CDI Russia Weekly #256 Contents Return to Standard Version
#13
NG Dipkuryer
No. 7
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
USA MIGHT FACE THE FATE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
Anatoly UTKIN, director of the Center for International Studies under the Institute of USA and Canada
When a superpower starts considering itself a unique and the only important country in the world, its priorities immediately shift toward the single goal - to thwart any attempts of other states to become its worthy opponents.
In 279, Rome demanded that Epirus Pyrrhus should leave the Apennines Peninsula. In 1823, the United States, using its "Monroe Doctrine," demanded that the European countries should leave the Western Hemisphere. Both, the Decree of the Roman Senate in 279 and the "Monroe Doctrine," forever became the predominant principles of the empires whose history is divided by almost 1,500 years. Even before entering the First Punic War, Rome had been superior in all major respects to Carthage and the Hellenic states. The same way, the United States, having surpassed by 1914 Great Britain, France and Germany combined in terms of production volumes, became the world leader long before the official recognition of its status.
The great similarity between the two empires lies in their decision to leave their sphere of influence, recognized by the rest of the world, and establish control over key world regions. By April of 1941, half of the Americans had been convinced that Europe, defeated by Hitler, would actually strike against the USA, had Nazi Germany smashed Great Britain and its fleet. Therefore, Washington quickly moved forward with its war plans in order to prevent anybody from seizing the American dominance in the world at any time.
America's might initially depended on a highly advanced level of its economic development. Rome's might, on the contrary, was mainly based on the political prowess of its leaders and the willingness of its soldiers to make sacrifices for the sake of the Empire. The common feature here is the refusal to implement half-measures, the fierce drive to lead the events to their logical end. In the 2nd century BC, historian Polybius justly criticized the Romans for their conviction that "everything could be achieved by the use of force." Nowadays, the Americans, following the example of the Romans, refuse to accept any decisions, except the ones that fully satisfy their interests. The very notion of "security" for Rome and Washington has always meant and does mean today the complete impotence of any potential rivals. Moreover, the Americans are convinced that "anything that's good for the United States is good for the rest of the world." And misfortune certainly befalls those who don't have the "amicus populi Americani" status.
We could see a similar transformation in the definition of the American goals during the mono-polar period, when, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States didn't have a comparable adversary anymore. In 1996, the Commission on determining US national interests emphasized two major tasks: 1) to prevent any nuclear, chemical or biological strike against the United States; 2) to guarantee the US superiority for as long as possible by preventing the emergence of an enemy state, which would strive at the same time to gain hegemony in Europe or in Asia.
In order to accomplish the first task, the Americans invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. To accomplish the second task, according to American researcher Peter Bender, Washington, besides anything else, started to rely on post-Soviet republics in order to stave off even a potential rise of Russia. In that respect, the United States focus "first of all on Ukraine; pursuing anti-Russian interests, the Americans deeply penetrated the rich in oil Central Asian region. In addition, Washington imposed certain restrictions on Russia, trying to prevent Russia's rapproachment with the West and the spread of its influence on Western Europe by providing direct support to former Soviet satellites in their strive to join NATO. Besides, the United States supports Japan and South Korea against China."
However, nothing lasts forever. There are three major reasons that portend the fall of any hegemony even in the best of the circumstances: other states or coalitions of states gain a comparable might; overexertion of the imperial might undermines the empire itself; the internal state of affairs creates favorable conditions for moral degradation and overall weakening of the empire.
Today, we don't see any state on the world horizon that could compete with the United States. Presently, only China demonstrates its willingness, desire, ambition and modernization capabilities, which potentially might challenge the US dominance. However, it would become possible only if this great country manages to maintain its political and economic unity, unlike the Soviet Union.
The more realistic threat to the US dominance lies in the processes occurring within the United States. The fight against international terrorism has spread the US might on new regions, but, at the same time, has also increased the potential fronts of applying the American forces. It's inevitable that one day even such an imperial titan as the United States wouldn't be able to dominate on all fronts. The number and determination of potential foes would be constantly increasing, straining the moral and physical resources of the leader more and more.
In Ancient Rome, the "common cause" - res publica - in the end surrendered to purely private interests. Luxury overshadowed republican moderation, lax morals devalued purely military valor. And nowadays, even such proponents of the US imperial greatness as Zbigniew Brzezinski start warning about "personal hedonism" and "dramatic fall of former values."
What awaits the United States in the future? Would it be able to fight the temptation of transformation into even more stringent political mechanism, better adopted to react quickly to the destruction of an external and internal status-quo? Some of the American ideologists have already started appealing to political and public circles to take into account the dismal lessons of the decay of the Roman Empire, claiming that otherwise the United States would never be able to maintain its phenomenal superiority. The Patriarch of American politics and political sciences, Henry Kissinger, follows the suit by saying that the imperial road leads to the decline of internal politics because, with time, the striving for absolute power destroys internal limitations. None of the empires had avoided the road, which ultimately led to Caesarism...A deliberate effort to achieve hegemony is the most sure way of destroying the very values that had made the United States a great power." Let's pay attention to the fact that Rome transformed all captured territories into one state. It held in its hands the orbis terrarum - all known civilized lands - but definitely not the entire world. The United States obviously attempts to dominate the entire planet. However, the Americans don't have either necessary strength or reliable and loyal allies to exercise total control. Rome, in its time, could at least count on allied territories. Modern France is not ancient Gallia, and Japan hardly resembles the "loyal Rhodes." In the middle of the 2nd century BC, historian Polybius attempted to determine to what extent the imperial power in Rome was a blessing or a curse for humanity. He found examples supporting both, the former and the latter theses. The Americans are striving to use force as much as the Romans did. Meanwhile, it happens that democracy serves only as a rather insignificant deterrent for them. And historians will still have to determine whether the American dominance was a blessing or a curse for humanity.
