On the early morning of 10 May 1940, German forces invaded neutral Holland as part of Operation Fall Gelb. The German high command, including Adolf Hitler, had a very low opinion on the capabilities of the Dutch army and believed that Holland could be taken in one day. They had good grounds for this believe, because the Dutch army was badly trained and terribly equipped.
The Dutch army fought the Germans in the North at the Afsluitdijk (halting the German advance), in the middle of the country at the Grebbeline (withdrawing after three days), at the Hague (defeating the German airborne division) and at Rotterdam (surrender after the bombardment).
When after five days the Germans still hadn't decisively broken through the Dutch lines, they executed a dramatic strategic bombing on Rotterdam. After threatening to do the same to other major cities, the Dutch army surrendered.
This message has been edited by metternich on Dec 27, 2005 3:56 PM
As a student I wrote a thesis on the Dutch-British foreign relations between 1933 and 1940. A central point in these relations was a British irritation on Holland unwilling to side with the Allies. On the other hand, the Dutch high command knew that in case of war with Germany, neither France nor Britain would be able to offer military aid.
When the Dutch commander-in-chief general Reijnders realised that his army would have to face the Germans alone, he drew up a plan in which a large number of anti-tank guns, heavy artillery and light and medium tanks would have to be purchased. However, no country was willing to sell these equipment to Holland.
When the Germans invaded Holland, the Dutch army was thus badly equipped and knew that it fought a lost battle. Some commentators therefore have questioned whether it was "a right decision" to actually resist. Was it worth the bloodshed?
This is an interesting thread. I didn't know that the Dutch performed so well.
>> When the Germans invaded Holland, the Dutch army was thus badly equipped and knew that it fought a lost battle. Some commentators therefore have questioned whether it was "a right decision" to actually resist. Was it worth the bloodshed? <<
I was hoping on an interesting thread with German perspectives, but unfortunately no German seems to have read this topic.
Anyway, it's a shame that the history of WWII is likely to forget the fighting in Holland. The battle was very interesting: a daring airborne assault (the Hague), a very bloody WWI-style infantry battle (Grebbeline), etc.
I was hoping on an interesting thread with German perspectives, but unfortunately no German seems to have read this topic."
Well, I did read it. Now, not with regards to the Dutch, but I find it interesting to note that during WW2 Allied victories (even small ones usually are named and rather well known, while on the other hand German victories are usually lumped together for example Battle of France, Battle of Poland etc.
Now to the campaign itself. The airborne assaults in general were a spectacular success considering that we were the first ever to use this method in a shooting war. The first combat drops were IIRC in Norway some months prior. The Fallschirmjäger and their battles can stand up well to any Allied airborne formations.
The battles in the Netherlands and the whole campaign in the lowlands and France were much harder than the short timespan suggests. I often wonder why many accuse the French of cowardice when the German soldiers who fought them have nothing but praise for them.
The main reason the Allies lost was that they were simply outgeneralled, outmanuevered and outpaced. The soldiers themselves did as well as possible.
A question, how do you see the Dutch soldiers who fought with Germany in the Waffen SS and the Heer after the Netherlands was defeated. Are they regarded as traitors or is their prime motvation (fight against communism) taken into account?
A question, how do you see the Dutch soldiers who fought with Germany in the Waffen SS and the Heer after the Netherlands was defeated. Are they regarded as traitors or is their prime motvation (fight against communism) taken into account?
About 20,000 Dutch soldiers fought in German units, notably in the SS "Westland" and "Wiking" divisions. Fight against communism is often mentioned as a prime motivation, but I have my doubts. I would guess many of them sought adventure or tried to escape the restricted way of life during German occupation. "Fight against communism" was more used in propaganda to find volunteers.
As to answer your question: yes, I, among a vast Dutch majority, consider them as traitors.
The Dutch army had surrenderd, but the Queen, government and Navy had fled to England. Moreover, in the Netherlands Indies our Colonial army (30,000 troops) still existed. The Kingdom of the Netherlands never seized to exist and fought with the Allies during the whole war. When you as a Dutchman join the German ranks, you're a traitor. Also note that the communist Soviet-Union was our ally at that time (apart from Dutch reservations to that regime).
>> A question, how do you see the Dutch soldiers who fought with Germany in the Waffen SS and the Heer after the Netherlands was defeated. Are they regarded as traitors or is their prime motvation (fight against communism) taken into account? <<
They are certainly regarded as maybe the worst traitors here in Norway (short of the NS leadership and Henry Rinnan). The Germans were wise to put them all on the eastern front. If they had by chance come up against the Norwegian army in the west then no prisoners would have been taken.
Well, considering the first 3 executions after the war were those of servicemen who joined the SS, one could say they're viewed as traitors... They still are.
When the Dutch commander-in-chief general Reijnders realised that his army would have to face the Germans alone, he drew up a plan in which a large number of anti-tank guns, heavy artillery and light and medium tanks would have to be purchased. However, no country was willing to sell these equipment to Holland.
The same happened in the East Indies. At one point, over 1300 aircraft had been ordered, mainly from the US. But, due to the large number of requests at that point, the US was only capable of delivering a small number. One could hardly blame the US for this, though, as the Dutch waited too long to arm themselves, relying on their neutrality in WW1. Which was odd, considering they were much better armed during WW1, when both sides tried to get them involved in the conflict on their respective sides.
This message has been edited by LoupGaroux on Jan 2, 2006 8:54 AM
From David Lehmann, a specialist of May-June 1940 THE 1e DLM IN THE NETHERLANDS
While the 2e DLM and 3e DLM are engaged in Belgium with the 1st army, the 1e DLM (general Picard) has to fulfil a similar mission in the Netherlands for the 7th army. The French 7th army has to deploy between Breda and Turnhout but this line was rather far away from the starting line in France. The 1e DLM was to move first, to provide intelligence and reconnaissance for the 7th army and to establish contacts with the Belgian and Dutch armies. Its mission was then to delay the German troops long enough to allow the 25e DIM (general Molinié) and the 9e DIM (general Didelet) to occupy the position on the Marck River.
The 1e DLM will have to face the XVIII. Armee (general von Kuchler) including the 9.PzD (general Hubrig) and the 1. Kavallerie Division. The 9.PzD has to cross the Meuse River, to reach Tirlburg and to take Breda. It will then be split in two groups :
• a first group reinforced by the SS Verfügung (mot) division
• a second group reinforced by the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) regiment and 2 airborne troops battalions of the VII. Fliegerdivision with the mission to take Rotterdam
The Dutch troops concentrated their 26 armored cars, strong infantry and AA elements around their airfields. They inflicted significant losses to the airborne German operation. The Luftwaffe lost about 300 aircrafts in the Netherlands due to the allied air forces but also because some 220 Junkers Ju52 transport planes were destroyed, mainly on the ground by artillery fire.
10th May 1940
The 1e DLM will be supported by 2 reconnaissance groups :
• one with the 2e GRCA and the 5e GRDI under command of lieutenant-colonel Lestoquoi, which will operate with the 1e DLM
• one with the 2e GRDI, 12e GRDI and 27e GRDI under command of colonel Beauchesne, which will operate independently
Nevertheless this reconnaissance units are reduced, only the motorized elements are used, the horse mounted elements being to slow. All these reconnaissance groups include motorcycle platoons. The 2e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the 9e DIM and includes also 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H39 tanks. The 5e GRDI is the reconnaissance group of the 25e DIM and includes 13 Panhard 178 armored cars and 13 Hotchkiss H35 tanks.
The reconnaissance regiment of the 1e DLM is the 6e RC (Régiment de Cuirassiers), commanded by colonel Dario, with about 40 Panhard 178 armored cars. It is reinforced by the Lestoquoi group (2e GRCA and 5e GRDI). Together, they cross the Belgian border at 10h30 and reach the Albert canal east of Anvers during afternoon. They move beyond Turnhout during the night. The tanks of the 1e DLM arrive by train around Oosmalle, 15 km west of Turnhout.
11th May 1940
At 4h15, the first French troops are landing on the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands (Zeeland islands) during operation F (F as Flessingue) : the 224e RI (infantry regiment) of the 68e DI, supported by 1 group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA. The transport ships are escorted by 7 torpedo ships.
The reconnaissance elements reach Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven. 400 German paratroops held the Moerdjik bridge next to Breda. They have occupied the previously Dutch fortifications and are equipped with MGs, mortars AT rifles and AT guns. 1 Panhard 178 platoon (5 armored cars) and 2 motorcycle platoons are ordered to prevent the Germans to move towards Breda which is the final objective of the 1e DLM. They block the Germans with the help of Dutch infantry units.
Motorized German elements are moving north-east of Tilburg and skirmish with French advanced elements. One German tank is destroyed. Around 21h00, detachment Dudognon (Panhard 178 armored cars from the 6e RC) defend the Moergestel bridge over the Reussel River. At 23h00, 3 German armored cars accompanied by 3 side-cars and a truck full of troops appear. Maréchal-des-logis (NCO rank) Gaulthier recalls : "the leading 2 German armored cars do not see me and head for the Panhard 178 "La Varende". The first German armored car crushes 2 of our side-cars and barely dodges the "La Varende" (tearing off a mudguard on the way) and crashes into a cement pole. The second German armored car (an 8-wheeled Sd.Kfz.231 probably) stops to my left and opens fire. Meanwhile the third German armored car turns out in front of me on the bridge. I open fire with my 25mm SA35 gun and I hit it square on. The German armored cars rolls for several extra meters before stopping to my right. At the same time, the explosive charges placed under the bridge explode as the German truck is on the bridge. I was in the turret so the deflagration stunned me and I fell inside. When I recovered and went back to the hatch I saw the second German armored car still firing on my left. I pivoted the turret and fired point blank with both the main gun and MG (with AP bullets). It quickly ceased firing. The whole action only lasted a quarter of an hour. The enemy lost around 20 dead and drowned. The 6e Cuirrasiers detachment has captured 4 men including 2 wounded. The three German armored cars whose motors cannot be started again are scuttled as well as a German side-car. Two more intact BMW side-cars will replace the 2 that were crushed and we used them up to Dunkirk." The French troops had only a few lightly wounded men.
The 2e GRCA deploys in Breda and the 5e GRDI is in Tilburg after the loss of 1 armored car in an ambush. The infantry of the 1e DLM is deployed on the Reussel River between Tilburg and Turnhout, north-west of the Belgian 18th infantry division. The deployment would be satisfactory but the Belgian and Dutch troops retreat rapidly and the 1e DLM is suddenly alone to face the German troops. The Belgian army abandoned a triangle formed by 3 canals (Turnhout, Campines and Albert). The right flank is completely unprotected and German troops are infiltrating. Tilburg, Breda, Turnhout and Oostmalle are bombed by the Luftwaffe.
12th May 1940
The 9.PzD has crossed the Meuse River at Gennep and moves towards Breda. The French reconnaissance elements retreats to the Wortel – Merxplas – Turnhout – Desschel line after having skirmished with German armored elements. The movement of the 7th army towards Breda is cancelled to reconstitute a continuous front after the retreat of the Belgian army on the Berg op Zoom – Anvers line. The 25e DIM is deploying in Wortel. The infantry of the 1e DLM and Belgian troops are in contact with the enemy on the Turnhout canal and are reinforced by the 9e DIM on 13th May only. The pressure of the 9.PzD is increasing in the area of Turnhout and a German infantry division crosses the canal but cannot advance more.
13th May 1940
the 1e DLM is strongly attacked by the Luftwaffe and the 9.PzD. Movements through the Anvers tunnel are delayed because Dutch employees in charge of the air intake went on strike !
General Picard launches 2 Hotchkiss squadrons of the 18e RD (42 tanks) in a counter-attack against the German troops who managed to cross the Tunhout canal. The objectives are Moll and the bridges on the Turnhout canal. An other canal has to be crossed and only one, 8 meters long, engineered bridge enables the crossing of tanks but only the lighter ones. The Somua S35 tanks cannot be engaged. 1 German battalion is forced to retreat from Moll but the bridges are strongly defended by AT guns and infantry. Without infantry the French attack cannot go on. Several German AT guns are destroyed or crushed and the enemy infantry sustained losses. Several French tanks are damaged but only when engaged at close range. At the end of the day, receiving no infantry support to open the way, the French tanks have to move back.
The French troops in the Walcheren and Zuid Beveland islands are reinforced by the 271e RI, motorized elements of the 68e GRDI and 1 engineer company.
14th May 1940
The 1e DLM is attacked south of Berg op Zoom and defeats the Germans. Because of the context of the German breakthrough in Sedan and the very advanced position of the French 7th army and of the 1e DLM, the French troops are ordered to retreat towards Anvers. The 9e DIM and the 25e DIM are sent to the south to reinforce the French 1st army.
During this day 1 tank battalion of the 9.PzD, reinforced by German infantry, AT guns and supported by artillery fire encircles and destroys the 12e GRDI and several armored cars of the 6e RC in Berg op Zoom, west of Tilburg.
15th May 1940
Rotterdam and La Haye have been captured by the Germans. On 15th May, the Dutch army capitulates.
The 1e DLM is deployed in the area of Kontich and begins to move back at 21h00. The 1e DLM will fight hard delaying combats. In one week the division moved on more than 600 km, managing to defeat all the German encirclement attempts before being trapped around Dunkirk.
A strong German attack is launched against the French troops still in the Zeeland islands. The French 271e RI is in Zuid Beveland and the French 224e RI is in Walcheren. The French troops are completely cut from the 7th army, encircled by German troops and the 224e RI is a B reserve regiment. The 271e RI launches a counter attack but without success. The regiment is destroyed, only 300 survivors retreat to the island of Walcheren.
Walcheren is defended by the 224e RI supported by 1 group (12 75mm Mle1897 field guns) of the 89e RA and the remains of the 271e RI who are completely demoralized. These troops are nevertheless supported by the fire of the French torpedo boats and by several Loire-Nieuport LN.411 dive bombers of the French fleet air arm. The canal between Wlacheren and Zuid Beveland is a poor defense since it is completely dry at low water. The French troops will resist until 17th May.
17th May 1940
The torpedo boat "Cyclone" fires 80 shells of 130mm on the main road of Zuid Beveland where German troops are concentrating. It is replaced by the "Siroco" and later by the British ships "Wolsey" and "Vimiera". During the same time, the 12 guns of the 89e RA fires 3000 shells of 75mm. Nevertheless this doest not prevent the Germans to cross the little canal separating the 2 islands, mainly thanks to the support of the Luftwaffe.
The French defense collapses and the troops have to retreat slowly to the harbour of Flessingue to be evacuated. General Deslaurens is killed in Flessingue while fighting, a carbine in his hands. Most of the French troops are embarked by the French navy but operation F is a failure. The general commanding the operation has been killed, the 271e RI doesn’t exist anymore as operational unit and 2 battalions of the 224e RI have been captured. The 12 guns of the 89e RA group have been destroyed or scuttled. Concerning the navy it proved able to land and embark troops under heavy German air attacks, only 1 British ship was sunk.
Thanks Roland for your addition. It's interesting that Dutch authors are quite critical towards the French 7th Army:
The promised French attack on the Moerdijk bridges with French armoured forces was actually carried out, but not in a very aggressive way. Contact with the Dutch commanders were awkward. After a German bombing attack the French rapidly retreated to Breda. [..] By prematurely breaking off the attack on the Moerdijk, the French enabled the German 9th Armoured Division to penetrate almost unopposed to the Moerdijk bridges. http://www.grebbeberg.nl/grebbeberg/uk_summary.html
Without a hint of rancor, Doorman also points out that although relatively strong French forces arrived in the Netherlands on 11 May, they also proved unable to stand up to the German assault. "If these [French] troops had succeeded in arresting the German advance on the line Turnhout-Tilburg or Turnhout-Breda...the campaign in Holland would have taken an entirely different course." http://stonebooks.com/archives/050501.shtml
Do you know something about the origins of the French 7th Army? I've heard many North Africans (Moroccans) fought in it.
As the Dutch waited too long to arm themselves, relying on their neutrality in WW1.
"It takes two to tango". The strict Dutch neutrality is a hard myth. If Britain had offered military support, say in 1936 or 1937, the Hague would immediately have said "yes, please!", thereby abandoning its neutrality policy.
Britain had informed the Dutch on many occasions that it would be unable to provice military aid. Holland sticked to neutrality, mainly because there was no alternative.
Thanks Roland for your addition. It's interesting that Dutch authors are quite critical towards the French 7th Army:
The promised French attack on the Moerdijk bridges with French armoured forces was actually carried out, but not in a very aggressive way. Contact with the Dutch commanders were awkward. After a German bombing attack the French rapidly retreated to Breda. [..] By prematurely breaking off the attack on the Moerdijk, the French enabled the German 9th Armoured Division to penetrate almost unopposed to the Moerdijk bridges. http://www.grebbeberg.nl/grebbeberg/uk_summary.html
Most probably, the unit the Dutch saw were just the reconaissance element sent forward of the 1st DLM:
"The reconnaissance elements reach Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven. 400 German paratroops held the Moerdjik bridge next to Breda. They have occupied the previously Dutch fortifications and are equipped with MGs, mortars AT rifles and AT guns. 1 Panhard 178 platoon (5 armored cars) and 2 motorcycle platoons are ordered to prevent the Germans to move towards Breda which is the final objective of the 1e DLM. They block the Germans with the help of Dutch infantry units."
I think this well illustrate the poor coodination between the French and the Belgian/Dutch during this campaign due to the Belgian/Dutch refusal to communicate with the allies before the invasion began because they didn't want to "provocate" the Germans.
That created misunderstanding that last even today.
Quote:The promised French attack on the Moerdijk bridges with French armoured forces was actually carried out, but not in a very aggressive way. Contact with the Dutch commanders were awkward. After a German bombing attack the French rapidly retreated to Breda. [..] By prematurely breaking off the attack on the Moerdijk, the French enabled the German 9th Armoured Division to penetrate almost unopposed to the Moerdijk bridges. http://www.grebbeberg.nl/grebbeberg/uk_summary.html
Without a hint of rancor, Doorman also points out that although relatively strong French forces arrived in the Netherlands on 11 May, they also proved unable to stand up to the German assault. "If these [French] troops had succeeded in arresting the German advance on the line Turnhout-Tilburg or Turnhout-Breda...the campaign in Holland would have taken an entirely different course." http://stonebooks.com/archives/050501.shtml
In fact, I believe countries like Belgium and the netherland shouldn't be given any help (not to mention due to Belgian opposition the Maginot was never complete).
THe biggest mistake that the french forces made was to ignore report of German movement through the ardennes. The battle of Holland was infact of minor importance--at most a diversion; it was German maneuvers through Ardennes that was the killing blow; it caused the french and allies structure to collapse, creating a sort of chaos, while the German retained perfect order and before that I would say the war was going well for France better than WW1 in fact. If Hitler had stuck to the original plan and invaded through the netherland only, that war would have been exactly similar to WW1, the German troops would have been stopped somewhere near Marne, by that time french industry would have been working at full speed.
The German were scoring victories after victories but unlike WW1 they had more vision with that Ardennes maneuvre, this can only prove the point that I've been arguing so many time, war is about maneuver and intelligence. Equipments play a critical role only if the gap in technology between the opposing faction is too great. One might say the battle of Holland was respectable but in reality it was merely a diversionary tactics, and sending troops there was taking the bait. Guess what, the allies did just that. Instead they should have thought of Belgium and Netherland as a buffer to force the opposition to stretch it supply lines and to cause logistical constraints.
Helping the netherland and Belgium were the biggest mistakes France committed, instead they should have deployed them somewhere in btw Paris and Tournai to fill any gap as quickly as possible.
-------------------------------------------- We were not given dominion over the earth; our forebears earned it in their long, nightmarish struggle against creatures far stronger, swifter, and better armed than ourselves, when the terror of being ripped apart and devoured was never further away than the darkness beyond the campfire's warmth. -Darwin
Erix One might say the battle of Holland was respectable but in reality it was merely a diversionary tactics, and sending troops there was taking the bait. Guess what, the allies did just that. Instead they should have thought of Belgium and Netherland as a buffer to force the opposition to stretch it supply lines and to cause logistical constraints.
True. Not only that but we sent our best troops in Belgium/Holland, notably the only tank corps we had: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd DLM with 300-400 tank each.
In Belgium and Holland, each French division, composed of good troops had to defend a 5-7 km front.
Along the Maginot line, the ratio was about the same with the help of heavy fortifications.
On the Ardenne front, the 9th army, not only it was unexperienced troops but also each division had to protect a 20-30 km front.
The stupidity of the French hight command of this time is unmatchable. Those Georges, Corap, Huntzinger were all semi senile fat cats with the most idiot of all at there head: Gamelin. That's a pity considering the remarquable generals France had at the lower level: those Juin, De Larminat, Hauteclocque/Leclerc, De Lattre, even De Gaulle, that illustrated later with the Free French in Italy, Provence, Alsace and Germany.
This message has been edited by ultrarep on Jan 3, 2006 9:12 AM
Hi,
I remember reading somewhere about a brigade of Dutch Marines in Rotterdam who were awaiting transfer to the Dutch East Indies in May, 1940. They were lacking most of their heavy weapons as most of their equipment had been sent ahead of them to SE Asia, but they gave the Germans alot of determined resistance just the same.
Hi,
I remember reading somewhere about a brigade of Dutch Marines in Rotterdam who were awaiting transfer to the Dutch East Indies in May, 1940. They were lacking most of their heavy weapons as most of their equipment had been sent ahead of them to SE Asia, but they gave the Germans alot of determined resistance just the same.
That's true; they played a vital role in defending the Willemsbridge. The German troops, who severely disliked them as every German soldier who tried to cross the bridge was shot, called them 'black devils', because of their black uniforms. However, after the capitulation, the German CO ordered his troops to salute to the marines after the battle. More can be found in the book 'De Helden van de Willemsbrug' (Heroes of the Willemsbridge), by Wim Hornman.
Roland --- I think this well illustrate the poor coodination between the French and the Belgian/Dutch during this campaign due to the Belgian/Dutch refusal to communicate with the allies before the invasion began because they didn't want to "provocate" the Germans.
Poor coordination it certainly was. However, you cannot totally blame the Belgians and Dutch. Of course they didn't want to provocate the Germans, since the Allied support they could count on was little. And, in case of the Dutch is was nihil!
Eryx --- In fact, I believe countries like Belgium and the netherland shouldn't be given any help (not to mention due to Belgian opposition the Maginot was never complete).
I'm not saying you're wrong, especially not since the Germans actually hoped that French forces would move to Belgium. The more the better!
However, there was some sense in defending the Low Countries: their airfields! Britain and France were scared to death seeing the Luftwaffe taking these airfields. Oh man, people were so scared of bombings in the 1930's.
