than the number ofthose who come there for good. The products of the Far East FederalDistrict should be Asian-Pacific countries' market-oriented and becompetitive. After his report, Putin yielded the floor to Senior Deputy Prime MinisterViktor Khristenko.

The Dragon The Bear

Forbes Magazine
Thursday March 6, 1:45 pm ET
By Benjamin Fulford

The China-Russia border has been a contentious one for centuries, with the power of each nation waxing and waning. Now a search for arable land and other natural resources is drawing the Chinese back into Russia's Far East.

Luo Yi is a chinese pig farmer eking out a living in a decrepit former aluminum parts factory near Khabarovsk, in the Far East of Russia. He is a small part of a smoldering conflict that could prove to be one of the biggest geopolitical problems of the 21st century.

The land that Luo is on is part of a vast area that Russia annexed 140 years ago, when China was too busy fighting the Opium Wars to object. Through pogroms, massacres and mass deportations between 1860 and 1937, the Russians purged a Chinese presence that dated back at least a thousand years.

But now the Chinese are returning, lured by a landmass that is 2.3 million square miles, almost as big as China itself, but with a population of only 6 million people. Luo, 40, was a village headman and Communist Party official in his native Heilongjiang province before going to Russia on a trade visit in the early 1990s. He stayed.

One reason: the vast tracts of derelict farmland, largely unpopulated. In his native district near the Russian border, Luo says, there were 186 people per square mile. In southern Khabarovsk, which has the same climate, there are only 3 people per square mile, meaning the region could support tens of millions--if not more--of Chinese, he argues. "You cannot say whose land it is. We have only one Earth, and throughout history the strong races prevailed over the weak ones."

Driving the migration, as well, are severe water shortages in the impoverished north and west (along the Russian border). In tandem with the collapse of state-owned enterprises, these vast new dust bowls have created at least 100 million economic and ecological refugees who have no place to escape to in their own country. Many poor Chinese have been filtering across the border, building illegal peasant villages and working in factories.

"We have to hide from the police, because they come to ask for money, to ask us to work for free, or simply to take our vegetables," says Fang Yan Jun, 32, who works in a Chinese farm village in Siberia. "In the army we learned the strategy of hiding, like in Maoist-style guerrilla or partisan warfare; we have learned to survive by hiding whenever the Russian police come."

He says his people want to peacefully reconquer the region for China. But the Russians harass even those Chinese like Luo whose papers are in order. Luo lost most of his pigs recently when one of his farms was arbitrarily confiscated.

How many Chinese are now in eastern Russia? Nobody really knows. Beyond the 12,000 legally there, estimates range from the Kremlin'sofficial figure of 200,000 to a "secret" official number of 1.5 million. "You could easily hide 10 million people in Siberia, it is so vast," says Jeffrey A. Van Dreal, first secretary at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

Officially, Sino-Russian relations are friendly, and territorial disputes are limited to a few islands on the Amur River. Unofficially, the Russians are terrified. They are desperate to keep the Chinese out, while the increasingly confident and nationalistic Chinese view the return of their land as destiny. "The Russians have good reason to be scared, because we Chinese are not afraid of anything," says Wei Dai Tong, a Chinese merchant in Vladivostok. "In the past Russia was strong and China was weak, but now China is strong and Russia is weak."

According to Victor I. Ishaev, governor of Khabarovsk, the regional Russian governors are so worried about Chinese expansion that they recently called an emergency security meeting with President Vladimir Putin. "If you have no population you have no security, so it will be impossible to maintain a Russian presence in the Far East," Ishaev says.

The Russians make it very clear the Chinese are welcome as tourists but that visits must not last longer than a month. The Chinese could not assimilate, Russian immigration officials explain. Widespread anti-Chinese prejudice makes a legal influx politically impossible to accept, despite a desperate shortage of people, the officials say.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Far East could no longer depend on subsidies, notably cheap transportation costs, to survive. So the entire region faced starvation, says Igor Ilyushin, who was chief adviser for the head of the Vladivostok region at the time and who is now a college professor.

Ilyushin says the local government turned a blind eye as people broke all sorts of Soviet rules and sold scrap metal, surplus cement and anything else they could find to the Chinese in exchange for food and clothing. The Russians were resentful, not grateful.

"The Chinese do not need to physically conquer the Far East, because they have already enslaved us economically," claims Raisa Rozhanskaya, a federal immigration official in Vladivostok. She refers to the Far East's dependence on China for 90% of its food supply and much of its clothing. In other words, the Chinese can seek peaceful conquest through trade, immigration--and the latent threat of hostile action. Starting this year military training has become mandatory for all Chinese middle school, high school and university students.

At the same time Russia is disarming. The once-mighty Vladivostok fleet, for example, is a tenth its former size, says Sergey Khromykh, a former senior officer on a nuclear armed destroyer who now runs a travel agency. Many Russian ships have been sold to China.

Russian experts, such as Sergey Vladislavovich Drazdov, a colonel in the Russian border militia in charge of liaison with the Chinese military, say Siberia cannot be protected by conventional means--but they cite nuclear weapons as a reason there will be no war. From Siberia, Russian missiles can reach Beijing in a matter of minutes.

Those who believe in a gradual integration of the region with China cite increasing trade and tourism as evidence that a smooth transition is possible. In the first ten months of 2002 trade was up 18%, compared with a similar period a year ago, according to Chinese customs data cited by the Xinhua news agency. However, the amount--$9.8 billion--is still a fraction of, say, the $30 billion Chinese trade with South Korea. Russia's $7 billion in exports to China consisted mainly of timber and scrap metal, while its $2.8 billion imports consisted mostly of food, clothing and light manufactured goods.

Grain may be the ultimate lure to Russia as China's aquifers run dry. Hebei province in northern China had over 1,000 lakes a decade ago; now there are only 83. After peaking at 392 million tons in 1998, China's grain harvests have fallen to 350 million tons a year since then.

Within two decades, according to a U.S. government report drawing heavily on classified data, China could need 175 million tons of grain a year, more than the total world grain trade in 2001.

No wonder Siberia, remote to so much of the world, looks to Chinese eyes like a convenient granary.

Russia may close border with China soon, Onishchenko says.

Interfax. Tuesday, May. 6, 2003, 5:16 PM Moscow Time

MOSCOW. May 6 (Interfax) - Russia's Main Sanitary Inspector Gennady Onishchenko said the Russian-Chinese border may be closed in the near future due to the SARS threat.

"It's possible that I will raise the issue of fully closing the border with the government in the near future," Onishchenko told Ekho Moskvy radio on Tuesday.

"Closing the border would have a tremendous negative effect on the country's economy, above all on small businesses. However, I do not rule out that the border will still be closed," he said.

Onishchenko said the Blagoveshchensk section of the Russian- Chinese border is "practically closed" now. "In the next few days, the situation in other territories bordering China will be the same," he said.

Onishchenko said he has issued recommendations to all regions stating that "Only Chinese citizens should be allowed to leave and only Russian citizens should be let in." "This practice has been working: no SARS has been brought in. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the virus will get into Russia," he said.

China Set To Field World's Most Powerful Tank
13.05.2003 [12:42]

China has made substantial advances in some areas of its ground and naval forces, including upgrades to tanks and armor, laser systems and anti-submarine warfare.

Jane's Defense Weekly, a respected Britain-based military journal, said the People's Liberation Army is set to deploy a new main battle tank, or MBT, that, when fielded, will become the most powerful of its kind in the world.

The magazine said the tank will feature a huge 152 mm main gun with an automatic loader that, when coupled with a new advanced aiming system, will enable the tank to fire on the move with high first-hit-first-kill capability.

The U.S. military's M1A2 Abrams MBT, which is generally considered one of the world's best tanks, features only a 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun, developed by Rheinmetall GmbH of Germany. It, too, can fire while in motion and has a high first-shot capability.

The M1A2 Abrams is an upgrade of the M1A1.

Russia, meanwhile, is upgrading(no, it's a new version) its MBT to the T-95 version, which is so secret public photos have yet to be released, according to an analysis by the American Foreign Policy Center.

Jane's said China's new MBT is outfitted with advanced armor and an active protection system would also be fitted on the tank for increased survivability.

At least one source indicated to the magazine Russia has supplied some of the technology for the Chinese project in exchange for foreign currency to fund its own tank programs.

Another of the newest MBTs currently in mass production in China is the Type 98, a slightly more advanced derivative of the Type 96. But the Type 98, according to published assessments, is fitted with a 125 mm smoothbore main gun.

The latter two MBTs also are fitted with a JD-3 integrated laser rangefinder/warning/self-defense device - also called a "dazzler" - which uses a high-powered laser to directly attack the enemy weapon's optics and gunner.

AFPC said China is believed to be the first country to use such active laser defense devices on its tanks.

Meanwhile, China is also making advances in its naval warfare capabilities. The Chinese Guangming Daily reported last month the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) East Sea Fleet successfully conducted a live-fire anti-submarine search-and-destroy exercise(a Ming class suffered an accident, and possibly so did another sub) .

The paper said those exercises, involving eight battle formations of missile destroyers and missile frigates, were the first such live-fire exercises in the PLAN's history.

China has been working to develop a "blue water" navy that is capable of conducting and sustaining combat operations far from its own shores. Currently, the PLAN deploys mostly a "brown water" coastal defense force that is not able to venture far from its shore-based supply lines(yeah right, I guess the Han, Xia , and Song classes are not real?).

Also, the PLAN lacks sufficient military sealift capabilities to conduct amphibious and invasion operations, say experts(well the experts must have their fingers crossed because the reality is far from that, 10 years ago China had over 200,000 marines, now the numbers have changed because other units have been created in the Airborne forces, but transports and Type 62,63 and 63A still are built and in service) . That's a plus for neighboring Taiwan(which has a WW2 era navy), which has been watching the mainland's military modernization with interest and some alarm. China is expected to address this deficiency in the future.

--COMMENTS: Just to clarify some things: the Russian T-95 project is not an upgrade of any existing Russian tank but a completely new design with an unmanned turret and a high-caliber main gun. Currently China's most advanced tank in service is the Type 98 (pictured above) which was first shown publically during the 1999 military parade in Beijing. This tank is based on a chassis derived from the Russian T-72 but features a new all-welded steel armour turret armed with a 125mm smoothbore gun and modern electronic equipment including a roof-mounted laser dazzle device - first such device in service in the world. [Venik]--

(I will add some references to prove what I am talking about-Uragan)

----------------------------------------------------

SOME OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT...
http://www.sinodefence.com/army/tank/type98.asp


Chinese Type 98 Main Battle Tank.

Compare with American MBT (MainBattleTank)

U.S. Army M1A1 Abrams tank.

----------------------------------------------------

The Chinese Type 98 Main Battle Tank: A New Beast from the East.

www.china-defense.com
by Jim Warford

The New Chinese Type 98 - Configuration of the turret roof, from left, includes the commander's independent sight, the Laser Warning Receiver, Wind Sensor, and the Laser Self-Defense weapon.

On October 1, 1999, during a parade in Beijing marking the 50th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, the world got a look at the current Chinese armored force, including a first glimpse of the new Type 98 main battle tank (MBT). This huge parade, the first since 1984, reportedly involved 500,000 PLA personnel, and provided an unprecedented view of the Chinese army's latest weaponry and equipment.

The PLA paraded three different tank types, with one of the most significant surprises being the new Type 98, which resembles a Russian T-72 MBT with a new and well-protected "box-like" turret. The Type 98 (and other improved and evolving armored vehicles like it) represent a potentially significant and continuing heavy threat confronting U.S. Army forces in the future.

While two of the tanks paraded by the PLA were shown for the first time in their latest forms - the Type 80-III/Type 88B and the Type 85-III/Type 88C - the Type 98 had never before been seen in public. This tank, also known as the WZ-123, represents a significant improvement in Chinese MBT development.

The Type 98 actually began during the continuing development of another Chinese tank known as the Type 90-II/Type 90-IIM. In late 1991, the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) re-leased initial information describing the development of the Type 90-II. Reportedly, a deal had been signed in May 1990 between China and Pakistan allowing for the production of this new tank in Pakistan. As of early 1999, however, the Type 90-II had still not been put into production in either China or Pakistan.

Although the Chinese consider the Type 90-II a tank development for the export market, there apparently is a future for the tank in Pakistan. In January 1998, a photograph was published showing the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the driver's position of an "Al-Khalid" or P-90 MBT. The photo confirms that the Al-Khalid is either based on the Type 90-II or is, in fact, the same tank. Pakistani press reports in August 1999 finally con-firmed that the Al-Khalid is now in production at the Heavy Industries facility in Taxila, Pakistan. Reportedly, this new tank has evolved into a three-way development effort between China, Pakistan, and Ukraine, with Ukrainian support focused on the addition of the 6TD 1200-hp diesel engine. Finally, the Chinese exhibited a model of the Al-Khalid labeled the "Type 2000" tank in 1999. According to the available information, the Type 2000 tank is the international version of the Al-Khalid currently being marketed by the Chinese.

Since the Type 90-II/Type 90-IIM failed to meet expectations during trials in China, a major effort was initiated to improve its performance. Unconfirmed reports claim that in 1997 the Russians conducted a series of secret demonstrations of Russian MBTs in China at a PLA tank test-center in the city of Zhang Jia Kou. Reportedly, these demonstrations pushed the PLA to demand even better performance from its next MBT. That new, previously unseen tank was shown for the first time in model form during an exhibition in Beijing in 1999. The model clearly showed a new tank development, which combined a T-72-like hull with a new "box-like" turret. Additionally, the tank model was fitted with what appear to be hunter-killer style optics for the commander and gunner, a wind sensor, and two new devices on the turret roof (see photo at left). Undoubtedly timed to coincide with the October 1st parade, photos of this new tank on maneuvers with the PLA suddenly appeared in the Chinese press. While the exact role and designation for this tank are unconfirmed, it is probably a prototype of the Type 98, known as the Type 96 MBT. It is safe to say, however, that the Type 96 is not exactly the same tank that was in the anniversary parade through Beijing.

When the Type 98 was first seen during the rehearsal for the parade, it was initially incorrectly identified as the Type 90-II/Type 90-IIM. Photos taken during the actual parade, however, confirmed that it was only a relative of the Type 90-II and was still different from the Type 96. The Type 98 incorporated a variety of subtle differences from the Type 96, including different style hull skirts, tracks with rubber pads, and a slightly different box-like device behind the gunner on the turret roof. The Type 98 is armed with a 125mm smoothbore main gun fed by a carousel autoloader. The source of this gun and autoloader, which allow the crew of the tank to be reduced to three men, is believed to be the former Soviet Union/ Russia. While not much is known about the tank's fire control system, it is fitted with a new stabilized independent sight for the commander.

Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the Type 98 is the addition of what appears to be a previously unknown active self-defense system. Unlike contemporary Russian active tank self-defense systems like Drozd, Drozd-2, and Arena, which launch projectiles to disable or "shoot-down" incoming anti-tank missiles and projectiles, the Chinese system apparently uses a high-powered laser to directly attack the enemy weapon's optics and gunner. The system includes what appears to be a laser warning receiver (LWR - the dome-shaped device on the turret roof behind the commander's position), that warns the crew that their tank is being illuminated by an enemy range-finding or weapon-guidance laser. The turret of the tank can then be traversed to face the direction of the enemy threat, and the laser self-defense weapon (LSDW - the box-shaped device on the turret roof behind the gunner's position), can be employed against the source of the enemy laser.

While the engagement procedure of the Type 98's self-defense laser is unknown, published reports concerning similar weapons describe a procedure where the laser weapon would first use a low-powered beam to locate the optics of the enemy weapon. Once the enemy weapon was located, the power level of the laser would be immediately and dramatically increased. Such an attack would disable the guidance optics of the enemy weapon and/or damage the eyesight of the enemy gunner.

The turret-mounted system carried by the Type 98 is very similar to a tripod-mounted laser weapon that was seen for the first time at an arms exhibition in Manila in 1995. Identified at the exhibition as the "Laser Interference Device," it matched the description of a known Chinese laser weapon called the ZM-87. According to its promotional information, one of the ZM-87's major uses is to "injure or dizzy targeted individuals." The ZM-87 can reportedly injure the human eye at 2-3 kms, this rising to over 5 kms using a 7-power magnification device. Additionally, short-term "flaring blind-ness" can be inflicted on the human eye at up to 10 kms. The ZM-87 and the laser weapon carried by the Type 98 should not be confused with electro-optical "dazzlers" like those turret-mounted de-vices used by the Iraqis during Operation Desert Storm. Those Iraqi devices (some of which are believed to have been supplied by the Chinese), are designed to confuse the tracking systems of Western/NATO anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), without directly attacking the controlling optics or the eyesight of the weapon's gunner. The available photos of the Type 96 have also confirmed that the laser weapon can be elevated to a higher angle than the tank's main gun, indicating that the engagement of attack helicopters is possible.

The Type 98 reportedly weighs 50 tons and is powered by a new 1200-hp diesel engine. As far as armor protection is concerned, some initial observations can be made. Generally speaking, the Type 98's turret is larger than the turrets of other PLA tanks. More importantly, the turret has been lengthened or extended forward, creating a noticeable gap between the lower edge of the turret-front and the hull decking. This new gap is most visible just to the right and left of the driver's position (see photo on top of next page). It is very likely that the Chinese decided to increase/improve the turret frontal armor protecting the Type 98 to the point where extending the turret forward became a requirement.


Elevated view of the Type 98 reveals detail of the box-like
turret roof, new optics for the commander and gunner, and
the triangular lifting eyes along the turret upper edge. The
Laser Self-Defense Weapon can be seen on the gunner's left.

For comparison, the Type 90-II/Type 90-IIM prototypes, which carry a smaller turret and are two tons lighter, do not have this tell-tale gap between the turret frontal armor and the tank's hull decking. While details concerning the type and design of the Type 98's armor are lacking, there is the possibility that its armor is based on, or influenced by, the Russian T-80U MBT. When the PLA's relatively recent purchase of Russian T-80Us is combined with what was learned during the parade, a Russian armor connection is certainly possible. Like the T-80U, the Type 98 incorporates turret frontal armor cavities (one on either side of the main gun - clearly visible when viewed from above), covered by plates which are fitted flush and bolted to the turret roof. The purpose of these cavities may be to allow the composite contents of each cavity to be easily upgraded and changed during the life of the tank.

In addition to these frontal armor cavities, the construction of the turret itself may provide some insights into the Type 98's armor. Close examination of the turret roof reveals that the portion of the roof above the crew compartment is raised and slightly rounded when compared to the lower and flat area of the roof above the frontal armor arrays. Additionally, there has been speculation that the Type 98's turret is actually manufactured in two parts, consisting of a cast crew compartment protected by box-like frontal armor arrays or "packs" that are welded in-place. A close look at the turret roof also reveals prominent welding seams or "beads" that run from the turret front (on either side of the main gun), back to the raised portion of the roof.

Finally, the Type 98's turret is fitted with six lifting "eyes;" four on the turret front (two on either side of the main gun) and two on the turret roof (one on either side of the main gun), just inside the welding seams on the flat part of the turret. While it's clear that these lifting eyes are not intended for lifting the entire turret, their purpose is still the subject of speculation. If they were used solely for the initial installation or attachment of the frontal armor arrays to the rest of the turret, it would be unnecessary to keep them fitted to the tanks after they left the factory. In fact, all 18 Type 98s that participated in the parade were fitted with the lifting eyes.

All of this information concerning this new tank's turret seems to point to a very interesting possibility: that the lifting eyes may be intended to facilitate the removal, upgrade and/or modernization, and sub-sequent replacement of both turret frontal armor arrays. The triangular arrangement of the lifting eyes does generally support the use of a "T-shaped" lifting "sling" that would certainly be available in a variety of maintenance organizations. If true, this would mean that the Type 98's turret frontal armor could be completely changed on an as-needed basis. Like the Cold War "shell game" established by the evolution of Soviet/Russian tank turret armor, perhaps the Type 98 and the potential of its turret armor has ushered in a shell game all its own.


Chinese Type 98 MBTs on the parade in Beijing in October, 1999. Note the new hull skirts, rubber padded tracks, and the raised turret roof.

The production status of the Type 98 is still unclear. The group of Type 98s that participated in the Beijing parade may be prototypes. But unlike the infamous PLA tanks photographed crushing a historic rebellion in Beijing, the tanks that re-turned to Tianenmen Square for the 1999 parade provide a clear glimpse of both the present and the future of Chinese MBT development.

Like the majority of potential threat military forces around the world, the PLA is modernizing at a significant pace. So fast, in fact, that many of the new weapons systems that remain on the drawing boards throughout the West are at risk of being surpassed by our potential opponents.

As the U.S. Army turns its focus inward and reconsiders the design of its own armored force, it could be a costly mistake to underestimate the heavy threat represented by tanks like the Chinese Type 98 - the Beast from the East.

----------------------------------------------------

The New Chinese Type 98 MBT: A Second Look Reveals More Details.

by Jim Warford

Since the first article on the Chinese Type 98 MBT appeared in the May-June 2000 issue of ARMOR ("The Chinese Type 98 Main Battle Tank: A New Beast from the East"),[1] there has been additional information available regarding the tank's firepower, armor protection, and production-deployment status. This additional information actually confirms initial assessments and solidifies the serious threat posed by the Type 98.

Since it was first seen during the rehearsals for the massive 50th Anniversary parade held in Beijing on October 1, 1999, observers have tried to piece together the small bits of available information concerning the Type 98. Photographs and video footage from the parade confirmed that the tank is armed with a 125mm smoothbore main gun, but very little was known about the ammunition it fires. Now there have been a series of unconfirmed reports that the Type 98 (and other Chinese 125mm-armed MBTs) use Israeli-designed APFSDS ammunition and that the Chinese have developed depleted uranium (DU) rounds for their tanks. As far as the Israelis are concerned, they are certainly marketing their M711 125mm APFSDS round to somebody, and the Chinese are a likely customer. The solution to the DU part of this equation was apparently displayed during a recent military exhibition in China that included Chinese 100mm DU ammunition. Although not specifically intended for the Type 98, this DU development clearly indicates that DU ammunition is available to the PLA. Interestingly enough, published reports have also recently confirmed that Pakistan is currently marketing at least two DU tank rounds. Pakistan is a close Chinese ally and currently employs both the Chinese 125mm-armed Type 85-IIAP MBT as well as the new limited production Al-Khalid MBT.

Some of the most heated discussions relating to the Type 98 involve the tank's turret frontal armor protection. External examination confirms a major change in frontal armor, incorporating composite armor arrays and armor cavities on each side of the main gun. Similar in many ways to the turret armor cavities used on the Russian T-80U, T-72B, and T-90S MBTs, the Type 98's armor cavities are easily accessible through two cover-plates fitted flush with the turret roof and held in-place by eight bolts. These two composite armor cavities apparently evolved from a design seen on early prototypes of the Type 98. Unlike the two large cavities used on the production Type 98, these prototypes were fitted with two small cavities on each side of the main gun. According to published reports, these smaller cavities provided access to the mounting bolts that attached the composite armor arrays or modules to the turret base armor. This would allow damaged or obsolete armor arrays to be replaced by the tank crew while in the field. In fact, the Type 98 is also fitted with six lifting "eyes" which could be used with a T-shaped lifting sling to facilitate the replacement of the turret frontal armor modules under field conditions.

While the two large armor cavities on the Type 98 may also be used to provide access to these internal mounting bolts, they most likely also provide storage for some kind of removable composite armor material. Although the design and configuration of the tank's composite armor remains unknown, published reports continue to hint at a relationship between the Type 98's armor and the armor protecting the Russian T-80U and T-80UK. While the "closeness" of this relationship is unknown, it's clear that the Chinese had complete knowledge of the armor protecting these two Russian tanks while they were working on the Type 98. The Type 98's armor configuration also implies that the Chinese may have received assistance from another source as well. The Israelis have done extensive work on updating the armor protecting their older tanks and the more modern Merkava MBT. The Merkava, in particular, is known to incorporate modular armor in its design. Several recently published photographs have appeared clearly showing Israeli Merkava Mk 3s in Lebanon fitted with new modular armor arrays unofficially called "Lebanon" armor. Published sources have confirmed that this Israeli modular armor is designed to be changed in the field.

One of the biggest mysteries surrounding the Type 98 is the tank's current production-deployment status. The fact that only 18 of the new tanks participated in the October 1st parade has led to additional speculation that the Type 98 may have only been produced in that quantity to make a point to parade observers. New information indicates, however, that the Type 98's role in the PLA may be much larger than these observers initially believed. The Chinese are currently mass-producing two MBTs, the 105mm-armed Type 88B and the 125mm-armed Type 88C, at their primary tank production facility, Factory No. 617. Published photos have confirmed that the Type 98 is in limited production at this same factory. Reportedly, only about a battalion-set of Type 98s have been produced (31 tanks) to date. When deployment of these new tanks is considered, however, this small group may actually be part of a much larger production and deployment effort.

According to unconfirmed reports, the PLA currently deploys 10 active tank divisions, each one supporting a Group Army (GA). Of these, the 38th and 39th GAs are generally considered the highest priority and best-equipped organizations in the PLA. The 38th GA's tank division (the 6th Tank Division) is also known as the "Digital" Tank Division, and is based in the Beijing Military Region. Conflicting reports place Type 98s in the 6th "Digital" Tank Division, as well as the 8th Tank Division (of the 26th GA). Additionally, reports have associated the Type 98 with the 7th Tank Division, which is reportedly being reorganized in the Beijing Military Region as a "blue tank brigade." All of this information supports the contention that there are more Type 98s being produced and deployed than initially believed.

The key remaining question is, "Where will the Chinese go from here?" The secrecy surrounding the future of the Type 98 is still fairly intact, but there is enough information available to piece together what may be next for the Type 98. A model of this next step for the Type 98 is actually just starting to roll off the production lines in Pakistan. The tank in question is the Al-Khalid and it could very well represent, not the actual tank, but a critical cooperative relationship between the Chinese and the Ukrainians. The Al-Khalid is the result of a three-way development effort involving China, Pakistan, and Ukraine. While the level of Ukrainian participation is unconfirmed, published reports have confirmed that the Al-Khalid uses a Ukrainian engine and transmission, and that a number of these same components were recently supplied directly to China. As opposed to developing a new tank, the Ukrainians have been hard at work rebuilding and upgrading their existing MBT designs, with the T-72-120, T-72MP, and T-80UD/ Object 478BEh clearly showing the results. In fact, the success of this effort can be seen by the recently completed delivery of 320 Ukrainian T-80UD/ Object 478BEh MBTs to Pakistan, which makes Ukraine the world's leading exporter of T-80 series tanks.

Interestingly enough, at about the same time the Ukrainians announced the development of their new 120mm-armed T-84-120 MBT, information concerning a new variant of the Chinese Type 98 called the Type 98B began to appear. The T-84-120 "Oplot" is a new variant of the Ukrainian T-84 MBT that mounts one of apparently two or three different 120mm main guns in a new turret, fitted with a bustle- mounted autoloader. The incorporation of a turret bustle-mounted auto-loader (instead of the Soviet/Russian style carousel autoloader) is a huge advance for Ukrainian tank design; and reaffirms the advantages and maturity of modern Ukrainian tanks over their Russian competitors. The T-84-120 (fitted with the Swiss Compact 120mm main gun) is the Ukrainian tank currently competing in the Turkish tank competition. This confirmed tank development relationship between China and Ukraine and the timely announcements revealing both the T-84-120 and the Type 98B, point to a relationship between these two designs. In fact, much of the speculation concerning the Type 98B includes its use of a bustle-mounted autoloader in a new turret.

The Type 98 is a significant tank for the Chinese and for their potential adversaries. It represents a modern heavy armor threat in an era where some countries seem to be moving away from the proven mobile protected fire-power offered by the MBT. One thing is clear, the Type 98 is a post-Desert Storm tank that incorporates the lessons the Chinese learned from that conflict; lessons that will characterize the next battlefield.

[1] When the ARMOR article was reprinted in the February 2001 issue of the Chinese military magazine WuChi (WEAPON), the article was re-titled from "New Beast from the East" to "Heroic Lions from the East."



People's Liberation Army Catalog:
http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/political_science/MIIIE/catalogPLA.htm

Discussion about the article above on other forums.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/910114/posts
http://www.network54.com/Hide/Forum/thread?forumid=187373&messageid=1052866574&lp=1052921123

Does Demise of Chinese Submarine Give Hope to Russian Shipwrights?

Pravda.Ru
Andrey Mikhailov
05/15/2003 15:12

China's losses in sea campaigns will increase if the submarine fleet is not renewed.

In the very near future, Beijing may consider placing an of order for modern Russian diesel electric submarines. This information was provided by the famous Russian submariner, retired Rear Admiral Georgy Kostev. He commented upon the loss of a Chinese submarine in the Yellow Sea: "If the diesel submarine fleet of the Chinese Navy is not renewed at a faster rate, China's losses in sea and ocean campaigns will be increase."

It is said Beijing loses one submarine every year. With the exception of Russian submarines and torpedo-boat destroyers purchased by China, vessels in the Chinese Navy are outdated. They seriously lag behind present-day technological standards.

Interestingly, this is the first time that information about the loss of a submarine has been openly published in China. Numerous Internet media sites say Chinese authorities explained the reason for the disaster by blaming some failures onboard the vessel. The ill-fated No. 361 submarine belonged to the Ming (?People¦) class. It is a Chinese version of Soviet submarines from the 1950s. Armed with 20 torpedoes, the submarine can go 300 kilometers under water. No more exact information about the accident with the submarine could be obtained. There is still much mystery about it.

How long did the dead bodies of Chinese submariners remain in the open sea? The authorities gave information on the tragedy only on May 2. Foreign experts think that the accident happened about a month ago, during military exercises held near the entry to China's strategic inner sea, the Bohai Sea. If this is actually so, the scenario of the catastrophe can be reconstructed. The area is in shallow waters; when the submarine No.361 struck the reef, the crew lost control over the submarine. However, it is not yet clear why the whole the crew died.

It is ruled out that the submarine caught on fire. The submarine was afloat, and some of the crew could have been saved. It looks like all the submariners perished at once. It is suggested that the crew died because of poisoning as a result of the commander's order to bolt the bars - it is said that poisonous gas accumulated because of broken electric batteries or leakage of torpedo fuel.

It is not clear why the submarine was overcrowded as a city bus in rush hour. There were 70 men on board the submarine instead of the 57 that are stipulated by the regulations.

Rear Admiral Kostev says that Chinese leadership actually cares about the armed forces, especially the Navy. "Because of this, I suppose that Beijing may soon consider possible placement of an order in Russia for modern Project 877 submarines and their variant, the Project 636."

Rear Admiral Kostev and other experts say that, as the partnership between Russia and China is of a strategic nature, Moscow may give Beijing access to better high-technology armament systems than those produced in China now. These may be Project Amur-1650 and Project Amur-950 submarines equipped with the latest technologies of the 21st century.

More Russian weapons go to China.

Asia Times ^ | 1/30/03 | Sergei Blagov

MOSCOW - In a timely seasonal greeting, on the eve of the Chinese Lunar New Year, China's defense ministry and Russia's arms export monopoly Rosoboronexport have clinched a US$1 billion deal regarding the shipment to the Chinese navy of 24 Su-30MKK multi-role naval fighters from the KnAAPO plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Russia's defense ministry officials told Interfax news agency on January 27.

However, the Russian Kommersant daily argues that last week China purchased 28 Su-30MKKs, and was mulling procurement of 22 naval fighters in the future. Despite these discrepancies in the media coverage, the new deal is a clear step in Beijing's drive to increase its naval capabilities. The fighters, with a maximum altitude of 17 kilometers and a range of some 2,700 kilometers, are armed with supersonic X-31A missiles designed to strike sea-based targets.

Furthermore, Russia lost little time to indicate that it had something else to sell. On January 27, AVPK Sukhoi announced that it had resumed tests of the Su-47 experimental swept-forward fixed-wing aircraft. The Su-47 (earlier known as the Su-37) is powered by two D-30F6 engines and has a maximum speed of 2,200 kilometers per hour, a maximum altitude of 18 kilometers and a range of some 3,300 kilometers.

However, Russian officials opted to counterbalance the Chinese deal by making overtures to India. On January 28, the head of AVPK Sukhoi, Mikhail Pogosian, held a press conference in Moscow for Russian and Indian journalists at which he announced that India is due to start manufacturing Su-30MKIs under license at plants in India as soon as 2004.

Nonetheless, China tops the list of Russia's arms importers and is heavily reliant on assistance from Russia, according to a Pentagon report to Congress released last July.

Over the past decade, Russia has steadily increased its arms sales to China. The Chinese air force received its first Russian-made Su-27 in 1992, under a deal to sell 20 Su-27SK fighters and six Su-27UBKs. China was later supplied with another 50 Su-27s as well as 57 Su-30MKKs. In 2003, China is expected to receive 19 Su-30MKKs, according to earlier contracts. On the other hand, in 1996, Russia and China inked a $2.5 billion deal to manufacture 200 Su-27SKs under license at a plant in Shenyang.

In addition, last year agreements were signed for the shipment to the Chinese navy of two ship-based S-300F Reef anti-aircraft missile systems. These systems are designed to provide major naval task forces with air defense.

In 1999-2000, Russia sold two Project 956E Sovremenny (Modern) class destroyers to China in a $603 million deal. In January 2002, the two countries clinched yet another $1.4 billion contract to build another two Project 956EM destroyers. The destroyers are equipped with Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles. China has also been supplied with two Project 877EKM diesel-electric submarines and two Project 636 vessels (an upgrade of the 877EKM). In May 2002, a $1.5-billion contract was signed to build another eight Project 636 vessels. It has been reported that China plans to procure Russian Akula nuclear submarines to supplement its ongoing purchase of eight Kilo-class conventional submarines, as well as two Slava-class cruisers armed with 16 P-500 anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometers.

Russia has sold eight regiments of the S-300PMU1 long-range anti-aircraft missile system and 27 short-range Tor-M1 systems for China's air defense. In 2001, Russia and China reportedly signed a $400 million contract to supply another four regiments of the more modern S-300PMU-2. China has also been reported to be considering the purchase of MiG-31M interceptors, Tu-22MZ bombers with Granit cruise missiles, Project 949 nuclear missile subs with 24 Granit cruise missiles, and Project 1144 nuclear cruisers with 20 Granit systems.

However, some Russian politicians have questioned the strategic wisdom of the Kremlin's policy to sell arms to China, a neighboring state that obviously becomes stronger with each purchase. On January 22, at a meeting of the Russian State Council, Viktor Ishayev, governor of the Khabarovsk region, vocally complained that Chinese maps allegedly painted vast areas of the Russian Far East "in Chinese colors". Ishayev speculated that China was considering the annexation of at least 1.5 million hectares of Russian territory. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Ishayev's concerns and stated that borders issues between the two nations were close to final resolution.

Moscow's and Beijing's respective positions have recently converged on a variety of important international issues. They have said that they currently see no cause for war against Iraq. And as Pyongyang's longtime allies, they support a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and a cautious approach towards dealing with North Korea.

When Putin traveled to China on December 1-3, 2002, in Beijing he warned against US unilateralism. And in a joint declaration signed on December 2, Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin called for diplomatic solutions to the Iraq issue and North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The declaration called for a "multipolar world" - a phrase used by both governments to oppose perceived US global dominance.

The "multipolar world" mantra still remains fixed in the Kremlin's vocabulary. On January 27, Putin sent New Year greetings to Jiang and Communist Party chief Hu Jintao. "[Our] bilateral strategic partnership has become a strong factor in forming a multipolar and just world," the Kremlin's press service quoted Putin's letter as saying.

Russia and China have also opposed the planned US missile shield. However, Washington has ignored their warnings that this could trigger a new arms race. Last year, President George W Bush dismissed the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia as a "Cold War relic", withdrew from the treaty and announced plans to build a shield against ballistic missile attack - National Missile Defense (NMD).

Until recently, Russia and China banded together to lead the fight to preserve the ABM treaty. In a joint statement signed on July 16, 2001, Putin and Jiang described the ABM Treaty as the "cornerstone of strategic stability". However, the Kremlin has not only moderated opposition to Bush's missile defense program, in recent days it has indicated a willingness to assist Washington in building the shield. Last week, Putin stated that he did not "rule out possible cooperation with the US in building a missile defense [system]".

In an interview published on January 28, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the US NMD plans should not hinder bilateral cooperation in missile defense. Hence, Russia is probably rethinking its approach to relations with China, as a joint opposition to US missile-defense plans used to be one of the key elements of the so-called "strategic partnership" between Moscow and Beijing.

Post-Cold War Sino-Russian Relations: An Indian Perspective.

IDSA ^ | January, 2001 | Jyotsna Bakshi

Abstract.

The equations among the three large powers-India, Russia and China-are of immense significance for the whole region and the world at large. Beginning with the initial hitches and uncertainties in the post-Soviet period, Russia and China relations have gradually expanded to the level of strategic partnership directed towards the 21st century in 1996 and the 20-year Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation signed on July 16, 2001. Growing military-technical cooperation between Russia and China and their cooperation in Central Asia within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have a direct bearing on India's security and strategic interests. Significantly, the growing curve of Russia-China multifarious ties has been accompanied by a certain improvement in India-China relations, too. Indeed, in the post-Cold War period, all the major powers are purusing a multi-vector and omni-dimensional policy aimed at enhancing their strategic space and manoeuvrability.

The relations between Russia and China have always tended to impact on the larger regional and global political scenario. During the historical process of formation and expansion of the two large empires or state systems, they came to share the largest land boundary running into 7,500 km. The fact that the two shared a long border, which was also disputed, inter alia generated nascent and actual apprehensions and distrust regarding each other's motives and objectives. At the same time, the two were also compelled to extensively interact and deal with each other.

From the Indian perspective, the study of Sino-Russian relations and their implications for India is of particular importance as India shares a 4,700-km long and disputed border with China and the equation among the three large powers-India, Russia and China-is of immense significance for the whole region and the world at large.

The Soviet Legacy

Sino-Soviet relations were marked by sharp ups and downs in the second half of the twentieth century. In February 1950 the two Communist giants signed a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance. By the beginning of the 1960s, they were bitter ideological and political rivals and in 1969 there were military clashes between the two over Ussuri river islands. Their relations began to improve by early 1980s. By this time China was a relatively more satisfied power after having made up with the West and having occupied its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Domestically, it was pursuing the four-fold modernisation drive launched in 1978 that required a peaceful external environment. China, therefore, was now in a mood to follow a more balanced policy towards the two blocs.

Soviet security model till the mid-1980s reflected the siege mentality of a country that had armed itself to the teeth against any potential threat posed by its adversaries from any direction either singly or jointly. It was estimated that the Soviet Union had about 50 divisions stationed on border with China and also in Mongolia amounting to one million men out of a total of 3, 705,000 armed forces. The cost of maintaining the troops facing China was estimated to be about two per cent of GNP in 1979.1 The then Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, was reported to have remarked in 1991 that "by most modest calculations, the confrontation with China cost us 200 billion roubles".2 No wonder there was re-thinking in the Soviet circles regarding policy and approach to China.

The Soviet economic model of autarchy also did not stand the test of time. The young and dynamic General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), Gorbachev, sought to bring about radical changes in the country's domestic and foreign policies. He took bold steps to vastly improve relations with China, although the process of Sino-Soviet rapprochement had started before him.

Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in May 1989 marked the completion of the process of normalisation between the two countries. During Jiang Zemin's return visit in May 1991, the two sides signed their first boundary agreement regarding the eastern section of the border that forms the bulk of the present-day Russia-China border.

Russia and the People's Republic of China: Initial Post-Soviet Period

There were apparent hitches in the initial post-Soviet period in Russia-China relations. The initiators of the aborted hard-line coup of August 19, 1991 had clear political and ideological sympathy for Communist China and the Chinese leadership also did not hide sympathy for the hard-line coup. The rise to power of President Yeltsin was viewed with some apprehension in China as he was seen as the 'gravedigger of communism'. Also, there existed an inherent antipathy between the Russian democrats, who dominated the Russian foreign and domestic policies in the immediate post-Soviet period, on the one hand, and the Chinese leadership, on the other. The Russian democrats initially were quite hopeful in their enthusiastic belief that communist rule in China would also be overthrown by the tidal wave of democracy as had happened in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They were critical of the human rights record of the Chinese State and the suppression of pro-democracy student demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in June 1989. On its part, the Chinese leadership viewed with misgiving and suspicions the pro-West orientation of the Russian democrats as well as their policy of 'economic shock therapy', which seemed to have resulted in complete dislocation of the economy.

In the initial Russian order of priorities, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was given a place behind the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Russian Foreign Ministry even asserted that China was only of secondary importance in Russia's foreign policy.3 Pro-Western proponents defended the idea of a strong ideological, economic, and even military alliance with the West. Former Russian Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, for example, recommended "cementing a military alliance with the West and switching our deterrence potential to the Far East".4

Also, in the initial period pro-Taiwan lobby was also quite active in Russia. In September 1992, a close aide of President Yeltsin visited Taiwan and signed an agreement on exchanging semi-official representation. This greatly provoked Beijing. A compromise was subsequently reached with the PRC, whereby President Yeltsin issued on September 15, 1992 a decree pledging allegiance to "one China policy". On its part, Beijing agreed that Russia could maintain unofficial ties with Taiwan.5

Disenchantment with the West and the Western aid in Russia began to set in by the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, but there was no 180-degree turn away from the West. There were shifts in emphases and priorities, but no sharp turns in the policy. Moscow was neither in a position, nor willing to confront the West in the old Soviet style. However, Russia began to pay greater attention to its neighbours in Asia. Ties with great Asian countries-China and India-were consolidated through Presidential visits in December 1992 and January 1993 respectively. These visits were projected as imparting greater balance to Russian foreign policy between the West and the East.

President Yeltsin's Visit to China

The phase of initial uncertainty ended after the visit of President Yeltsin to China in December 1992. The joint declaration signed during President Yeltsin's visit, included the basic principles of mutual relations.

Russia-China relationship during the Yeltsin years persistently grew from the initial stage of 'good neighbourliness' during 1992-94 and 'constructive partnership' during 1994 to 1996 to "strategic partnership directed towards the 21st century" from 1996 onwards.6

From the very beginning both the countries agreed that their relationship would not be one of alliance directed against third states. A relationship of alliance was seen as constraining the freedom of the sides which neither of the two countries wanted.

To some extent it seemed that the wordings and formulations adopted in the statements issued by Russia and China during Yeltsin's visit, were similar to those adopted in India-Russia parleys also at that time. Thus, with both India and China, Russia signed an agreement not to enter into any alliances or commitments with the third countries directed against the security interest of the sides.

However, owing to the fact that China was a bordering country and nature and character of Sino-Russian ties impinged on direct Russian interests in Asia-Pacific region as well as on Russia's relationship with the Western powers, China figured more importantly in the calculus of the Russian policy-makers in comparison with India. As the events unfolded, Russia and China displayed a stronger impulse and greater diplomatic activism in cementing ties and evolving a structure and mechanism of expanding multi-faceted cooperation. Both needed each other for counterbalancing the more dominant West, even as for each of them individually, the West remained the more important partner in economic terms. In contrast to India, which was visited by President Yeltsin only once, Russia's summit meetings with China became an annual feature. The two countries forged what can be termed a strategic partnership in Central Asia through the grouping of Shanghai Five-now Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).7 The leaders of Russia and China also met additionally in the annual summits of the Shanghai Five. The meetings at the level of Prime Ministers, foreign, defence and other ministers and the two-way exchange of delegations between Russia and China have been much more numerous in the past decade in comparison with India-Russia exchanges.

Convergence of Russian-Chinese Interests

A much weakened Russia after the Soviet collapse is no longer a threat to China. In fact, China is more apprehensive that powerful elements in the USA and Japan would want to isolate and contain it. A strong Chinese partnership with a recovering Russia is seen as a preferred countermeasure. In 1990s, China faced the Western challenges on the issues of human rights and Taiwan. Russia has its own difficulties with the West. The Russian and the Western objectives differ on issues like Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Iran, Baltic nations, etc. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) eastward extension has prompted Russia to move closer to China. Pavel Grachev, former Russian Defence Minister was reported to have remarked: "If NATO goes East, we shall go East, too", meaning thereby move closer to China.

The new Russia has no other alternative but to continue to seek good-neighbourly relations with all because of its much reduced economic and military capabilities and geopolitical clout. Also, agreement on troop reduction and other confidence building measures (CBMs) helped Moscow to cut down costs on military presence on the border with China when it could not afford it. China, on its part, treated Russia with due respect and sensitivity befitting a great power. The Russian analysts more favourably disposed towards China particularly highlighted the fact that in contrast to the West, China did not take advantage of Russia's current difficulties.

Jiang Zemin's Moscow Visit

President Jiang Zemin of China paid a return visit to Russia in September 1994. The joint declaration issued during the visit expressed the determination of the two sides to take their relations on a qualitatively new level towards the twenty-first century. Thus a long-term vision was imparted to developing cooperation. The two sides agreed not to target strategic nuclear weapons at each other and pledged "no first use" of nuclear weapons on each other.8

Jiang Zemin's visit took place at a time when economic reforms had floundered in Russia. The country faced all-round decline and multiple crises. In contrast, China was experiencing a period of sustained growth. It has been pointed out that in the 1990s, Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by 47 per cent while China's grew by 152 per cent. The Russian intelligentsia apparently must have been in a more chastened and receptive mood to listen to the Chinese reform experience called "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" and promoting modernisation in the Chinese agriculture, industry and defence forces. Jiang's speech in Moscow demonstrated this sense of Chinese confidence.9

The following figures show: a) drastic reduction in the share of Russia in the global Gross National Product (GNP) among the four powers of the Asia-Pacific region, b) rapid increase in the share of China c) mild decrease in the share of USA and Japan. The Chinese share of global GNP in 1997 was about half that of the USA.

Table-1: Shares of Global Gross National Product (%)

1980 1990 1995 1997

USSR/Russia 7.0 5.6 1.9 1.7

USA 22.3 22.5 20.8 20.6

China 3.3 6.6 9.7 10.7

Japan 8.1 9.0 8.0 7.7

Source: Pavliatenko, "Russian Security in the Pacific Asian Region, The Dangers of Isolation", in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia, The 21st Century Security Environment (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 20.

The following table shows the Share of Russia in global industrial production has drastically reduced, the shares of the USA and Japan have marginally reduced, and the share of China has rapidly increased:

Table-2: Shares of Global Industrial Production (%)

1980 1990 1995 1997

USSR/Russia 9.0 7.0 2.0 1.8

USA 18.7 17.4 16.9 16.6

China 3.0 8.0 14.1 15.3

Japan 7.3 8.7 7.1 6.9

Source: Ibid. p. 21

Russia's Apprehensions and Concerns

If there were difficulties and problems in mutual attitudes, they were on the side of certain elements and forces in Russia. In the last years of the Soviet Union and the early post-Soviet period a large-scale border trade or shuttle trade flourished between Russian Far East and the neighbouring Chinese provinces. Cheap Chinese goods of mass consumption flooded the border regions and helped in warding off acute shortages of food and consumer goods in the region. Subsequently, however, a sharply negative sentiment grew in the Russian Far Eastern provinces over uncontrolled flow of Chinese traders and laboureres in the region. The Chinese demographic threat was widely named as the "yellow peril". There were reports of "Mafia links" of the Chinese traders and the Chinese poachers and smugglers trying to plunder the forest wealth of the Russian Far East. Negative attitude also developed about the poor quality of cheap Chinese goods and the "unfair" trade practices of the more organised and experienced Chinese traders cheating the more gullible and inexperienced Russian traders and customers. Sino-Russian trade that had peaked in 1993 reaching $7.7 billion mark, substantially declined. In 1997, Russian export to China was about $4 billion, while import was just $1.3 billion.10

In the face of growing concern at the illegal immigration of the Chinese in the Far East, aided and abetted by widespread corruption and crime in the region, the Russian government strengthened its border controls in 1994.11

Addressing Russian concerns during his 1994 visit to Moscow, President Jiang Zemin emphasised that "the Chinese Government is always against illegal emigration and will firmly crack down on criminals engaged in illegal emigration." But at the same time stressing the importance of Sino-Russian economic interaction, he said that there is a Chinese saying that "one does not stop eating for fear of choking". He also expressed the hope that the "Russian side will take effective measures to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese citizens engaged in lawful economic activities and trade".12

There is no doubt that there is a marked difference in the approach of the Russians and the Chinese. As the Japanese Prof. A. Iwasita has remarked, even such experienced politicians like Aleksei Arbatov and such prominent specialists on China like Prof. Mikhail Titarenko, despite their disinclination for 'alarmism', have expressed concern with contours of interaction between the two countries and the growth of the Chinese influence in the Far East. According to Iwasita, in Russia the debate continues whether China will belong to the category of "friends" or "foes". He remarks that in this connection we cannot find a "common denominator".13

While the Russians are, thus, uncertain and concerned, there is little doubt in the Chinese minds regarding Russia. They take note of the Russian concern over illegal immigration. But after referring to the measures taken by the concerned agencies of the two sides, they prefer to conclude, "since then the situation has improved substantially" and add, "further cooperation on border control and migration is needed". At the same time, they caution, "any exaggeration of the issue is not in the interest of either country".14

Some regional leaders in the Far East, particularly, articulated the Chinese threat. Thus, Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko of Primorskii krai opposed in January 1995 the boundary agreement with China. He said that "handing over to the PRC parts of Russian territory is unjustified and impermissible". He remarked, "the agreement on Soviet-Chinese state borders in its eastern part was prepared in 1991 by people who had never been to the Far East and had no idea as to what they were going to hand over voluntarily to the other side".15

On the state level also the call by the government for strengthening Russia's strategic partnership with China at times was combined with statements of obvious anti-Chinese character. The Secretary of the Russian Federation Defence Council, Yury Baturin was reported to have remarked that "neither Russia nor the United States want to see China as a dominant power in Asia.16 In fact, neither the scenario of China becoming a super power, nor the latter becoming unstable is welcome to Russia. It is feared that if China is destabilised or faces acute crises and shortages, more and more Chinese may cross over to neighbouring Russian regions and Central Asia in search of work, food and other necessities. From the Russian perspective it appears that the Chinese drive towards the south in the near future is more likely and even desirable than Sino-Russian conflict.

Expanding Ties

By 1995, meetings and dialogues of leaders at the highest level had acquired a regular character; cooperation between the Ministries of Defence had been growing with the purpose of achieving mutual security and adopting CBMs in the military field; trade-economic, scientific-technological as well as diplomatic-political cooperation was regulated by Russian-Chinese Commission through corresponding treaties and agreements and systematic consultations at the level of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs for discussing bilateral as well as global, regional and international problems.17

In May 1995, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin again visited Moscow to participate in the celebrations of the Fiftieth anniversary of victory over Fascism. He was emphatic that there did not exist any problems in the relations between Russia and China. In view of the growing resentment in the Far Eastern regions against the boundary agreement of 1991,18 President Yeltsin assured his Chinese counterpart that the boundary agreement between the two countries was solemn and unchangeable, which Russia would fulfil without doubt.19 In the face of local opposition, President Yeltsin's government took a strong stand and confirmed that it would go ahead with the implementation of the border agreement reached in 1991 under Gorbachev. The demand for review of the agreement was rejected by President Yeltsin and foreign Minister Kozyrev. The local opposition, however, was reported to have delayed the work of demarcation.

Soon after President Jiang Zemin's visit, the Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Moscow from June 25 to 28, 1995, and met all the Russian leaders. The development of relations in trade-economic and scientific-technological fields was in the focus during his visit.

It is widely agreed that Russia-China relations began to 'seriously warm up from 1994-95'.20 It has also been pointed out that while in the early post-Soviet period there were several question marks regarding the future of Russia in the Chinese minds, by 1995, the Chinese writings about Russia became somewhat more optimistic. From the Chinese perspective, partnership with Russia could both help in promoting a multi-polar world as well as help China in realising the goal of attaining great power status by getting access to modern military equipment and technology.

Change in the Stewardship of Russian Foreign Ministry

In January 1996, President Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov, an Academician Orientalist and the head of the external intelligence service, as his Foreign Minister with a view to silence his foreign policy critics. Primakov laid particular emphasis on a balanced foreign policy towards the West as well as the East and a stout defence of the national interests of Russia taking due cognisance of the country's capabilities and limitations. In contrast to his predecessor Kozyrev, Primakov was more acceptable to both the nationalists and the leftists as well as other elements on the wide spectrum of Russian political opinion. As Sergei Troush had remarked, Primakov's approach was essentially a "centrist approach".21 The replacement of pro-West Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev by Primakov was regarded in China as a repudiation of Russia's heretofore "bankrupt pro-West foreign policy".

NATO's Eastward Expansion Plans

The projected eastward enlargement of NATO threatened Russian security. The gap between the military capabilities of NATO and Russia had immensely increased. Politically, economically and militarily NATO enjoyed overwhelming advantage over Russia.22 NATO's eastward extension was an anathema to Russia. The Chinese also feared that the presence of NATO in Central Asia on the very doorsteps of China would directly impinge on the Chinese security. Also, both Russia and China did not welcome the possibility of the West getting an unrestricted access to the fuel and energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. China, therefore, viewed with sympathy and understanding Russia's strong opposition to the eastward enlargement of NATO. However, on the issue of NATO expansion Russia, and to some extent China, adopted a more nuanced and flexible response in view of the complex interplay of various factors.

According to Sergei Troush the "centrist" opinion in Russia, whose representative was Primakov, did not favour an "excessive pro-China tilt" also. While playing the "China card" in countering NATO extension, Russia hoped to keep room for manoeuvre by relating to the "US-centred" security structure in Asia-Pacific.23 Moreover, Moscow did not want to enter into head-on confrontation with the West over the issue of NATO expansion. In early1994 a formula was devised whereby Russia and other former Soviet republics could cooperate with NATO under a Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).

At the US-Russian summit in New York in October 1995, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had reportedly agreed that Russian cooperation in Bosnia with the NATO forces would delay NATO enlargement decisions. However, in January 1996 the US Congress passed Public Law 104-107 endorsing the principle of NATO enlargement, though the candidates for admission and time were not mentioned. This led to a hardening of Russian approach. On February 29, 1996 Primakov declared, "We are not against speedy NATO expansion, we are against expansion".24 On its part, China was also facing tensions in its relations with the USA over the issues of Taiwan, human rights, Tibet, etc. It was against this background that President Yeltsin made the high profile visit to China in April 1996.

Equal, Trust-Based Partnership

The joint declaration issued on April 25, 1996 proclaimed their determination to develop relations of "equal, trust-based partnership directed towards strategic interaction in the 21st century". The initiative for upgrading the bilateral relationship to the level of "strategic partnership directed towards the 21st century" had reportedly come from the Russian President, to which his Chinese hosts had cautiously but affirmatively responded. President Yeltsin, who was facing a strong Communist challenge in the forthcoming Presidential elections wanted to send images back home of strengthening ties with the great Communist neighbour.

During the visit, President Yeltsin also proposed to the Chinese a target of $20 billion trade turnover in next five years, which the Chinese side, accepted.25 However, as the subsequent developments proved this figure proved to be rather unrealistic and could not be attained.

The joint declaration decried "hegemonism"-an indirect reference to the USA, resort to pressure and the politics of force. But the USA was not mentioned by name. It said that new signs of bloc politics were emerging.26 Significantly, there was also no direct mention of NATO in the Joint Declaration. However, following President Yeltsin's talks with the Chinese leadership, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofeng told the reporters, "President Jiang Zemin expressed understanding and support for Russia's stand on the issue of NATO". He was reported to have remarked that, in the post-Cold war era, any eastward expansion of NATO was "not in keeping with the times".27

The press reports suggested that President Yeltsin was more upbeat about the Chinese support, while the Chinese side was more cautious and preferred to hedge expression of support. President Yeltsin told the reporters, "As far as NATO expansion is concerned, Chairman Jiang Zemin resolutely joined Russia's view that NATO's expansion toward its borders is impermissible".28 It is likely that the joint declaration that was probably prepared in advance did not mention NATO expansion directly. However, as a consequence of President Yeltsin's talks the formulation that the Chinese "understand" the Russian concern on the issue was subsequently added in a briefing to the press. Speaking to the reporters President Yeltsin was more ebullient than his traditionally cautious Chinese counterpart. In his speech in the Great Hall of the People, President Yeltsin said, "I can't name a single question on which we would have different opinions". He added, "...We want relations between Russia and China to mature so that they can withstand any twists and turns". Echoing President Yeltsin's optimism, President Jiang Zemin remarked, " Sino-Russian friendly relations have entered into a new stage".

It appears that the Chinese caution in openly criticising NATO was probably aimed at extracting more favourable terms for China in the on-going negotiations on border demarcation and mutual force reduction issues. The progress of demarcation work of the Sino-Russian border was reported to have been stalled because of the opposition of the local governors of Primorski (Maritime territory), Khabarovsk, Amur and Chita regions. It was only after the due efforts of the central government in 1996 that the demarcation work was reported to have been resumed. Similarly, the negotiations on the issue of the troop reduction in the border areas were going on for seven years, but it was during the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Peng in December 1996 that a breakthrough was reported to have reached. Russia's growing concern at NATO enlargement appears to have prompted it to reach a compromise with the Chinese, which was criticised in some circles in Russia.29

The Russia-China summit had taken place shortly after the G-7 (Group of 7 industrially advanced Western countries including Japan), in which Russia took part as an associated guest. At Beijing, President Yeltsin sought to play the role of broker between the G-7 and China on the issue of China joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He was reported to have promised the G-7 that he would impress on Beijing the need for early adherence to the treaty.30 At the meeting China confirmed its decision to join the CTBT.

The two sides agreed to hold regular summit level meetings -not less than once in a year. It was decided to create a large joint commission at the level of the Prime Ministers. The commission was to be on similar lines like the one which Russia had with the USA at the level of US Vice-President and the Prime Minister of Russia called Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

The most important achievement during the visit was the agreement signed on April 26, 1996 at Shanghai by the Presidents of Russia, China and the three bordering Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on forming a grouping called Shanghai-5.31 The Agreement signed at Shanghai on Confidence-Building Measures in the military sphere in the border areas is a highly specific document that provides for the minutest details regarding the mechanism of sorting out any misunderstandings or disagreement between the sides to preclude any possibility of border incidents and clashes.

Russia and China Endorse the Multipolar World

In April 1997, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid another visit to Moscow. On April 23, the two countries issued a "Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China And the Russian Federation on the Multipolarisation of the World and the Establishment of a New International Order".32 The statement rejected "hegemony and power politics". Though there was no mention of either USA by name or the projected extension of NATO, the statement rejected the bloc politics. Significantly, in the face of the challenge posed by the projected extension of NATO, the two sides agreed on the issue of strengthening the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to the joint statement, "Both sides are of the view that the Commonwealth of Independent States is an important factor making for stability and development in Eurasia". The statement is a declaration of general principles of international norms. It calls for respect for state sovereignty, equality of states, eschewing of pursuit of hegemony, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, an equitable and just economic order and the strengthening of the UNO. What is of particular interest is the fact that Russian-Chinese joint statement seeks to coopt the Non-Aligned Movement and champion the cause of the developing countries.

It may be said that through a clever move, China forged a "strategic partnership with Russia", avoided frontal criticism of the Western bloc, and advocated its own vision of the world while maintaining extensive trade and economic ties with the countries of the Western bloc. What was more, it advocated the cause of the subaltern majority comprising the non-aligned and the developing countries. Thus, China hopes to emerge as truly the "middle kingdom" whose word will count without having a shot to be fired.

The shape of the desired "multi-polar world" remained unspecified in the documents signed by the two countries.

Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces

During Jiang Zemin's visit, the leaders of Shanghai-5 also signed an important agreement on mutual reduction of military forces within a 100-km zone on both sides of the border. The agreement was hailed by the two sides as "a new model for the achievement of regional peace, security and stability in the post-Cold War world".

Russian opinion on the agreement signed by the Shanghai-5 on the "Mutual Reduction of Military Forces" was quite divided. As Sergei Troush had pointed out, the details of the agreement were not disclosed to the public. But they were discussed by the Russian analysts. The analysts of the pro-Western orientation argued that the agreement would weaken Russia's military posture in the Far East as the Russian ground troops would have to be reduced on a larger scale than the Chinese ground troops. It was argued that the bulk of the Chinese ground forces deployed on Russia-China border, were deployed beyond the 100-km zone in the depth of the Chinese territory. But the analysts of the "leftist" orientation did not share this view. They argued that the strategic missiles, air defence missiles, long range air force and fleet were not scheduled for reduction. Therefore, the overall military balance in the Far East would still remain favourable for Russia.33 One thing was clear the pressure of NATO enlargement forced Moscow to speed up the agreement with China on border CBMs.

Russia-NATO Founding Act

Ariel Cohen of Heritage foundation described Primakov as a 'flexible tactician', who is "skilled in dealing with setbacks". Just a month after Russia-China joint declaration endorsing the "multipolarisation of the world and the establishment of a new international order" and after much bluster regarding NATO enlargement, Russia signed on May 27 the Russia-NATO Foundation Act in Paris. The Russia-NATO agreement did not grant Russia the right to veto the decisions of NATO, but it provided for the formation of a Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council, whereby a mechanism was provided for consultations between Russia and NATO. As Russia was not in a position to halt NATO advance, it tried to sweeten the bitter pill somewhat by trying to bargain hard and extract from the West the best terms in return as were possible in the circumstances.

China sought to develop its own "constructive strategic partnership" with the USA during President Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington in October 1997. Thus, although Russia and China had joined hands, still both of them were also seeking accommodation and cooperation with the West.

In November 1997, President Yeltsin again visited China. The high point of the visit was the announcement that the demarcation of the eastern section of Sino-Russian border running into 4,200 km has been completed for the first time in history. It was decided to demarcate the small western section of the border within stipulated period and resolve few remaining border problems on a "fair and reasonable basis".

On August 17, 1998, Russia was rocked by a huge financial and banking crisis that completely destroyed whatever macro-economic stability was achieved in the country following the Soviet disintegration. The economic crisis was also accompanied by political crisis and uncertainty. President Yeltsin's public image and authority appeared to have been greatly eroded. It was in such a situation that President Jiang Zemin visited Russia in November 1998 and held an informal sixth summit meeting with President Yeltsin in the latter's hospital room. The joint statement issued was in the spirit of continuation of the earlier joint statements and lacked any new and powerful impulse. Meanwhile both continued to diversify ties and assiduously sought to reach an understanding with the dominant West also.

Sino-Russian Rapprochement and Partial Improvement of Situation on India-China Border

Beijing is interested in rapidly increasing the country's economic and military power and its global clout through its vastly enhanced comprehensive national power (CNP). An open pursuit of assertive and ambitious policy of national aggrandisement could only scare the neighbours and other big and small powers and encourage a trend towards the formation of anti-China coalitions. It is also likely that Moscow impressed on the Chinese side the need to improve ties with India, as the Russian scholars told the author in course of conversations. Apparently, Russia does not want to be in the embarrassing position of having to choose one of the two Asian giants. Both India and China happen to be the two major customers of Russia's arms exports. Moreover, coming closer of the three large countries-Russia, China and India-can help in countering the Western pressure. It is in this context that one may see the informal proposal put forth by Yevgeny Primakov during his visit to India in December 1998 regarding the formation of Russia, India, China 'strategic triangle'. However, neither India, nor China enthusiastically responded to the proposal at that time, as there remain numerous problems and an unsettled border dispute between the two.

Nonetheless, the strengthening of Moscow-Beijing ties and the resolution of Russia-China border dispute, were accompanied by partial improvement of the situation on India-China border areas as well. On September 7, 1993, India and China signed the agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas along the line of actual control (LAC). In December 1996, the two countries signed the agreement on CBMs in the military field along the line of actual control.

NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia and The Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade

It is believed that in the beginning of the year 1999, both Russia and China were separately seeking to improve relations with the USA. However, the decision by the US-led NATO to resort to extensive bombing of Yugoslav targets without getting any authorisation from the UN Security Council, sent shock waves in both Russia and China and tended to bring the two together in joint opposition of the NATO action. The precedent set by NATO interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country in the name of "humanitarian intervention" was an ominous development. NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was opposed in unambiguous terms by India also. Indeed, the Russian commentators derived satisfaction from the fact that although there was no formal agreement between the three, still all the three countries criticised the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

What aroused further Russian and Chinese concern and even the concern of countries like India was the enunciation of new strategic doctrine of NATO (April 1999) that permitted use of force in regions beyond the area of its traditional responsibility.

The "accidental" bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, further strained relations between Beijing and Washington. In the wake of these developments, Moscow and Beijing demonstratively came together. And there was a marked upgradation of their military and military-technical cooperation.34 The Russian and the Chinese Presidents met in Bishkek in August 1999 at the fourth summit of the Shanghai-5. President Yeltsin told the reporters at the airport that he was ready for a battle "especially with the Westerners". At that very time, the Sino-Russian commission for economic cooperation was meeting in Beijing. The Russian delegation was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of defence industry complex Ilya Klebanov. At Bishkek Presidents Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin had a long meeting. They were reported to have discussed military-technical cooperation. They highly appraised the work of the negotiations being carried by Ilya Klebanov in Beijing.

The Bishkek summit declaration underscored the commonality of Russian and Chinese opposition to National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) projects and their insistence that 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty be respected as the basis for maintaining strategic stability in the world.

Special attention was devoted to the growing menace of Islamic extremism and militancy in the region afflicting all the countries of the Shanghai grouping. At the very time of the Bishkek summit on August 25, 1999, Islamic militants reported to be based in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan had indulged in a number of militant acts in the southern Batken district of Kyrgyzstan.35 In Russia the problem of Islamic extremism and militancy was heating up in Chechnya that precipitated the second Chechnya war. Russia's use of force in Chechnya aimed at establishing the Federal control over the breakaway rebel republic invited strong Western criticism. But China supported Russia on Chechnya considering it as the country's internal affair.

On his return from Bishkek summit, President Jiang Zemin met the Russian delegation led by Ilya Klebanov on the last day of its visit. Ilya Klebanov was reported to have said that the Russian delegation had brought "several new, very serious proposals, including on military-technical cooperation". Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Russian Defence Ministry's international cooperation department, was reported to have remarked that military cooperation between Russia and China would soon expand considerably in all aspects. During the visit a protocol for cooperation between the space agencies of the two countries was also signed.36

There exists an opinion among some Chinese scholars and analysts that events in Kosovo and Chechnya may lead to the speeding up of Russian military reforms and ultimately military recovery of Russia. Russians, on their part, have repeatedly asserted during the past couple of years that in case the USA violates the 1972 ABM treaty and goes ahead in building its National Missile Defence (NMD) system, Russia's response would be "asymmetric". Russia can resort to new technologies to counter the challenge.37

Yeltsin's Beijing Visit, December 1999

On December 9, 1999, President Yeltsin arrived in Beijing for the second informal (coatless) and the seventh actual summit with his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin. During the visit the two foreign ministers signed the border protocols marking the completion of demarcation of the border and formally putting an end to their border dispute. Yeltsin-Jiang Zemin meeting took place against the backdrop of a shrill criticism in the West of Russia's military action to re-impose the federal rule over the rebel republic of Chechnya. In contrast, China extended full support to Russia on Chechnya and Russia reiterated its support to China on Taiwan. President Clinton had warned that Russia would have to pay a "heavy price" for its actions in Chechnya. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had suspended the expected loan tranche to Russia. Some members of the European Union had hinted that sanctions might be imposed on Russia for its heavy-handed military action in Chechnya. Stung by the Western criticism, President Yeltsin made use of his meeting with the Chinese leaders to send a strong impromptu message to the West. He declared, "Yesterday, Bill Clinton permitted himself to put pressure on Russia. It seems he has for a minute, for a second ...forgotten what Russia is, that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons...No one person, including Clinton, has and no one will dictate the whole world how to live, how to work, rest and so on".38 However, it is significant that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who took over the reins of power from President Boris Yeltsin after three weeks, promptly issued a statement in Moscow to soft-pedal Yeltsin's warning to the USA. Putin asserted that "Russia has very good relations with the USA and its leaders" and that it was not correct to give an impression of "a cooling of Russian-American relations".39 Thus, the first sign of the foreign policy course of the new President was to avoid antagonising the West and pursue the country's national interests with greater practicality and pragmatism.

Putin Presidency

On January 1, 2000 the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, took over as the acting president. Following his election in March 2000, Vladimir Putin became the powerful president of Russia. On December 31, 1999, Rossiskaya Gazeta published a landmark article by Acting President-Designate, Vladimir Putin, entitled "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium".40 The article drew a grim picture of the Russian economy. It emphasised that the first and foremost requirement of the country is to ensure fast and stable economic growth and to work for the integration of Russian economy in the world economy on non-discriminatory terms. It was with this agenda that Vladimir Putin took over the reins of power in the sprawling but impoverished former super power.

As a former officer of the country's external intelligence agency, by training and aptitude Putin is inclined to be practical, pragmatic, calculating and shrewd. As regards Russia-China relations, he inherited an elaborate structure and mechanism of multi-faceted and expanding cooperative ties that had evolved over the years and seemed to correspond to the national interests of both the countries. Any abrupt changes were not likely. However, the Chinese, as everyone else, watched with great interest as well as concern the first moves of the new man in the Kremlin. Within two months after Putin's takeover, China's defence minister and foreign minister visited Moscow to familiarise themselves with the situation under the new Kremlin chief as well as to establish early contacts with him.

President Putin continued with determination the military campaign in Chechnya despite strong Western criticism. However, he abstained from entering into a verbal duel with the West over the issue. He insisted that Russia was fighting against international terrorism in Chechnya on behalf of the entire world community. In response to a question by David Frost of BBC telecast on March 5, 2000 whether Russia would join NATO, Putin replied, "I don't see why not". He added, "I would not rule out such a possibility. Russia is a part of European culture and I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and the civilised world".41 Thus, the initial move of Putin was to send a conciliatory message to the West. The Chinese leadership and strategic community must have taken due note of it.

Initial Caution

From 16 to 18 January, the Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian visited Moscow to confer with his Russian counterpart Igor Sergeyev for expanding the framework of Russian-Chinese military cooperation. Chi Haotian was warmly received by Putin. But the press reports indicated that the Russian officials displayed caution in committing anything in the military-technical field beyond what was agreed in August 1999. Defence Minister Sergeyev was reported to have insisted that Russia was interested in cooperation in the field of civil aircraft-building and China's possible participation in Russia's civilian space project, GLONASS. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov was reported to have made it clear that Russia would "not allow a tilt in our relations...only in the field of military-technical cooperation".42 Russia reportedly showed interest in selling not only military equipment and military aircraft to China, but also civilian aircraft. China, on its part, seemed to prefer Western civilian aircraft to Russian Tupolovs.

The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan paid a visit to Moscow from February 28 to March 1, 2000. On his return Tang referred to his talks with the Russian Foreign Minister as "very candid as well as constructive". Common opposition to Washington's moves to alter the 1972 ABM Treaty united Moscow and Beijing. Earlier, on April 14, 1999, Russia and China had issued a press communiquй in Moscow stressing the need to preserve and strengthen the 1972 ABM (anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. On October 21, China supported a Russian resolution in the UNO for preserving the ABM Treaty. China was also reported to be trying to make the bilateral 1972 ABM Treaty between the Soviet Union and the USA a multilateral accord.43 At the same time, Chinese have made it clear that China would not enter into an arms race with the USA.44 China is acutely aware of the fate of Soviet Union which entered into an arms race with the USA . Reports have appeared from time to time to the effect that Russia and China may cooperate in jointly developing a missile defence system to counter the US plans. However, in response to a question in March 1999, the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji denied such a cooperation between the two and remarked that the "time has not come for that".45

It appears that in the initial period after Putin's coming to power, when the new President was trying to test the ground and chalk out his broad strategy towards the major powers, the overall Russian attitude to China was one of caution. Russia tried to confine itself to the implementation of existing agreements and not immediately enter into new ones.

Arms, Broader Economic Cooperation and Energy Links

In March 2000, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and the minister in charge of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, Ilya Klebanov visited China. He reportedly showed interest in broadening economic ties, that included the Russian proposals to build new generation civilian aircraft, possible sale to China of passenger airplanes, joint manufacturing of energy equipment, cooperation in oil and gas production and transportation, and Chinese construction of 45 ships for Russian shipping companies. Agreements were signed on Russian fuel exports for a nuclear power plant in southern China and a joint programme of cooperation in navigation, manned space missions, and space and communications and research. China invited Russia to join the Chinese State Planning Committee in developing its western provinces.46

Dushanbe Shanghai-5, July 2000

President Putin and his Chinese counterpart had an opportunity to meet in the course of Dushanbe summit of Shanghai-5 on July 5, 2000. The accent at Dushanbe summit was on jointly combating international terrorism, illicit drugs and arms trafficking, separatism and religious extremism. All the leaders agreed to coordinate their actions against these evils. It was decided to set up an anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek. President Putin suggested that the name of Shanghai-5 be changed to Shanghai Forum and even hinted at the possibility of opening the membership of the grouping to other neighbouring countries.

Central Asia is regarded by Russia and China as their strategic hinterland and both of them are interested that the region is not rocked by turmoil and instability that would inevitably spill over to Russian and Chinese neighbouring areas.

President Putin had inherited from his predecessor the framework and mechanism of Shanghai-5 ensuring peace, confidence-building measures and stability in the entire border area of the former Soviet Union and China. It is only natural that he would value and preserve these gains. However, if China's comprehensive national power (CNP) continues to grow at the rate at which it is growing, China would be in a position to dominate the Shanghai forum by the sheer weight of its size, population and economic strength. The campaign to develop the less developed western regions of China launched in the beginning of 2000 with much fanfare and promise of scores of billions of dollars of investment can add to China's capability to enhance its influence further west in the neighbouring Russian regions, the Central Asian states and even in the troubled Transcaucasian region. An increase of the Chinese influence in these regions would be at the expense of traditional Russian influence and would not be welcome to any authority in Moscow. Significantly, especially since taking over by President Putin, both Russia and China are vigorously trying to consolidate their hold over their respective parts of Central Asia.

In this context, the question assumes significance whether Russia would like India-and also possibly Iran-to join the Shanghai Forum to balance the Chinese power? It is significant that at the Dushanbe summit of Shanghai-5, the hints of possible extension of the grouping came from the Russian President. At the same time, it is clear that Moscow would not be averse to joining hands with Beijing in restricting the Western designs and influence in the inner Asian region.

In the beginning of January 2001, Pakistan made a formal request for the membership of Shanghai-5, to which Tajikistan and Russia have made their opposition known. It has subsequently been made clear that any decision for admitting new members to the grouping shall be taken by consensus among all the members. In June 2001 Uzbekistan formally joined the grouping as its sixth member and the grouping has been renamed as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The June 2001 Shanghai declaration keeps open the possibility of admitting new members by consensus. However, it is generally believed that except for Mongolia new members may not be admitted in near future.

President Putin Visits Beijing

Shortly after Dushanbe summit of Shanghai forum, President Putin made his first visit to China on 17-18 July, 2000. President Putin stuck to the main themes that have become a well-known platform of Russia-China coming together, like multi-polar world and "joint effort of the two countries to preserve global balance".47

The highlight of the visit was the joint statement issued by the two Presidents on July 18. Emphasising their joint opposition to the attempts to alter 1972 ABM treaty it was entitled: "Joint Statement by the Presidents of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Anti-Missile Defence".48 The statement emphasised that "The maintenance of and strict compliance with the ABM Treaty is of paramount importance".

The joint statement said that US Government's programme to establish the national Missile Defence System (NMD) is "aimed at seeking unilateral military and security superiority." It will trigger off another round of arms race. Instead of scrapping the ABM Treaty, said the statement, the best way is to establish "a new, just and equitable international political order, do away with the practice of power politics and the abuse of force in international affairs and further strengthen regional and international security." They refuse to accept the logic that the NMD was only aimed at defending the USA against the so-called rogue states. The joint statement stressed the need for Russia and the US to continue to deepen the process of reducing offensive strategic weapons on the basis of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and engage other nuclear weapons states in such a process in due course in the future.

The joint statement also opposed the programme of deploying non-strategic missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region (meaning thereby TMD) and the inclusion of Taiwan in such a system.

The proposed NMD system of the USA is expressly aimed at providing defence against the 'rogue' states, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc. The launch of Pyongyang's rocket over Japan in 1998 provided justification for such apprehensions. Russia and China, therefore, have sought to minimise the perception of the North Korean threat. They favour a rapprochement between North and South Korea and one between the USA and North Korea. Soon after his visit to China and before G-8 meeting at Okinawa, President Putin visited North Korea with this end in view.

Thus, while in the economic field the Western countries remain major partners of both the countries, in the security field the two countries seemed to increasingly gravitate towards each other.

The two also signed the Beijing Declaration calling for a multi-polar world, upholding the basic norms of international law, against pressure exerted by force, or interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The two decided to further expand their cooperation. The possibility of the two signing a treaty on friendship and cooperation was mooted during the visit. It is significant that the proposal for treaty reportedly came from President Jiang Zemin and President Putin accepted it.49

Russian Proposals for a European Anti-Missile System

Moscow has no other alternative but to balance between the East and the West. As economically, politically and militarily the much weakened Russia faces the direct pressure of NATO enlargement towards its borders, it is also not in a position to adopt a posture of uncompromising confrontation. Through a policy of "flexible response" and keeping its options open, Russia also kept some room open for accommodation and compromise with the USA and European powers on the tactical aspects of ABM Treaty. The hallmark of the present day Russian policy is an omni-directional policy in order to maximise space to manoeuvre and keep its policy options open rather than adopt rigid postures and enter into a confrontational mode. Thus, despite Russia's staunch opposition to any abrogation or revision of the 1972 ABM Treaty, President Putin made an overture to European Union and NATO to reach some compromise solution on tactical ABM system. He called upon the European Union and NATO to join forces with Moscow and set up a joint anti-missile shield during a visit to Rome on June 5, 2000. He said at a news conference that such a system "will avoid creating problems linked to an imbalance in the equilibrium of forces, and ensure 100 per cent security to European countries, with the obvious involvement of our American partners".50

The very next day China hinted that it would object to Russia and Europe developing a joint anti-missile system to balance a similar system proposed by the USA. The spokesperson of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, said that China had taken note of President Putin's proposal, but was not clear on details. She reiterated China's strong opposition to any violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. "Any efforts to amend the ABM treaty or to withdraw from it, would not only threaten the nuclear disarmament process but would also shake the basis for nuclear non-proliferation and would give rise to a new round of arms race, including an arms race in outer space." It would disturb the global strategic balance and stability and do good to no country.51

China would apparently not welcome any agreement between Russia on the one hand and the USA and Europe on the other hand keeping China isolated and out in the cold. Indeed, the greatest worry of China is the possibility that Russia may ultimately compromise with the USA on the revision of the ABM Treaty. China is also aware that Russia can penetrate the NMD system by "MIRVing" its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Indeed, Chinese opposition to NMD plan is more stringent than the Russian response as China fears that the NMD system would degrade China's small nuclear deterrence arsenal of about 20 ICBMs. Any increase in the Russian arsenal as a response to the US going ahead with its NMD plan is also seen as a cause of worry for the Chinese.52 It should not be ruled out that in such an eventuality, China might also reach some compromise solution with the USA and the West. Indeed, both Russia and China are pursuing a twin-track policy. They are strengthening ties with each other and projecting joint opposition to attempts to revise the ABM Treaty. The reports have been appearing in the media from time to time of the possibility of Russia and China building a joint ABM system, if the USA violates the 1972 ABM Treaty and goes ahead with the building of an NMD system. Both of them have threatened to respond to Washington's NMD challenge through "asymmetric" means. On the other hand, each of them individually has kept channels of accommodation with the West open.

If the developments of the recent past are any guide for future trends, they demonstrate that for Russia the test lies in details. The bottom line is that Russia is never again going to slide into a Cold War with the West. But with its huge resources, vast territorial expanse and skilled manpower, Russia cannot become totally a supplicant country too. The initial phase when Russia tried to work in close cooperation with the USA meekly always saying "yes", is over. At the same time, Russia does not want to be in a position of having to say "no" always. It has now entered into a phase when it is saying "let us talk" about the details of the arrangements and work out mutually agreed solutions. Russia's skill would lie in working out the details. Naturally, in the present conditions edge will have to be given to the dominant power. But while working out the details, Russia would like to ensure that it gets the best possible deal in terms of present and future gains.

As concerns Indian position on the NMD issue, it may be pointed out that the present de jure nuclear order is not to the liking of India, (the latest nuclear weapons power along with Pakistan). India hopes to gain from being on the right side of the dominant power in terms of getting admission in the coveted big power league. Russia and China cannot help India in acquiring this position. At the same time, India cannot surrender its cards even before the negotiations start. India has to move step by step in the long journey protecting its legitimate and 'core' interests at every step in the course of negotiations for elaborating the rules of the game. One thing is clear, there cannot be 'exclusive' relationships in today's world even among the allies as is the case between the USA and European countries and the USA and Japan, etc. What is more, it is in India's interest to have peace and stability along the borders and in the region and the world at large-in that order-so that she can concentrate on economic development. The skill lies in synthesising engagement with the neighbouring countries to ensure peace along with due containment of their actual and potential aggressive and ambitious designs at the expense of legitimate Indian interests.

Significantly, neither Russia nor China has allowed its relations in the recent past to enter into a blind alley on any issue. Both have consistently looked for compromise solutions. Thus it was reported on February 28, 2001 that Russian Deputy FM Georgy Mamedov and Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Wu Tao discussed the possibility of using the ideas of Moscow's proposed European missile defense system in the Far East and the Asian-Pacific region. As China could not prevent Russia from making overtures for a join tactical ABM system with Europe and NATO, it sought to benefit by applying the same ideas to its region.53

The view is widely shared by several circles in the West that Washington's policies and approach have contributed to Moscow and Beijing coming closer to each other. These also include some initial moves made by President Bush. At the same time, both Moscow and Beijing are deeply conscious that none of them can afford to do without extensive economic ties with the prosperous West in general and the USA in particular. China has a more than a hundred billion-dollar trade turnover with the USA with a huge trade surplus in China's favour. For Russia the biggest trading partner is Europe. But $10 billion Russian-US trade in the year 2000 is more than its $8 billion trade with China in the same year.

Russia-China Treaty

On July 16, 2001, During Chairman Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow, the two countries signed a 20-year Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation.54

The two countries have been diligently working on the draft of the treaty for past one year. It is significant that China which has been opposed to signing any treaty with any major power for past three decades, has showed a particular interest in signing the treaty with Russia. Both the sides have emphasised that the treaty is not a treaty of alliance. The Russian side has broadly bought the argument that in view of the impending change in the Chinese leadership at the forthcoming 16th CPC congress, when the leadership is expected to pass on to technocrats trained in the West, the current Chinese leadership is keen to put the gains of Sino-Russian cooperation on a long-term and formal footing.55

It would appear that by signing this treaty both the countries have sought to consolidate their flanks comprising the long border between the two in order to be able to negotiate with the West from a position of relative strength. In the treaty both the sides have endorsed each other's unity and territorial integrity. The border issue is by and large settled. The two have committed themselves to settle the remaining issues peacefully. Meanwhile, they have agreed to maintain the status quo regarding the disputed areas and that goes in Russia's favour as Russia is in possession of these areas. In Article 5 of the treaty Russia has recognised that "there is only one China in the world, that the government of the People's Republic of China is the only legal government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian side is against the independence of Taiwan in whatever form". It is clear that Russia would prefer that if China must expand it should do so in the direction of Taiwan and the south and southeast and not towards the north.

Of particular importance from the Indian point of view is the Article 9 of the treaty, which ironically is very similar to the article 9 of Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and which has not been included in the Indo-Russian Treaty of January 1993. Article 9 of Russia-China Treaty reads:

"In case of a situation, which one contracting side thinks can threaten peace, break peace or infringe on its security interests, as well as in case of a threat of aggression against one of the contracting sides, the contracting sides shall immediately enter into contact with each other and hold consultations with the aim of removing the threat".

Article 9 of Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 9, 1971 reads:

"In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries."

The circumstances necessitating consultations are wider in scope in the case of the Sino-Russian Treaty. Both the treaties provide for consultations for "removing the threat". The Indo-Soviet Treaty stipulated "appropriate effective measures", but such words are absent in the case of the Sino-Russian Treaty. It is widely agreed that the Chinese were particularly enamoured of Indo-Soviet ties and even jealous of them. Is it a message to New Delhi-which is seen as assiduously courting the USA-that China is now closer to Moscow than New Delhi? Significantly, China-which was initially cool to the proposal of Russia-China India triangle which was first informally mooted by Prime Minister Yegeny Primakov during his visit to New Delhi in December 1998-is evincing some interest in the idea now.

Article 8 of the Sino-Russian Treaty commits the sides "not to take part in any unions or blocs, ...not take any actions, including the signing of treaties with third countries, that can do damage to the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other side". Could this article be interpreted as precluding the possibility of Russia joining NATO at some future date? Indeed, in such an eventuality, the very character of this institution will undergo a radical change. In fact Russia wants NATO's very character to change from a military-political bloc to political-collective security organisation.

All the main themes evolved in the course of development of Sino-Russian relations in the past decade find expression in the treaty, including the multipolar world and strategic stability. Article 12 says that the sides "shall take joint efforts to maintain global strategic balance and stability and shall energetically promote compliance with the fundamental agreements that ensure the maintenance of strategic stability".

The sides agree to develop cooperation in trade and economic, military-technical, research-technological, power engineering and aviation spheres, etc.

Russia and China have put their ties on the footing of long-term peace and cooperation and predictability. Commenting on the treaty Svetlana Babayeva and Yekaterina Grigoryeva have remarked that coming together of Russia and China "is a defensive, and not an offensive reaction" with Russia and China trying to protect their interests from the US onslaught.56 The authors-duo emphasise that Russia and China are not ganging up against the USA. Both of them want to maintain their respective strategic autonomy vis-а-vis the dominant USA.

During the visit, both Chairman Jiang Zemin and President Putin reiterated their opposition to the US plan to build NMD, which they said would be a destabilising force and an obstacle to world peace. Jiang and Putin also reportedly agreed to share information regarding each side's talks with U.S. leaders on major strategic areas.

A section of the Western media has commented that there was more to the Putin-Jiang summit in July 2001 than what was told to the press by the two sides. It is opined that the two sides agreed on "pooling resources" in view of Bush administration's decision to deploy the NMD.57 However, on July 18, two days after the signing of the treaty, President Vladimir Putin made it clear at a Kremlin news conference that Russia has no plans for a joint response with China to the latest US moves on building a national missile defense system. He said, "We have enough means to respond to any changes ourselves."58

Russia-China Economic Ties

It is clear that economic ties between Russia and China have lagged far behind the strides made by the two in political, diplomatic, strategic and military spheres in the course of the previous decade.

It is apparent that the two countries are also to create economic interdependence. The economies of the two countries are mutually complementary. Russia is a major producer and supplier of energy while China is energy hungry and its needs are growing. Russia's main exports to China include fertilizer, steel, timber and machinery, while its main imports are consumer goods and food items.

Russia and China share a common interest in laying oil pipeline from Siberia to China. During Zhu's visit to Russia in February 1999 Russia Petroleum and China National United Oil Corporation signed an agreement to prepare a feasibility study for the Kovykta gas project. The project envisages installation of a 2,300-mile pipeline between the Kovykta field north of Irkutsk, and China's Shangdong province to carry 20 billion cubic metres of gas annually. The original project included undersea links to South Korea and Japan, but this was scaled down due to the Asian crisis and brought the cost estimates down to $4 billion from the earlier $10 billion to $12 billion. There have been debates on whether the Kovykta field contains reserves big enough to justify a pipeline. The financial problems also plagued the project.

Following Klebanov's visit to Beijing in March 2000 the Russian and the Chinese companies signed several agreements. It was reported that projected oil pipeline will start pumping Siberian oil to China as early as in 2004. Once the pipelines are constructed to China, they could be further extended to Japan and South Korea. Two pipeline routes were reported to be under consideration, one, 2,500-km long pipeline from Angarsk in Russia through Mongolia to Beijing, and the other, 2,300-km long pipeline from Russia through Altai territory directly to northwestern China. It was reported that the Chinese leadership has included this pipeline construction project into its regular five-year economic plan. In the meanwhile, it was reported that Russia has been already delivering crude oil to China by railroad.59

In November 2000, South Korea's state-run Korea Gas Corporation signed an agreement with Russia and China to begin a feasibility study on the route and construction of a natural gas pipeline from east Siberia to China and then to South Korea. The study is expected to be completed in mid-2002. The Russian Kovyktinskoe field is also reported to be holding a proven gas reserve of 1.200 trillion cubic meters, which is enough to provide China and South Korea with gas for the next 30 years. Once the pipeline is complete, the gas field will deliver 20 billion cubic meters to China and 10 billion cubic meters to South Korea. The 4,000-kilometer pipeline is estimated to cost of US$10 billion and is expected to be completed between 2008 and 2010.60

In September 2001 during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Russia, an outline deal was signed between Russia's largest oil producer Yukos, state pipeline monopoly Transneft and China's National Oil Company to build the pipeline from Angarsk in eastern Siberia by 2005. It is expected that major energy deals would boost bilateral trade between the two countries. China was also reported to have agreed to buy five Tu-204 passenger jets from Russia, the number of which could subsequently go up.61

Russia has also signed a deal for the supply of electricity to China. Russia's Irkutsk region is now mulling the construction of a 500-kw power line to export electricity to China.62

Russia-China trade ties have steadily improved of late. In 1999 their bilateral trade amounted to only $5.72 billion. However in the year 2000, Russia-China trade reached an all-time high figure of $8 billion. Two-way trade between China and Russia grew significantly in the first six months of the year 2001.63 It is estimated to reach $10 billion mark in the year 2001. The two countries have also agreed on streamlining border trade, by improving banking services. At the same time, the fact remains that Russia accounts for just two per cent in China's trade.64

What is of particular significance is that both Russia and China have sought to address important issues in their bilateral ties one by one and seek mutually advantageous solutions to them. In November 2000, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Moscow for the purpose of boosting the practical implementation of the various projects aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two. Zhu Rongji and Russian Premier Mikhail Kasynov signed 14 new pacts and set up sub-committees on space and banking and to promote high-tech military transfers from Russia to China and boost sluggish bilateral trade. "I believe Sino-Russian relations are enjoying their best period ever,'' Mr Zhu said before the talks. Both sides reportedly discussed the possibility of jointly developing forestry, gas and oil resources in Russia, setting up Chinese supermarkets in Russia and also reaching an agreement on limited, temporary Chinese immigration.65

Russian scholars are increasingly appreciative of China's success in managing an independent foreign policy, arguing with the USA on various issues, but at the same time attracting huge Western investments, including US capital into the Chinese economy. It is being suggested that Russia could learn from the experience of the Chinese.66

Further Expansion in Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation

Following the initial caution, Putin's Russia has proceeded to expand ties with China in all spheres, including in the military-technical field. It was reported that during the visit of President Putin the sides discussed a two-stage, 15-year cooperation plan in the military-technical field. During the first five years (2000-2005), China would purchase from Russia upto $15 billion of new generation weapons or licence to produce them. Sino-Russian military cooperation would be further expanded in all areas, including joint exercises and military training. The long-term cooperation would focus on joint research and development and production of military equipment.67

The concept of short-term and long-term military-technical cooperation was further elaborated when the defence officials of the two countries met in Moscow on February 20 to 22, 2001 for the eighth session of the Russian-Chinese inter-governmental committee for military and technical cooperation. It was reportedly agreed to categorise their expanded military-technical cooperation into short (2001-02) and mid-term (2001-07)frameworks for both research and development in military technology and weapon sales. An annual growth rate of 20 to 25 per cent in such sales was reported to have been agreed. Chinese General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, joined the military-technical subcommittee. It was reported in the Western media that the two sides agreed to regularly exchange defence intelligence and it was seen as a major step toward the forming of a quasi-defence alliance. Russian Deputy Premier in charge of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, Ilya Klebanov, ruled out the sale of Russian nuclear submarines to China. But it was reported that Russia would sell five Russian A50 early warning radar planes (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) to China.68

During his visit to Moscow in February, 2001, General Zhang Wannian was received by President Putin. Both of them stressed that the two countries should strengthen their partnership of strategic cooperation to ensure global stability and security.69 Indeed it has become a recurring theme in Sino-Russian parlance. Earlier, the Chinese side preferred to emphasise the need to improve Russia-China bilateral ties. Of late, however, the cooperation of the two is also projected by Beijing as strengthening global strategic stability and security.

Currently China has emerged as the single largest purchaser (40 per cent) of the Russian military equipment. Russian press has reported that in private the Russian military leaders are worried as the Chinese side is concentrating on buying the modern weapon systems some of which have not even been supplied to the Russian armed forces. However, it is generally believed in Russia that the military modernisation of China is taking place largely keeping the potential conflict with Taiwan in view. Besides, it is realised that paradoxically it is due to the large-scale Chinese purchases that Russia is able to keep its cash-starved MIC and R&D facilities going and its ability to supply the Russian forces also with modern weaponry.70 It seems Russia hopes to gain from competitive buying of modern Russian military equipment by both India and China.

On their part, the Chinese analysts have expressed the view that the acquisition of 310 T-90 tanks and 140 Su-30 MKI jet fighter bombers would make the Indian military even better equipped than its Russian counterpart in conventional terms by 2010, a situation Russia would never allow to occur in relations with China.71 Russia's arms sales to Vietnam also are generally seen as aimed at restraining China.

Acquiring Leverages vis-а-vis Each Other

During his recent visit to Moscow President Jiang Zemin spoke in Russian, sang Russian songs and declared that China would never harm Russian interests. But the fact remains that both Russia and China are pursuing their respective national interests in relation to the third countries and even seeking leverages that can be potentially used as pressure points against each other. Thus, Central Asia is not only a region of their strategic partnership, but also one of competition. At present both of them are vigorously trying to consolidate their influence in their respective part of Central Asia.72 The following instance amply highlights how China is seeking to acquire a foothold in Transcaucasus, which Russia regards as an area of its traditional influence.

Russia wants to emerge as the transportation and transit corridor and a bridge between the East and the West and North and South. It is seeking to connect the two Koreas, China and Japan through Russia's Trans-Siberian railway to Europe. The European Union's Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) is one such project besides Baku-Ceyan pipeline, which Russia views as being detrimental to its interests as it plans to revive the Great Silk Road from China to Europe bypassing the Russian territory. Russia wants to turn Trans-Siberian Railroad into a real alternative to TRACECA, which is seen by Moscow as aimed at further weakening Russia's geopolitical position in the region. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 6, 2001) noted that until recently such plans did not cause much alarm in Moscow because neither Turkey nor Georgia interested in the TRACECA had money for building such projects. Moreover, the presence of Russian military bases in Georgia made the project unattractive for potential foreign investors. However, in the Istanbul summit of OSCE in 1999, Moscow agreed to withdraw its troops from Georgia. Recently returning from his visit to Turkey, President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia declared that China has expressed a desire to help build the railroad between a Georgian capital Tbilisi and the Turkish city of Kars. The railroad would bypass Armenia and link Turkey with south Caucasus and Central Asian region. It will be a part of the larger TRACECA project. China's interest in and contribution to the project would definitely undermine Russian interests in the region, especially in a situation when the railroad linking Transcaucasus with Russia via Abkhazia has been idle and Baku-Moscow running through Chechnya is rather vulnerable. According to the author, if TRACECA project has to succeed, various ethnic conflicts in the region shall have to be resolved.73

Recently reports have appeared of China and Pakistan developing the Indus Basin corridor that would provide the latter an access to Central Asia. Reports have also appeared regarding the possibility of China and Pakistan joining the pro-West grouping of former Soviet republics called GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova). If Russia enters into some understanding with the West on missile defence and NATO enlargement issues, it is likely that China may also try to enter into a deal with the West and comply with the Western design of promoting 'geopolitical pluralism' in former Soviet space.

Post-September 11 Developments

The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and subsequent military action against Taliban-Osama bin Laden-Al Quaeda network in Afghanistan by the US-led international anti-terrorist coalition have radically altered the geopolitical situation in the region. Owing to their geographical location bordering on, or in close proximity to Afghanistan and the past experience of involvement in that country, Russia and the Central Asian states have acquired a prominent place in the US military strategy in Afghanistan. The interests of Russia, the Central Asian states the and the USA have broadly converged on joint action against religiously motivated cross-border terrorism radiating from Afghanistan-Pakistan belt that threatens to destabilise the entire region.

Initially there was some opposition within the Russian establishment to the entry of US troops in Central Asia, an area of traditional Russian influence. Defence Minister of Russia, Sergei Ivanov himself was reported to have expressed opposition to the appearance of NATO troops in the region. However, subsequently, Moscow decided to allow air corridors, the use of its bases for search and rescue operations as well as sharing of intelligence regarding the terrorist networks operating in Afghanistan. It was left to the Central Asian states to extend whatever facilities they wanted to give to the USA in the war against terrorism. Russia even claimed to have encouraged the CARs (Central Asian Republics) to do so. Reports suggested that Uzbekistan, the most independent minded of the CARs, offered its airspace and bases to the US troops ahead of others. Moscow, on its part, preferred to maintain the faзade of coordinated stand of all the CIS states. Uzbekistan has been conducting a heavy-handed and determined campaign against Islamic extremists fighting under the banner of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) believed to be operating from bases in Afghanistan. In return for facilities extended to the US war effort, Uzbekistan has sought security guarantees from the latter. Being members of Russia-led collective security treaty, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are bound to coordinate their stands with Russia. Moreover, Russia has its 201 Motor Rifle division deployed in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan has been pursuing a policy of neutrality. However, the possibility of USA further extending and strengthening its military presence in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cannot be ruled out. Prolonged US/Western military presence in Afghanistan and in some of the Central Asian states is likely to have wider repercussions for the new great game being played by the major powers and various regional actors in the region. During her visit to Central Asia in October-November 2001, the author got an impression that post-September 11 developments in the region are seen there as a set back to the SCO, where China, along with Russia, is the dominant player. The presence of the US troops in Central Asia would certainly not be to the liking of Beijing.

In the post-September 11 period, Moscow itself appeared to have demonstratively gravitated towards the West. The Chinese must have viewed these developments with considerable consternation, although they have been careful not to show it. On its part, China has also extended support to anti-terrorist coalition but without specifying the nature of its support. On September 19, President Putin and President Jiang Zemin held telephonic conversation. The two "reaffirmed their tough stance against "terrorism in all its forms." At the same time the two stressed the need to work out international "mechanisms" in conjunction with the UN, its Security Council and together with other international organisations.74 The two have sought to ensure that in the changed international environment, their own efforts to eradicate Islamic separatist movements in Chechnya and Xinjiang get due international understanding and the Western criticism in the name of human rights violation there is stopped.

On the other hand, the Chinese must have derived some satisfaction from the fact that involvement with the anti-terrorist campaign has deflected the USA from targeting China as its future rival in the global arena as was increasingly becoming evident prior to the September 11 events.

Behind the faзade of joint anti-terrorist struggle an intense new great game has started among the great powers for influence and leverages in Central Asia and Afghanistan. At the heart of the scramble is also oil and gas pipeline politics, particularly the proposed pipeline from Central Asia across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. Russia apparently would disfavour pipelines bypassing the Russian territory. Nonetheless, the current thinking in Moscow seems to be in conjunction with the dictum "if you cannot oppose them, join them". If a pipeline were to be constructed towards the south, Moscow would like to ensure that it also has a share in it.75 Unlike Russia, which is actively backing the Northern alliance in Afghanistan, China is not an active player in the developing Afghan scenario, but China maintains very close strategic ties with Pakistan, the chief creator and supporter of Taliban.

The elaborate architecture of the post-Cold War Sino-Russian partnership, evolved over the years has imparted stability and predictability to their relations, which none of them would like to disturb. Thus, the show of Sino-Russian cooperation goes on despite all the vicissitudes and twists and turns of world politics. On September 14, 2001 the heads of governments of the SCO met in Almaty. They adopted a joint statement condemning acts of terror in the USA. The member countries agreed to develop trade and economic relations in keeping with WTO rules and expand investments.

On October 27, 2001, the Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, who is expected to succeed President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow to have extensive discussions with President Putin on recent developments in Afghanistan and prospects for post-Taliban government there. Welcoming him, President Putin remarked, "We are delighted to affirm the high level of Russia-China relations'', and that, ``We have today a high level of cooperation in the political, economic and military areas as well as in our coordination in the international arena.''.76

Russia is deftly pursuing a multi-vector or multi-dimensional policy whereby close ties with China would not be permitted to come in the way of Russia's relations with other powers or vice versa. However, within this broad framework there may be tilts to one side or the other in keeping with the imperatives of national interests in the foreseeable future.

Relevance for India: What Can India Do?

As a major supplier of military equipment and technology to both India and China, Russia has a deep interest in ensuring that a clash of interests and rivalry between the two major Asian powers is contained and narrowed down so that Russia is not forced to choose one or the other between the two. The informal suggestion made by the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov during his visit to New Delhi in December 1998, regarding a "strategic triangle" between Russia, China and India did not at that time evoke enthusiastic response either in India or in China. The Russian side also realised that all the three angles of the proposed triangle are not equal, as mutual apprehension and difficulties between India and China do persist. Moreover, individually each of these three countries has economic and trade transactions with the Western countries on a much larger scale than with one another. It appears that the idea enjoys wide support in the Russian strategic community as a means of resisting the pressure of the dominant West. It is believed that even if these three major countries do not enter into a formal agreement and only take similar positions on major issues independently and informally like on opposing "humanitarian intervention" in the affairs of sovereign states, their joint weight cannot be totally ignored. In the Russian formulations it is repeatedly asserted that the purpose of the "strategic triangle" is not to form any formal alliance or grouping directed against the West.

The strategic triangle of Russia, China and India is a far cry from the point of view of present day political reality and the West would go to any extent to spoke spanners in the wheels of any such arrangement. Nonetheless, in the military-technical field, Russia's strategic planners have already made it a fait accompli to an extent by turning Russia into the largest supplier of military equipment and technologies to both India and China. Significantly, hints have emanated from Beijing recently of a more favourable appraisal of the "triangle" idea. It is in India's long-term interests to promote goodneighbourly relations with China. At the same time a discreet policy of due containment coupled with engagement would best serve India's interests and defeat the Chinese policy of keeping India confined to South Asia in a stand off with Pakistan.

India can seek to expand its international linkages to be able to play its due role at the regional and world stage at a time when a new balance of power is evolving among the major players. Both Russia and China are vigorously pursuing what they call an "omni-directional" or multi-dimensional policy. There is no reason why India should be inhibited from pursuing a similar policy in order to pursue its own geopolitical interests.

It would be in India's interest that exclusive and mutually hostile alliances are not formed in the post-Cold War world. Undue pressure from the West can force Russia to move closer to China, which would not be in India's or Russia's own interest. In fact continued multi-dimensional friendship between India and Russia now formally raised after President Putin's visit to the level of "strategic partnership" serves India's and Russia's long-term as well as short-term interests.

The leitmotif of Russian-Chinese discourse is the call of a just and equitable "multi-polar" world order against the attempts to enforce "unilateralism" and a unipolar world order dictated by the sole-surviving super power. The two countries have not as yet defined the shape of the multipolar world they have in mind. However, they both regard each other as part of several great powers or power centres that would form the basis of the multipolar world order. Of particular interest from the Indian perspective is the fact that while Moscow has shown a certain readiness to accept India as one of the great powers in the multi-polar world, China would prefer to ensure that India remains at best a regional power confined to South Asia and does not emerge, and is not recognised, as a great power in Asia or the world as a potential rival of China. From this point of view the current status quo, when China is the only Asian power in the Security Council appears to suit China. Through various statements of Russian leaders from time to time, and in India-Russia joint statements, Russia has repeatedly committed itself to supporting the case of India for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Similar support has not been coming from Beijing. It is not unlikely that Beijing opposes New Delhi's bid for the permanent membership of the Security Council when the issue of reforming and further expanding the Security Council comes for decision at some future date. Any such decision can only be taken by mutual consensus among the present five permanent members. The consensus, or absence thereof, would depend on the emerging power equations among the P-5 and a number of other factors, including unpredictable factors.

No doubt, India is interested in getting the permanent membership of the UNO. It appears that this particular interest of India can best be served in a cooperative and not a divisive world order where no current permanent member would veto India's bid for permanent membership.

There is no doubt that China would accord greater respect to a strong, pragmatic, economically growing and politically cohesive India than would be the case otherwise. Just now China is reluctant to recognise India as one of the 'poles' in a much-heralded multipolar world. But if India is having close multifaceted and growing ties with all other great powers, it would become imperative for China also to recognise the reality of India's due geopolitical weight and importance.

India's objective in the new great game being played by the great powers on the world arena is the growing international recognition of the country and its acceptance in the league of big nations. India's hour is arriving if not arrived as yet. It should play its cards deftly and astutely. In the process, it may contribute to the greatest good of greatest numbers because of its well-entrenched democratic institutions and liberal and pluralist traditions.

There do exist areas of convergence of Russian-Chinese and Indian Interests. Russia has forged 'strategic partnership' with both India and China. All the three countries are facing the challenge of Islamic terrorism and extremism radiating from Afghanistan-Pakistan region. All three of them call for the establishment of a multipolar world.

It is in everybody's interest to have peace, stability and calm on the borders. In the era of globalisation, information technology, free movement of goods, peoples and ideas and growing regional cooperation, the boundary issue is not already the central issue in modern day geopolitics. What is of particular importance is the level and rate of economic growth, the level of technological development, integration into the world economy and domestic socio-political cohesiveness. Together all these determine the comprehensive national power of a country. At the same time, it is crucially important that India exerts its utmost to ensure a settlement of the boundary disputes with China, or the demarcation of the LAC on the ground, in a manner that is favourable to the long-term interests of the country. India should insist on quid pro quo with China while recognising "one China" in terms of-endorsement and speedier demarcation by the latter of LAC; the recognition of Sikkim as India's part; and the principle of strictly peaceful bilateral settlement of Jammu &Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

Of late China-India relations have somewhat improved. India and China have initiated their own "security dialogue". India has been urging China to expedite the process of demarcation of the LAC. As a first step in this direction, the two countrie have exchanged maps on the least controversial middle sector of the LAC.

Russian arms and technology transfers to China do add to the latter's military muscle and threaten India's security interests. India can impress on the Russian side to ensure that the equipment is not used against India, the achievements of joint Indo-Russian R&D in defence projects are not directly or indirectly passed on to China, and also Russian defence equipment and technology given to China are not transferred to Pakistan.

During the visit of Foreign and Defence Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh to Moscow in June 2001, it was decided to promote joint R&D in defence sphere, joint production and even sale to the third countries. Russian side committed itself to fulfil India's need for defence spare parts and agreed to provide exhaustive catalogue of spare parts along with price lists to ensure easy availability and smooth and transparent transactions. Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Moscow from 4 to 6 November 2001 has further strengthened the bilateral ties. The highlight of the visit was the signing of Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism. As the Russian and Chinese leaders have been frequently meeting, the decision to hold annual Indian and Russian summits also, is a welcome development.

Russia, China and four Central Asian members of SCO the have evolved a structure and mechanism of jointly combating the threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism. There is no harm in India taking the initiative to cooperate with the SCO on the issue of countering the threat of cross-border terrorism, drugs and arms- trafficking even if India did not formally join the grouping. It has been decided to set up an anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek with which India can closely collaborate. Indeed, India can develop a mechanism of both bilateral as well as multilateral security cooperation with Russia and the CARs on the issue of combating terrorism. India and Russia have already formed a joint working group on Afghanistan. There can be greater cooperation and mutual sharing of experiences and exchange of intelligence between security and law enforcement agencies of India, Russia as well as the Central Asian states. However, here a word of caution may be added. Since Russia, China and the CARs have already joined hands in the battle against terrorism and if they succeed in smashing terrorism in their region the entire brunt of religious terrorism currently emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, will be diverted to India and will have to be borne by India alone. So in case India remains isolated it is imperative for India to take energetic initiatives to join these countries in the common struggle.

The defeat of the Taliban in the US-led military action in Afghanistan in October-November 2001, and the subsequent inclusion of India in the group of 21 countries under the UN aegis to facilitate post-Taliban peace process in Afghanistan are eminently favourable developments for India. However, there is a need to further incessantly pursue India's legitimate interests in the region.

India can also activate the North-South transport corridor via Iran to southern Russia and Central Asia. Indian interests demand that an effort is made to promote interdependence and enmeshing of Indian and Iranian economies as Iran can provide an access to Central Asia and southern Russia. India should not be isolated from the activity in its "strategic neighbourhood" aimed at forming regional groupings for economic cooperation in mutual advantage. Indeed India can also seek to be linked with Central Asia through the proposed Indus basin corridor and whatever other transport and communications networks are being developed in the region on commercial basis.

If feasible, India, Russia, Iran and Central Asian states can float an economic grouping of India and Caspian Sea littoral countries. With a view of acquiring alternate leverages, India can activate cooperation with Turkey, Japan, South Korea and other important economic players in Central Asia. India, Russia and China can also have cooperation on economic and trade issues.

It is crucially important for India to ensure that the emerging balance of power in inner Asian region does not get tilted in favour of the forces that are inimical to India. Owing to its geographical and geopolitical location, India is best suited to play the role of a "balancer of power" in the region by siding with the weaker side. In the nineteenth century the British rulers of India sought to contain the growing power of the Tsarist Russia by upholding the nominal claims of a weak China over far-flung provinces. Now Russia has become weaker and the comprehensive national power of China is growing and is bound to spill over in the adjoining areas in the form of geopolitical weight and influence. India should play its cards deftly without entering into frontal confrontation with any country or by keeping all its eggs in a single basket. It would seem the world is moving towards a phase of `cooperative geopolitics' with ample sprinkling of competitiveness among the major players. The former Soviet space comprising the vast Eurasian land mass is rich in fuel and other mineral resources, major trade and transit routes and pipeline network pass across the region. India should seek access to these resources, get connected and be present with its best foot forward through expanding ties of multifarious cooperation along with other major players. Cementing India-Russia strategic partnership can provide a stable and predictable anchor to Indian policy framework in the former Soviet space. But in the changed post-Cold War environment, even Russia is not and cannot seek exclusive role in the region. It is seeking integration with the wider world economy along with the new republics.

References/End Notes

1. R.K. I. Quested. Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History. 1984. George Allen & Unwin; Sydney, London, Boston. p.164.

2. Cited in Charles E. Ziegler. Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era. 1993. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge. p. 58.

3. The Moscow Times, May 14, 1997.

4. Viktor N. Pavliatenko. Russian Security in the Pacific Asian Region: The Dangers of Isolation. In Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, Eds. Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment. 1999. M.E. Sharpe; East West Institute, New York. p. 27.

5. Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov. Russia and Asia in 1992: A Balancing Act. Asian Survey. January 1993, 33 (1) 95.

6. A. Iwasita. Moskva-Pekin: 'strategicheskoe partnerstvo' i pogranichnie peregovory. Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya (Moscow). November 2000, (11) 92.

7. Jyotsna Bakshi. Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia: Implications for India. Strategic analysis. May 2001.

8. Text of Joint Russia-China Declaration, September 3, 1994. In Sbornik Rossisko-Kitaiskikh dogorov, 1949-1999. 1999. Terra sport; Moscow. pp. 271-273. Translated by the author from Russian.

9. Text of Jiang Zemin's speech in Beijing Review, September 19-25, 1994, pp.7-13.

10. Viktor B. Supian and Mikhail G. Nosov. Reintegration of an Abandoned Fortress: Economic Security of the Russian Far East. In Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, Eds. Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment. 1999. M.E. Sharpe; New York. pp. 83-85.

11. See, for instance, Chen Qimao. Sino-Russian relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In Gennady Chufrin, Ed. Russia and Asia: the Emerging Security Agenda. 1999. Oxford University Press; SIPRI, Stockholm. p. 297.

12. Jiang Zemin's speech, no. 9.

13. A. Iwasita, no. 6, p. 93.

14. Chen Qimao, no. 11, p. 297.

15. Viktor N. Pavliatenko, no. 4, p.26-27.

16. Ibid. p. 27.

17. Prof. Mikhail Titarenko, Ed. Kitaiskaya Narodnaya Respublika, politika, ekonomika, kultura 1995-96. 1997. Institute Dalneva Vostoka; RAN, Moscow. p. 213.

18. A. Iwasita, no. 6. p. 97. Also, Alexander Lukin. "Perception of China threat in Russia and Russian-Chinese Relations" at alukin@cityline.ru. The Governor of the Primorski Krai (the Maritime Territory) had been repeatedly voicing his opposition to the concessions being made to China under the 1991 boundary agreement.

19. Mikhail Titarenko, no. 17. p. 214.

20. See, for instance, Peter Ferdinand. China and Russia: A Strategic Partnership? China Review, Autumn/Winter 1997, (8), passim.

21. Sergei Troush. Russia's Response to the NATO Expansion: China Factor. 1999. On Internet; NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships 1997-1999, Final Report, Moscow. p. 3.

22. Michael Pillsbury. China Debates the Future Security Environment. January 2000. National Defence University Press (On the Internet); Washington DC.

It was noticed that the GNP of NATO member states was 20 times that of Russia. In conventional arms NATO was believed to be three times superior to Russia. After the entry of new members NATO's relative strength vis-а-vis Russia would have further increased.

23. Sergei Troush, no. 21. p. 6.

24. Ibid.

25. Mikhail Titarenko, no. 17. pp. 223-224.

26. The text of Joint Russia-China Declaration, 25 April 1996. In Sbornik..., no. 8, pp. 333-337. Translated from Russian by the author.

Chinese side promised to support the admission of Russia in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).

27. Oleg Shchedrov. China, Russia Warn West Against Seeking Hegemony. Reuters dispatch in Electronic Telegraph. April 26, 1996. Also, Mikhail Titarenko. no. 17, p. 221.

28. Reuters dispatch from Beijing in World Tibet Network News. April 25, 1996.

29. Sergei Troush. no. 21, pp. 10-11.

30. Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1996.

31. SWB, SU/2598 B/10-11, April 29, 1996.

ITAR-TASS (26 April 1996) gave details of the agreement. The document was called Agreement on the enhancement of Confidence in the Military Field Along the Border Areas. It was decided to turn a 100-km zone on each side of the long border between China and the former Soviet Union into a zone of reduced military activity with a view to put an end to past suspicion and hostility and promote peace, stability and friendly cooperative ties among the signatories.

32. The text in Beijing Review, May 12-18, 1997. pp. 7-8.

33. Sergei Troush, no. 21. Also, Sherman Garnett. Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership. The Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2001, 24 (4) 43.

It has been reported that in keeping with the agreement, Russia agreed to reduce the size of its forces in the 100-km border zone by 15 percent and place limits on "a wide range of ground, air defence and frontal aviation equipment and personnel". However, Sherman Garnett has expressed the view that "these lower levels probably reflect actual holdings -not future reductions-on the Russian side, given the unilateral reductions in force structure that have been taking place since the early 1990s".

34. For details see, Jyotsna Bakshi. Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: Implications for India. Strategic Analysis, July 2000, passim.

35. SWB/SU/3623 G/3. August 26, 1999.

36. SWEB/SU/3627 H/4. August 31, 1999

37. Michael Pillsbury, no. 22.

Indeed, some Chinese analysts even believe that Russia may surpass the USA in RMA (revolution in military affairs). Russia's General Staff Military Academy and other military learning organizations are believed to be focusing on new RMA efforts.

38. Izvestia. Moscow. December 10, 1999.

39. Kommersant. Moscow. December 10, 1999 in The Current Digest of Post-soviet Press. January 12, 2000, 51 (50) 1-4.

40. Rossiskaya Gazeta. Moscow. December 31, 1999.

The article drew attention to the reality that the country's GNP that sharply declined following Soviet disintegration is today ten times smaller than in the USA and five times smaller than in China. Putin stressed that the country needed no new revolutions and upheavals. He emphasized the need for evolutionary, gradual and prudent methods and above all the maintenance of political stability.

41. Jonathan Power. Putin Wants Russia in Europe. The Statesman. New Delhi. March 10, 2000.

42. Bin Yu. "New Century, New Face and China's `Putin Puzzle'". Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS. April 2000 at http//www.pfejournal @lava.net.

43. Financial Times. January 13, 1999 cited in "China's Opposition to US Missile Defence Program", Factsheet, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, USA, at http://cns.miis.edu. copyright 2000

44. Xinhua. November 25, 1999, cited in "China's Opposition to US Missile ....", no. 43.

45. Ibid.

46. Bin Yu. No. 42.

47. RIA Novosti Daily Review. Russian Information Centre, New Delhi. July 18, 2000.

48. Text in Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english.

49. Yu Bin. "Putin's Ostpolitik and Sino-Russian Relations: July-September 2000 " Comparative Connections at www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0300Qchina-rus.

50. See "Lateline News" at http://www.muzi.com. June 7, 2000.

The US defence secretary, William Cohen found in Putin's proposal for a Russian-European defence system a recognition by Russia of a missile threat and a "step forward", but added that the proposal was "quite vague".

51. "Chinese Opposition to the US Missile Defense Programs" at http://cns.miis.edu

52. "China-Russia Relations January-March 2001," at www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0101Qchina-rus.html.

53. Ibid.

54. Text of the Treaty in Rossiskaya Gazeta, July 17, 2001.

55. Sergei Luzyanin. China Seeks Continuity in Ties with Russia. The Statesman, July 23, 2001.

56. Izvestia, July 17, 2001 in The RIA Novosti Daily Review. July 17, 2001.

57. www.cnn.com, July 17, 2001

58. www.russiajournal.com/news/index.shtml#n8445?nd=8445, 18 July 2001.

59. Trud, March 29, 2000 in The RIA Novosti Daily Review, March 30, 2000

60. "Russian gas for China, Koreas", Russia Journal, November 4, 2000 at http://www.russiajournal.com/news/index.shtml#n1272

61. http://latelinenews.com/ll/english/1093662.shtml, September 9, 2001

62. http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/AC11Ag03.html, March 11, 1999.

63. "Trade between China, Russia on Upward Trend" at http://ce.cei.gov.cn/enew/new_e2/e41d0g58.htm. Also, http://english.pravda.ru/diplomatic/2001/04/30/4486.html).

Figures released by the General Administration of Customs show that trade between the two giant neighbors hit US$3.56 billion for period from January to June, up 31.5 per cent from the same period last year. China's imports from Russia, mainly fertilizer, rolled steel, refined oil, aluminum and timber, reached US$2.68 billion, up 22.4 per cent from the same period last year. On April 30, 2001, Pravda reported that Russia is ninth among the foreign trade partners of China.

64. http://lateline.muzi.net/ll/english/1083451.shtml, July 16, 2001.

65. Fransco Sisci, "Russia-China Military Transfers Get Boost After Talks" Straits Times, Nov. 4, 2000 at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/News/ST-110400.htm.

66. See, for instance, the article by Alexei Pushkov. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. July 18, 2000.

67. "China-Russia Relations July-September 2000" Comparative Connections at www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0300Qchina-rus.

68. "China-Russia Relations January-March 2001" Comparative Connections at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0101Qchina-rus.html.

69. "China, Russia to boost strategic cooperation" Xinhua, February 22, 2001 .

70. Yekaterina Grigoryeva and Dmitry Safonov. Russia's Reasons for Selling Weapons to China. Izvestia, June 15, 2001 in The RIA Novosti Daily Review, June 20, 2001.

71. "China-Russia Relations...", no. 68.

72. See, for instance, Jyotsna Bakshi. Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia: Implications for India, Strategic Analysis, May 2001.

73. Armen Khanbabyan. New Players Enter the Transcaucasus Geopolitical Arena. N.G., February 6, 2001, in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. March 7, 2001, 53 (6)19-20.

The author points out that Russia retains leverages in the region and at least leverages to obstruct the project. For instance, the part of Georgia from which the proposed railroad would pass borders with Armenia and is entirely populated by Armenians. These Armenians have economic ties with the Russian military base and are opposed to dismantling it. Certain circles in Russia can hope to use the local Armenians for opposing the projected railroad.

74. Muzi.com News http://latelinenews.com. September 19, 2001.

75. The RIA Novosti Daily Review, October 2, 2001.

76. Muzi.com News http://latelinenews.com. 27 October 2001.

Dr. Jyotsna Bakshi is a Research Fellow specialising in Russia and Central Asia. She has spent two-years at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow. She has published a book, Russia and India from Ideology to Geopolitics, 1999. Dev Publication, Delhi and many research articles.

It went through the Bosporus and to China to be used as a "Casino"

HUGE PICTURES at this link!
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/640358/posts

Thursday, 1 November, 2001, 15:14 GMT

Giant vessel shuts the Bosphorus.

BBC


A Turkish woman watches as the Varyag passes.

Turkey has temporarily closed the Bosphorus Straits - which is one of the world's busiest waterways - to allow the passage of a huge vessel. Tugboats hauled the giant aircraft carrier Varyag through the narrow and treacherous straits, as crowds of sightseers lined the shores. The 300-metre Varyag waited for 16 months to pass through the narrow straits on its way from Ukraine to China, which wants to convert it into a floating casino. The Turkish authorities had refused to let the 55,000 tonne vessel through on safety grounds, and agreed only after the lengthy negotiations with China.

Floating danger.

The Bosphorus has a reputation of being one of the world's most dangerous waterways. There have been some 200 accidents over the last decade in the 34km straits, which links the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The Turkish authorities argued that the Varyag would have considerable difficulties to navigate the straits' tight curves. They said, that together with its tugs, the vessel would be too long to safely pass the Bosphorus.

"The Bosphorus narrows to around 700 metres at one point. And in six different places you need to change course by about 30 to 40 degrees," said Aslan Dede from Istanbul state-run Shipping Rescue office. "There is a real threat, it's a risky passage," he added. Turkey also insisted that the Varyag would pose too great danger to bridges, palaces and homes in Istanbul. The Bosphorus bisects Turkey's largest city, which is a home to more than 10m people. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits are governed by Turkey under the 1936 Montreux treaty, which guarantees all commercial ships the right of free passage.


Turkey feared the vessel might damage Istanbul.

The deal.

The Varyag received the go-ahead in August after China and Turkey finally made a deal. China said it would minimise the potential security risks and compensate Turkey for any possible damage. The deal also included a tourism agreement and trade concessions by Beijing. But the decision has angered Turkish environmentalists. They say that the Varyag's passage will set a precedent for other vessels that are oversized or carrying dangerous cargoes.

"Shooting casino"?

China paid Ukraine $20m for the half-built aircraft carrier. Beijing says it wants to convert the Varyag into a pleasure palace of casinos, restaurants and hotels. But some experts have expressed doubts about China's intentions. They say China wants the technology to build its own aircraft carrier to strenghten its Navy in the Pacific. However, military experts say the rusty Varyag would offer relatively little to China for any projects of its own.


The ship scrapes under a bridge.

http://www.dragonsfury-breathoffire.com/

4.3.2002 20:04 MSK

“Chinese threat” rallied Cherepkov and Nazdratenko.

Moscow, RUSSIA. According to Russian intelligence, China wants to capture Siberia and the Far East. As MP of the State Duma and former mayor of Vladivostok Vladimir Cherepkov said, to accomplish this aim, Chinese authorities favor peaceful expansion of Chinese population to these territories.

Cherepkov stated at a news conference in Moscow on March 4 that he had found out some information about these Chinese communists’ plans from conversations with “competent persons”. He held that the information coincides with his own observations. Up to now, there are over 400,000 Chinese people out of total two and a half million of residents of Primorie. The MP complained that “all is congested with their goods, they buy land and hire Russians to work on it. The penetration of Chinese is assisted by suborned local authorities”.

Journalists also expected chairman of the State Committee for Fishery and former mayor of Primorie Evgenii Nazdratenko, who had been announced at the news conference. However, he didn’t turn up because of some urgent matters in the Government. Nazdratenko is famous for being an uncompromising opponent of Cherepkov, but the latter stated that their positions do “fully agree” in the case of the “Chinese threat”.

The only difference is that Nazdratenko is inclined to counter it by means of administrative measures, and Cherepkov presumes that “more astute methods” like allowance for Chinese investments instead of Chinese goods would be more efficient.

According to Cherepkov, the United States and China want to “divide Russia”. Answering a PRIMA question about where he could know it, the MP said that is “a common logic for all states, and all states aspire to ruin each other”.

PRIMA News Agency[440-2002-03-04-Rus]

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Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Wednesday, January 16, 2002

US Congressman Talks About "China Threat" in Russia.

Weldon, congressman of U.S. House of Representatives who is paying a visit in Moscow, gave a flourish of trumpets on "'China Threat", suggesting that Russia and the United States join hands in missile defense system.

One of the reasons of his suggestion for a Russia-US missile defense system is China's long-range missile power and of possible development of long-term missile systems by the DPRK.

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Clashes of civilizations - The Coming of the Chinese.

Jeanne Vlasova
globalrus.org/

The Chinese are gaining control over Russian Far East.

Ever since Russia cancelled the entry visa requirement for Chinese citizens in 1998, Chinese has been becoming the language spoken on the streets of Russia’s Far East. Today, Chinese tourists, workers, and businessmen are all moving into the region, practically claiming it as a future province for China. Naturally, there isn’t the threat of an all-out Chinese invasion, as Russian-Chinese relations are at their most cordial since the fifties. It’s just that the Russian Far East is dying out, both economically and demographically, and the Chinese are only too glad to have the extra space in which to overflow, from their overpopulated homeland.

Of course, there is no denying that the “Chinese factor” has a positive aspect for the Russian Far East, where handouts from the federal budget are small and rare. Chinese business, such as retail, has become a major contributor to the local budget; a significant part of the population makes its living in the field of small-scale import from China. The Chinese are renting Russian fields to grow vegetables and opening ethnic restaurants and cafes. Their attitude, however, shows that they’re here to stay. They’re playing the game by their own rules, circumventing the authorities, and instilling the same customs they lived by in China. For instance, in Primorye region, the Chinese not only control the markets, but also operate on a larger scale, taking over the travel business. In this field, the competition between Russian travel agents and their Chinese neighbors is very serious. Having purchased several hotels in the city, Chinese tour operators are driving down lodging prices, enticing Russian travel companies’ clients to switch. Export/import is also very tightly controlled by the Chinese. In order to avoid paying import duties, they are using every trick in the book. For instance, a widely spread practice is to hire an entire group of Russians to travel as tourists and bring consumer goods across the border.

The downtown area of Blagoveschensk, one of the largest cities near the border, been completely transformed over the past five years. A strong Chinese motif runs throughout the architecture of new buildings and in the technologies used to construct them. Chinese companies rule the city’s construction market. Municipal authorities have first balked at letting the Chinese use their own reinforced concrete for building stairwells. They finally caved in because the delivery of concrete blocks from Russia was too problematic. Chinese construction workers marvelled at their refusal to cooperate: “what difference does it make, as long as we’re building it for ourselves?”

Despite the importance of the Chinese diaspora for the economy of the Far East, only 5% of its residents fully approve their presence. 16% of those polled believe that the region will be given over to China, and another 12% think it will be forcefully annexed. Anatoly Belonogov, a former Blagoveschensk city administration official, forecasts the grimmest outcome for the region. In his opinion, if Chinese immigration is not restricted, the widely unpopulated region will become a source of raw material for overpopulated China. Federal authorities are also starting to realize that “the Chinese threat” is very real indeed. In one of his interviews, President Putin has warned that intensifying Asian influence in the Far East is a threat to Russia’s very identity. “Unless we put in an effort,” he said, “in the near future, the local languages will be Japanese, Korean, and Chinese.” The issue of limiting immigration into Russia can be effectively combined with Putin’s line of integrating into a single European space. A number of problems can be resolved by passing tough immigration laws. Besides, by securely locking its external borders, Russia will be able to strike the “Kaliningrad issue” from its agenda.

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OPINIONS, NUMBERS DIFFER OVER CHINESE 'THREAT'

JAC

"Versiya" reported on 10 June that while the Interior Ministry estimates that there are 2 million Chinese in all of Russia, other unnamed sources believe that there are 5 million ethnic Chinese in Russia, compared with just 250,000 five years ago, according to Carnegie Moscow Center figures. However, Federal Migration Service head Andrei Chernenko told reporters in Moscow on 13 June that "migration to Russia from China does not constitute a big threat," Interfax reported. Chernenko said that in the last five years there has been no increase in migration from China to Russia, although there has been "an integration of Chinese representatives into the system of socioeconomics of the border zone." According to the weekly, although local authorities in the Russian Far East frequently complain about the threat of Chinese domination of the region, not a single representative in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, or Ussuriisk has any exact data on land purchases by Chinese citizens.

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>>>With a population of 1.3 billion, the Chinese could potentially absorb a massive nuclear strike intact. One indication of this is the Chinese "Great Wall Project" — a missile complex built into the Tai-Hang Mountain Range in Northern China which is designed to withstand a massive nuclear strike and ensure Chinese nuclear retaliation.<<

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Russian Journal / Politics /
english.russ.ru/politics/20020426.html

The Chinese Temptation.

Oleg Yefremov
Translated from Russian by Igor Pospekhin,
edited by Anna Arutunyan
Publication date: 26 April 2002

The post-reform crossroads impel Russia to look for patterns and ideals in the surrounding world, which are to be emulated on the uneasy path to modernization. Disillusioned with western liberalism, sick and tired of vague "originality" concepts as a possible way out, the national intellectual elite is more often turning to the East, looking out for "a rising sun" there that could serve as our reference point.

The modern East really deserves rapt attention - and not only from anti-terrorist forces. The Arab oil paradise, the aggressive Dragons, let alone "the Country of the blooming sakura," which has secured a strong foothold among the world's most powerful nations, are quite impressive. But political strategists are particularly interested in our recent younger brother - Chinese People's Republic. Astounding successes, apparent political stability, and an independent foreign policy seem to demonstrate how a nation not only geographically close, but also sharing out totalitarian past, has found its own original and so far successful development path. In the eyes of our compatriots, China is becoming a role model, an "attractor" structure, especially in view of growing anti-Western sentiments in our society. China is looked upon not only as a role model, but as a possible strategic partner, since our alliance may put an end to the offensive American hegemony.

How warrantable are these expectations? Do China's successes deny western liberalism? Can China really be a model for us to follow? If so, then what is particularly instructive in the Chinese experience for Russia? And ultimately, can our alliance with China provide an alternative to rapprochement with the West?

The Glitter of the Heavenly Empire

In recent decades, China has reached impressive successes: giant skyscrapers, modern science centers, airports equipped with latest technologies, not to mention Chinese consumer goods that have usurped the whole world. And all that was made possible without any freedom of speech, human rights and other liberal rhetoric. Are these not the arguments in favor of the Chinese way? But a question arises: what's the cost of all these successes?

China is far from being united. The northern, predominantly agrarian part of the country differs greatly from the industrial South. Everything that would strike a tourist's imagination has nothing to do with rural China, where 75% of the national population lives. The lifestyle of these "original" (in the higher sense of this term) Chinese peasants is hardly different from that of their ancestors, who lived here 100-150 years ago. A golden age visited only the southern regions and of those, only the so-called "free economic zones," where the principles of liberal market economy based on private property were strictly followed.

The leaders of Communist China came to realize that there could be no golden age without "economic liberalism." True, liberal principles were introduced by government decrees in the best totalitarian tradition, and they were limited only to the sphere of economy (liberalization did not spread to politics or intellectual spheres), but they were the very "western" economic principles that are so hateful to our indigenous patriots.

And what about Chinese specificity? Liberal principles are not realized in a vacuum, but in a concrete setting. The general environment can either enhance their effectiveness or reduce it considerably. The paradox of China is that the elements of public environment hostile to liberalism (a totalitarian regime, mental idiosyncrasies, a high degree of action readiness in society) actually assisted national prosperity.

There are three key factors in the success of China: a stable political system, public support of all moves by the Party leadership, and the people's willingness to put all decrees of the regime into practice. Let's not forget that the policy, including economic liberalization, is officially called "building Communism with Chinese specificity." It is remarkable that since 1999, national business undertakings that rank as "the most important aspect of market socialist economy" have been an integral part of this specific Communism.

The Chinese are building the market economy with the same resolution they extirpated sparrows - without a shadow of a doubt. They are ready to follow out. Their resignation to the higher authorities, their willingness to make sacrifices, as they put party decrees into practice, prove to be as efficient as the Protestant ethics of Max Weber. The variety of ways these principles are manifested is just amazing. For example, their willingness to make sacrifices predetermines the low cost of labor, which, in its turn, enhances the competitive strength of Chinese manufacture. Workers of light-industry enterprises in South China live in factory hostels, 4 to 6 persons in one room, and work in shifts. Such conditions are not considered the worst.

Another example is how the Chinese responded to the idea to hold the Olympic Games in China, in 2008. Seven years are left till the grand opening of the Games, you can already buy Olympic souvenirs, and as you walk the streets of Beijing, you cannot help feeling that only several days are left to the Olympics. Such enthusiasm of the Chinese people can only be envied.

Poverty of the Heavenly Empire

But how long will this enthusiasm last? The developing market economy will inevitably shatter the traditional patriotic asceticism of the Chinese people, making way for consumer values, egotism, and a desire to live better. The growing gap in income levels is also a cause for concern. Unemployment keeps growing. This is all evidence of the contradiction between liberal market principles, which underlie the economic upturn of China and assist it, and the peculiarities of totalitarian society.

Apart from merely economic issues, a political conflict looms ahead. A class of private proprietors is forming in China. Experience shows that sooner or later this class will want political guarantees which are absolutely incompatible with the party monopoly for power, but can be obtained only in the context of democracy - at least, a relative or restricted one. Intellectuals also demand democratization, thus provoking a totalitarian reaction. Yet the power does not dare make claims to the liberal principles in the economy, since it is aware that the nation will not be able to secure common wealth without "corrupt western liberalism." How will this contradiction between liberalism, which is about to extend beyond tight economic limits, and totalitarianism, the two elements of the Chinese miracle, be solved? First blood has already been shed on the Tiananmen Square.

And so the experience of China testifies to the fact that only liberal economic reforms may underlie an economic upsurge in modern society. In this sense, China has not invented anything different from the West. But the Chinese have been quite successful in using political and national-historic peculiarities of their society, totalitarian and anti-liberal in their essence, to their own advantage. This contradictory synthesis does not guarantee a bright future, but has enabled them to make an unconditional economic spurt.

Do We Need a Chinese Wall?

What can Russia learn from this example? First of all, it's silly to turn our back on Europe, demonstrating contempt for western market liberalism. Second, it's not wise to set our national-historic peculiarities off against liberalism, nor to nurture a dislike for private property and trade in the "popular mindset." Rather, we should use them for developing and strengthening effective liberal-market economic mechanisms.

We should also remember that our situation is still different from that of China. First of all, our people are not ready to sacrifice comfort and happiness "in the name of some bright future." They've fizzled out. We'll never be able to secure such cheap labor and ensure such high discipline. The latter can be attained only through market, rather than totalitarian methods. Already many national light-industry entrepreneurs prefer to place their production facilities in China. By so doing they lower the costs and get better quality of their goods.

Second, our government was different even before Perestroika: it did not have enough strength to hold our society in a totalitarian political leash. Perhaps this was a better way of development, since democratic institutions were firmly established in our country without any bloodshed.

But Russia has other advantages: huge mineral deposits (a comparison with Arab oil countries would be quite appropriate here); huge intellectual potential accumulated during the totalitarian era, first of all, in the defense establishment. If only we could learn how to use it and not sell it out thoughtlessly! Perhaps we should learn from Arabs.

Is Russia to change its political priorities and instead of seeking friendship of the West look for allies in the East? China seems to be a good partner. The advantages of such an alliance are quite obvious. The joint potential of Russia and China could be a serious counterbalance to brazen American hegemony and therefore promote the national interests of both countries. But it is also quite apparent that even if such an alliance becomes a reality, in no way should it mean confrontation with the West in general and with the USA in particular. Quarrelling with the West is not to the advantage of either Russia or China. We'll lose more than we gain.

Moreover, in what capacity can we form an alliance with China? Certainly China is as interested in cooperation with Russia as Russia is interested in partnership with China. Here we are dealing both with political and economic interest. Last year the bilateral commodity turnover exceeded 7 billion U.S. dollars. Russia and China launched many joint projects including the development of oil and gas fields and construction of gas pipelines, the joint construction of subways in some Chinese cities; extensive deliveries of civil-purpose industrial equipment manufactured at converted Russian munitions factories.

But there are several limitations to extending foreign economic ties: a restricted commodity variety of the Russian export which is basically reduced to energy carriers and industrial raw materials; and lack of a reliable climate for foreign investments in Russia, including Chinese ones. There is an opinion that China does not encourage investing in the Russian economy, for it is not interested in its upturn.

China is apparently interested in Russian technologies and markets, especially after becoming a member of WTO. Russia also suits China as an ally on the world arena, since Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But both Russia and China need western investments and technologies too badly to risk forming any alliance against the United States. Beijing is playing its own intricate political game, taking into account the strengthening economic relations with the United States, complicated relations with Japan and India and many other factors.

The issue of territorial claims is also worth mentioning. They were made by Mao Tse-tung and have since been gaining ground in Chinese political circles. There is also a hidden potential of contradictions between Moscow and Beijing that proceeds from Russia's weakness in comparison to China, which grows stronger every year. It is difficult to predict how China will behave after it becomes a superpower.

So it is absolutely clear that China will never again be our "younger brother." It is more likely that it will claim the role of the elder one. China is no less selfish than the West, and it is even more dangerous to us in view of its proximity to our borders and its unexhausted expansionist potential. We should not exaggerate the would-be sympathy of the Chinese for Russia either. It is mainly cherished by the older generation, since many of them got their education in the Soviet Union. Urban youths are more pragmatic and oriented towards western values.

Therefore it would be wise for us to take the Chinese experience into consideration: first, we should not neglect western market liberalism - at least, in economy. Secondly, we should learn to turn even the negative elements of grave "totalitarian legacy" to our advantage. We should build pragmatic relations with China, and in no way should we aim at "the great anti-western front." Walls are not the only thing that China can build.

27.05.2003

В Кремле прошли российско-китайские переговоры на высшем уровне.

1tv.ru


Лидеры двух стран обсуждали планы расширения сотрудничества России и Китая. Итогом этой встречи - стало подписание совместной декларации.

Переговоры начинаются с торжественной церемонии встречи в Георгиевском зале Кремлевского дворца. Это обязательное по протоколу государственного визита мероприятие. Проход по залу, на встречу друг к другу, приветствие и исполнение гимнов. Даже, несмотря на то, что накануне вечером оба лидера уже вели переговоры и общались в неформальной обстановке за домашним ужином.

Переговоры тет-а-тет продолжались около 2 часов, затем прошла встреча делегацией в расширенном составе и подписание документов. Главный из них - совместная декларация. Она затрагивает практически все сферы двусторонних отношений и важнейшие вопросы международной политики. Россия и Китай будут добиваться прорыва в развитии торгово-экономических связей. Ставка делается на крупные проекты в энергетике, новые нефте и газопроводы.

Во время переговоров, президент несколько раз с удовлетворением отметил, что новый председатель КНР выбрал Россию для своего первого зарубежного визита.

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China-Russia summit: Giants strengthen ties.

Asia Times
By Jeremy Bransten

PRAGUE - Hu Jintao has chosen Russia for his first official visit abroad since becoming Chinese president. When he began his visit in Moscow on Monday, Hu was repaying a courtesy extended by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who last December became the first foreign leader to meet with Hu after he assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

But experts say there is far more driving the Russian-Chinese relationship than politeness. Key economic as well as geopolitical issues will be discussed during Hu's visit, among them possible agreement on the construction of a 2,400-kilometer pipeline from eastern Siberia to the Chinese city of Daqing.

Aleksandr Konovalov, head of the Moscow-based Institute for Strategic Assessments, explained why this is the case: "Very important issues will be discussed such as the use of energy resources in Siberia and the Far East, the construction of a gas pipeline to Daqin, and the increasing of oil and gas deliveries from Russia to China. I think the problem of Korea will figure prominently, although that is not a bilateral issue. If you look at the issue, not only from the military point of view and from the standpoint of the unacceptability of the nuclearization of North Korea, I would [underline the importance of] the issue of a transport corridor through both Koreas and China to link up with the Trans-Siberian railroad."

Dmitrii Trenin, at the Carnegie Institute in Moscow, is the author of Russia's China Problem and an expert on Russian foreign policy. He said that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been forced to come to come to terms with Beijing's rapidly growing economic might.

"For Russia, which borders China, this creates a new situation - a new reality," Trenin said. "Russia used to look upon China as a backward, distant country. For a time it even tried to dominate China. But these days, Russia has been forced to acknowledge that China has surpassed it not only in terms of population - which was always the case - but in the size of its gross domestic product [GDP], which is now five times [as large]. China is developing at a much faster pace than Russia."

That makes China an increasingly important economic partner. Both sides have emphasized their desire to boost bilateral trade, which currently stands at some US$12 billion a year. China is especially interested in imports of Russian military hardware and Russia, Trenin said, has been relying on arms sales abroad as a key source of revenue.

"Russia needs to sell China weapons technology because the sale of armaments abroad is the only way for industries in the military-industrial complex to survive and receive some kind of profit. When Russia's government is not placing orders for modern technology with these military enterprises, they are dependent on foreign clients. And China is one of the leading clients," Trenin said.

Critics say the policy is shortsighted. They warn that Russia, by selling its superior weapons technology to China, will ultimately undercut its own interests and help boost China's geopolitical influence, to Moscow's detriment. But Trenin said the Kremlin is not worried.

"Russia's military and political leaders consider that in the near term and foreseeable future, China will not present a military problem for Russia, because Chinese arms purchases and the whole structure of its armed forces are oriented towards other tasks - above all Taiwan and to a lesser degree towards Chinese-American relations. So they believe Russia can rest easy on this issue," he said.

Geopolitical questions, especially in the aftermath of the Iraq war, are expected to weigh heavily on the Hu-Putin meetings. After a period of tension over Iraq, Moscow appears keen to repair its relations with Washington. China, Trenin said, sees this as an opportune time to mount a charm offensive.

"China wants to send a message to Moscow and other capitals. China wants Russia to remain a dependable [partner]. China does not want Russia to become part of some alliance whose aim could be to restrict China. China believes that now, when Russian-American relations are emerging from their crisis caused by the Iraq war, is the right time to look for new opportunities," he said.

Those opportunities extend to Central Asia, where China has also been keen to check the United States' post-September 11, 2001, presence. After his three-day state visit, Hu will remain in Moscow for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which groups together China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Trenin explained the importance of the organization to Beijing: "I'd say the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is, for China, another name for Central Asia. That is, thanks to this organization, China can take part in discussions and the resolution of questions tied to security and development in Central Asia as an equal to the countries of the region and Russia. This is important for China, because new opportunities have been opened for the Chinese to consolidate their position and raise their influence in a very important region for them, without antagonizing Russia, which has been the traditional power which has long dominated Central Asia."

Hu leaves Russia this Sunday, after attending celebrations marking the 300th anniversary of St Petersburg.

27.05.2003

В Москве прошли переговоры лидеров двух крупнейших держав - России и Китая.

1tv.ru

Формально визит председателя Китая в Россию открылся вот этой официальной церемонией встречи в Георгиевском зале Кремля. Однако, накануне лидеры уже успели пообщаться без галстуков в загородной резиденции президента. Судя по тому, что сегодня обычно скупой на эмоции Ху Цзиньтао назвал Владимира Путина своим другом, вчерашняя неформальная встреча не прошла даром.

Никаких неожиданностей и громких заявлений от сегодняшних переговоров в Кремле никто не ожидал. Новый китайский лидер не раз заявлял, что намерен придерживаться курса прежнего руководство, на развитие устойчивых отношений с Россией. А об уровне этих отношений говорит хотя бы то, что для первой своей заграничной поездки Ху Цзинтао избрал именно Россию.

Официальным делегациям пришлось запастись терпением, переговоры лидеров с глазу на глаз длились в два раза дольше запланированного. Но вот переговоры продолжились в расширенном составе. В центре внимания совместная российско-китайская Декларация. Поставив свои подписи под этим документом, главы государств обязались укреплять стратегическое партнерство стран, вне зависимости от изменений происходящих в мире. Наше экономическое взаимодействие ставится во главу угла. Сегодня объем только регистрируемой взаимной торговли достиг 12 миллиардов долларов.

Владимир Путин: "Однако при этом есть еще нерегистрируемая торговля, и она составляет по разным источникам до 10 млрд. долларов".

Президент Путин уверен, что, через четыре пять лет, товарооборот двух стран вполне способен удвоится. Наиболее перспективны: крупные совместные проекты в энергетике, новые нефте- и газопроводы. Владимир Путин отметил, что в прошлом году мы поставили в Китай 3 млн. тонн нефти и намерены увеличивать объемы поставок. Есть хорошие перспективы в области ядерной энергетики. Не здесь ли кроется ответ на вопрос, почему Ху Цзинтао избрал Россию для своей первой зарубежной поездки.

Ху Цзиньтао: "Мы считаем, что и в дальнейшем нужно ставить российско-китайские отношения на приоритетное место во внешней политике. Успешное развитие российско-китайских отношений не только приносит реальные выгоды народам двух стран, но и привносит вклад в дело мировой стабильности".

Лидеры отметили, что по таким острым проблемам как иракский кризис, ситуация вокруг Северной Кореи и многим другим, позиции стран близки или совпадают. Во многом это объясняется общим видением стран будущего мироустройства. Лидеры убеждены, что для того, чтобы мир был стабильным он должен быть многополярным.

Владимир Путин: "Этот миропорядок должен быть основан на учете интересов всех участников международных отношений и должен строиться на базе понятных, ясных и легко применимых международных правил".

Визит китайского лидера в Россию, только начался. Здесь у него запланирован еще целый ряд встреч. Он примет участие в саммите Шанхайской организации сотрудничества. После чего, как и многие мировые лидеры, примет участие в торжествах в Санкт Петербурге.

Russia and China bound by uneasy ties.

Straits Times ^

HONG KONG - Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Russia allowed the two powers to consolidate their relations, synchronise their world views and build a united front against a world dominated by the United States, the world's only superpower.

This was the most significant outcome of the Chinese leader's first overseas trip since he assumed the presidency in March.

But he did not succeed entirely in allaying Russian concerns over a rising China.

Still, the general strategic accord reached at the summit between him and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin is likely to enhance their ability to withstand future American pressure.

COMMON ENEMY.

BOTH leaders are suspicious that US President George W. Bush, egged on by hawkish neo-conservatives, wants to establish American global dominance under the guise of promoting security and democracy.

They are afraid that in such a situation, the Americans do not see others as allies or partners, but only as followers or accomplices.

Hence, in their joint statement, both leaders condemned unilateralism, promoted multi-polarism, called for democratisation of international relations and stressed the need to strengthen the United Nations framework.

On American concerns, such as North Korea and Iran, they agreed there was a need to defuse the crises - but not on American terms.

In particular, China reiterated its support for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The process is currently stalled mainly because the US has withdrawn its once-solid support, after Moscow's openly anti-American stance on the Iraqi issue. 'The two Presidents see eye to eye on almost every aspect of international relations,' said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov when he briefed his country's media.

The most tangible outcome of the Hu-Putin summit is an agreement to build a 2,400km pipeline from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to Daqing in north-east China.

The US$2.5-billion (S$4.4-billion) project would enable Russia to export about 5.13 billion barrels of oil, worth some US$150 billion, to China between 2005 and 2030.

This would go a long way towards solving China's supply bottleneck in petroleum.

China, which became a net importer in 1993, imported 70 million tons, or 33 per cent of its total needs, last year. By 2010, oil imports are expected to make up half of total consumption.

Currently, over half of China's imported oil comes from the Middle East. The Siberian oil will enable China to reduce its dependence on the Middle East, an area that is increasingly falling under American dominance.

The project will bond the two countries and spark a quantum jump in bilateral trade, now at a miserable low of US$12 billion.

However, Mr Hu was unable to allay Russian fears of a rising China. The Chinese proposal to lease two Russian ports - Posiet and Zarubino - for 49 years was flatly rejected, according to a source. The ports are situated at the mouth of River Tumen, where it meets the Sea of Japan.

The proposal included plans to increase the capacity of the two ports, now totalling just one million tons, by 10 to 15 times, and to build a railway link between the Chinese city of Hunchun in Jilin province and the sea ports 34km away. Had the plan been accepted, it would have provided the huge Manchurian hinterland in north-east China with access to the sea.

RUSSIA'S FEAR.

THE Russian President was surprised to find out on a recent trip that Heihe, which he remembered as a small Chinese border village, has developed into a major city in a matter of two decades. Heihe is the northern-most city of China right on the Sino-Russian border. Mr Putin is also worried about the long-term implications of a massive migration of Chinese into the Russian Far East.

When he was in the region last year, he urged his local governments to take appropriate measures or else 'Chinese will become the spoken language there'.

Given such fears of a rising China, it is hardly surprising that Russia refused to lease its ports. Even the nine-year haggling over the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline showed that the Russians had great misgivings about using their oil to fuel Chinese development.

The project was first conceived in 1994 and reaffirmed in a series of joint communiques between governments at the highest level in 1996, 2001 and last year.

Yet a Japanese proposal at the 11th hour - that the oil be sold to it instead of China - almost led to its collapse.

Although subsequent consideration, not least the need to solicit Chinese support in its WTO membership bid, forced the Russians to honour their original commitment, the episode showed up the fragility of Sino-Russian relations.

So while Mr Hu did manage to add substance to a bilateral relationship, he failed to remove Russian uneasiness about a growing China.

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I think the title of this article is very accurate.

I also think the argument/statement... "They are afraid that in such a situation, the Americans do not see others as allies or partners, but only as followers or accomplices"... is a very weak one.

posted on 06/02/2003 9:38 PM PDT by maui_hawaii

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To: maui_hawaii

The Chinese and Russians are pretending to be friends right now, but deep down, they hate other.

Notice which units in both the PLA and the Russian Army have the best weapons and training, the Far Eastern Army in Russia and the PLA's forces stationed in the North China. The China's goal in its expansion is resources. Siberia happens to be one of the world's treasure troves in resources. Also, the Russian general staff, the Stavka have warned Putin not to get too close with the Red Chinese.

Keep in mind, when the T-90 was introduced in Russian service, the first units to get them were stationed in Siberia, not European Russia or the Caucuses. Also, the Russians keep thousands of T-34/85s, T-54/55s, and T-62s in reserve in Siberia, in case of emergencies. Most of Russia's Su-35 fighters are stationed in Siberia. Also, the carrier Kuznetsov is stationed in Vladivostok.

posted on 06/02/2003 9:59 PM PDT by Sparta (Tagline removed by moderator)

http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=c8b9346d4742fcc0

Chinese businessmen set fire to Russian forests.

521 forest fires are reported to be burning in Russia, and about 100 new fires are reported in different regions every day. The situation is particularly serious in the Irkutsk region, where more than 170 forest fires are ablaze, 18 of them classified as large. Efforts to extinguish them have so far been unsuccessful. Damage from taiga fires has already exceeded RUR 100m (about $3.23m); over 56,000 hectares of forest land were charred, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports.

Meanwhile, reports have recently appeared in the Baikal region suggesting a “Chinese trail” in forest fires. According to them, foresters, acting in conspiracy with Chinese businessmen, set fire to forests and sell the affected areas to the Chinese cheaply.

According to another version, these forest fires are intended to distract the attention of forest guards from illegal forest felling activities. While firefighters are tackling forest fires in one place, electric saws are working in another place. Woodcutters load several trucks with stolen trees and transport them to the nearest railway dead end.

However, Vladimir Chekhov, Deputy Chairman of the Irkutsk Department of the Russian Nature Ministry, blames bad weather for forest fires. According to him, forest fires in the Baikal region began two weeks earlier than usual, and they spread quickly in dry and windy weather, the newspaper concludes.

Symbolism of New Chinese President's Visit to Moscow.

Pravda.Ru
Andrey Devyatov
06/11/2003 13:24


Hu Jintao's choice to come to Russia on his first-ever official visit was not incidental.

The new Chinese leader picked Moscow as the destination of his first official visit to a foreign country. Now-deceased patriarch Deng Xiaoping decided to travel to the USA in January of 1979 within the scope of his first official visit. In February of 1979 he struck a military blow on the socialist republic of Vietnam "with a self-defense view." The same year, Deng Xiaoping pronounced China an "open" state, accepted capitals, technologies and other resources from developed capitalist countries in the total sum of $465,78 billion. He managed to increase the Chinese GDP four times in 1997, retrieved Hong Kong - the symbol of the national humiliation v under China's jurisdiction, and then deceased as the creator of the Chinese miracle.

The first official visit of the next Chinese leader Jiang Zemin was not marked as something grand. At the end of his ruling era, Jiang signed a treaty of friendly relations with Russia in Moscow. The treaty was signed for the period of 20 years, the essence of the signed document may be paraphrased as "good neighbors forever, never enemies."

Hu Jintao took the office of the Chinese leader in November of 2002. Now the new Chinese president has an objective to increase the national GDP four times by 2019 in comparison with 1999. Yet, Mr. Hu decided to come to Moscow, not to Washington, against the background of the victory of the American "coalition of good forces." The USA has just exercised its power to the whole world, overthrown Saddam's regime in Iraq, gained control over the Iraqi crude.

China does not live in compliance with Western laws. Hu Jintao's prime goal is to quadruplicate the GDP, which stipulates the attraction of additional resources from abroad. China ran out of its raw materials sufficiency in 1997. Deng Xiaoping's era was marked with the absorption of the Western energy - industrial technologies, money inflow. On the other hand, the symbolic first visit of the new Chinese president to Moscow gives a reason to assume that China is determined to absorb the Eastern energy at present - oil, gas, woods, land, intellect.

It is worth mentioning the Western prosperity caused with the American triumph in 1991 - the break-up of the Soviet Union, the confrontation with the Muslim world, the war in the Gulf - has been worsening lately. On the contrary, the situation in Russia has been ameliorating since the default in 1998. China does not have an abstract long-term program, it has a project with a precise objective and time limits. It was announced in January of 2003 that China had already started the new period of the economic growth. Yet, China needs to preserve the activity of the USA + NATO and Russia + CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States). China does not want to impede the USA to develop its activity, the military activity, first and foremost. Russia and CIS states make a totally different matter, though. The reduction of Russia's activity in international affairs is out of the question for China. That is why, the new Chinese leader decided to travel to Moscow. Russian political life was full of events with China's participation at the end of May - in the beginning of June: Hu Jintao visited Moscow, the Shanghai Group of Six held its session in Moscow, then Russia took part in the EU meeting in St.Petersburg, Vladimir Putin participated in the G-8 meeting in France. All those events showed Russia's objective to accumulate political forces in the world in order to counteract the USA's global leadership. This is exactly what China needs.

13:50 2003-06-27

Russuian Maritime Territory and Chinese province agreed to cooperate in combating narcobusiness.

The law-enforcement bodies of the Maritime Territory (the Russian Far East) and of Chinese province of Heilongjiang signed a treaty on cooperation in the struggle against narcobusiness, officials of the Interior directorate of the Maritime Territory said on Friday.

The agreement provides for broader exchange of operational information and working out of a mechanism of joint actions.

Chinese and Maritime militiamen have already amassed experience of successful cooperation in this sphere. At the end of the spring of 2003 two citizens of Russia who engaged in making drugs were detained in the city of Suifanhe (Heilongjiang province) through joint efforts. As much as 1.6 kg of marijuana, 20 kg of hemp, chemical raw materials and the equipment needed for making drugs were confiscated from them. The investigation of this case is under way, and Russian and Chinese links of the drug dealers are being found out.

An analogous treaty on cooperation exists also between the law-enforcement bodies of Heilongjiang province and the Amur Region of Russia (the Far East).

© RIAN

Wednesday, 9 January, 2002, 13:59 GMT

Vladivostok's Chinese puzzle.

BBC


Vladivostok's markets are filled with Chinese goods.

In a series of special reports from Russia's Far East, BBC East Asia Today reporter Francis Markus examines the identity, the problems and the potential of this unique region. In a windy open air market, where the only structures are built out of disused shipping containers, mid-morning shoppers browse among the clothes, shoes and household goods. Almost everything here is made in China. "The Russians just don't have these things, their light industry is no good because they've always concentrated on heavy industry," says one Chinese trader in his thirties. The Russian customers picking over the merchandise acknowledge that if it weren't for Chinese products, they would for instance have no affordable footwear.

"I have a medical background, but I'm retired and my pension is only 1,400 roubles ($50) per month, so there's no way I could afford French or Italian shoes," says an elderly Russian woman, wrapped up against the wind in a brown overcoat. But while they welcome cheap, Chinese consumer goods, Russian shoppers almost without exception voice concern about the increasing numbers of Chinese visiting and working in the Russian Far East. "I don't like them because there are a lot them in our country and I think in the future, they will occupy our territory," says one young Russian even as she browses among the stock of shoes at a Chinese-run stall.

Chinese 'ambitions'

The fear of China's vast population and its potential domination of Russia's resource rich Far East is nothing new in this country's history. In his office amid the shabby corridors of one of Vladivostok's universities, China expert Andrei Alexandrov brandishes a Chinese historical atlas, which he says Beijing is using to reinforce its claim that large swathes of territory that's now part of Russia's Far East, used to belong to China: "They're trying to present this material as if it was the territory of the Ming dynasty Chinese state, whereas in fact it was territory which belonged to the Manchus," he says. "Even if people haven't studied this atlas, they will have certainly been to museums or read the media where the Chinese authorities put their ideological slant on it."

Comments by some of the planeloads of Chinese tourists visiting Vladivostok, would seem to back up Dr Alexandrov's assertions. "I've heard that this place was once part of the People's Republic of China," says one Chinese visitor to the city's fort. "We've come to have a look at it." When asked whether Chinese people wanted to retake control of the region, which has historically passed backwards and forwards between China and Russia, he replies: "Sure we want to, when our country is great and strong, we'll take it back." The laughter from his companions which greets the remark makes clear that it was intended in a tongue-in-cheek spirit.

Useful lessons?

Not all Russian analysts shares a gloomy view of China's long-term intentions. Another China scholar Galina Romanova thinks the fears have their roots in Russian political discourse and instead of fretting about Chinese expansionism, Russia should try to emulate some of China's economic reforms; "When China's reforms started the Soviet Union didn't understand them and thought they would undermine socialism and be a switch to bourgeois capitalism. "The fact that they chose economic reforms is a plus for them. We are now following our own way but it's still worth learning from them because we have a lot in common."

Violence.

But the reality of Russian-Chinese co-existence on the mean streets of Vladivostok can be a different story, both from talk of geopolitical rivalry and that of peaceful co-operation. In the cramped apartment building near the market where many of the Chinese traders live, one man displays a still fresh looking bruise to his face. He says he was attacked by a group of young Russians trying to rob him. "This kind of thing happens to Chinese people here all the time," he says.

"Because we're foreigners here and at the end of the day there's no-one to defend us and stand up for our interests." Two Chinese women say they only feel secure in a large group and a prey not only to violence but also to bogus policemen who try to force them to hand over their passports. "Maybe many Russians are worried that the Chinese will settle here permanently," says the man with the bruise, "but in practice, the vast majority of Chinese people have no intention of staying here long term."

RUSSIA SEEKS TO ATTRACT IMMIGRANTS (Russia Becoming Depopulated)

Russian Information Agency Novost ^ | 1 December 2003 | Olga Sobolevskaya, RIA Novosti analyst
Posted on 12/02/2003 2:56 AM PST by shrinkermd

The declining population is causing ever more concern for Russia's government. Some 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves "abroad" when the USSR collapsed. The outflow from the Asian part of the country, which takes up 74.8% of its vast territory, has grown immensely, as local residents head for European Russia to seek better social and economic conditions. As a result, the density of the population on the eastern side of the Urals is as low as 2.4 per 1 sq.m.

Russia's population is plummeting "owing to the high death rate and a birth rate as low as 1.25 births per one woman," says Nikita Mkrtchian, an expert with the Economic Forecasting Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. There is, in fact, zero probability that this downward spiral will ease up. "To maintain the population at the current level of 145 million, Russia needs to admit from 700,000 to 1,100,000 immigrants annually, and increase that inflow to between 900,000 and 1,700,000 by 2025," the scientist notes.

However, this migration influx will hardly be possible. Today it compensates for only 4.7% of the population losses. The most optimistic forecast of UN experts suggests only 138 million people will be living in Russia by 2025.

It is obvious that this country must make energetic efforts to attract immigrants in this demographic crisis, primarily our former compatriots living in the CIS and Baltic countries, including ethnic Russians. President Putin has mentioned it on several occasions.

He has also repeatedly pointed out that Russia's economy, too, is interested in attracting immigrants. Russia needs additional workers. In Moscow, for example, the majority of people employed in transportation, trade, construction and public utilities, are CIS citizens. Ukraine topped last year's list of countries supplying Russia with workers; it "exported" 91,000 people who accounted for 25.2% of the foreigners working in Russia. China rated second (41,000, or 11.4%, followed by Vietnam (27,000, or 7.5%) and Moldova (21,000, or 5.8%). Russia will need more and more workers for any further economic upswing.

In addition, Russia's population is growing older, which reduces the workforce. After 2010, the annual population decrement could reach 1 million people. Only immigration can help restore the balance of working and retired citizens.

The state regards the return of ethnic Russians to their historic homeland as a priority goal. However, according to Yevgeny Andreyev, a well-known demographer, "although this country has declared its willingness to accept Russian-speaking citizens of the CIS and Baltic countries, its law on citizenship impedes their entry". This is not good for a country which needs immigrants. It stipulates a five-year period of waiting to be granted citizenship, which is too long, according to experts. It could be adequate for Western nations, but not for Russia and the CIS residents who wish to move to this country.

Meanwhile, Russian officials think the law allows applicants to obtain Russian citizenship "calmly and assuredly". At least that is what the Interior Ministry's Federal Migration Service says. The procedure involves three stages. First, one has to apply for a temporary residence permit. Once the migrant has it, he or she no longer needs a work permit, and can choose any job he or she could find. At the second stage one obtains a permanent residence permit, and at the third, Russian citizenship.

In late October, the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament) approved presidential amendments to the law on citizenship, which liberalised the procedure for certain categories. Such "most favoured" guests include former USSR citizens registered in Russia as of July 1, 2002, World War II veterans, children and disabled individuals who have foreign or no citizenship at all.

Starting from January 1, 2004, foreigners serving under contract in the Russian army will also be entitled to a simpler scheme of obtaining Russian citizenship.

Still, despite the liberalisation of the citizenship law, Russia can hardly expect a flood of welcome guests. "The 1990s immigration won't repeat itself," says Mkrtchian. "It is decreasing because serious political or interethnic conflicts are no longer plaguing the former Soviet republics, while a number of the CIS countries concerned with the outflow of workforce, try to meet the interests of ethnic Russians in many ways, for example by giving a higher status to the Russian language. The economic situations are improving in those countries, new jobs are being created, and people who mostly think in economic terms, no longer hurry to Russia abandoning their property. Sometimes it is the other way around - Russians head for former Soviet republics to make some money." Russia's efforts to channel the flow of immigrants to Siberia and the Far East are not always successful. Local governments and migration services try to entice them to empty lands with promises of jobs and housing, but no tangible changes are as yet obvious. The government is adopting development programmes for these regions, but they will hardly ever compare with Moscow and the Central Federal District in terms of living standards and economic prospects, Mkrtchian says.

"Today's migration is orientated towards the centre. Up to 70% of legal migrants head for the capital." It is obvious that as the Asian part of Russia is losing its residents, it is becoming rapidly populated by Chinese. RIA Novosti learnt at the Federal Migration Service that Chinese immigrants are now trying to establish economic control and gradually infiltrate the authorities there.

"We cannot forbid immigration from the Asia-Pacific Region, as it would increase ethnic tension," says Mkrtchian. "China is a dynamically developing nation, and Russia benefits from maintaining economic ties with it. We need to ensure that Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese feel at home, and enjoy a better living standards than at home. They must be given help to assimilate."

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1032184/posts

Far East free of charge?

12/12/2003 13:04

Slavyanka village is situated within 80 kilometers of the Korean border. Surprisingly, its Slavic population has been decreasing rapidly in the course of past years, reports the New York Times.

According to local politicians, such demographic transformation of Russian Far East might be quite significant if it will soon be inhabited by refugees from North Korea.

Such human drama of 150,000 North Korean refugees secretly living in North China has really "touched American Congress." As a result, several amendments have been introduced in November aimed at simplifying current visa procedures for refugees as well as providing material support.

In the course of his trip across Khasansky region, Governor of Seaside region Sergey Darkin has stated that he is willing to accept Koreans. This piece of land is located between China and the Pacific Ocean. It dead ends at North Korean territory which is only 8 kilometers. "America is moving in a right direction as far as the issue is concerned. I completely support its actions. Also, I am willing to help, even with money," stated Darkin.

After his two-month trip from Vladivostok all the way to North Korea, Darkin appeared quite depressed. He said that current economic underdevelopment in the region leaves him absolutely hopeless of witnessing future growth. "Economy is in deep trouble over there," added Darkin. "There is absolutely nothing out there. No fuel, no cement, no fertilizers-absolutely nothing."

"Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that it is of strategic importance to make people move to the Far East," stated Press -Secretary of the federal Government Peotr Samoilenko while in Vladivostok. "One very important factor that Korea offers today is its cheap labor."

Today, there are 40,000 Russian Koreans living in the Seaside. Another 40,000 live in Sakhalin. In the course of the past decade, South Korea has become one of the most important foreign investors in the region.

NewsForum.com

Wednesday, 17 December, 2003, 14:59 GMT

Where Russia and China meet.

By Rosie Goldsmith
BBC Radio 4's Crossing Continents


Khabarovsk is the capital of the Russian Far East.

Eight hours by plane or a week by train, Khabarovsk is a long way from Moscow. But it is not just distance that separates the cities. This part of Russia, on the eastern tip of Siberia, is developing a separate economy and lifestyle, partly due to the Chinese presence there. Judging by the new ice skating rink in Khabarovsk, life is good for Russians living here. The rink is the most modern in the country. It seats over 7,000 spectators and is the base for the successful ice hockey team, Amur-Khabarovsk, which is sponsored by a local gold mining company.

Bright and brash, the rink is evidence of private money coming into the city. In the main street outside, the paint on the brightly coloured facades still looks wet. Cranes are everywhere, overshadowing the Soviet-era housing estates where the majority of residents still live. Khabarovsk was once a forgotten outpost, but now the capital of the Russian Far East is waking up from a spell of hibernation. And the potential wealth of the area is staggering.

But it could still go horribly wrong.


Vladimir Kuchuk feels the area is unable to utilise its resources.

"Just over a decade ago, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this area was left unceremoniously out in the cold," said Vladimir Kuchuk, a regional government adviser. "Under Soviet central planning we had a big defence and timber industry. With the arrival of the market economy and Moscow's lack of interest in us, we had to find new funds and new partners."

The region is rich in natural resources such as gold, oil, natural gas, timber and diamonds. But Kuchuk told the programme: "We do not have the money to mine or develop them or to build pipelines." According to Maxim Gladki, a Khabarovsk journalist, today its economy looks not west to Moscow for salvation but further east to Japan, Korea and China, all close and interested neighbours.

Economic tension.


Anatoly Novokov is a local director of immigration.

It is the Chinese which preoccupy the Russian Far East and their presence is highly visible. And although relations between the two former communist giants are officially friendly, there is economic tension. Northern China shares a 1000 mile frontier with Russia along the Amur River, one of the world's longest. The city of Khabarovsk sits on its shores. Since border restrictions were eased in the early 1990s, Chinese workers have flooded across the river to work as traders, constructions workers and farm labourers.

Northern China is developing fast but it lacks space and natural resources. The Russian Far East has all that. Meanwhile, Russia needs the labour to build up its new, burgeoning economy. Only eight million Russians live in the Far East. On the Chinese side of the border, there are ten times that number. One of the directors of immigration in the region, Anotoly Novokov, spoke of the dilemma in their dealings with the Chinese: "This region of Russia is fast depopulating. We need a programme of resettlement. We must think of our own people and jobs first. "There have been problems with illegal migrants and with poachers from China. The borders and the numbers of Chinese entering are now strictly controlled."


Many Chinese migrants have come here to find work.

But he adds carefully, "We would treat German or French would-be immigrants in the same way. We cannot allow every foreigner with a dollar in his pocket to settle here." At the Chinese market in Khabarovsk the Russian customers are not so guarded. Galina said, "It is nice to have all these goods from China but why can us Russians not produce them?" The market opened only 10 years ago. The 700 traders are Chinese - most on short-term visas - and all the goods, from food to furniture, are Chinese. Another customer, Boris said, "The Chinese will overtake in the Far East."

Life of Luxury.

A few more hours out of Khabarovsk is a village called Luxury. The name is in bleak contrast to the village itself. There is just one house, a pretty wooden dacha painted green, blue and brown. Luxury also has only one inhabitant, a farmer called Valentina, who is in her 60s. "We used to have a thriving, self-sufficient village with 130 houses," she said, "there used to be dances and orchards and pig farms. But now I am struggling to manage on my own."

Like most families in Siberia and the Russian Far East, Valentina's came from the West. With subsidies and coercion the Tsars - and then Stalin - moved people out here to live and work. In the 1980s the relative prosperity of urban life drove farmers out of their villages. "The land is being neglected," Valentina says. "I am sad about all the people who have left who could develop the land." She is pragmatic about the Chinese. "If they want to come, let them come. There is certainly enough land and work to do."

In Pictures: Russian Far East.


This ferry connects Khabarovsk with the Island of Big Ussuri, one of the remaining territorial disputes between Russia and China.


This Chinese peasant is one of thousands who have crossed the border between Russia and China illegally, in search of work.


In Khabarovsk's main street, elegant buildings of the 1900s have been restored, very often using cheap Chinese labour.


The Chinese supply goods to markets throughout the Russian Far East, but this trader admits some shoppers are unhappy about their presence.


This typical Russian wooden house is becoming a less frequent sight due to continuing depopulation.


Some analysts consider the Trans-Siberian Railway an answer to the region's economic woes.


Valentina, the only remaining inhabitant of a village called Luxury does not consider the Chinese a threat.

WELL, SHE'S JUST BEING NAIVE...GOODHEARTED THOUGH, THAT'S THE WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH OF THE SLAVS...

Wednesday, 26 November, 2003, 16:37 GMT

Siberia: Rivalry by the river.

BBC


Many Chinese migrants have crossed the river to do business.

It is the fault line where two continents meet: the Amur River Valley in Eastern Siberia, a pivotal frontier between two empires. On one side of the river is China: densely populated, thriving and assertive. On the other side is Russia, where there is poverty, a shrinking population, resentment, and the old fears of "the yellow peril".

Once the Amur River kept the two enemies apart, but today thousands of Chinese migrants - many illegal - cross the river to trade, and to work in catering and construction. Officially they are welcomed - and needed - by the Russians, but in the markets and on the river banks the old rivalries live on. Rosie Goldsmith profiles this remote region and asks whether these new tensions between China and Russia on the Amur River can be bridged or whether the river is a symbol of a permanent divide.

CHINA: The Dragon’s Dawn: China as a Rising Imperial Power.

strategypage.com ^ | August 28, 2003 | Geoffrey Cain

August 28, 2003: The Dragon’s Dawn: China as a Rising Imperial Power: Possessing a brutal history of foreign invasion, rape, and occupation by expanding Asian empires, most notably the Mongols under Genghis Khan, modern China has developed a sense of cultural pride through feelings of ethnic revenge and in notions of national expansion. Such an upsurge in patriotism can essentially be seen in such factors; however, in order to fully understand China as a rising power, other aspects of growth must be considered within its full international context.

Increasing Defense Expenditures and Territorial Expansion

In 2000, China increased its defense spending to 13 percent of its gross domestic product, followed by another augmentation to 17 percent in 2001. One analyst observed that recent purchases by Chinese generals tend to “emphasize power-projection forces” to apply military power “at a distance.” Though the actual reasons are decreed as protective measures by the Chinese government, some correlation can be drawn to recent maneuvers, such as its claim of 80 percent of the South China Sea, which is against international law, and by its direct colonialism over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, also in possession of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. A former Philippines defense minister called this a “creeping invasion” when asked to comment on its possible ramifications. China has also laid claim to the Philippines’ Mischief Reef and has established military installations on four other disputed reefs; moreover, has been a notable increase in Chinese naval traffic around the Philippines’ territories that makes many countries “uneasy that China may want to resume the imperial status it had in earlier centuries,” according former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

Furthermore, the Japanese government has reported that Chinese military vessels sail into Japanese waters approximately 20 times per year. This has prompted the Japanese Defense Ministry to begin a massive project for mapping its coastal seafloor to observe China’s growing fleet of submarines. This is not to mention that Japan moves 70 percent of its crude oil and fishing through the South China Sea, of which China has called for the “immediate eviction of foreign military vessels or vessels owned by foreign governments and used for noncommercial purposes that violate the laws and regulations” of China.

The People’s Republic is currently gaining a number of territories through aged treaties as well, such as Britain’s Hong Kong in 1997, Portugal’s Macau in 1999, and some former Russian territories in 1997.

In 2000, China forged a pact against terrorism, drug czars, and Islamic radicalism and has been helping Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with security problems. Some analysts believe that this is a move to establish more authority in Asia and challenge the traditional U.S. dominance since World War II. This can be seen in an ancient Confucian tenet that calls for leading by example, not by force.

China as the “Middle Place”

The Chinese have traditionally seen themselves as the center of the world due to their history of occupation by foreign invaders. In fact, the Chinese word for “China” is Zhong Guo, which literally means “Middle Place.” In addition, the Great Wall symbolizes its sense of being besieged, as it had been conquered by the Mongols under Genghis Khan (1167-1227 A.D.), the Yuan Dynasty under Kublai Khan (1260-1368 A.D.), and by the Manchu Dynasty (1911 A.D.) from a northern invasion after the reestablishment of Ming control. It has also been under the de facto control of Japanese, European and American commercial imperialism throughout the 1900s. As one Chinese general puts it, “This was a period of humiliation that the Chinese can never forget. This is why the people of China show such strong emotions in matters concerning our national independence, unity, [and] integrity of territory and sovereignty.”

According to the Chinese government, the U.S. is worried about Chinese economic and political growth, and thus is trying to encircle it with bases and alliances. Chinese nationalists point to its recent support of India (because China has been giving blueprints for nuclear arms to Pakistan), its recognition of Vietnam, its sales of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, its support of Japan as an economic powerhouse, and its support of a unified Korea under Seoul. Likewise, U.S. bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan gives them evidence to support their cause against Western dominance, according to one Tsinghua University professor. It should be noted, however, that China supported the war in Afghanistan.

The Taiwan Dilemma

It can be asserted that China’s extravagant claims over the South China Sea are part of a plan to ultimately unify with Taiwan. James R. Lilley, former U.S. Ambassador to China, stated, “[Uniting with Taiwan] would end what China feels to be a blockade on its abilities to control its surrounding seas.” To them, Taiwan appears to be a Western military stronghold that is impeding its cause of Asian dominance. Moreover, China sees Taiwan as its own territory from its profligate cultural history; that is, Taiwan was originally part of China before the Communist revolution, and the original government of China fled to Taiwan upon defeat. Both the Communist and the former government believed that there was one China, but they disagreed as to who was in control.

Conclusion

There is a high possibility that China will one day dominate Asia through its military, economic, and political influence. Its Confucian doctrine of leading by example is currently being supplemented by a slow military expansion into islands that are not highly visible on the world stage, thus not diverting much attention to its actions. Moreover, its nuclear weapons (though not numerous) act as a deterrent from the UN or the U.S. from taking multilateral action in the area. As Chinese General Mi Shenyu puts it, “For a relatively long time it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance. We must conceal our abilities and bide our time.” -- Geoffrey Cain

CHINA: The Dragon’s Dawn: China as a Rising Imperial Power.

May 26 2004 at 8:03 AM
No score for this post Цар Самуил
(Premier Login TsarSamuil)

I read that foreign farms are starting to produce especially for feeding china, since that country won't be able to feed itself. It's bad enough that countries will be dependant on china, what is worse is that china will not able to make do without them...china is where japan was before ww2, expand or starve..that booming economy could produce in the future hightech superlarge armies, and large navies outstripping anything the west could put up. Then the chinese would throw their weight around in the world much more than usa, since china will be in an ever larger need of resourches than usa..

If the world is a country, then the chinese are the majority and we are all minorities. If we are not careful the earth could become a chinese planet..the chinese have given up their one-child-per-family policy, meaing they are growing again in huge numbers again...what does that mean? With a nation that large, it grows in huge numbers very fast, they more they are, the faster they become more.

Sooner or later they will hit that critical point where they have to watch their people starve, since in ca 15 years they will need as much food as was produced in the whole world today. They cannot be given all that food! They will either watch their people starve or...we will face World War III, where the chinese seek to take the planet and make it all theirs...

There's no middle ground. Isn't destined for large nations to squeeze out others in the end? The world is not large enough for countries over one billion...because one billion is such a large number that it produces millions upon millions every year in a short time.

You do not want to know how many chinese were born when u finished reading this post...

China...

China offers $900 mln loans for Russia, Central Asia.

18 Jun 2004 03:01:47 GMT

BEIJING, June 18 (Reuters) - Chinese President Hu Jintao has offered $900 million in loans with preferential treatment for Russia and four Central Asian neighbours to boost economic cooperation and trade, state media said on Friday.

Hu made the offer at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Tashkent on Thursday. The SCO, established in 2001 to fight terrorism, groups China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

"We should fully take advantage of the high complementary economy among members and the rich natural resources and start cooperation in various forms," the official Xinhua news agency quoted Hu as saying.

Economic cooperation and the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism are key areas the organisation should work on, Hu said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan is vital to central Asia's stability and proposed the establishment of a liaison mechanism between the SCO and Afghanistan, it said.

Uzbek leader Islam Karimov proposed establishing a Central Asia Common Market, the agency said.

Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev called for stronger cooperation in energy and transportation, Xinhua said.

The summit adopted an pact to cooperate in fighting drug trafficking. The grouping should also widen cooperation in the areas of culture, education, science and technology, tourism and the press, Hu said.

The group accepted Mongolia as an observer, the official China Daily said. Next year's summit will be in Kazakhstan.

China wakes up and alarms the world.

by Ignacio Ramonet

PEOPLE used to talk about "the day when China wakes" as if that nation were a brooding menace threatening the planet. The day has come and it is time to ask what effect China’s impressive awakening is likely to have on the world market. This demographic colossus with its population of 1.3 billion only embarked on economic reform after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and especially after 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power.

China’s model of development is built on abundant supplies of poorly paid labour, the creation of many assembly plants, the export of cheap production goods and inflows of foreign investment. As such it has long been seen as a fairly primitive economy, a country that is basic ally backward and in the iron grip of a mon opol istic ruling party. Even the much-needed measures China took to deal with its population growth were authoritarian.

However, China, though still a communist country, has ceased to be frightening to outsiders; in the euphoria of globalisation, hundreds of companies that relocated their production to China (having sacked millions of workers elsewhere in the world) saw it as a goldmine for the shrewd investor.The network of special economic zones along its sea coast has quickly turned China into a phenomenal exporter, and it now leads the world in exports of textiles and clothing, shoes, electronic products and games. Its products are invading the rest of the world, especially the United States. A huge trade imbalance has been created with the US: in 2003 the US trade deficit with Beijing was $130bn (1).

Such an export whirlwind has generated spectacular growth figures, and for the past two decades they have exceeded 9% a year (2). This democratic market communism has led to a real increase in incomes and in the quality of life for millions of Chinese households (3). It has also created a distinctively Chinese capitalism. At similar speed, the state has begun a fast-track modernisation of the country with an intensive construction programme of ports, airports, motorways, railways, bridges, dams, skyscrapers, stadiums for the 2008 Beijing Olympics and buildings for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo.

This construction frenzy, together with the consumer fever that has seized the Chinese, has added an extra dimension to its economy: in a very short time the China that previously frightened the world as an invasive exporting power has become an importer with a worryingly voracious appetite. Last year it was the world’s number one importer of cement (55% of world production), coal (40%), steel (25%), nickel (25%) and aluminium (14%). And it was the second biggest importer of oil after the US. These imports have led to an explosion of prices in world commodity markets, especially in oil prices.

China was admitted to the World Trade Organ isation in 2001 and is now the world’s sixth largest economy (4). It is leading world growth, and every surge in China has an immediate impact on the global economy. This is just the start. As China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, has said, despite the speed of growth, China is still a developing country, and it will take another 50 years of growth at the present rate for it to become an average developed country (5).

However, if China continues at this rate, by 2041 it will overtake the US and become the world’s number one economic power (6). This would have major geopolitical consequences. It would also mean that by 2030 its total energy consumption will equal that of the US and Japan today. And since it doesn’t have the oil to satisfy such energy demands, between now and 2020 it will be forced to double its nuclear capacity, building two nuclear power stations a year for the next 16 years.

Even though it ratified the Kyoto treaty in 2002, China is already the second biggest polluter on the planet and seems likely to become the first, releasing vast amounts of greenhouse gases that will dramatically worsen climate change.

In this sense China is a test case that may provide answers for the problems to be faced tomorrow or the day after in India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa: how to rescue billions from the misery of underdevelopment without making them join a production-oriented western con sumerist model that will have disastrous consequences for the planet and humanity.

Another monster that threatens christian nations...

China, Russia Settle Last Border Disputes.

AP ^ | Oct. 14, 2004

BEIJING Oct. 14, 2004 — China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time.

The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war.

Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, signed the final agreement at a ceremony in the Great Hall of the People in central Beijing. Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao attended the event.

"We have found a solution to the border issue which allow us to have closer cooperation with regards to development of natural resources, environmental protection and economic issues," Putin said.

The two governments didn't immediately release details of the final agreement.

However, in a joint statement, Hu and Putin said the accord would "create more favorable conditions for the long-term, healthy and stable development of China-Russia strategic partnership of cooperation."

"It means an important contribution to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large," it said.

The border tug-of-war reaches back centuries to the competition for territory as imperial China and czarist Russia expanded toward each other.

At one point, the Soviet Union was believed to have as many as 700,000 troops on the border, facing as many as 1 million soldiers from China's People's Liberation Army.

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Vaya con Dios!

Russia's Chinese Invasion.

By Julian Strauss in Vladivostock
The Telegraph - UK
11-5-4

Less than a decade ago, Sui Huiling, a Manchurian trader, crossed into Russia carrying a bag of nylon track suits and cheap shoes.

Now 39, he runs an import-export company with a multi-million pound turnover, has a young Russian wife, two smart flats in the Pacific port city of Vladivostok and a Japanese sports car.

"Life is so much better here," he said. "In China the competition is cruel and there is huge pressure on people. Here there is space and nature. I can walk by the sea or feel the fresh air in the forest. In China there is barely a tree left."

Mr Sui was one of the first Chinese to cross into Siberia and the Russian Far East, among the most sparsely inhabited areas on earth, looking to make a living in the resource-rich region.

Since then hundreds of thousands of Chinese have followed the well-worn path north. Each year the pace is accelerating. Such is the influx that locals and some experts predict a seismic demographic shift.

They say the Chinese will change the ethnic make-up and fear they will eventually gain control over huge swathes of eastern Russia.

Sergei Buchma, the deputy president of the Association of Russian-Chinese entrepreneurs, runs a business centre in Vladivostok where eight Chinese companies with a collective turnover of Ј6 million a year are based.

He said: "Ten years ago they were all shuttle traders. Now they are big managers, some of them turn over millions of dollars a year. They already control half of the economy here. Within 30 or 40 years they will have economic control of this whole area."

Statistics fuel the Russian fears. In the Vladivostok region the population density is 15 times lower than in the Chinese areas just across the border.

The local Russian population numbers 2.1 million. Officially, about 280,000 Chinese are already working in the area. The real number may be many times higher.

Some local politicians blame Moscow for its lack of financial support and its indifference to the far-flung regions.

Nikolai Markovtsev, an MP in Vladivostok, said: "If official policies don't change, within 30 years the Chinese will dominate the Russian Far East. Last year alone, 40,000 Russians left the coastal regions"

Tens of thousands of Chinese farmers are also now working the land throughout Siberia. The scene in Zholti Yar, a tiny settlement a thousand miles north-west of Vladivostok, is typical. Yar Dongxian, 38, was harvesting water melons in the humid afternoon sun.

He had risen at six and expected to be in the fields until 10pm. He earns a few pounds a day.

Despite the fears, many Russians support the Chinese presence which has brought significant economic benefits to the region, stranded seven times zones and 6,000 miles east of Moscow. The Chinese bring consumer goods that are cheaper and superior to what Russian industry can offer and a work ethic that is rare among Russians.

"It's very simple," said Ivan Rugansky, the Russian farmer who employs Mr Yar. "They are cheaper, they work harder and they work longer. Our people are so lazy, they don't want to work. They only want to drink." The Russian economic boom also means that the area needs more workers than it can find.

In Vladivostok the changes the Chinese have wrought are pronounced. A decade ago the city was little more than a scrapyard for rusting Soviet-era ships. Now it has vitality. There are dozens of new restaurants and a wealth of consumer goods from across the border.

But the new mayor of Vladivostok, Vladimir Nikolayev, is not convinced. "They have flooded our markets with their goods," he said. "We don't mind that. But they have also flooded our markets with their people."

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Vaya con Dios!

SPEAKING FREELY

If it comes to a shooting war ...
By Victor N Corpus

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century. Why worst case? Because of the hard lessons from history. The Romans did not consider the worst-case scenario when Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants and routed them; or when Hannibal encircled and annihilated the numerically superior Roman army at the Battle of Cannae.

The French did not consider the worst-case scenario at Dien Bien Phu and when they built the Maginot Line, and the French suffered disastrous defeats. The Americans did not consider the worst-case scenario at Pearl Harbor or on September 11, and the results were disastrous for the American people. Again, American planners did not consider the worst-case scenario in its latest war
in Iraq, but instead operated on the "best-case scenario", such as considering the Iraq invasion a "cake walk" and that the Iraqi people would be parading in the streets, throwing flowers and welcoming American soldiers as "liberators", only to discover the opposite.

Scenario One: America launches 'preventive war' vs China

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia.
–Paul Wolfowitz, former US deputy secretary of defense and currently president of the World Bank
Consider these snapshots of China:

Since 1978, China has averaged 9.4% annual GDP growth

It had a five-fold increase in total output per capita from 1982 to 2002

It had $61 billion in foreign direct investment in 2004 alone and foreign trade of $851 billion, the third-largest in the world

The US trade deficit with China exceeded $200 billion in 2005

China has $750 billion in foreign exchange reserves and is the second-biggest oil importer

Last year it turned out 442,000 new engineers a year; with 48,000 graduates with master's degrees and 8,000 PhDs annually; compared to only 60,000 new engineers a year in the US.

China for the first time (2004) surpassed America to export the most technology wares around the world. China enjoyed a $34 billion trade surplus with the US in advanced technology products in 2004 (The Economist, December 17, 2005). In 2005, the surplus increased to $36 billion

It created 20,000 new manufacturing facilities a year

It holds $252 billion in US Treasury Bonds (plus $48 billion held by Hong Kong)

Among the five basic food, energy and industrial commodities –grain and meat, oil and coal and steel –consumption in China has eclipsed that of the US in all but oil.

China has also gone ahead of the US in the consumption of TV sets, refrigerators and mobile phones

In 1996, China had 7 million cell phones and the US had 44 million. Now China has more mobile phone users than the US has people.

China has about $1 trillion in personal savings and a savings rate of close to 50%; U.S. has about $158 billion in personal savings and a savings rate of about 2% (The Wall Street Journal, Nov 19, 2005)
Shanghai boasts 4,000 skyscrapers – double the number in New York City (The Wall Street Journal, Nov 19, 2005)
Songbei, Harbin City in north China is building a city as big as New York City

Goldman Sachs predicts that China will surpass the US economy by 2041.

Before China's economy catches up with America, and before China builds a military machine that can challenge American superpower status and world dominance, America's top strategic planners (Project for the New American Century) decide to launch a "preventive war" against China. As a pretext for this, the US instigates Taiwan to declare independence.

Taiwan declares independence!
China has anticipated and long prepared itself for this event. After observing "Operation Summer Pulse –04" when US aircraft carrier battle groups converged in the waters off China's coast in mid-July through August of 2004, Chinese planners began preparing to face its own worst-case scenario: the possibility of confronting a total of 15 carrier battle groups composed of 12 from America and three from its close British ally. China's strategists refer to its counter-strategy to defeat 15 or more aircraft carrier battle groups as the "assassin's mace" or shashaujian.

After proper coordination with Russia and Iran and activating their previously agreed strategic plan, troops and weapon systems are pre-positioned. China then launches a missile barrage on Taiwan. Command and control nodes, military bases, logistics centers, vital war industries, government centers and air defense installations are simultaneously hit with short and medium range ballistic missiles armed with conventional, anti-radar, thermo baric and electro-magnetic pulse warheads.

At the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command and Control Center, ranking defense officials watch huge electronic monitor screens showing seven US and two British aircraft carrier battle groups converging on the East China Sea with another three US carrier battle groups entering the Persian Gulf, while the remaining two US and one British battle groups remain in the Indian Ocean to serve as a strategic reserve.

As the aircraft carrier battle groups advance, China draws out one of its "trump cards" by leaking to the world media that it is dumping its holdings of US Treasury bonds and shifting to gold and euros.

Meanwhile, strategic planners at NORAD watch with glee as they observe on the screen as monitored by their radar satellites that Chinese surface ships are making a hasty retreat as nine allied carrier battle groups advance toward the Philippine Sea and Chinese waters near Taiwan.

The assassin's mace: China's anti-satellite weapons
Glee and ecstasy soon turn to shock as monitor screens suddenly go blank. Then all communication via satellites goes dead. China has drawn its second "trump card" (the assassin's mace) by activating its maneuverable "parasite" micro-satellites that have unknowingly clung to vital (NORAD) radar and communication satellites and have either jammed, blinded or physically destroyed their hosts.

This is complemented by space mines that maneuver near adversary satellites and explode. Secret Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons also blind or bring down US and British satellites used for C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). And to ensure redundancy and make sure that the adversary C4ISR system is completely "blinded" even temporarily, hundreds of select Chinese and Russian information warriors (hackers) specifically trained to attack their adversary's C4ISR systems simultaneously launch their cyber offensive.

For a few precious minutes, the US and UK advancing carrier battle groups are stunned and blinded by the "mace", ie, a defensive weapon used to temporarily blind a stronger opponent. But the word mace has another meaning; one which is deadlier and used in combination with the first.

A mace can be a spiked war club used in olden times to knock out an opponent. Applied in modern times, the spikes of the assassin's mace refer to currently unstoppable supersonic cruise missiles capable of sinking aircraft carriers that are in China's inventory; complemented by equally unstoppable "squall" or SHKVAL rocket torpedoes and regular 65 cm-diameter wake-homing torpedoes, bottom-rising rocket-propelled mines, and "obsolete" warplanes converted into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) firing anti-ship missiles from standoff positions and finally dive-bombing into the heart of the US and UK aircraft carrier armada.

Missile barrage on advancing carrier battle groups
A few seconds after the "blackout", literally hundreds of short and medium-range ballistic missiles (DF7/9/11/15s, DF4s, DF21X/As, some of which are maneuverable) pre-positioned on the Chinese mainland, and stealthy, sea-skimming and highly-accurate cruise missiles (YJ12s, YJ22s, KH31A/Ps, YJ83s, C301s, C802s, SS-N-22s, SS-NX-26/27s, 3M54s & HN3s) delivered from platforms on land, sea and air race toward their respective designated targets at supersonic speed.

Aircraft carriers are allotted a barrage of more than two dozen cruise missiles each, followed by a barrage of short and medium-range ballistic missiles timed to arrive in rapid succession.

Supersonic cruise missiles constitute China's third deadly "trump card" against the US – part of the so-called assassin's mace. These unstoppable cruise missiles may be armed with 440-lb to 750-lb conventional warheads (or 200-kiloton tactical nuclear warheads 10 times stronger than Hiroshima) traveling at more than twice the speed of sound (or faster than a rifle bullet).

The cruise missiles, together with the SRBMs and MRBMs (short and medium-range ballistic missiles) may also be armed with radio frequency weapons that can simulate the electro-magnetic pulse of nuclear explosions to fry computer chips, or fuel-air explosives that can annihilate the personnel in aircraft carriers and battleships without destroying the platforms.

Their effective range varies from less than 100 to 1,800 kilometers from stand-off positions. Delivered by long-range fighter-bombers and submarines, their range can be extended even further. In fact, stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can deliver such nuclear payloads to the US mainland itself.

No US defense vs supersonic cruise missiles
The US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups do not have any known defense against the new supersonic missiles of their adversaries. The Phalanx and Aegis ship defense systems may be effective against subsonic cruise missiles like the Exocets or Tomahawks, or exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, but they are inadequate against the sea-skimming and supersonic Granits, Moskits and Yakhonts or similar types (Shipwreck, Sunburn and Onyx - North Atlantic Treaty Organization codenames) of modern anti-ship missiles in China's inventory.

Not only China and Russia have these modern cruise missiles, so do Iran, India and North Korea. These missiles can be delivered by SU-27 variants, SU-30s, Tu22M Blackjacks, Bears, J6s, JH-7/As, H-6Hs, J-10s, surface ships, diesel submarines or common trucks.

Adding to the problems facing aircraft carriers are the SHKVAL or "squall" rocket torpedoes installed in some Chinese and Russian submarines and surface ships. At 6,000 lbs apiece, these torpedoes travel at 200 knots (or 230 miles per hour) with a range of 7,500 yards guided by autopilot. They are designed to sink aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Again, it is unfortunate for the US and UK to have no known or existing defenses against this new generation of rocket torpedoes.

China's sea mines
Complicating matters for the US aircraft carrier battle groups are the hundreds of hard-to-detect, rocket-propelled, bottom-rising sea mines that are anchored and hidden on the sea bottom covering pre-selected battle sites in the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea designed to home in on submarines and surface ships, particularly aircraft carriers.

These sophisticated sea mines (EM-52s) have been deployed by Chinese and Russian submarines before the missile attack on Taiwan in anticipation of the major event that is to follow.

Finally, in addition to all these asymmetric weapons, the US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups will have to contend with the thousands of "obsolete" Chinese fighter planes converted into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) launching missiles at stand-off positions and finally diving kamikaze-style into the heart of the carrier battle groups.

Chinese and Russian submarines fire their inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and "squall" rocket torpedoes at the aircraft carriers and submarines of the US and UK as the carrier battle groups come within range. As the battle progresses, the Chinese and Russian submarines maneuver to the rear of the carrier battle groups to complete the encirclement.

In less than an hour after launching the saturation barrage of missiles on the US and UK naval armada, all the aircraft carriers and their escorts of cruisers, battleships and several of the accompanying submarines are in flames, sinking or sunk, turning the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea into a modern-day "Battle of Cannae".

Meanwhile, the Chinese fleet that conducted a strategic retreat forms a phalanx along the forward positions off China's coast, ready to augment the hundreds or thousands of land-based long-range surface-to-air missiles of China (SA-10s, SA-15s and SA-20s) with their own short, medium and long-range air defense missile systems.

Applying its long-held military doctrine of "active defense", China also launches simultaneous missile attacks on the forces-in-being and logistics-in-place of the US and its allies in Japan, South Korea, Guam, Okinawa, Diego Garcia and Kyrgyzstan, hitting these US bases with missiles armed with radio frequency weapons, fuel-air explosives and conventional warheads. As another Chinese military doctrine states: "Win victory with one strike."

Chinese and Russian missiles cocked
Both Chinese and Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the two countries' extensive air defense systems have been coordinated and ready to respond in the event that the US and UK decide to retaliate with a nuclear attack.

In addition, Ranets-E and Rosa-E radio frequency/electro-magnetic pulse systems scattered all along China's coastal cities are on the look-out to neutralize incoming missiles and aircraft that may respond after the attack on the aircraft carrier battle groups. These systems can work in tandem with airborne-based anti-missile laser systems now in China's inventory.

China's trump cards vs the US
China's deadly "trump cards" (ie, the huge holdings of US Treasury bonds, the anti-satellite weapons system, the supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, SRBMs, MRBMs, "squall" rocket torpedoes, sea mines, UCAVs, DF31A and DF41 road-mobile ICBMs, JL2 SLBMs, air defense system, IO/EW/IW, and other RMA weapons) are the key ingredients of the assassin's mace.

China may not possess any of those expensive aircraft carriers of the superpower, but it can wipe out those carrier battle groups with a "single blow" of its assassin's mace or shashaujian –its major tool for conducting asymmetric warfare to defeat the US in a major confrontation over the Taiwan issue or other issues.

The US may possess the most powerful war machine in the world, but it can be defeated by an inferior force by avoiding the superpower's strength and exploiting its weaknesses. Again, an integral part of Chinese doctrine is: "Victory through inferiority over superiority." One famous Chinese strategist, Chang Mengxiong, compared asymmetric warfare to "a Chinese boxer with a keen knowledge of vital body points who can bring a stronger opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement".

The sad part for the American people, particularly the innocent sailors who will be manning the battle groups, is that even if US planners come to realize that the aircraft carrier battle groups (which are the mainstay of the US Navy and the main instrument of US power projection worldwide), have been rendered vulnerable or obsolete by China's assassin's mace.

The US cannot simply change strategy or discard such a weapons system. To change strategy or "retool" would mean wasting hundreds of billions of dollars invested in those highly sophisticated systems. The strong lobbying of influential defense contractors making those systems would make change extremely difficult.

For defense authorities to admit the strategic blunder constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier to a change of strategy. And finally, the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs related to those systems may be politically and economically unbearable for any US administration to bear should the program for the aircraft carrier battle groups be scrapped. Because of these factors, America may be stuck with an obsolete system that is too expensive to maintain but will only lose the war for the US when employed in a major conflict.

Meanwhile, on the Middle East Front
On another major front, on previously coordinated signals with China and Russia, Iran lets loose its own barrage of supersonic Granit, Moskit, Brahmos and Yakhont cruise missiles carried by trucks or hidden in man-made tunnels all along the mountainous shoreline of Iran fronting the Persian Gulf.

The three US aircraft carrier groups that entered the Persian Gulf to ensure the unhindered flow of Arab oil are likely to be helpless "sitting ducks" against the bottom-rising sea mines and low-flying, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles in Iranian hands. In the process, a couple of oil tankers about to exit the Strait of Hormuz are hit with the aid of rocket-propelled sea mines, thus effectively blockading the narrow strait and stopping oil supplies from coming out of the Middle East.

A "weak" nation like China or Iran, without a single aircraft carrier in their respective navies, could thus obliterate the carrier battle groups of a superpower. Here, one can see the hidden and often unnoticed power of asymmetric warfare, which may well spell the end of "gunboat diplomacy" in the not so distant future.

The Central Asian front
On yet another major front in Central Asia, Russian troops lead the other member-countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) into a major offensive against US military bases in Central Asia.

The bases are first subjected to a simultaneous barrage of missiles with fuel-air explosives and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads before they are overrun and occupied by SCO coalition forces. The missile attack on the US bases is followed by a lightning attack by four mechanized armored divisions coming from the Yili Korgas pass of China's Xinjiang province, linking up with Russia's own armored divisions in a pincer offensive against US forces in Central Asia and the Middle East.

America crippled on three major fronts
In just a few hours (or days) after the outbreak of general hostilities, America, the world's lone superpower, finds itself badly crippled militarily in three major regions of the world: East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Impossible? Unfortunately, the answer is no. China now has the know-how and the financial resources to mass-produce hundreds, if not thousands, of Moskit, Yakhont and Granit-type supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and "squall"-type rocket torpedoes against which US and UK aircraft carriers and submarines have no known defense.

Iran, on the other hand, already possesses the same supersonic cruise missiles that can destroy any ship in the Persia Gulf, including aircraft carriers. Russia and China, meanwhile, are operating on familiar grounds close to their territory, compared to the US, which needs to cross the Atlantic and Pacific to replenish troops and logistics.

A geopolitical reality America has to face
An important consideration in any US-China conflict is the geopolitical reality that the US and its allies will be operating on exterior lines, while China will operate on interior lines. This gives China a huge advantage in a major war in Asia against US and allied forces.

Consider the long sea lanes of communication (10,000 kilometers) that the US alliance would be forced to cross each time its forces had to resupply and you get an idea of the huge logistics problem that the US would face in a confrontation with China.

Such lengthy sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are highly vulnerable to a gauntlet of Chinese and Russian submarines lying in ambush along the route laden with underwater sea mines. This will make transporting personnel and equipment by the US over the Pacific or the Atlantic extremely dangerous and expensive.

Compare this US handicap with troop movement by Chinese troops using heavy-lift aircraft, railways and highways within the China mainland. China's interior lines of communication are shorter and protected, with little chance for enemy interdiction. Chinese troops can concentrate numerically superior forces rapidly at any given point to defeat invading US forces one by one with much shorter and less vulnerable lines of communication.

And in the event that the US forces and their allies are lucky enough to land on the Chinese mainland, they will be faced not only with a conventional People's Liberation Army of more than 2 million, but also with a people's militia conducting asymmetric warfare and a people's war in its teeming millions. US forces and their allies will be like a raging bull charging and goring a hive of killer bees. US forces may be able to set foot in China, but it is highly doubtful if they could come out alive.

Grimmer scenarios
There is a scenario grimmer than described above, however, and that is if strategic planners belonging to that elite group called the Project for the New American Century decide to launch a nuclear "first strike" against China and Russia and risk a mutually-assured destruction: 1)In defense of Taiwan ... or 2) In launching a "preventive war" to stop China from catching up economically and militarily. Or, if China decides to start an offensive against Taiwan with a one-megaton nuclear burst 40 kilometers above the center of the island. Or, if China and Russia decide to arm a number of their short and medium-range ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles with tactical nuclear warheads in defending themselves against US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups.

Land-attack versions of these supersonic cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads carried by stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can also put American coastal cities at great risk to nuclear devastation. Strategic planners must also consider these worst-case possibilities.

Scenario two: America vs a medium power
"In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region's oil." - Paul Wolfowitz

"I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian. But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan." – Dick Cheney in 1998 as chief executive of a major oil services company

History is replete with vivid examples where a much stronger and larger force has been defeated by a weaker and smaller force. The French were defeated by Vietminh guerrillas in Dien Bien Phu. Soviet Union forces, still a superpower at that time, were defeated in Afghanistan. And another superpower, the United States, was defeated by "ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-armed" Vietcong guerrillas in Vietnam.

Asymmetric warfare
If the US pushes through its plan of world domination, then it should expect all the smaller and weaker countries that do not wish to be pushed around to fight back using asymmetric warfare. This is a form of warfare that allows the weak to fight and defeat a much stronger foe by "attacking the enemy's weakness while avoiding his strengths".

The US, for instance, may possess the most sophisticated weapons system on Earth. It may have the most modern planes, helicopters, ships, guns, precision-guided weapons, sophisticated sensors and command and control systems, but if it cannot see its adversary, if it is fighting a shadowy and "invisible" enemy (like American and British forces are experiencing in Iraq), such advanced and sophisticated weapons systems are rendered useless.

In asymmetric warfare, most of the fighting is conducted at the team level. Thousands of agile and elusive teams consisting of two to five members equipped with man-portable surface-to-air missiles, portable anti-tank guided weapons, sniper rifles, man-portable mortars, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, sea mines, C4 explosives (for making car bombs, booby-traps and improvised explosive devices or IEDs) riding on bicycles and motorcycles and fast boats will make the lives of any invading or occupying forces extremely miserable.

These "invisible" agile teams merge with the population most of the time and come out only when there is a vulnerable target to strike at. Then, they disappear into the shadows. They communicate via runners bringing coded written messages, so there are no electronic signals to track down. They operate semi-autonomously, so there are no centers of gravity that can be targeted.

And since they are indigenous to the area and united with the local people, their human intelligence (humint) is far more superior to that of the invaders. They will also enjoy a tremendous advantage in psychological operations (psyops), for it is much easier to mobilize nationalist sentiments against a foreign occupier than for an aggressor to justify occupation.

Asymmetric warfare may be compared to a fierce lion invading the territory of a school of piranhas; or a king cobra encroaching into a colony of fire ants. The lion may be the king of beasts, mighty and strong, but it is no match against the tiny piranhas in their own territory. The sharp fangs and claws of the lion are rendered useless. The same is true with the cobra's venom. The analogy applies to the French in Dien Bien Phu, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam and now in Iraq.

Asynchronous warfare
Aside from asymmetric warfare, weak nations fighting the strong can also avail themselves of asynchronous warfare. If a strong nation invades or occupies a weak one, the weak bides its time before striking back. And it strikes at a time and place when and where the adversary least expects.

An example is Iraq. The underground resistance movement in Iraq may recruit Iraqi scientists or sympathetic scientists of other nationalities to infiltrate the US (via the Mexican border, for instance) and manufacture dirty bombs as well as chemical and biological weapons inside the US. Such weapons may be brought to Washington and detonated in or near the US Congress.

They could also hire a private plane, or buy one themselves, and use it to spread biological or chemical weapons they have manufactured in-country over New York or Washington. They can mail letters containing anthrax to key offices of vital services all over the US and paralyze utilities and other government functions nationwide.

Or they can smuggle, say, the components of a hundred portable surface-to-air missiles, assemble them in the US, and employ them simultaneously in all of the major airports in America. Or they can employ those portable surface-to-air missiles to simultaneously target American airlines taking off or landing in different international airports all over the world.

Some major powers may pass on their research on RMA (revolution in military affairs) to the Iraqi resistance to be tested inside the US. These weapons include laser weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, ultrasonic wave weapons, stealth weapons, high-powered microwave weapons and electromagnetic guns. They include miniature robot ants that infiltrate computers, stay dormant and then activate on the signal to destroy their hosts. The Iraqi underground could also recruit hackers to work inside and/or outside the US to hack into key US systems.

American crossroad
As the sole superpower, the US stands at a critical crossroad. One road leads to world domination. Using its pre-eminent military war machine without equal, it can strike at any perceived threat, change foreign sovereign regimes at will, grab precious mineral resources anywhere in the world and control local economies with its host of transnational corporations. It can also sabotage the economy of up-coming rivals, or launch preventive wars to preempt prospective competitors and try to defeat them militarily while they are still weak compared to America.

Such a course of action is very tempting, especially to leaders with global ambitions of becoming "Lords of the Earth". But such a road is full of risks and what is planned on paper, as what was done in Iraq, may not turn out as hoped. And such a path will necessarily ignite the outrage of most right-thinking people. America will earn for itself the enmity and hatred of people all over the world.

America had outlined its blueprint for world domination, by force if necessary, in the following documents:

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2001

President George W Bush's speech at the Graduation Ceremony at West Point, June 1, 2002

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for the New Century, a report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000

Defense Planning Guidance written by then deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz in February 18, 1992

In these documents, the US outlined some of its new doctrines and policies, such as: preventive war, pre-emptive military action, unilateralism, regime change, acting as the world's constabulary or "cavalry", establishment of military bases and spreading US forces all over the world, control of outer space and the global commons of cyberspace and control of the world's oil resources.

The alternate road, on the other hand, leads to world leadership. The US can choose to use its power, wealth and influence to sincerely do good for the people on this planet. It can lead in easing or obliterating the debt burden of poor nations, or in promoting the spread of quality education through distance learning in remote villages of developing countries.

It can focus in the fight against poverty, or the fight against drugs, or the effort to save the deteriorating environment of planet earth. It can lead the fight against HIV/AIDS, or malaria and other deadly diseases. The whole world is waiting for the US to lead in these important battles.

If the US chooses to focus its huge resources on the latter, I am confident that it will gain the hearts and minds of people all over the world. Then it can be a true world leader. Then it can maintain its preeminent world status. By gaining the world's sympathy and support, terrorism directed against Americans and the US mainland will be greatly minimized. The alternate road, in fact, is the key to defeating the phenomenon of "terrorism" gripping the world today.

Victor N Corpus is a retired brigadier general. He has a master's degree in public administration from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. His major assignment while serving in the armed forces of the Philippines was as chief of the intelligence service.

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Vaya con Dios!