found this, pretty interesting. After some stupid comments on the Nazi thread on the main forum, even some French side unfortunatelly, I thought it could be interesting.
May 30th -The drama of Franco-German military rivalry, a concise history by Erald Kolasi.
Few annals in history have recorded as much drama as Franco-German military rivalry. Popular conceptions of the struggle between these titans are often confined to the two world wars, but French and German-speaking peoples had been warring for centuries prior to the modern era. These struggles reflected everything from competition for strategic positioning to deep-seated ideologies and opportunism. They were frequently accompanied by complex and dynamic alliance systems that yielded a plethora of results on the battlefield. As so often in history, victory and defeat depended more on underlying sociopolitical and economic structures than on oft-cited factors like courage or motivation. Humans are famous for personalizing and politicizing history, and the epic saga between these two combatants has, unfortunately, suffered from much of that, particularly among recent American public opinion.
If our story has a strict beginning, it would be 843, when the Treaty of Verdun split the Carolingian Empire between the sons of Louis I. The roots for what later became France and Germany were sown here, and the new powers, West Francia (later France) and East Francia (later Germany), conducted several wars over the next century to settle outstanding issues that mostly concerned territorial authority. The early part of these struggles occurred between Charles the Bald and Louis the German, who had earlier fought and won together at Fontenay (841) to restrict the ambitions of their brother Lothair. Louis invaded West Francia in 858 to overthrow an unpopular Charles, and although militarily successful because of light opposition, he eventually turned back upon realizing that he would not be crowned king of the West Franks. When Louis died in 876, Charles struck back in an attempt to capture East Francia, only to be badly beaten at the Battle of Andernach on October 8 of the same year.
After Andernach, large-scale military encounters between the two would have to wait until after the reign of Charles the Fat, who for a while was king of both East and West Francia. After Charles died, Odo became King of West Francia (888) while Arnulf was ruling in East Francia after having declared himself king in 887, interrupting the reign of Charles in that area. The two fought for three years (894-897) and Arnulf came out ahead, forcing Odo to yield some minor territory from his kingdom. In the early tenth century, a conflict emerged between Louis IV and Otto the Great over a territory whose name would haunt Franco-German history ever since: Lorraine. Louis supported the rebelling Eberhard III, Duke of Franconia, and Giselbert of Lorraine, but their defeat at the Battle of Andernach (October 2, 939) saw Franconia incorporated into Otto’s German Empire. Otto then invaded France and forced Louis to recognize German hegemony over Lorraine. Although neither side knew it at the time, the stage had been set for an explosive period in world history over a thousand years later.
These early clashes between East and West Francia were super-imposed upon numerous Viking, Saracen, and, later, Magyar invasions. It is difficult to know the extent of the impact these intrusions had on preventing the total domination by any given part of the former Carolingian Empire over the others, but certainly they contributed significantly. East and West Francia devoted a sizeable portion of their ‘national’ resources and will to combating foreign invasions. The battles of Saucourt-en-Vimeu (881, French victory), Leuven (891, German victory), and Lechfeld (955, German victory) were some of the more memorable triumphs over those invaders.
Otto’s involvement in Italy shifted the German strategic focus. The Holy Roman Empire would now be mired in controversies with the Pope and in battles with Italian city-states. The situation in France also changed dramatically; the Carolingian line of kings collapsed when Hugh Capet was elected king in 987, and later Capetian rulers spent much of their efforts controlling recalcitrant nobles and battling with the English after the successful Norman Conquest of England in 1066. As a result, from about the late tenth century until the early thirteenth, Franco-German military rivalry included mostly blips on the historical radar screen. French and German armies, however, did participate in some crusades together as allies.
The next encounter between the two was unforgettable and would change history. Before the Battle of Bouvines (July 27, 1214), the very existence of France was being threatened. Afterwards, Philippe II had become the most powerful monarch in Europe, King John of England was forced to sign the Magna Carta, German Emperor Otto IV was deposed, and the resulting political fragmentation in the Empire gutted German strength for centuries. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. How did this amazing battle come about? How did the French army defeat a larger and combined Flemish-German force in what was perhaps the greatest pitched battle of the Middle Ages?
The events leading to Bouvines are lengthy and convoluted, but they can be largely traced back to the ascension of Henry, who in the twelfth century was Duke of Anjou, Normandy, and Aquitaine, on the English throne as Henry II. The resulting ‘Angevin Empire,’ as it is sometimes called by historians, encompassed England and significant portions of France, presenting a major strategic challenge to French ambitions, which could not allow such a major power to exist that closely. The battle was preceded by the formation of (perhaps) the first great continental alliances in European history, and certainly the most significant up to that point. From 1197 to 1208, Otto IV of Brunswick (Welf) had been battling Philip of Swabia (Waiblinger) for control of Germany. Philip was murdered in 1208 and Frederick II became Otto’s new rival. Frederick allied himself with Philippe and Otto went with John I of England. By 1213, John was ready to strike against Philippe and reclaim lands lost some years ago. He would invade France from the southwest as a diversion while Otto would lead a Flemish-English-German army across the Flemish frontier.
The decisive clash took place between Tournai and Lille. The two armies deployed in front of each other and Guérin, the Duke of Bourgogne, opened the battle by leading 300 cavalrymen against the German left. The French right and German left became entangled in the ensuing melee, with Ferrand, Count of Flanders, being captured. Otto then sent his infantry towards the French center; the communal militia broke easily, but the more veteran French knights hung on and defeated Otto’s soldiers. The attack on the center had exposed Otto’s right flank, which the French now assaulted with full vigor, destroying Salisbury’s heavy cavalry. The German center was also feeling the pressure and French chivalry gradually began to carry the day; Otto fled the field and his army, defeated on all fronts, followed quickly after, but not before Reginald led a heroic rearguard of Brabancon pikemen that significantly slowed the French advance. It was a complete and total triumph.
It is futile to comment on numbers and casualties too definitively. The only certain thing is that Otto’s army probably outnumbered the French and his casualties were also much higher, the vast majority of them being prisoners. While Philippe was winning at Bouvines, his son, Louis, had defeated John to the west. Although Bouvines was not the most impressive of military victories from a tactical standpoint, it was unequivocally the most important battle in French history. Otto was deposed, replaced by Frederick, John was forced to sign the Magna Carta by his barons, and France became more centralized under the monarch. The opposite was true in Germany: a lengthy period of decentralization followed, one which undercuts our story by reducing Franco-German military conflict.
France was preoccupied with England for much of the later Middle Ages; after its ultimate victory over England in 1453, France became involved in Italy. The decades-long Italian Wars led to sharp French defeats against Charles V and Spain, which became the dominant European power in the sixteenth century. From about 1562 until 1598, the Religious Wars crippled France. Meanwhile, Germany was being gripped by the Protestant Reformation. The two did not have good prospects going into the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, outstanding religious issues plunged Europe into one of the most vicious struggles it had known up until then. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) involved almost all major European powers and laid the roots for the nation-state system and a renewed sense of Franco-German rivalry. France did not enter the conflict until 1635, but the wait for Sweden and the United Provinces was well worth it: after a slow start, French armies were unstoppable and steamrolled their way to victory after victory: Rocroi (1643), Nördlingen (1645), and Lens (1648) were all instrumental engagements that played key roles in ending the war. Turenne’s brilliant campaigning in Bavaria during the mid-1640s would foreshadow Sherman’s ‘March to the Sea’ over 200 years later. French armies brutally ravaged, burned, and pillaged Southern Germany, something that the local population would remember rather unkindly for a long time to come. Victory in the Thirty Years War left France as the greatest power in Europe and highly wont to intervention in German affairs, both militarily and politically. German states were numerous and politically fractious, an unfortunate combination when having to go against a militarized France with one-sixth of Europe’s population in the seventeenth century.
Although hope may not have sprung eternally for Germany at this point, there were hints of good news. The state of Brandenburg (later Prussia) would become the banner for German aspirations; blessed with able and determined leaders, it made several successful reforms in civil and military administration. Slowly but surely, Prussia grew more efficient and stronger. It did not yet have the power to stop French incursions-that job fell mostly to Austria, Spain, and England, whose success was mixed anyway (as in the War of the Reunions, when France overran several Spanish possessions, or in 1704, when after a deep invasion through Bavaria, the French suffered a horrible defeat at Blenheim at the hands of Marlborough and Eugene)-but it had made sufficient progress to present more than a serious challenge to the Habsburgs during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). Despite being somewhat historically aberrant, France and Prussia fought this war as allies. Both were fairly successful on most major fronts, but the political settlement simply returned the status quo ante bellum, with the exception that Prussia was allowed to keep Silesia. Maria Theresa of Austria was unhappy with the war and forged what has since become known as the ‘Diplomatic Revolution:’ France, Austria, and Russia joined together for the purpose of crushing Prussia once and for all, and so began the Seven Years War (1756-1763).
November 5, 1757. Students of military history will recognize it as one of the black days of the French army. The Battle of Rossbach shocked the French; the sting of defeat was exacerbated by the fact that they had not only lost badly, but they had lost badly to Prussia. Prior to the war, the French generally did not consider Prussia a serious contender. However, Prussian military supremacy was demonstrated in every way at Rossbach: superior drill, impressive inter-arm coordination between the infantry and artillery, and wonderful command decisions. The Prussians broke from camp, fooled the French into thinking they were retreating, feverishly marched around the French on the Janus hill, and then fell on the enemy flanks. For about 500 Prussian casualties, Frederick had inflicted over 7,000. The Seven Years War was a wake-up call for French military intelligentsia; Rossbach would not be the only defeat in the European theater, they would be beaten again, perhaps most famously at Minden (1759), but the conclusion of the war permitted a serious re-evaluation of French military doctrine. The men who began to carry out the necessary reforms of the French army were hampered by entrenched Bourbon conservatism, but the work they started would be very useful in the long run.
The French Revolution established a new era in military history. The fall of the Bourbons allowed more liberal assemblies to take chances by turning military theories into practice. Organization, tactics, officers, and the very ethos and nature of what war was about changed: the French Revolutionary Wars can be thought of as the first modern ‘total war’ because they mobilized French society in a spectacularly unknown way; mass conscription made the first entrance in human history (August 23, 1793, courtesy of the National Convention) and saw an explosion in the size of French armies. Europe now had to contend with this new behemoth. France would eventually be defeated, but not before some more chapters were added to our story.
The most significant armed meeting between France and Prussia in the early stages of the war started in 1792 occurred at Valmy on September 20 of the same year. France won. But it wasn’t much of an impressive military victory; total casualties numbered around 500 and the battle was noted more for its artillery duel than any brutal fighting. Politically, however, it was huge. The Prussians lost heart and decided to withdraw from France after the defeat. Two days later, the First Republic was proclaimed (September 22, 1792).
After victories against the first two coalitions (1792-1801), a sense of fragile peace, but peace nevertheless, hovered over Europe. Napoleon took this time to train and improve his armed forces. The French army exercised at the famous Camps of Boulogne and added the final touches on what would be a ferocious military machine. They swept forward at an alarming pace when the Third Coalition formed in late 1804 and early 1805: the Austrians surrendered at Ulm (October 20, 1805), Vienna fell (November 12, 1805), and a Russo-Austrian army was famously defeated at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805). Prussia could have intervened and seriously threatened Napoleon’s exposed lines of communication and retreat; their absence from the Third Coalition would cost them dearly in 1806.
Austerlitz severely upset the balance of power in Europe. Prussia could not allow such an affront to her status, and diplomatic gaffes preceding the war only worsened the situation. Pride was at stake, and France now set out with its Grande Armée to take revenge for Rossbach. La Grande Armée invaded Prussia in the now-legendary “battaillon-carré” system: a series of corps no more than a day’s march from each other convergently moving towards a previously-set objective. 180,000 French troops stormed through the Thuringer Wald, unaware where the Prussians really were, and hugged the right bank of the Saale River and the left of the Elster. The Prussians were stationed around Weimar (to the left of the Ilm River), but split in several groups once they heard of the French advance: the main group of 63,000 went northeast to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe took 38,000 to Jena, and Ruchel, with 15,000, held a reserve role. The decisive actions took place on October 14: with an army of 90,000, Napoleon crushed Hohenlohe at Jena, but Davout, one of the greatest of all French Marshals and commander of the III Corps, outdid everyone when his 27,000 troops held off and defeated the 63,000 Prussians under Brunswick (who was mortally wounded) and the king at the Battle of Auerstadt. Auerstadt was a spectacular victory, and more than a fine revenge for Rossbach: whether it was moving with battalion columns supported by skirmishers or deploying in squares, the French did it quickly, efficiently, and with such tactical superiority that Rommel himself would have wept. This battle demonstrated the peak of Napoleonic warfare. Napoleon himself claimed that “the Battle of Jena has wiped out the affront of Rossbach,” but that does a big disservice to Davout, who was the real hero of October 14. The men of III Corps had covered themselves with glory and were the first to enter Berlin in the famous French victory parade.
Prussia’s defeat at Jena-Auerstadt was brutal, but worse was to follow. The French now unleashed themselves after the sad remnants of the Prussian army, and one of the greatest pursuits in history followed. When it was all said and done, Prussia had lost 25,000 in killed and wounded and 140,000 prisoners. After the French went on to beat the Russians in 1807, Napoleon made sure Prussia was humiliated at the Treaty of Tilsit: all Prussian territory west of the Elbe River would go to the new Kingdom of Westphalia, to be ruled by Napoleon’s brother Jerome. Prussia’s loss shocked Germany and Europe. A sense of German nationalism now acquired stronger feelings, and the desire to avenge 1806 certainly fuelled those sentiments. Even though many Germans did not like France, they saw it as somewhat of a model on what a strong, united nation could accomplish. After the French catastrophe in Russia, Prussia joined the Sixth Coalition and helped liberate Germany from French hegemony in 1813. Prussian and Russian troops marched through Paris in 1814, the year that should have marked the final defeat of Napoleon and the fall of the French Empire.
Napoleon had other designs. He left Elba in February 1815 and entered Paris by March 20. European leaders meeting in Vienna declared him an outlaw and prepared for a new war against France. The British, Prussians, and the Dutch were the only ones nearby that could seriously threaten Napoleon, who decided to attack through Belgium and defeat them. Napoleon’s advance initially caught the Allies by surprise. Wellington incorrectly read the strategic situation and could not help the Prussians when they went up against the French at Ligny on June 16. Blucher was defeated, breaking with 16,000 casualties to 11,500 for the French, but not as decisively as Napoleon believed. While Napoleon assigned Grouchy to follow the Prussians, he took the main force against Wellington. At the Battle of Waterloo, Dutch, Belgian, British, and Hannoverian troops managed to fiercely resist against all French charges until Prussian aid late in the day finally turned the tide. When the final attack by the Imperial Guard failed, the French army retreated. Prussian intervention almost certainly saved Wellington, whose center was being brutally battered after the French had taken La Haie Sainte. After Waterloo, Napoleon abdicated for a second time, Paris was reoccupied, and foreign troops would remain on French soil until 1818.
The rest of the nineteenth century witnessed Prussia taking the lead in German affairs. After defeating Austria in the Seven Weeks War of 1866, only France remained as a weighty challenge to Prussian domination of Germany. A number of German states joined Prussia for the Franco-Prussian War, and a term like ‘Franco-German War’ would be more appropriate, though only to signify ethnicities, since Germany was not a national entity yet. These additional troops helped swell German numbers and forced the French to retreat after their early incursions. An extraordinary German victory at Mars-La-Tour (August 16, 1870) was followed by the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18), where the French managed to stop and inflict heavier casualties on the Germans, but inexplicably retreated anyway. Marshal Bazaine’s army was eventually surrounded at Metz and 180,000 French troops ignominiously surrendered (October 23) after a pathetic campaign. During the Siege of Metz, Napoleon III and Marshal MacMahon had formed the Army of Chalons and marched to save Bazaine, but the Germans cleverly intercepted them and forced a withdrawal to Sedan. The resulting battle on September 1, 1870 led to the loss of the entire 120,000-strong Army of Chalons, with about 20,000 captured and 80,000 surrendering. The Germans marched on Paris but found Parisians in no mood to let them in; a heroic four-month siege with several break-out attempts followed, but with appalling conditions in the city, reason finally prevailed and Paris fell on January 28. It is said that future Provisional President Adolphe Thiers broke into tears when he heard the guns of the last fort in Paris fall silent. Meanwhile, ten days earlier, the German Empire was proclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Fighting continued, and the French managed to win a relatively irrelevant encounter at Coulmiers, but eventually the Germans defeated all organized and armed opposition.
The theme of France and the Germans imposing harsh treaties on one another, first started by Napoleon at Tilsit, continued with the Treaty of Frankfurt, which was signed on May 10, 1871. France was forced to give up Alsace-Lorraine, pay a hefty indemnity, and stand under occupation until all indemnities had been paid. The loss of Lorraine, which had been part of France since 1766, and Alsace, part of France since Westphalia in 1648, caused deep agitation between the two nations. The two provinces had traditionally been German-speaking regions, and the Germans thought it made sense that they should be part of Germany. France was irate, however, and Alsace-Lorraine became a powerful motivator for French revanchism.
Historians have debated the causes of World War I ad infinitum. Nationalism, complex alliance systems, arms races, mobilization timetables, and imperialism have all been suggested as possible candidates or in combination. Whatever the causes, the ensuing conflict was more horrible than anything humans had ever known, leaving behind at least 10 million dead from 1914 to 1918. France and Germany were both profoundly shaken by the war. The two titans gave humanity a savage redefinition of militarism, one whose horrors have never been forgotten.
Germany’s potential strategic difficulty, having to fight a war on two fronts, was supposed to be resolved by the now famous Schlieffen Plan, which called for the quick defeat of France before Russia could mobilize its huge masses. It is often said that Schlieffen’s inspiration was Cannae, but the plan had far more in common with Napoleon’s famous wheeling movement around Ulm in 1805. Schlieffen did not envisage a double envelopment; his dying words, “Keep the right wing strong,” explain the main idea behind the plan: in case of war, Germany would hurl the majority of the army through Belgium and fall on Paris before the French could successfully react. It was a brilliant plan, but Schlieffen underestimated his opponent.
The French went through a series of strategic conceptions about how to respond in a war with Germany. Early plans were defensive in nature, reflecting the numerical inferiority of the French army. Shortly before the war, however, the French General Staff adopted Plan XVII. This new plan was far more offensive than previous ideas, calling for furious bayonet charges that would be supported by equally furious artillery barrages. Like the Schlieffen Plan, though to a much greater extent, Plan XVII was hopelessly flawed in its underestimation of twentieth century warfare.
Reaver180 Good piece, I agree. There are some details I don't agree with 100%, but the overwhelming paortion is fine.
agree. enough details to make some nice flame war though
Good that this rivalry is over.
Yes. There is much more to earn kicking @ss together than kicking @ss each other.
Even, franckly, I wouldn't reject the idea of a "reunification" between "West Francia" and "East Francia" if it was based on Republican principles personally.
There are many flaws (minor) in this history, but mostly of no fundamental consequences for the long run. And I agree for the great part.
There is one that has major consequences: considering French-German history as mostly a consequence of their relationships is a big damper on history's sake. There is no "original sin" over the Carolingian heritage that would explain the different fightings between those two entities. It is not about a more than 1000 years conflict with intermisses due to civil wars or another country's arrival in the game.
To this regards, you can almost see the beginning of the rivalry to the two main components of the Merovingian territories: Neustria and Austrasia, the two main groups of noble Frankish lords battling for suppremacy over Clovis's legacy. France, and even more Germany, are not inevitable spaces: a Germany under Prussian and protestant definition was not necessarily meant to exist. Bavaria and catholic German regions could have joined a German space defined by Austria. Better campaigns, diplomacy, noble mariages and unions... could have secured the West bank of the Rhine for France (and they would have been voluntarily French like Alsatians). The everlasting Lorraine-Burgondy project (between the two countries), also called Lothringen could have succeeded at several moments... Many things could have defined other ways, other futures.
I think it is an error to see a real historical determinism or dominant logics that could last over a millenium. They can be used as political arguments, or mobilizing propaganda items, but politics and geopolitics reason on the short, or at best medium term.
For the record, I'm not trying to raise chauvinistic point of views, or anything of this kind; I'm just passionated by history, and a bit orthodoxic about its methods and necessary rigor. YEAH, I'm a maniac.
I am very doubtful about those "general direction of history" theories.
Personally, I stand for a French (with Wallony)-German unification, which would be the only real solution for a real Europe (even "a minima"): we are a small, but persisting group of lobbies and associations keeping that opinion alive in different spheres of the two countries.
Par St Michel vivent les Paras,
Pour que toujours vive la France...
Et pour qu'au nom de Dieu vive la Coloniale!
"Le fantassin se doit de calquer en tout son attitude sur le morpion, cet animal sublime qui meurt mais ne décroche jamais" (Maréchal Joffre)
Better to see a freindly rivally than the idiocy going on in the main forum.
One thing im intrested in and what this article doesnt really discuss.Is the early conflicts between the Gauls and the Teutons.I know a little about the Saxon wars with the Gauls,but most of the saxons went to England so it cant really be classed as german v french.I just cant find much out about the teutons..
Does anyone know much about this? or got any links..?
Reaver180 (Login Reaver180) Panzer Brigade(Germany)
Re: History of Franco-German military rivalry
June 7 2006, 8:45 AM
"agree. enough details to make some nice flame war though"
Hehe, it's mainly centered around his description of the Schlieffen Plan, but anyway.
"a Germany under Prussian and protestant definition was not necessarily meant to exist. Bavaria and catholic German regions could have joined a German space defined by Austria."
Germany was dominated by Austria for centuries, Prussia just rose above them.
"Better campaigns, diplomacy, noble mariages and unions... could have secured the West bank of the Rhine for France (and they would have been voluntarily French like Alsatians)."
Ehhh, no, not at all. The Alsatians became French by conquest, nothing voluntary about that. And the whole west bank of the Rhine is a big piece of land. Cologne would be partly French for example, shudder;)
Eighty-seven years later, in October 1685, however, Louis XIV, the grandson of Henry IV, renounced the Edict and declared Protestantism illegal with the Edict of Fontainebleau. This act, most commonly called the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, had very damaging results for France. While the wars of religion did not re-ignite, many Protestants chose to leave France, most moving to Great Britain, Germany and the Dutch Republic. This exodus deprived France of many of its most skilled and industrious individuals, who would from now on aid France's rivals (although some have sometimes overstated this effect). The revocation of the Edict of Nantes also further damaged the perception of Louis XIV abroad, making the Protestant nations bordering France even more hostile to his regime.
Upon the revocation of the edict, Frederick Wilhelm issued the Edict of Potsdam to encourage Protestants to come to Brandenburg.
The Alsatians became French by conquest, nothing voluntary about that. And the whole west bank of the Rhine is a big piece of land. Cologne would be partly French for example, shudder;)
Yeah, I wasn't accurate enough; Alsatia was conquered at a time were this whole area was accustomed to change their allegiance twice a decade. But after that, Alsatia was continuously French and accustomed itself to it, especially during the Revolution. German annexion in 1870 was against the will of the population; and the return in 1918 was preceded with a referendum which overwhelmingly asked for the return to France.
That was just the point; I was just saying that the rest of Rhineland could have had the same fate, as well as existing along the other lands bordering the Rhine, in an independant Lothringen; or in a GrossDeutschland, or no Deutschland but several countries, the identities of which being defined by religion, severeigns, domination logics (Saxony and Bavaria had such potentialities)...
Par St Michel vivent les Paras,
Pour que toujours vive la France...
Et pour qu'au nom de Dieu vive la Coloniale!
"Le fantassin se doit de calquer en tout son attitude sur le morpion, cet animal sublime qui meurt mais ne décroche jamais" (Maréchal Joffre)
One of the great cause of evolution in Germany has been the rising of the saxon populations, overwhelming the Frankish elites: Otto the Great is the most capital representative of this new elite, that gave to the German space one of the most determining impulse of its history: renouncement to latin languages along with the renouncement to the carolingian idea of a united western Europe, germanisation of the imperial title that Otto reraised after nearly one century of disappearance, definitive renoucement to the idea of a united christendom. This last one is one of the biggest shift in European history: it is the last death (yes,it had several) of the western roman empire, considered impossible.
The idea remained, though; Charles the Vth relaunched the dream after gathering his Spanish, Austrian and Burgondian (just after the last attempt to recreate Lothringen by a branch of the Valois family) legacies, and being elected emperor.
It is one of the other major quasi constant of French policy: the domination of the West; this slowly mutated towards a costant fighting against the Habsburg at the end of the XVth century, so not really a war against the German space, or a supposed "German idea", but a fight that includes the German Space, but mainly the part defined by the Habsburg policy: the whole Empire in a loose way, the southern part almost constantly, which is not only German (Austria, Bohemia, Moravia), that worked alongside Spain until the latter was finally crushed as a major power in 1659.
Don't ever forget what the Habsburg have represented for all Europe between the XIVth and the XIXth centuries: a gigantic attempt to re-establish the western Roman Empire. An empire not based on ethnic or language matters, but on laws and religion. It is a different conception, not limited in its territorial ambitions. This major tendancy had already been attemted by the Hohenstaufen family, between the XIIth and XIIIth centuries.
The holy German Empire, in its initial idea, was a pure saxon creation, admitting the end of the Roman dream, which had caused the downfall of Louis I the Faithfull,, son of Charlemagne, and focusing on the rule of a more limited ambition. The "Drang nach Osten" policy of Eastern Europe evangelisation (and colonization) was born of this conception.
Par St Michel vivent les Paras,
Pour que toujours vive la France...
Et pour qu'au nom de Dieu vive la Coloniale!
"Le fantassin se doit de calquer en tout son attitude sur le morpion, cet animal sublime qui meurt mais ne décroche jamais" (Maréchal Joffre)
Reaver180 (Login Reaver180) Panzer Brigade(Germany)
Re: History of Franco-German military rivalry
June 7 2006, 4:25 PM
"Yeah, I wasn't accurate enough; Alsatia was conquered at a time were this whole area was accustomed to change their allegiance twice a decade. But after that, Alsatia was continuously French and accustomed itself to it, especially during the Revolution."
Well, the territory was longer German than French, but be that as it may.
"German annexion in 1870 was against the will of the population; and the return in 1918 was preceded with a referendum which overwhelmingly asked for the return to France. "
Referendum? Never heard of that, do you have a source? Bismarck quite rightly didn't want the territory back, but pressure from the monarchs demanded the territory as spoils of war.
"That was just the point; I was just saying that the rest of Rhineland could have had the same fate, as well as existing along the other lands bordering the Rhine, in an independant Lothringen; or in a GrossDeutschland, or no Deutschland but several countries, the identities of which being defined by religion, severeigns, domination logics (Saxony and Bavaria had such potentialities)..."
Yes, of course, but this then is true for other territories (including french ones) as well. I agree with you there.
Woops! My bad. I checked out and it occurs my memory is a bit rusty.
I mixed up The return of Alsace with the plébiscite (don't know the word in English) in favor of President Louis-Napoléon becoming Emperor napoléon III: Alsace was the most Bonapartist province. In fact, the links under the monarchy were loose, very feudal-like, more aimed towards the sovereign than towards a country, the idea of which was far less developed before the Revolution and Empire era. With the Revolution, foreign invasion and the little Corsican guy, thing changed: this was the beginning of the real Alsatian francisation (and the huge role played by some popular Alsatians, like Kléber, Kellerman, Schulmeister... and local events: the Marseillaise was written in Strasbourg).
After 1870, the germanisation policy failed because of many gaffes by the local authority. But already then, a significative part of the provinces (Alsace and Moselle) had evacuated towards France.
In 1918, the return of the provinces was followed by a re-francisation policy, easily handeled thanks to the still strong Bonapartist feeling, but also opposed by autonomist movements appeared during German occupation. In 1940, 400 000 Alsatians fled the German advance; the Nazi regim then fired the Francophiles and autonomists (if you add the "despite us" draftees, the area must have been quite empty during the occupation).
A seven year commission was settled in order to put Alsatian laws in order with French ones, particularly to what regards religion. The result was made a general law in 1925: the 1801 Concordate is still in full application in Alsace (State and Churches not split, priests are civil servants, the President names the bishops), the social legislation and laws about small business have kept their validity until the rest of the country rejoined them.
The referendum was for Sarre, in 1955.
As for Alsace being longer a German territory; yes, but then again, what is Germany before the Zollverein and the definitive choice of "small Germany" under Prussian leadership, rather than "big Germany" under the Habsburg rule (and then including non-German speaking territories)?
I don't think an Alsatian (or another guy from one of the Rhinelands, Baaden, Wurtemberg, Westphalie, Saxe, Bavaria, Brandenburg-Prussia, Mecklemburg, Pommern, Schlesien...) will tell you he is German; maybe he'll tell you he is of Germanic culture, but no more. The Ottonian "Kingdom of Germania" didn't exist for more than two centuries.
That is quite the question: what are the diverse myths that goes here and there in our two countries, and yet remains or re-rise from time to time?
In France, besides political wills about the regime (still: legitimist monarchists, Orleanist monarchists, Bonapartists, absolute Republicans-no president...), what do we have, or used to have:
- the "natural frontiers": historical Gaul's frontiers (left bank of the Rhine). Always remained, as it is linked to security matters and the invasion corridor of our North-East.
- the European proeminence, in order to have our arse relieved from invasion pressure and to be able to develop worldwide.
- Centralize the country, to be able to spend money on other matters than battling local autonomist landlords (or bribing some to have them kick the ass of the other)
Here have been our main goals/pains in the arse
Par St Michel vivent les Paras,
Pour que toujours vive la France...
Et pour qu'au nom de Dieu vive la Coloniale!
"Le fantassin se doit de calquer en tout son attitude sur le morpion, cet animal sublime qui meurt mais ne décroche jamais" (Maréchal Joffre)
This article is flawed; this is the typical amateur article you would read in an encyclopedia or come across on the net.
For instance the term French and German are used incorrectly and without clarification.
The author wrote the French was challenged by the Angevin Empire in the west. Well if I had been born during this era I would be part of the Angevin. He misused the term French where he should have used the term Francilians (for ile-de-France faction). THe French, he mentioned were in fact, the royal domain which occupied a territory not larger than ile-de-france at onset (hardly representative of France). The Angevin empire, on the other hand, was centred around Anjou, and included the Normandy, Aquitaine, and French-controlled England (note England at this time was an apartheid system, the anglo-saxons were the lower class and usually separate from the french). THe Francilians are not representative of the whole France, I loathe all those amateur historians who take this fact for granted. The Francilians were challenged by numerous French factions overtime like the Normands, Angevins, and Burgundians (which was originally attached to Francia media).
The Angevins empire was France, not the Francilian kingdom, who by some miracle defeated the Angevins.
Another mistake, he failed to mention that the Frankish empire broke into three kingdoms not two. Francia occitentalis, Francia Media (Alsace, Lorraine and must of south-eastern France), and Francia orientalis. This was a major failure by the author, since it is important for the alsace issue. At onset Lorraine-Alsace were neither part of France or Germany but controlled her own kingdom. He never once mention the HRE wasn't truly an empire but a loose federation of warring statelets with no integrity with the Hapsburg (the Austrian) as protector.
Germany, as a nation, only really existed after Bismark. For instance he failed to mention Bavaria was a traditional french ally for most of its existence. France kept Bavaria as a buffer to check Austrian aggression. Germany was rarely a menace until Bismark. The Hapsburg were way a superior adversary throughout history.
Bouvine wasn't a struggle between France and Germany, but more a desperate attempt by the foolish King John, (who had lost most of the Angevins territories in France and the French conquest of his brother Richard Platagenet (Couer de Lion, known as lion heart by the anglos)) to regain lost land. His failure at Bouvine meant the French faction were trapped in England, cut off from their motherland and was forced to integrate into the anglo-saxons. This was how French lost as a language in England, but left its mark on the English language.
Overhall a very poor article.
-------------------------------------------- Pity is treason -Robespierre
This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 7:26 AM This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 4:31 AM This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 4:29 AM This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 4:23 AM This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 4:15 AM This message has been edited by Eric_De_La_Legion on Jun 9, 2006 4:12 AM
Current Topic - History of Franco-German military rivalry
