Rommel wasn't and isn't overrated, because if he would have been given reinforcements he could have won. He saved lots of lives in Africa, by retreating, sometimes you have to retreat, it war.
The most overrated American is definatly Patton, the man was no a genius people.
Fool: Yeah...Patton just outperformed every other field commander in the West. Yep...he's sure overrated.
I wouldn't be so harsh on Lutjens though. He's only really bad decision...which is in hindsight...is the fact that he didn't top off the Bismarck's fuel tanks when he had the chance. Not really a big issue at the time...but a combination of bad luck resulting from the shallow belt of the Bismarck and a plunging 14 inch shell from the POW caused a critical fuel leak that precipitated the inevitable. I'd say the people who designed the Bismarck were more at fault than the admiral. The ship had some pretty bad flaws (Heavy AA mounts that were too complex and prone to shorting, 1 main rudder and an auxilary that didn't work, shallow belt, low armored deck, insufficient light & heavy AAA, and a poor anti-torpedo system) that made it into a bit of a death trap...especially against newer and more well rounded ships like the Duke of York and the Prince of Wales as well as the heavy battery of the Rodney.
"I wouldn't be so harsh on Lutjens though. He's only really bad decision...which is in hindsight...is the fact that he didn't top off the Bismarck's fuel tanks when he had the chance. "
Add to that:
- The refusal to open fire on the Hood, he simply did nothing, fortunately Lindemann, the captain took the initiative.
- The radio signal to Hitler, which the RN could trace back. Without that, the Bismarck would have probably reached the harbour.
Anyway about what numbers are we talking?
These are so many people 1.000.000
somehow really unbelievable how many died
If I imagine that these were all induviduals and not some mashines.
We can be happy to live in todays time. Even perhaps with Islamistic terror a new cancer starts.
"The Russians suffered near 300,000 casualties(not deaths) in the battle for Berlin."
really? well I guess many died or became cripples. Soviets had not good medicins like Americans.
„…und wenn wir uns nicht die Rolle des Hammers vorbereiten, so bleibt uns nur die des Amboß übrig“(Bismarck 1847)
This message has been edited by Puma2 on Feb 12, 2004 10:31 PM
Best General:
Heinz Guderian. A pity that Hitler made him stop the advance to many times, i guess hitler got scared that the germans where advancing to fast.
Worst General:
Friedrich Paulus. A coward, to scared of Hitler and wouldnt allow the 6th army to retreat. He schould have retreated sooner, instead he holed up in Stalingrad and everbody knows how that went out
Patton was the only western feild commander to not recognize the Allies contributions. HE though USA could take Germany by itself, he also made many bad mistakes during the Battle of the Buldge.
The Germans also thought Patton was the best on the Western Front. IMO that ends all debate, since the enemy knows best.
The American Marine Division has the highest combat effectiveness in the American armed forces. It seems not enough for our four divisions to surround and annihilate its two regiments.
---Mao Tse Sung to General Song, prior to Chosin Reservoir
Quote:
Patton was the only western feild commander to not recognize the Allies contributions. HE though USA could take Germany by itself, he also made many bad mistakes during the Battle of the Buldge
I guess he didnt know that there were still 9.100.000 German soldiers with 5 year combat expirience on the field in 1944 And on top of that they were superior in nearly every aspect.
This message has been edited by Derwyvern on Feb 12, 2004 11:08 PM
Actually Soviet casualties were high in Berlin because they were reckless. They too felt the pressure to rush west...and they were hoping to seize Berlin before the Allies got it into their heads to cross the Elbe. Instead they just rushed the German defences...such as they were...and overwhelmed the Germans by sheer number...on the theory that the Germans would run out of bullets before Russia ran out of men (used the same idea to clear minefields during Op Citadel).
Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo (1892 - 1947) was a Finnish general who led troops in the Winter War, Continuation War and Lapland War. He also saw action as a part of the Finnish volunteer "jägerbattalion 27" fighting on the German side in World War I. As a colonel Siilasvuo led the Finnish defence at Kuhmo and in the Battle of Suomussalmi. During the Continuation War he led the III Corps in northern Finland in 1941 and on the Karelian Isthmus in 1944. In the autumn of 1941 he took command of the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord and was the only non-German to command an SS-division during WWII. After the peace with the Soviets, he was given the command of the Finnish forces fighting the Germans in Lapland.
Semyon Budyonny
His career consisted of defeat after defeat, from the Soviet-Polish war, the Finnish war, and finally Barbarossa, where he led what is probably the largest defeat ever, by shear numbers.
Model was good to organize haphazard ad hoc defences Manstein was the genious of long term plans and operations
Model did many mistakes though to especially at Remagen and the Ruhrpocket where his troops wasn`t commandend brilliantly but that may have been because he knew the war was lost
General Wingate also very good ofcourse he would have to fight germans to prove he could fight well conventionally to
Montgomery was good in the sence that his planning nearly always guarenteed overall victory but Patton was much more feared by the germans since his speed and irrationality stopped them from reorganising and good defences
WHen general Bradley was asked which general he ranked highest he put Patton high but not at the top some of the air generals was put higher together with some land generals I forgot who he picked I once posted it in this forum
when the german generals however after the war was asked which general they feared and admired most nearly all of them put Patton at the top
Much as it pains me to say it, I reckon Monty was one of the worst on the Allied side (well, he along with the Fwench!) Clearly overrated, over-concerned with looking good to the media, very egoistical, etc.
WHen general Bradley was asked which general he ranked highest he put Patton high but not at the top some of the air generals was put higher together with some land generals I forgot who he picked I once posted it in this forum
That's only because Omar Bradley didn't like Patton as a person.
Chiang Kai Shek- the idiot military leader who once ordered Stilwell to provide a watermelon for every 4 soldiers in the middle of the Chinese attempt to save the British in Burma and who;s solution to everything in the damn battlefield was pincer movements. Of course all done whilst sitting in Chungking some 2000 kilometres away from the battlefield.
Manstein,Guderian,Rommel,Auchinleck,Zhukov.Slim is up there too.
No Rommel is is absolutly not overated .Read what Liddle Hard sayd about him in his post war book.Increadble work of military
education.Rommel pionierd Stosstrupers and was absolutly maginificant in awry respect.Rommel Papers-by Liddle Hard.
Now Patton iz overated.Nothing but a Rommel copycat.Like Liddle jard sayd most amasing thing nabout rommel is is that he won his victoris without air superioritie and nummnerical superiority.
Also if you read and look the whole picture Rommel as a Strategis is just as good as a trhuster.
Read Rommel Pappers by Liddle Hard wich is downable on internet for free.
Apart the French (Juin, De Lattre, Leclerc were really excellent), Patton was the only general, allies side, to have the "coup d'oeil", able to improvise to take advantage of a situation and jump at enemy's throat to win a decisive victory. (Aromanche and many other cases)
All the others, specially Montgomery, were slooooooowwwww as hell and always waited they could win the victory with brute force and overwelming hardware superiority. One have to admit that they were in there role, but one can't call this genius, just good planners and logisticians.
Patton is not overated in that sence but in the way he won his victories.Its easyer to corcet mistakes ween you have huge supply and nummerical advantage.Where otherwise eavn the smalest mistake can lead to defeat.
Thats why Pattons vicotrioes dont comme close to the vicotries won under such handicaps by Rommel or Manstein.
I dont think Patton would feard good against any German tank generals fully suplyd at the beginn of the war =1940....
Montogomery was the best setpeace battle general.But Overal the best of all generals was and stays one man- Erich Von Mannstein.
Read Rommel Papers,you can download for free....vary interesting.
Gotthard Heinrici oHHHH Hell YeA!
THAT MAN WAS A MASTER IN DEFESIVE WARFARE WITHOUT EQUAL!
In my eyes he scores 3 points higher than Patton in all respect.
Eavn Zhukov was afraid of him.
But its a pitty tha he remains so unknown to Peapol.He surely
belgongs to top 10 of WW2.
An Hon. Mention should go to Takeo Kurita for his shoddy handling of the Battle of Samar, letting the most powerfull battleships in the world be defeated by escort destroyers.
Definitely, quite probably the best general of the whole war.
"Guderian"
Built the Panzerwaffe and led it from the front, surely belongs on this list.
"Rommel"
He was a very good division commander, but not on the same level as the two before for example. His greatest victories are linked to the fact that he did the unexpected (disobeyed orders). While he was right, this could have cost him badly had he faced a more coherent enemy than the retreating French or the British division commanders who fought like headless chickens until Montgomery arrived. You can also thank Kesselring for keeping Rommel supplied, the Herr Feldmarschall thought himself above such menial things.
"Auchinleck"
Why?
"Zhukov"
One of the better Russian generals, but not the best. Koniev or Rokossovsky were better IMO.
"Slim"
Don't know enough on the Indian theatre to comment on that.
"No Rommel is is absolutly not overated .Read what Liddle Hard sayd about him in his post war book.Increadble work of military
education.Rommel pionierd Stosstrupers and was absolutly maginificant in awry respect.Rommel Papers-by Liddle Hard."
All well and good, but his attacking style and energy become a liability rather than an asset when he tries to command units larger than divisions. He had no mind for grand strategy like Manstein for example.
"Now Patton iz overated.Nothing but a Rommel copycat.Like Liddle jard sayd most amasing thing nabout rommel is is that he won his victoris without air superioritie and nummnerical superiority.
Also if you read and look the whole picture Rommel as a Strategis is just as good as a trhuster.
Read Rommel Pappers by Liddle Hard wich is downable on internet for free."
Patton was the best general the Americans had apart from general Marshall who was the main reason for the US victory. He was the one who organised the massive US armies and enabled them to fight with so much support. Their battlefield generals were ordinary, exept perhaps Patton.
Patton was damn good. Mannstein was superb. Monty was mediocre. Yama****a was good in a losing cause. Italians in general were mediocre. French learned nothing from WW1.
The biggest French error of WW2 was putting their faith in fixed fortifications instead of mobile weaponry. They learned the WRONG lesson from Verdun and it cost them during the first Ardenne offensive.
but had they bult the maginot line also along the belgian frontier it could have been tested better ofcourse that static defense should have been combined with a more mobile army outside of those that would have maned the maginot line
Landos The biggest French error of WW2 was putting their faith in fixed fortifications instead of mobile weaponry. They learned the WRONG lesson from Verdun and it cost them during the first Ardenne offensive.
I don't think that is the main reason for the defeat of 1940. Static defense worked pretty well in the battle of Gembloux or in the battle of the Somme in June 40 when the french adopted the hedgehog tactic. But in the later battle that was too late, half the army and its best part was trapped in Belgium and north France (Dunkirk)
The main reasons of the defeat are:
- absolutely insane high command that did horrible mistakes such as make the best armies advance in Belgium and holland while its right flank was way too weak,
- lack of AA guns,
- lack of radios,
- lack of big armoured divisions. Like one said, we had 1000 groups of 3 tanks instead of 3 groups of 1000 tanks.
Still there was some tank divisions: six french with 130 or 160 tank each, one British (284 light tanks) while there was 10 panzerdivisions with 220-320 tank each. Of the 3000 modern tanks france had, only 960 were in division. Of the 3000 German tanks, all were part of panzerdivisions.
The battle of Hannut showed that despite lack of air cover and lack of radios, French tank divisions were able to defeat Panzer divisions.
The battle of Hannut is of all the war the biggest tank battle of the Western front. edit: and it was afaik the first big tank battle of history.
The battle of Gembloux showed that infantry and artillery, still without air cover, could stop Panzer divisions too.
One week after the beginning of the battle, it was already lost: half the army was stuck in Belgium and north france, cut from the rear and supply lines witch is fatal in modern warfare. The french tanks were stopped more by lack of fuel and ammo than because of the Luftwaffe and even less because of the Panzers or AT guns that apart the AA 88 gun were rather ineficient against the french tanks.
This message has been edited by ultrarep on Feb 7, 2008 1:26 PM
The French aircraft manufacturers built some of the finest fighters in WW1. But somewhere along the line the French Armed Forces stopped buying aircraft, modern tanks and modern ships and started spending Billions of francs on concrete fortifications. French designed aircraft, tanks and ships suffered accordingly and the Germans had more advanced designs pre WW2.
Here's an article from a much respected site about the War over Holland of May 1940. Among other times in which the French are mentioned on this site, this is a summary about the French 7th Army. This is the army you mentioned as the one being ordered to move into Belgium and southern Holland.
www.waroverholland.nl
---
The French
The fact that the French 7th Army would be sent up north was already known by the German intelligence prior to the invasion date. The Germans were very well aware that the French would endeavour to safeguard Antwerp and seal off the northern front for German penetration into Belgium from the north.
The French 7th Army was a strong unit on paper, with probably the finest French General in command: Giraud. The Army comprised five infantry division [2 off which were mechanised], one tank division with light and medium tanks and one armoured reconnaissance brigade. As reinforcement another tank brigade had been attached. The majority of these units were equipped with plenty of artillery and light AAA. Later another infantry division was added to the 7th Army [68th].
The French army had no special interest in the Dutch cause. The only objective that the French were after was the safeguarding of Antwerp - by forming a screen around the Schelde - and to be the seal on the northern door to Belgium in addition to the Belgium troops along the defence-lines south of the Dutch border. That this objective would lead the French also partly over Dutch soil had nothing to do with any potential desire to contribute to the Dutch cause. The French had but one objective in Holland: form a screen around the Schelde. That the Dutch defence of the southeast of Brabant would contribute to the French assignment forced the French to coordinate with the Dutch once the first main units arrived in Holland at the 11th.
When these first French troops had arrived they were soon confronted with the Dutch Territorial Commander [TC] who tried to do everything within his power to coordinate his actions with the French. Unfortunately the French did not appear to have received any consisting orders themselves. Every time the TC met with a French officer another instruction or piece of information was given. Once it had become clear that the Germans had broken through the Peel-Raamline, the French lost every interest in the Dutch and started to plan their own strategy. They hardly involved the Dutch and when they did it was due to Dutch initiative - with exception of the French order to evacuate Breda.
A handful of French/Dutch coordinated actions was registered, amongst which the evacuation of Breda and the action around Moerdijk. Later at Bergen op Zoom and the Roosendaal district another series of coordinated actions followed. In all of these instances the French totally ignored the Dutch after issuing the orders. The attempt to coordinate a defence-line east and north of Tilburg failed. The Dutch were unable to meet their end of the plan, and the French retreated before a shot was fired. On many occasion when local Dutch commanders had been incorporated in the French plans, the French altered plans without informing the Dutch. The latter usually had to find out themselves what had happened.
The French performance in Brabant was nothing less than a disgrace. The powerful army of Giraud failed time and again to even form a solid front, and when they hd taken a position the first appearance of even German recon parties was usually enough to sent the French running away from the front. Even south of Tilburg - and later at Bergen op Zoom - where the French had plenty of medium tanks and heavy armoured cars available [against no German tank whatsoever] the French ran even before a serious engagement had developed. The action at Moerdijk - the only French action that actually mattered to the Dutch cause - was not an exception; everywhere in Brabant they ran without putting up any kind of fight. The one exception to this dramatic French performance was a local skirmish south of Breda [Ginneken], where a French company managed to hold a German force occupied during the night from 12 to 13 May.
In Brabant the last Frenchman would disappear after the yet again disgraceful French defence around Bergen op Zoom at the 13th. Although a French force with over 100 medium tanks and armoured cars defended the area around Bergen op Zoom and Woensdrecht, they were chased off within a couple of hours by two German SS battalions with no tanks whatsoever! The ran so hard that they left a considerable amount of heavy weapons and tanks behind.
Meanwhile the province of Zeeland had also received French forces. Basically two of the less able divisions of the 7th Army - the 60th and 68th - had arrived. These divisions comprised elder reservists and were sometimes equipped with old and obsolete material. Still - they brought in some additional artillery and light AAA.
The first senior French officer that set the rules in Zeeland was the Brigadier-General Durand. This man proved himself a disaster in every aspect of the word. The man managed to frustrate all Dutch senior officers in Zeeland, and was extremely stubborn. He showed nothing but contempt for his Dutch allies. When he failed to perform any effective deployment of French troops he was relieved of his command by his own superior. At Walcheren the Brigadier-General Deslaurens took over, and this officer proved a capable and decent person. When the French had withdrawn their troops into Walcheren - after the Germans had easily overrun both Dutch defence-lines at Zuid-Beveland - the General tried to form a new defence-line here, but soon all troops proved exhausted and no organisation could be established. The French were then ordered to retreat via Vlissingen. Deslaurens himself took care of organising the defence against the pursuing Waffen SS, and during this action he proved himself a very courageous man. In the final confrontation with the SS at Vlissingen, the General himself perished by a lethal head-wound from a German bullet. He is - still today - regarded a hero in Zeeland. Unfortunately this French General was a rare exception amongst an Army that failed to impress anyone. Even the Germans proclaimed that they rather fought the better equipped French than the ill prepared Dutch.
We shouldn't exaggerate the French failure in the south, for it didn't matter too much to the final outcome. Still - the French performance - whether studied with a neutral or a biased pair of glasses - can not be analysed as satisfactory in any aspect. It was stunning to learn that even during WWII - whilst being POW in a camp for senior officers - some French senior officers [who had fought with the 7th Army] had the "courage" to call General Winkelman to account for the poor Dutch performance in southeast Brabant. The Dutch General was not at all aware of the extremely poor performance of the French and had felt embarrassed. Only after the war the picture of the poor French performance started to get shape. The Belgian army experienced exactly the same with the French, when the French blamed them for abandoning them when the Scheldeline was evacuated by the Belgians - although that retreat had been executed on orders of ... Gamelin himself.
It wouldn't be fair to blame the French and not taking into account that after all they fought on foreign soil and that quite a number of them gave their lives whilst doing so. The French casualty figures in Brabant and Zeeland are not exactly known, but we know that 229 were buried in Dutch soil. These men fought and paid the highest price, whilst fighting on foreign soil for the cause and freedom of foreign people. The regular French soldier just followed orders, just like soldiers did in any nation.
The awareness of the modern warfare was also very insufficient in French circles, and although the French had the most formidable army of entire Europe - in many aspects superior to even the German army of those days - they didn't stand a change against the new strategic and tactical warfare the Germans introduced to the battle-field. The French had fallen in their own sword of arrogance and complacency.
Although the French would continue to play a peculiar role in WWII, the Free French who joint De Gaulle would later proof that French soldiers can be fine soldiers. The only aspect that the French would never learn - and what might still be seen today - is that they have the greatest difficulties with being an Ally and achieve things in close cooperation with other nations. Pride and arrogance - aspects that the Dutch officers who got involved with their French counterparts during the May War all experienced - often gets in the way of cooperation and camaraderie.
I'm affraid the autor mismatch refusing the fight and retreat and run away. The commanders of the army group of north (1st and 7th armies, commanders Blanchart and Giraud, Billotte for the group) disagreed with Gamelin about the Dyle plan that pushed the armies in Holland. They thought more realist a defense on the Escau river and they were right.
I would like to know more about the example the autor give of troops running away in disorder leaving the material on the ground. I suspect it's more complicate than that. In general the armies in Holland retreated because of orders. All in all, the north army group was not beaten: the Germans were contained in Hannut, Gembloux and Dyle.
If they had to retreat it's because the 9th army, at the right, collapsed leaving the right flank wide open.
The 1st DLM, armoured division of the 7st army, equipped with Somua, fought in Holland against the 9th panzerdivision. They contained the panzers near Breda the 11th of May. Then the 12 and 13 they contained the Germans in the chanel of Turnout. Then they held the line Oostmalle-Zandhoven the 14th. If they had to retreat it was because it was given order to do so (embarquement in Boom and Poers)
One have to realize that as soon as the right was destroyed the army had to retreat. Without fight, often, that's true. Does not mean the army was bad.
Could have been percieved like that by the Dutch though.
The autor is an historian, must know what he is talking about. May be there was failure, it's true that like most Germans general said, the french forces were either much worse than expected, either excellent but never like expected. But I'm surprised they've met such bad troops in Holland (rather bad commanders, the french don't and never fought like robots: they need good chief to fight well). I would like to have more details.
As for the coordination with the Belgium and Holland, it was horrible, that's true. One can't exclude stupidity and arrogance from commanders on the ground but the french had there own agenda. Also if nothing could have been prepared before the war it's because of the stupid Belgian and Dutch policy of appeasement with Hitler (for example the Belgian army had as many soldiers facing France as facing Germany and did zero preparation of positions for the french on the Escaut river).
ps: may be this "historian" is well respected but look incompetent to me:
"The awareness of the modern warfare was also very insufficient in French circles,"
more exactly: the Germans were in advance in modern warfare over everybody: afaik the Brits, Dutch or Beligians weren't more advanced than the french.
" and although the French had the most formidable army of entire Europe - in many aspects superior to even the German army of those days - "
saying that suggest that the french army was superior in number and hardware witch is pure ignorangce or bias.
"they didn't stand a change against the new strategic and tactical warfare the Germans introduced to the battle-field."
like said, that was true to everybody including the Dutch and Brits witch make this conclusion:
" The French had fallen in their own sword of arrogance and complacency."
completely dumb.
"The only aspect that the French would never learn - and what might still be seen today - is that they have the greatest difficulties with being an Ally and achieve things in close cooperation with other nations. Pride and arrogance - aspects that the Dutch officers who got involved with their French counterparts during the May War all experienced - often gets in the way of cooperation and camaraderie."
yeah right: 1) France and Holland were NOT allies, 2) it's NOT the french who refused cooperation before the war, it's the Dutch.
conclusion: here we go, an other moron bad mouthing on france, nothing new.
This message has been edited by ultrarep on Feb 13, 2008 10:25 PM This message has been edited by ultrarep on Feb 13, 2008 10:23 PM
The conclusion here is that France no mather how cant stand to germany by itself!
We have seen it in Franco-German war.We have seen it in world war 1 eavn with zRussians help from east.And finaly France tought it can doo it eavn without Russian help from th east and payd a tremendous price.
But the saying that France did not fought and cowrdly gave up is wrong.They did fight just as they fought in Franco-german war.Its jus that ully mobilised germany+ausria are Way To strong for France to be able to fight efectivly.
Plus!I mass add--The Germans are so good in war if you piss them off.Simple Truth.
Veles The conclusion here is that France no mather how cant stand to germany by itself!
that's true since the industrial revolution and around 1850. Why do you think France bothered with alliance ? the Franco-British alliance isn't something that came naturally you know ?
Plus!I mass add--The Germans are so good in war if you piss them off.Simple Truth.
simple truth ? well Germany never won a war in its history so I doubt your "simple truth".
First of all, there's no intent from me to randomly bash France. The only thing I want to do is bring some nuance in the perceived strength of the 7th army. If you read into the events of May 1940, you'll often find statements stressing out the wrong decision of Gamelin to send his "most powerful" army on a mission to defend Antwerp.
Whether you look into the actual battle performances of the 7th army with Dutch, German or French glasses on, you'll at least start to wonder why today many still believe this was France's most powerful army. That's a myth.
Reaver180 (Login Reaver180) Panzer Brigade(Germany)
Re: TOP and FLOP Generals of WWII
February 15 2008, 12:13 PM
"simple truth ? well Germany never won a war in its history so I doubt your "simple truth"."
I thought we went over this numerous times. Semantics do not change facts.
I've got some more time right now. Let's put some things in better perspective.
Quote:The autor is an historian, must know what he is talking about.
I think the author is a WWII enthousiast, with an almost encyclopedic knoweledge about facts and figures of the battle in the Netherlands. I've read his site with much pleasure and I was sometimes impressed with the detailed almost hour-to-hour description of the events. However, I have to admit that the scientific approach sometimes gives way to his sheer enthousiasm. I doubt the author is a professional historian.
Quote:But I'm surprised they've met such bad troops in Holland (rather bad commanders, the french don't and never fought like robots: they need good chief to fight well). I would like to have more details.
Exactly. The frustrations of the Dutch towards the French were on the command level. There have been hardly any differences between an ordinary German, Dutch or French individual soldier who all obeyed orders.
Many frustations of course are also the result of high expectations. The Dutch army was very poor equipped, while the French 7th army was very modern for its day. Many Dutch units in the Breda area on the 11th and 12th of May felt that finally the Germans were to face equal opposition. But these high expectations became a deception, according to battle-reports stating the French "running away". The withdrawal after withdrawal and retreat after retreat was also a (pleasant) surprise to the Germans, who themselves had high expectations of the French too.
Quote:Also if nothing could have been prepared before the war it's because of the stupid Belgian and Dutch policy of appeasement with Hitler [...] it's NOT the french who refused cooperation before the war, it's the Dutch.
Here you should be more careful with your thoughts. The situation of the Dutch pre-1940 (I'm ill-informed about the Belgian case) can be described as "it takes two to tango".
In the 1930's there have been discussions between the governments in the Hague with those in London and Paris about the Netherlands giving up its neutrality and becoming "an ally". However, London and Paris were reluctant to commit troops to the defense of the Netherlands. Britain didn't really have much of an army and France wanted to keep its troops closer to home.
In short, if the Netherlands had abandoned its neutrality, this would not have resulted in a reinforcement of its defences. It would, however, have made a 100% certainty that Hitler would attack.
It's a myth that the Netherlands was surprised by the German attack. The army was ill-equipped but prepared (notice that the Belgian airforce was destroyed on the ground on May 10th, while the majority of Dutch planes were all in the air).
However, neutrality offered the minimal chance of staying out of conflict. With the knoweledge of today, this may sound stupid. But knowing that for the defense of the country it didn't matter to be an official ally of to be officially neutral... I understand that policy-makers choosed to be neutral. It may had offered the 1% chance of staying out of WWII.
Vin I think the author is a WWII enthousiast, with an almost encyclopedic knoweledge about facts and figures of the battle in the Netherlands. I've read his site with much pleasure and I was sometimes impressed with the detailed almost hour-to-hour description of the events. However, I have to admit that the scientific approach sometimes gives way to his sheer enthousiasm. I doubt the author is a professional historian.
ok, my bad. Obviously the man is biased against France and that show in the last part of his article. All in all most unfair: retreat, even without fight and "running away" are two completely different thing.
If there was some unit that "ran away", leaving there hardware intact behind, I would like to have more details cause I never heard of it as far a Holland is concerned.
Exactly. The frustrations of the Dutch towards the French were on the command level. There have been hardly any differences between an ordinary German, Dutch or French individual soldier who all obeyed orders.
Many frustations of course are also the result of high expectations. The Dutch army was very poor equipped, while the French 7th army was very modern for its day. Many Dutch units in the Breda area on the 11th and 12th of May felt that finally the Germans were to face equal opposition. But these high expectations became a deception, according to battle-reports stating the French "running away". The withdrawal after withdrawal and retreat after retreat was also a (pleasant) surprise to the Germans, who themselves had high expectations of the French too.
It's not in Holland the french decided to stop the Germans, it's in Hannut, Gembloux and Dyle.
Here you should be more careful with your thoughts. The situation of the Dutch pre-1940 (I'm ill-informed about the Belgian case) can be described as "it takes two to tango".
In the 1930's there have been discussions between the governments in the Hague with those in London and Paris about the Netherlands giving up its neutrality and becoming "an ally". However, London and Paris were reluctant to commit troops to the defense of the Netherlands. Britain didn't really have much of an army and France wanted to keep its troops closer to home.
In short, if the Netherlands had abandoned its neutrality, this would not have resulted in a reinforcement of its defences. It would, however, have made a 100% certainty that Hitler would attack.
It's a myth that the Netherlands was surprised by the German attack. The army was ill-equipped but prepared (notice that the Belgian airforce was destroyed on the ground on May 10th, while the majority of Dutch planes were all in the air).
However, neutrality offered the minimal chance of staying out of conflict. With the knoweledge of today, this may sound stupid. But knowing that for the defense of the country it didn't matter to be an official ally of to be officially neutral... I understand that policy-makers choosed to be neutral. It may had offered the 1% chance of staying out of WWII.
ok so you may agree it's stupid to blame the french for the lack of cooperation, finding stupid reason for that, when nothing was prepared before the war. It's as if in 1940 the french had an other agenda where the defense of holland itself played a little role. Most historian think the french were wrong to put even a single foot in Holland. Guess if we hadn't we wouldn't have found an "antousiast" idiot to insult france then.
This message has been edited by ultrarep on Feb 16, 2008 1:54 PM
Quote:Obviously the man is biased against France and that show in the last part of his article. All in all most unfair: retreat, even without fight and "running away" are two completely different thing. If there was some unit that "ran away", leaving there hardware intact behind, I would like to have more details cause I never heard of it as far a Holland is concerned.
Let's compromise. I don't think the author is obviously biased against France. His harsh words stem from the actual very poor performance of the French on Dutch soil. Nobody can't deny that, not even the most pro-French patriot. But, since the author isn't a professional historian, he should have had perhaps more eye for the fact that the commanders of the 7th army were against the mission they were assigned to in the first place.
As for the details you asked for (the underscripts are not my own words):
Picture of two crippled or deserted French Hotchkiss medium tanks that were abandoned in Brabant. The French had a considerable number of these capable tanks available during the fights in the Netherlands, but these fine weapons were never applied in a wise tactical manner. Many were lost by simply being abandoned by their crews due to lack of fuel, jammed roads or light damage. They never engaged a single German tank during the four days they were fighting on Dutch soil. The French made extremely poor use of all their assets.
When the French of the 25th Motorised Division gave up Breda at the 13th, the units in the city centre decided that they stood a better change escaping when leaving their vehicles and bikes behind. A remarkable decision, but a nice sight-seeing location for the returned civilians afterwards.
German soldiers enjoy a break in the flooded area in Zeeuws Vlaanderen, where the hasitely retreated French 7th Army have left much able material behind. In this sector one single German SS battalion with only a handful of light armoured cars at hand managed to chase off French tanks and armoured cars as well as a shear number of French troops. Up to this day it is a mystery why the French disgraced themselves in such a way in this area.
Quote:ok so you may agree it's stupid to blame the french for the lack of cooperation, finding stupid reason for that, when nothing was prepared before the war. It's as if in 1940 the french had an other agenda where the defense of holland itself played a little role. Most historian think the french were wrong to put even a single foot in Holland. Guess if we hadn't we wouldn't have found an "antousiast" idiot to insult france then.
The cooperation the author referred to was that of May 1940, where in joint operation against the Germans, the French were uncommunicative and unreliable in the execution of made plans. This has nothing to do with politics during the pre-war period. It's only the impression Dutch commanders had from the French counterparts.
I don't know whether it was the right or wrong decision of Gamelin to send the 7th army to seal off Antwerp. But if it was wrong, then it's still not an excuse for performing so badly as it did. It's not the author who insults France; the army itself is to blame.
Dutch troops in the province of Zeeland, for instance, performed extremely poor. Am I insulting my country to point out this fact? No! The troops themselves are the ones to blame.
Up to this day it is a mystery why the French disgraced themselves in such a way in this area.
Maybe outflanked somewhere else, even far away, and had to withdraw ASAP to not get trapped in Holand when they saw that it was not the main axis of attack.
A tactical view is not the same as a strategical one sometime.
All the Belgium/Dutch story was a big blunder to begin with. They should never had been so deep. They did so for political reasons only because the french had been insulted so much (relevantly) when they've let fall Zchekoslovakia (sp?) in 1938 that the politicians felt they couln't let fall Belgium and Holand again.
In another hand:
first: it's not supposed to be the politicians to conduct a war as far as I know...
and second: the French army wasn't designed for that and they should have concentrate with a high density defense in deepth on the Belgium border (the entire Belgian/Luxemburg border, yes...)
The time to wait the new kits to come in line (impressive both in quality and quantity thanks to the amazing industrial mobilisation which began in 1938) and to finish the deep re-organisation on the way in the French army.
Even 6 more month could have change a lot of things on this issue (planes, AA guns, radios, tanks...)
And even 3 in fact... even 1 month to a certain extense (Dowetine D520 planes, AA guns, Somoa S35 whose turrets were late)
And them resume the attack around 1941.
This message has been edited by c-seven on Feb 17, 2008 12:54 AM This message has been edited by c-seven on Feb 17, 2008 12:35 AM This message has been edited by c-seven on Feb 17, 2008 12:30 AM This message has been edited by c-seven on Feb 17, 2008 12:29 AM This message has been edited by c-seven on Feb 17, 2008 12:28 AM
As for the details you asked for (the underscripts are not my own words):
thanks.
this kind of picture means very little by themselves but when we add them to what you said and what the autor said (he can't be all wrong), that mean I should do the effort to have a closer look at what happened in Holland.
Mind you I never denied there wasn't any bad behavior from our troops in Holland it's just that I have some doubt, due to the autor obvious prejudice, also because I never heard of it before and also specially because I knew it's not in Holland the generals Gigaud and Billotte chose to do the big fight. When this big fight happened in Hannut, Gembloux and Dyle those same troops did pretty well. That said, we'll never know if they would have resisted much longer even if the 9th army hadn't collapsed but still, despite constant air attacks, they stopped the Panzer in there elan when they were the strongest, something not seen until .. I don't know but even in front of Moscow, the Germans were already exhausted and frozen.
don't know whether it was the right or wrong decision of Gamelin to send the 7th army to seal off Antwerp. But if it was wrong, then it's still not an excuse for performing so badly as it did. It's not the author who insults France; the army itself is to blame.
Dutch troops in the province of Zeeland, for instance, performed extremely poor. Am I insulting my country to point out this fact? No! The troops themselves are the ones to blame.
By insult I do not mean his opinion about how the french fought in Holland, but rather the fact of calling withdrawall "run away" and specially, what I noted before, such sentences where the autor gives his opinion presenting them as fact like:
"The awareness of the modern warfare was also very insufficient in French circles,"
when the french weren't more retarded than anybody else (quite the contrary in fact), it's the Germans who were in advance,
and specially:
" The French had fallen in their own sword of arrogance and complacency.
The only aspect that the French would never learn - and what might still be seen today - is that they have the greatest difficulties with being an Ally and achieve things in close cooperation with other nations. Pride and arrogance - aspects that the Dutch officers who got involved with their French counterparts during the May War all experienced - often gets in the way of cooperation and camaraderie."
witch is plain bullsh:t specially since France an Holland weren't even allies.
This message has been edited by ultrarep on Feb 17, 2008 10:32 PM
While the 2e DLM and 3e DLM are engaged in Belgium with the 1st army, the 1e DLM (general Picard) has to fulfil a similar mission in the Netherlands for the 7th army. The French 7th army has to deploy between Breda and Turnhout but this line was rather far away from the starting line in France. The 1e DLM was to move first, to provide intelligence and reconnaissance for the 7th army and to establish contacts with the Belgian and Dutch armies. Its mission was then to delay the German troops long enough to allow the 25e DIM (general Molinié) and the 9e DIM (general Didelet) to occupy the position on the Marck River.
The 1e DLM will have to face the XVIII. Armee (general von Kuchler) including the 9.PzD (general Hubrig) and the 1. Kavallerie Division. The 9.PzD has to cross the Meuse River, to reach Tirlburg and to take Breda. It will then be split in two groups :
• a first group reinforced by the SS Verfügung (mot) division
• a second group reinforced by the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) regiment and 2 airborne troops battalions of the VII. Fliegerdivision with the mission to take Rotterdam
The Dutch troops concentrated their 25 armored cars, strong infantry and AA elements around their airfields. They inflicted significant losses to the airborne German operation. The Luftwaffe lost about 300 aircrafts in the Netherlands due to the allied air forces but also because some 220 Junkers Ju52 transport planes were destroyed, mainly on the ground by artillery fire.
10th May 1940
The 1e DLM will be supported by 2 reconnaissance groups :
• one with the 2e GRCA and the 5e GRDI under command of lieutenant-colonel Lestoquoi, which will operate with the 1e DLM
• one with the 2e GRDI, 12e GRDI and 27e GRDI under command of colonel Beauchesne, which will operate independently
Nevertheless this reconnaissance units are reduced, only the motorized elements are used, the horse mounted elements being to slow. All these reconnaissance groups include motorcycle platoons. The 2e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the 9e DIM and includes also 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H39 tanks. The 5e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the 25e DIM and includes 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H35 tanks.
The reconnaissance regiment of the 1e DLM is the 6e RC (Régiment de Cuirassiers), commanded by colonel Dario, with about 40 Panhard 178 armored cars. It is reinforced by the Lestoquoi group (2e GRCA and 5e GRDI). Together, they cross the Belgian border at 10h30 and reach the Albert canal east of Anvers during afternoon. They move beyond Turnhout during the night. The tanks of the 1e DLM arrive by train around Oosmalle, 15 km west of Turnhout.
11th May 1940
At 4h15, the first French troops are landing on the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands (Zeeland islands) during operation F (F as Flessingue) : the 224e RI (infantry regiment) of the 68e DI, supported by 1 group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA. The transport ships are escorted by 7 torpedo ships.
The reconnaissance elements reach Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven. 400 German paratroops held the Moerdjik bridge next to Breda. They have occupied the previously Dutch fortifications and are equipped with MGs, mortars AT rifles and AT guns. 1 Panhard 178 platoon (5 armored cars) and 2 motorcycle platoons are ordered to prevent the Germans to move towards Breda which is the final objective of the 1e DLM. They block the Germans with the help of Dutch infantry units.
Motorized German elements are moving north-east of Tilburg and skirmish with French advanced elements. One German tank is destroyed. Around 21h00, detachment Dudognon (Panhard 178 armored cars from the 6e RC) defend the Moergestel bridge over the Reussel River. At 23h00, 3 German armored cars accompanied by 3 side-cars and a truck full of troops appear. Maréchal-des-logis (NCO rank) Gaulthier recalls : "the leading 2 German armored cars do not see me and head for the Panhard 178 "La Varende". The first German armored car crushes 2 of our side-cars and barely dodges the "La Varende" (tearing off a mudguard on the way) and crashes into a cement pole. The second German armored car (an 8-wheeled Sd.Kfz.231 probably) stops to my left and opens fire. Meanwhile the third German armored car turns out in front of me on the bridge. I open fire with my 25mm SA35 gun and I hit it square on. The German armored cars rolls for several extra meters before stopping to my right. At the same time, the explosive charges placed under the bridge explode as the German truck is on the bridge. I was in the turret so the deflagration stunned me and I fell inside. When I recovered and went back to the hatch I saw the second German armored car still firing on my left. I pivoted the turret and fired point blank with both the main gun and MG (with AP bullets). It quickly ceased firing. The whole action only lasted a quarter of an hour. The enemy lost around 20 dead and drowned. The 6e Cuirrasiers detachment has captured 4 men including 2 wounded. The three German armored cars whose motors cannot be started again are scuttled as well as a German side-car. Two more intact BMW side-cars will replace the 2 that were crushed and we used them up to Dunkirk." The French troops had only a few lightly wounded men.
The 2e GRCA deploys in Breda and the 5e GRDI is in Tilburg after the loss of 1 armored car in an ambush. The infantry of the 1e DLM is deployed on the Reussel River between Tilburg and Turnhout, north-west of the Belgian 18th infantry division. The deployment would be satisfactory but the Belgian and Dutch troops retreat rapidly and the 1e DLM is suddenly alone to face the German troops. The Belgian army abandoned a triangle formed by 3 canals (Turnhout, Campines and Albert). The right flank is completely unprotected and German troops are infiltrating. Tilburg, Breda, Turnhout and Oostmalle are bombed by the Luftwaffe.
12th May 1940
The 9.PzD has crossed the Meuse River at Gennep and moves towards Breda. The French reconnaissance elements retreats to the Wortel – Merxplas – Turnhout – Desschel line after having skirmished with German armored elements. The movement of the 7th army towards Breda is cancelled to reconstitute a continuous front after the retreat of the Belgian army on the Berg op Zoom – Anvers line. The 25e DIM is deploying in Wortel. The infantry of the 1e DLM and Belgian troops are in contact with the enemy on the Turnhout canal and are reinforced by the 9e DIM on 13th May only. The pressure of the 9.PzD is increasing in the area of Turnhout and a German infantry division crosses the canal but cannot advance more.
13th May 1940
the 1e DLM is strongly attacked by the Luftwaffe and the 9.PzD. Movements through the Anvers tunnel are delayed because Dutch employees in charge of the air intake went on strike !
General Picard launches 2 Hotchkiss squadrons of the 18e RD (42 tanks) in a counter-attack against the German troops who managed to cross the Tunhout canal. The objectives are Moll and the bridges on the Turnhout canal. An other canal has to be crossed and only one, 8 meters long, engineered bridge enables the crossing of tanks but only the lighter ones. The Somua S35 tanks cannot be engaged. 1 German battalion is forced to retreat from Moll but the bridges are strongly defended by AT guns and infantry. Without infantry the French attack cannot go on. Several German AT guns are destroyed or crushed and the enemy infantry sustained losses. Several French tanks are damaged but only when engaged at close range. At the end of the day, receiving no infantry support to open the way, the French tanks have to move back.
The French troops in the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands are reinforced by the 271e RI, motorized elements of the 68e GRDI and 1 engineer company.
14th May 1940
The 1e DLM is attacked south of Berg op Zoom and defeats the Germans. Because of the context of the German breakthrough in Sedan and the very advanced position of the French 7th army and of the 1e DLM, the French troops are ordered to retreat towards Anvers. The 9e DIM and the 25e DIM are sent to the south to reinforce the French 1st army.
During this day 1 tank battalion of the 9.PzD, reinforced by German infantry, AT guns and supported by artillery fire encircles and destroys the 12e GRDI and several armored cars of the 6e RC in Berg op Zoom, west of Tilburg.
15th May 1940
Rotterdam and La Haye have been captured by the Germans. On 15th May, the Dutch army capitulates.
The 1e DLM is deployed in the area of Kontich and begins to move back at 21h00. The 1e DLM will fight hard delaying combats. In one week the division moved on more than 600 km, managing to defeat all the German encirclement attempts before being trapped around Dunkirk.
A strong German attack is launched against the French troops still in the Zeeland islands. The French 271e RI is in Zuid Beveland and the French 224e RI is in Walcheren. The French troops are completely cut from the 7th army, encircled by German troops and the 224e RI is a B reserve regiment. The 271e RI launches a counter attack but without success. The regiment is destroyed, only 300 survivors retreat to the island of Walcheren.
Walcheren is defended by the 224e RI supported by 1 group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA and the remains of the 271e RI who are completely demoralized. These troops are nevertheless supported by the fire of the French torpedo boats and by several Loire-Nieuport LN.411 dive bombers of the French fleet air arm. The canal between Wlacheren and Zuid Beveland is a poor defense since it is completely dry at low water. The French troops will resist until 17th May.
17th May 1940
The torpedo boat "Cyclone" fires 80 shells of 130mm on the main road of Zuid Beveland where German troops are concentrating. It is replaced by the "Siroco" and later by the British ships "Wolsey" and "Vimiera". During the same time, the 12 guns of the 89e RA fires 3000 shells of 75mm. Nevertheless this doest not prevent the Germans to cross the little canal separating the 2 islands, mainly thanks to the support of the Luftwaffe.
The French defense collapses and the troops have to retreat slowly to the harbour of Flessingue to be evacuated. General Deslaurens is killed in Flessingue while fighting, a carbine in his hands. Most of the French troops are embarked by the French navy but operation F is a failure. The general commanding the operation has been killed, the 271e RI doesn’t exist anymore as operational unit and 2 battalions of the 224e RI have been captured. The 12 guns of the 89e RA group have been destroyed or scuttled. Concerning the navy it proved able to land and embark troops under heavy German air attacks, only 1 British ship was sunk. http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=6699
but still nothing about troops "running away". I have to search more
Quote:this kind of picture means very little by themselves but when we add them to what you said and what the autor said (he can't be all wrong), that mean I should do the effort to have a closer look at what happened in Holland.
I understand.
Since you seem to be interested in WWII (like me) - and you say you would like to have a closer look on the events in Holland - I could (again) recommend you this site:
It has its flaws, the sometimes anti-French stance of the author may offend you, but all in all it's an informative and enjoyable read about the Battle for the Netherlands. It's also very detailed and with quite some pictures.
The Battle for the Netherlands is an episode in the 1940 Blitzkrieg that is hardly known beyond the Dutch borders. You may find the site worth visiting, to learn more about this relatively untouched subject.
As for your second post, it's nice to read a more positive view on the French actions in the Netherlands. For the sake of not making this an endless discussion, I won't address the couple of errors in it. Not everything you Frenchies did was wrong, after all.
e how arogant can a Human be/
germany won awry war ween against 1 or eavn 2 sometimes 3 nations combined.but it lost 2 world wars cus it was fighting 50 to 1 adds+still nearly succeded.
But you all copyed german military thinking,weaponry tactics,strategy,basicly all was copyied from germans.
And i garantee you that today if a war would break out Germans would inroduce something new again that awryone would copy and then brash about.
I,m sick how all those countrys say we won the war.They make it sound like they won it singleandadly.But the math of fact is no country in the world could beatn germany by it self.all of
them would be overun in a mather of weeks if fought single.
Its the allies who won!Not the Americans,not the british,not the Frenhc,not the Russians.Tey all got beatn in awry battle ween they fought single,but jointly they beaten germany at high cost.
That is the story of german Solder.A fighter awry other nation compares its forces against or copyes its method of warfare and equipment.
Germany was born out of 3 sucessful Wars. Simple as that
And if any other nation ever managed to be at the state of War with 57 other countries, (among them Britain, Soviet Union, United States and France) at the same time and survive for a year, let me know.
---------------------------------------------
A German Soldier doesnt die, he goes to hell and regroups !
schlawa!
You put it good together!I also say if any Nation survives against 57 other for 1 Month(including USA,UK,USSR)then they can say something.Germany did it for 6 Years.
On top of that germany was noot just surviving,It was actualy winning at some points of the war.No Nation has achived this nor will it ewer happen.
Germans dont have to prove to anybody that they can fight.They showed it times and again.And point
out one nation that can singlehadaly conquer germany nowdays.(no nukes involved,cus that would be the End of the World.)Germany can produce Nukes instanteniusly if it desires.probably eavn more
advanced Weapons than just Nukes.
This message has been edited by Veles25 on Feb 27, 2008 5:05 AM
I would have to say that a name left off the list is Eisenhower, why? At senior levels of command, battlefield tactics are irrelevant. Personnel management, delegation and organizational skills are what will define success. Of these Eisenhower had a multitude of issues unique to the (western) allied side, numerous personal rivalries (Patton and Montegomery being the most famous), political considerations within the allied camp, and logistical nightmares. With all those issues to deliver victory within 11 months of first contact with the enemy is certainly an achievement.
"There are no masses of people, only ways of looking at people as masses."
"But you all copyed german military thinking,weaponry tactics,strategy,basicly all was copyied from germans."
Tanks were invented by the British, as were effective combined arms operations toward the end of WWI (in fact both Guderian and Rommel were heavily influenced by those late battles, and in fact realized the necessity of a radio in every tank from their analysis of these battles). On the topic of tanks, find a Wermacht Panzer veteran and ask him what he thought of the T34. And the one fault that Germany always seems to run into, is at a geo-political or strategic level, for taking on more than they can chew. By the way there were people such as Guderian in every army around the world, only political and economic factors kept other nations from adopting the same techniques.
"I,m sick how all those countrys say we won the war.They make it sound like they won it singleandadly.But the math of fact is no country in the world could beatn germany by it self.all of them would be overun in a mather of weeks if fought single."
Actually I believe you tried this with the USSR. I think something like 76% of all forces available were committed to the Barbarossa operation, the remainder were mostly static infantry divisions which wouldn't have made a big difference in the outcome. Without the western aid to the Soviets, perhaps the Wermacht could have got back to Moscow in mid 1942. By the time the end of 42 came around most Soviet production was coming from the other side of the Urals and it is long way from Moscow to Urals, outside of Luftwaffe bomber range. Therefore the Soviets would have drowned the Nazi's in a sea of men and equipment (just like they did really).
By the way I have nothing against the Germans and certainly consider them to be one of the preeminent military powers and military innovators for the last few centuries or so, and certainly man for man they produced some of the finest soldiers this planet has ever seen. They just had bad leadership for opening part of the last century, who failed them miserably on the strategic level
"There are no masses of people, only ways of looking at people as masses."
This message has been edited by coalde on Mar 6, 2008 5:22 AM
The first patent for a tank with a Turet was by a Austrian Officer!France buyed the patent as early as 1908!........
As for Blotzkrig.........The teories what Liddle Hard produced a questionable....cus in original
Guderian book he dosent eavn mention Hard as his influence......
------------------------------------------------------
Brithish invented the concetrating effect that Tanks can produce...Thats it.....
Awrything else that made Blizkrieg was German.......Actualy Rommel Praticed Blitzkrieg style eavn
in WW1...Read his book and his Sword and Shild Tactics or what he called Advancing Turret tatctics,,,,,This will give you some kwnoledge about Blitzkrieg and its Orgins........
Those things were published far before and were crutial and one of that Main things that made
Blitzkrieg.........
"The first patent for a tank with a Turet was by a Austrian Officer!France buyed the patent as early as 1908!........
As for Blotzkrig........."
Who cares, Da Vinci designed a tank, he just didn't have the technology available to him to make it practical, the British were the first to effectively plan for the use tanks, infantry, artillery and airpower together @ Amiens in 1918.
"The teories what Liddle Hard produced a questionable....cus in original
Guderian book he dosent eavn mention Hard as his influence......"
In the original version of Achtung, Panzer you are correct, however if you read his biography, Panzer Leader he definitely mentions Hart (it's Basil Liddell Hart not Liddle Hart...that maybe why you cannot find a reference) along with Fuller and numerous other foreign officers, Guderian was actually a remarkably modest man and gave credit to influences freely.
"Brithish invented the concetrating effect that Tanks can produce...Thats it.....
Awrything else that made Blizkrieg was German......."
Look into British combined arms tactics at Amiens and you see exactly Blitzkrieg tactics (somewhat limited by the technology of the day).
"Actualy Rommel Praticed Blitzkrieg style eavn
in WW1...Read his book and his Sword and Shild Tactics or what he called Advancing Turret tatctics,,,,,This will give you some kwnoledge about Blitzkrieg and its Orgins........"
I actually have read the Rommel Papers (and numerous other books about him), pretty much everything by Guderian, as well as some of Liddell Hart works and several other of the mobile warfare pioneers of the time. In addition I am looking at my bookcase in my computer room as I write this, it contains ~200 or so books on the history warfare and evolution of tactics and strategy I have accumulated and read in the past 20 years or so. Anyway I digress (that happens as you get older), a lot of what Rommel published in his papers regarding infantry tactics (which wouldn't have been available until after WWI) are very similar to the tactics that Canadians used to take Vimy Ridge in 1917, and as I said before all tactics are evolutions of previous fundamentals updated to take into account the latest technology available.
"Those things were published far before and were crutial and one of that Main things that made
Blitzkrieg........."
The concept of mobile warfare was being developed throughout the world after WWI, different nations just placed different priorities on it. Germany , effectively rebuilding it's army from nothing had very little to lose by going with new tactics and untested theories in between the World Wars.
"There are no masses of people, only ways of looking at people as masses."
yes you are corect!guderians influence was Fuller!he observed a British manover and experience
he accumulated as a signal officer.......
As for Rommel--i give that man a Huge Credit---he complitly reformed of what Fuller and Guderian
invented......also his StossTrupps were awsome......from Infraty greift an!
But to be fair....a form of Blitzkrieg was already practiced by the Germans as early as Frederik the great....So called BewegungsKrieg!That was one of the first form of Blitzkrieg......
Its also worth mentinonitng that Guderins Book Panzer leader was Highly edited by foreign
Book Publishers and translators.........If you can speak german then i sugest u read it...
It contains alout more differences than for example british or french edition.......
But you are absolutly corect Guderians influence was Fuller........
-------------------------------
Its good that you have read some good books,unlike many here!....As for me i have accumulated my kwnoledge in last 10-12 years...But since i speak 3 languages i read different oppinions from different authors......wich is also interesting since ur will find in one language something not mentioned in the other.........a fine example for this is Meinsteins Verlorene Siege!
This message has been edited by Veles25 on Mar 7, 2008 5:09 AM This message has been edited by Veles25 on Mar 7, 2008 5:08 AM This message has been edited by Veles25 on Mar 7, 2008 5:03 AM
And on top of that they were superior in nearly every aspect.
