I know it's too long but it's also a very good and professional article from a neutral source.

Anyone with doubts about the origin of the dispute should read it.

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Title: The Falkland/Malvinas Islands Clash of 1831-32: U.S. and British Diplomacy in the South Atlantic.,
By: Maisch, Christian J., Diplomatic History, 01452096, Spring2000, Vol. 24, Issue 2


THE FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS CLASH OF 1831-32: U.S. AND BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC[*]

* This article is the result of several years of work in the United States and overseas, and the author is indebted to many people at home and abroad. Especially, the author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. David D. Allen, Mr. Brian G. Beard and family, Mr. Charles Brodine, Dr. John J. Finan, Dr. Louis W. Goodman, Ms. Leigh-Anne Ingram, Ms. Stacey Marsh, Ms. Geneve E. Menscher, Mark A. Sherman, Esq., and Dr. Allan Spetter for their most valuable assistance and suggestions. The author also wishes to extend his deep thanks to the editor of Diplomatic History, Dr. Michael J. Hogan; the associate editor, Dr. Mary Ann Heiss; and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

In late December 1831 and early January 1832, a U.S. Navy officer led an incursion against the Argentine settlement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and took the Argentine authorities away as prisoners. The following year, in January 1833, the British Navy ousted the new Argentine authorities from the Islands and claimed the archipelago for the British crown.[1] These events have led to some speculation -- first by the Argentine press of the period and then by some historians -- that the United States, apparently disregarding President James Monroe's 1823 proclamation,[2] either conspired with Great Britain to support the British takeover of the Islands or unwittingly precipitated the British takeover.[3]

This study revisits these events to shed more light on the role that the United States might have played in the British takeover of the Islands by focusing on the diplomacy of Great Britain and the United States. More specifically, it seeks to determine if there was an Anglo-American conspiracy or if U.S. actions precipitated or facilitated the British move to occupy the Islands. While scholars have addressed the U.S. incursion against the Argentine settlement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands previously,[4] most either have done so incidentally in the context of the long history of the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Islands or have focused primarily on the actions of U.S. officials, not on the interaction between the U.S. and British diplomats at the time.[5]

While a detailed discussion of the conflicting Argentine and British claims of sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands lies beyond the scope of this article,[6] a brief review of some of the troubled history of this archipelago allows one to place the events of 1831 to 1833 in a broader context. All the parties involved in this dispute disagree over almost every aspect of the long history of these Islands. One fundamental disagreement concerns which country can claim the right of first settlement of the Islands -- the traditional basis for determining title to territory in international law. Although Louis Antoine de Bougainville of France established the first settlement in the Islands in 1764, the Spanish crown protested it as an incursion in its sphere of colonization. Consequently, the French transferred their settlement of Port Louis on East Falkland (or Malvina Oriental) to Spain in 1766. The Spanish then renamed the settlement Puerto Soledad and placed it under the administration of their colonial government in Buenos Aires. At approximately the same time that France transferred the settlement to Spain, the British established (in early 1766) their own settlement of Port Egmont on the Isle of Saunders, a small island located in the northwest region of the archipelago. Subsequently, Spain expelled Great Britain's settlement from the Isle of Saunders in June 1770, almost resulting in a war between the two countries. Following very difficult negotiations, mediated by the French ambassador in London, Great Britain and Spain defused the immediate crisis through a convention embodied in two diplomatic declarations dated 22 January 1771.

Unfortunately, this convention failed to resolve the dispute. First, Spain's declaration restored to Great Britain only "the possession of the port and fort called Egmont [in the Isle of Saunders]."[7] This meant -- as the Duke of Wellington was to acknowledge fifty-eight years later when he was prime minister -- that Great Britain could not clearly claim to "have ever possessed the sovereignty of all those islands. The Convention [of 1771] certainly goes no further than to restore ... Port Egmont [to Great Britain]."[8]

Second, the Spanish declaration included an explicit reservation that the restoration of Port Egmont did not in "any wise ... affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty of the Malouine islands, otherwise called Falkland's Islands."[9] The British declaration, in turn, accepted the Spanish declaration as "a satisfaction for the injury done to his Britannick Majesty" but failed either to object to the Spanish reservation or to make a counter-reservation protecting Great Britain's own claim of sovereignty.[10] This meant -- as William Pitt said in 1771 when he was one of the leaders of the parliamentary opposition to the government of Frederick Lord North -- that the exchange of declarations by Great Britain and Spain "was not satisfaction, nor reparation; the right was not secured and even restitution was incomplete, for Port Egmont alone was restored."[11] There is some evidence, mostly from Spanish and French diplomatic correspondence, that the significant aforementioned British omissions actually constituted part of a face-saving agreement. Apparently, Spain allowed the reestablishment of the British settlement while reserving its own right of sovereignty in exchange for a secret promise by the government of Lord North to withdraw from the archipelago after a "decent interval."[12] Great Britain's departure from the Isle of Saunders in May 1774 and its failure to protest Spain's continued acts of sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands (which included the destruction of the very fort abandoned by the British in Port Egmont) seem to support this interpretation. But, the British government has repeatedly described its withdrawal as a measure of austerity.[13]

After the British withdrawal, Spain maintained its own settlement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and administered it from the Captaincy General of Buenos Aires (later the Viceroyalty of the River Plate). During this period (1774-1811), Spain and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Saint Lawrence (also known as the Nootka Sound Convention) on 25 October 1790. By the terms of this treaty, Spain recognized Great Britain's right to navigate, land, and settle in the regions of the Pacific Coast of North America not already occupied by Spanish settlers and its right to continue fishing in the seas near the Spanish possessions in South America. The establishment of any permanent settlement by Great Britain in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands was implicitly prohibited by Article 6 of the treaty: "It is further agreed, with respect to the Eastern and Western Coasts of South America, and to the Islands adjacent, that no Settlement shall be formed hereafter, by the respective Subjects, in [the regions] ... South of those ... same Coasts, and of the Islands adjacent, which are already occupied by Spain."[14] Since Spain had a settlement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands at the time of this convention, while Great Britain did not, Spain and Argentina have claimed that this treaty represented a de jure recognition on the part of Great Britain of the Spanish right of sovereignty over these Islands.

Spain continued to occupy the Falkland/Malvinas Islands until 1811, when -- in response to the start of and under the exigencies of the Buenos Aires war for independence -- the Spanish colonial authorities were forced to redeploy their troops from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and Puerto Deseado to their last River Plate bastion of Montevideo in a desperate and ultimately failed attempt to suppress the Buenos Aires insurrection. This tactical consolidation of troops notwithstanding, the pro-independence forces defeated the Spanish in 1814, forcing them to withdraw completely from the River Plate and South Atlantic region. Subsequently, in 1816 the Buenos Aires Congress of Representatives formally declared the independence of the United Provinces of the River Plate, claiming the Falkland/Malvinas Islands as a successor to the Viceroyalty of the River Plate.[15]

The actual Argentine presence in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands began four years later, in 1820, when the Buenos Aires government commissioned the frigate Heroina, under the command of Colonel D. Jewitt, to take formal possession of the Islands. The captains and crews of approximately fifty foreign vessels in the archipelago at the time witnessed without protest the formal Argentine ceremony held on 6 November 1820. Jewitt made a point of notifying all of the vessels (many of which were American) "of the new laws of the United Provinces forbidding hunting and fishing in the islands."[16] Newspapers such as The Times of London[17] and the Salem Gazette in the United States reported this ceremony unremarkably. The Salem Gazette, for example, printed a copy of Jewitt's circular reporting the Argentine ceremony of taking possession of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.[18]

In spite of this publicity, the governments of the United States and Great Britain did not at the time challenge the Argentine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. In fact, even when Great Britain recognized the independence of Argentina in 1825 by signing the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, the British government made no reservations against the widely publicized Argentine formal claim to the Islands.[19]

In the 1820s, Argentina continued to affirm its control of the Islands and to impose the regulations that would eventually lead to a conflict with U.S. commercial vessels fishing, whaling, and sealing in the archipelago. First, on 22 October 1821, the Buenos Aires legislature passed a law restricting the exploitation of fisheries and the hunting of amphibious animals on the Patagonian shores and the islands adjacent.[20] Second, in 1823 the Buenos Aires government formally established its dominion by appointing Pablo Areguati as governor of the Islands. Third, also in 1823, the Argentine government initiated a settlement program by granting land concessions in the archipelago to Jorge Pacheco and Luis Vernet. Fourth, in 1828 the Argentine government granted additional land concessions in the Islands to Vernet in order to facilitate his efforts to establish a prosperous colony.[21] Fifth, on 10 June 1829 the Argentine government issued a decree that reaffirmed its claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands as the successor to Spain, placed these Islands as well as those adjacent to Cape Horn in the Atlantic Ocean under one governorship, mandated that the governor reside on the Island of Soledad (East Falkland or Malvina Oriental), and charged the governor especially with the responsibility to "provide for the due performance of the Regulations respecting Seal Fishery on the Coasts."[22]

Great Britain was not affected by the specific Argentine fishing restrictions because, according to Vernet's interpretation, the British fishing rights were protected by the Treaty of Saint Lawrence of 1790.[23] Nevertheless, perhaps motivated by its own long-standing geopolitical interests in the Islands, Great Britain chose this juncture to protest for the first time Argentina's overall exercise of sovereignty over this strategically located archipelago. Accordingly, on 19 November 1829 the British consul and charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, Woodbine Parish, sent a diplomatic note to the Argentine government asserting a British right to the Islands. Parish based his country's claim on "original discovery and subsequent occupation of the ... Islands" and noted that this claim had been given credence by the Spanish when they agreed to restore Port Egmont to the British in 1771.[24] This note was consistent with the recommendation by the Duke of Wellington in 1829 to affirm British sovereignty over the Islands as a warning to other powers not to take the archipelago from Argentina and to Buenos Aires not to cede the archipelago.[25] This British protest was also consistent with a strategically minded suggestion by Sir George Murray that "the interval between the cessation of power of the Old Spain and the consolidation of that of the new governments in South America would be the best time for ... resuming [Great Britain's] former possession of the Falkland Islands."[26]

In 1831, concerned about the Argentine attempts to regulate the Islands' fisheries, the United States also moved to question Argentina's claim. In response to a specific complaint by an American businessman affected by the Argentine restrictions, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren sent a very strong note to the U.S. charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, John M. Forbes. In this note of 10 February 1831, Van Buren, without providing any legal justification, declared that Argentina could "certainly deduce no good title to these Islands" and instructed Forbes to protest the Argentine claim.[27] Furthermore, in his zeal to protect U.S. fishing interests, Van Buren apparently did not consider what legal effect his challenge to the Argentine claim would have on the question of the Islands' ownership. Indeed, by challenging the Argentine claim, Van Buren might have been opening the door to territorial claims by other countries. Since Forbes did not act on these instructions before his own death in June 1831, it was Governor Vernet's seizure of three American vessels in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands later that year that precipitated a confrontation between Argentina and the United States.

Vernet seized the American ships when their captains refused to heed his warnings -- made pursuant to the decree of 10 June 1829 -- that the Buenos Aires government was going to enforce the existing restrictions on fishing, whaling, sealing, and hunting on the shores of the archipelago. Indeed, the captain of one American vessel, the U.S. schooner Harriet, from Stonington, Connecticut, repeatedly defied Vernet's proscription, as Vernet himself later reported: "[I]n the year 1829, I found the Harriet loaded with Seal skins which had been taken in that jurisdiction. I generously permitted her to depart with her Cargo, warning her that in case of the recurrence of the offence, both Vessel and Cargo would be confiscated; and to make the notification more complete, as she returned again in 1830, I delivered the Captain a Circular containing the same general warning."[28] Ignoring these two warnings, Harriet returned yet again to the Islands in 1831 to resume hunting, sealing, and fishing. Consequently, on 30 July 1831, Governor Vernet ordered the seizure of Harriet and two other U.S. ships, Superior and Breakwater.

As Governor Vernet prepared to take the captains of all three ships to court in Buenos Aires, the captain and crew of Breakwater managed to escape with their vessel, bringing the news of the seizure of the American ships directly back to the United States.[29] Then Vernet released the captain of Superior, his ship, and his crew after the captain signed an agreement accepting Argentine authority and promising to return to Puerto Soledad to appear before the authorities when the court case against him was adjudicated. Vernet, therefore, took only Harriet, Captain Gilbert Davison, and his crew to Buenos Aires for a court hearing.

When Harriet arrived in Buenos Aires in November 1831, Davison sought the support of U.S. Consul George W. Slacum, who -- although not accredited as a diplomat -- had assumed custody of the U.S. legation's files after Forbes's death.[30] Slacum, presumably drawing upon Van Buren's instructions to Forbes,[31] reacted by sending a note, dated 21 November 1831, to the Argentine minister of foreign relations, Tomas Manuel de Anchorena, angrily protesting Vernet's actions. Specifically, Slacum complained about the forceful capture of Harriet "at the Falkland Islands by order of Governor Vernet" and stated that he was "at a loss to conceive upon what possible ground a bona fide American Vessel, while engaged in a lawful trade, should be captured by an Officer of a friendly Government."[32]

Although Anchorena assured Slacum on 25 November that the Buenos Aires government would look into the matter,[33] the next day Slacum sent an even stronger note of protest denouncing the fact that the Argentine government had not disavowed Vernet's actions and denying without explanation the Buenos Aires government's claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands:

This unexpected reply ... cannot be viewed ... in any other light than as a virtual avowal, on the part of this Government [of Buenos Aires], of the right of Mr. Lewis Vernet to capture and detain American Vessels engaged in the Fisheries at the Falkland Islands. ... It, therefore, only remains ... [for me] to deny, in toto, any such right, ... and to add ... [the] most earnest remonstrance against all measures which may have been adopted by said Government, including the Decree issued on the 10th of June, 1829, asserting a claim to the ... Islands.[34]

While Slacum's notes were consistent with Van Buren's instructions, his tone contrasted sharply with that of Forbes, who had protested effectively through diplomatic means the capture of a U.S. schooner by Buenos Aires privateers a decade earlier.[35] Indeed, Forbes's style differed significantly from that of Slacum,[36] with whom Forbes disagreed on numerous occasions and about whom Forbes had complained to Van Buren.[37]

In contrast to the late Minister Forbes's prudent style, Slacum quickly resorted to military means to press his case by asking for the support of Master Commandant Silas Duncan -- who had recently arrived in the Buenos Aires harbor in command of USS Lexington -- and by intimating military action against the Argentine settlement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.[38] Duncan denounced Vernet's actions, declared Vernet "guilty of piracy and robbery," and requested that he "be delivered up to The United States to be tried, or that he be arrested and punished by the Laws of Buenos Ayres."[39] In doing so, Duncan either did not know or disregarded the fact that Vernet had acted under the authority and by the appointment of the Buenos Aires government (a fact that Slacum himself had initially recognized in his first note of protest wherein he referred to him as "Governor Vernet" and as "an Officer of a friendly Government").[40]

Anchorena's responses to Slacum's and Duncan's communications were equally sharp. He reminded Slacum that he was not accredited as a diplomat and therefore could not present a formal U.S. government protest against the Argentine claim to the Islands.[41] Next, Anchorena warned Slacum and Duncan that if the United States took any actions that infringed upon Argentina's possession of the Islands, the Buenos Aires government would formally protest and "use every means which it may deem expedient to assert its rights and cause them to be respected."[42]

At this point, Slacum decided to consult with the British envoys in Buenos Aires, Henry S. Fox and Woodbine Parish, who informed Slacum "that England has never abandoned or given up her right to [the Falkland/Malvinas Islands]."[43] Fox later stated that he had informed the U.S. consul of the British claim to the Islands primarily to ensure that Great Britain's interests would not be affected by any negotiated settlement between Argentina and the United States.[44] Yet, Fox's reassertion of the British claim seems to have had the effect of stiffening Slacum's opposition to Argentina's control of the Islands. Slacum briefed the British diplomats on his discussions with the Argentine government, telling them -- and this is most likely the basis for much of the speculation about the possible existence of a conspiracy between the American and British governments -- that he intended to send copies of all pertinent documents to the U.S. minister in London, Martin Van Buren, because "the question now agitated may lead to some understanding between the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain."[45]

Notwithstanding this candid suggestion by Slacum to the British diplomats, there is no evidence that Slacum ever wrote to the U.S. minister in London. In fact, Slacum's behavior was ambiguous. In the same letter in which Slacum reported to Secretary of State Edward Livingston that he had informed the British diplomats of his plans to write to the U.S. minister in London, he also -- on reflection --expressed suspicion of the British diplomats' intentions. Specifically, bespeaking a position that was consistent with President Monroe's 1823 proclamation, Slacum gave Livingston the following warning: "The most powerful reasons exist why England should not be permitted to colonise those Islands."[46]

Moreover, although Fox did report to London both the U.S.-Argentine tension and Slacum's intention to contact the U.S. minister in Great Britain,[47] there is no indication of any Anglo-American conspiracy on the question of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. All available U.S. Department of State correspondence with American diplomats in Buenos Aires and London (including Livingston's lengthy and detailed general instructions to Van Buren)[48] indicates that there were only inquiries for information and not any coordination of policies between the United States and Great Britain.[49]

Meanwhile, following through on his threat and acting without specific instructions from Washington, Duncan arrived with his ship, USS Lexington, in the bay of Puerto Soledad on 28 December 1831. All the islanders interviewed as part of an investigation of the incident (carried out shortly thereafter) testified that Lexington, a U.S. Navy ship, entered the harbor of Puerto Soledad flying the French flag --apparently to deceive and surprise the Argentine authorities.[50] Under this guise, Duncan invited the Argentine authorities on board and detained them. He then landed his forces on Puerto Soledad, spiked the settlement's cannons, seized the settlers' weapons, and burned their gunpowder. Duncan also ransacked several buildings and seized sealskins and other items claimed by Captain Davison of Harriet (who accompanied Duncan). Duncan then put most of the settlers under temporary arrest, declared the Islands to be without government, and warned the settlers that they would have no protection. Finally, he departed with several Argentine officials as prisoners.

Denouncing the actions of Duncan in the Islands as well as the brusque conduct of Slacum, the new Argentine foreign minister, Manuel J. Garcia, decided to cut off official communications with Slacum.[51] The U.S. government, however, never disavowed Duncan's or Slacum's actions. Slacum's forceful defense of U.S. commercial interests was not unusual during the administration of President Andrew Jackson -- a leader who was not averse to using strong diplomatic pressure and military (mostly naval) power to promote American trade, presence, and influence in the world.[52] In fact, Slacum's career did not suffer as a result of his actions in Buenos Aires but continued with appointments in the consular service and later the diplomatic service in Brazil and Mexico.[53]

At about the same time that Garcia was declaring his intention to terminate official communications with Slacum, Duncan arrived at the port of Montevideo, Uruguay, with the imprisoned Argentine authorities on board. Duncan then asked Slacum to inform the Argentine government that he (Duncan) would "deliver up or liberate the Prisoners ... upon an assurance from the Government of Buenos Ayres that they have been acting by its authority."[54] Foreign Minister Garcia responded swiftly by asserting that the Buenos Aires government had named Vernet the political and military commandant of the Malvinas Islands and that, consequently, he and his subordinates could "be judged only by their own authority."[55]

Although Duncan did write to Navy Secretary Levi Woodbury shortly before and soon after his expedition to the Islands,[56] he acted on his own initiative and apparently had some doubts about the legitimacy of his actions in the Islands, having kept no record of them in the log of Lexington.[57] Indeed, Duncan's actions unknowingly contradicted the specific set of instructions issued by President Jackson and the Department of the Navy right after they received the news of the capture of the American vessels directly from the captain and crew of Breakwater.[58] At that time, President Jackson had appointed a new minister to Buenos Aires to explore a negotiated solution while also dispatching Captain George W. Rodgers, in command of USS Warren, with instructions to ascertain whether Vernet's actions had been officially authorized and, if so, not to proceed punitively.[59] Preempted by his fellow officer, Rodgers was left with the awkward task of returning to Buenos Aires the prisoners who had been precipitously taken by Duncan.[60]

Apparently disregarding the intent of its own earlier instructions to Captain Rodgers, the Jackson administration eventually endorsed Duncan's actions, owing in part to the fact that Duncan's official account of his actions made them seem consistent with the general directions issued by the Department of the Navy on 29 November 1831. Those directions stated that all U.S. Navy ships were "to afford protection to ... [U.S.] citizens engaged in the fisheries, and in their lawful commerce, and particularly if they ... [were] molested in their usual pursuits and trade."[61] Accordingly, Secretary Woodbury provided a strong endorsement of Duncan's behavior: "Under the circumstances detailed in your letter, the President of the United States, approves the course which you pursued, and is much gratified at the promptitude, firmness, and efficiency of your measures."[62]

Duncan's actions also changed the nature of the diplomatic mission of the new U.S. minister to Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies. Although Secretary Livingston characterized Vernet's actions as "lawless" and "piratical," he had originally instructed Baylies to seek a negotiated solution to Vernet's seizure of the American vessels. Specifically, Livingston had told Baylies to question the legitimacy of the Argentine decree of 10 June 1829 by claiming, erroneously, that it had not been published. Livingston had also told Baylies to question the legitimacy of this decree on the grounds that it impeded access to the Falkland/ Malvinas fisheries, which, Livingston claimed, the United States had exploited for more than fifty years. Finally, Livingston had asked Baylies, somewhat paradoxically, to negotiate a treaty of commerce whereby Argentina would grant U.S. vessels free access to the Islands' fisheries.[63] After learning of Duncan's incursion against the Islands, however, Livingston sent further instructions to Baylies to defend Duncan's actions vigorously.

Guided by these instructions and apparently encouraged by subsequent communications with British diplomats in South America (on whose assertions and arguments he seemed to rely), Baylies developed an inflexible attitude in his negotiations with the Argentine government. In fact, even before arriving in Buenos Aires, Baylies expressed the uncompromising position he planned to take in a note sent to Livingston from Rio de Janeiro on 18 May 1832: "My course is a plain one and Capt Duncan has saved me, as I apprehend, some trouble. Without departing from the most rigid rule of national courtesy I shall not abandon one tittle of our maratime rights. I understand from Mr Aston the British Charge here [in Rio de Janeiro] that the claim of Great-Britain to the Falkland Islands has never been abandoned, and that it has been formally asserted; recently."[64]

After arriving in Buenos Aires, Baylies sent a strongly worded official note of protest to the Argentine authorities condemning Vernet's actions and demanding satisfaction. In this note, dated 20 June 1832, Baylies described Vernet's actions as a project to destroy "one of the most important and valuable national interests of the United States -- the whale fishery." In the same note, Baylies went on to say categorically that the United States denied "the existence of any right" of Argentina to stop or restrict any American commercial ship fishing, whaling, or sealing "in any of the waters, or on any of the shores or lands of any, or either, of the Falkland Islands, Terra del Fuego, Cape Horn, or any of the adjacent Islands in the Atlantic Ocean."[65]

The acting minister of foreign affairs of Argentina, Manuel Vicente de Maza, responded on 25 June by assuring Baylies that his charges against Vernet merited the most careful consideration by the Argentine government. In this same note, Maza also informed Baylies that the Argentine government, as part of its investigation of the dispute, had asked Vernet to respond to Baylies's charges.[66] As a result of this request, Vernet began to write a lengthy and detailed report of his handling of the dispute with the U.S. ships.

Refusing to wait for Vernet's report, Baylies abruptly responded on 26 June that no explanations from Vernet were necessary because the United States not only denied Vernet's right "to capture and detain the property or persons [of the U.S.] ... but also any right or authority in the Government of Buenos-Ayres so to do."[67]

Complicating matters even further in this already tense environment, British Minister Fox intervened once more. On 4 July 1832, Fox sent a formal diplomatic note to Baylies "in order to acquaint ... [him], officially, with His Brittanick Majesty's Rights of Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." With this note, Fox enclosed a copy of the British protest of 19 November 1829 against the Argentine government's decree of 10 June 1829.[68] Again, Fox's stated intention was to make sure that the American-Argentine negotiations did not prejudice the claim of Great Britain to the Islands.[69] Instead, Fox's note apparently led Baylies to take an even harder line vis-a-vis the Argentine government. Subsequently, on 10 July 1832, Baylies sent a lengthy letter to the Buenos Aires government challenging the Argentine claim to the Islands by invoking the very same arguments used by Great Britain to support its own claim to the archipelago. Accordingly, on the controversial question of the discovery of the Islands,[70] Baylies categorically attributed it to the British explorer John Davis in 1592;[71] and on the crucial question of the first settlement on the Islands (discussed above), Baylies also attributed it to Great Britain.[72]

After receiving this letter, Maza, apparently despairing over the possibility of ever reaching an understanding with Baylies, appealed directly to the U.S. secretary of state. In a lengthy note to Livingston dated 8 August 1832, Maza protested Slacum's and Duncan's actions, defended the Argentine claim to the Islands, and justified Vernet's capture of the U.S. fishing vessels. Specifically, Maza justified Vernet's capture of the vessels by indicating that all three ships had been seized by the governor of the Islands because they had continued to operate on the coasts of the archipelago "notwithstanding the notification issued by the Argentine Government in 1829 that all vessels so doing would be liable to seizure and confiscation both of vessel and cargo."[73]

A few days later, on 14 August 1832, Maza sent a note to Baylies defending Vernet's conduct and asking for prompt and complete satisfaction for Slacum's and Duncan's offenses, as well as reparations and indemnification for the damages and injuries caused by Captain Duncan's actions.[74] Together with this note, Maza also sent Baylies a copy of Vernet's report.[75] Baylies returned Vernet's report, refusing to consider it, and defended Duncan's attack on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands emphasizing that he (Baylies) had been "expressly directed by his own Government to justify those acts." He then asked for his passport to leave Argentina.[76]

In a final attempt to negotiate a solution to the dispute, Maza invited Baylies for a personal meeting on 27 August 1832 at the Argentine Foreign Office. At this meeting, Baylies once again refused to consider Vernet's report and also declined to consider an offer by Maza that "the question might be referred for the arbitration of some neutral power."[77] Moreover, Baylies reasserted that his government had expressly instructed him to defend Duncan's actions -- which Baylies described as "a consequence of the general instruction to all [U.S.] naval Commanders, in whatever part, to protect American Commerce." Baylies ended the meeting by requesting his passport once again.[78]

A few days later, on 3 September, Maza sent Baylies his passport with a note expressing disappointment at Baylies's refusal to consider Vernet's report. Maza's note included a diplomatically phrased protest conveying the hope that the U.S. government would feel compelled "to make reparation and indemnification, with promptitude, for the real damages and injuries caused by an officer of their navy."[79]

As Baylies prepared to leave Buenos Aires, he met once more with British Minister Fox. In the course of this meeting, Baylies expressed his personal preference for a British takeover of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and intimated a quid pro quo to Fox. Baylies implied that the United States would recognize British sovereignty over the Islands if Great Britain would permit U.S. fishing, sealing, and whaling vessels to operate in the region. Furthermore, Baylies even seemed to goad Fox into having the British seize the Islands and remove the Argentine settlers so that the United States would not have to take action a second time. Baylies did this on his own initiative and in apparent disregard of Slacum's aforementioned apprehensions.[80] Baylies left the following record of the meeting in a note sent to Livingston during his return trip to the United States:
[On board] United States Ship Warren, Rio de la Plata,
September 26, 1832.

On this subject [of the Argentine claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands] I had a long conversation with Mr Fox the British Minister and informed him distinctly that nothing was claimed by the United States in the Magellanick region, but the right of free fishery, and that right would always be claimed as well against Great Britain as Buenos Ayres --and I took the liberty to ask him whether Great Britain after giving notice to the United-States of her rights to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, and formally asserting her claim to them as apart of his Brittanick Majesty's dominions, could, under such circumstances, justify herself far permitting a horde of pirates to harbour there for the purpose of annoying the commerce of the United-States.[81]

Baylies's choice of words, "I took the liberty," when indicating that he had asked Fox whether Great Britain would allow "a horde of pirates" to annoy U.S. commerce in the Islands, supports the interpretation that the implied offer of a quid pro quo to the British was Baylies's own initiative and not part of his instructions from Livingston.

Fox, in turn, also sent an equally revealing account of the meeting to his foreign secretary, Henry Lord Palmerston:
Buenos Ayres, October 15th: 1832

My Lord, ... Mr. Baylies, ... communicated to me without reserve the course and conclusion of his negotiation [with the Argentine Government]. ... Mr. Baylies [demanded] ... security from future molestation to the American fishing navigation in that part of the Ocean, by the Officers or Agents of Buenos Ayres; ... denying, in toto, the claims of the Argentine Republick to the Sovereignty ... of the Falkland Islands. ...

I found that the American Charge d'Affaires, and his Government, were already fully aware of, and prepared to acknowledge, the Sovereign Rights of His [Britannic] Majesty [to the Falkland Islands]; ...

But it is my duty to add ... that the North Americans appear to claim, further, for themselves, an original right to freedom of fishery over all the waters adjacent to the Falkland Islands; and moreover to ground this claim (as Coheirs as it were with Great Britain in America) upon the very fact of the right of Sovereignty over those Islands being vested in the British Crown.[82]

Was there a conspiracy between the American and British governments to support the British occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the early 1830s?

There is no evidence of high-level government collusion between Washington and London to support the British takeover of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. There is only conclusive evidence that commercial interests in the region's fisheries led the U.S. government to oppose the Argentine claim to the Islands, but not necessarily to support the British claim.

There is also a clear indication that American envoy Francis Baylies went so far as to favor the British claim with the ulterior motive of undermining Argentina's right to seize the U.S. vessels and with the unfulfilled hope of securing a quid pro quo from Great Britain that would allow continued American access to the archipelago's resources. Yet, Baylies's quid pro quo offer to Fox was his own idea and not part of his instructions from Secretary Livingston, and thus not part of a U.S.-British understanding. Livingston's instructions did not include the argument used by Baylies that the United States should be entitled to have access to the fisheries of the Falkland/Malvinas as "coheir" of Great Britain.[83]

This conclusion is supported by Baylies's choice of words in his letter to Livingston of 26 September 1832, as well as by Baylies's own later explanation for his behavior in response to Argentine accusations that he had been responsible for the British takeover of the Islands. In his letter to Livingston of 26 September (as noted above), Baylies chose the words "I took the liberty" when indicating that he had asked Fox whether Great Britain would allow "a horde of pirates" to disturb U.S. commerce in the Islands. Then, on 23 April 1833, Baylies sent a letter to Livingston addressing the accusations against him published in Argentine newspapers of the time. In this letter, Baylies sought to justify his support for the British claim of sovereignty over the Islands as a necessary tactic to undermine the Argentine right to capture American ships near the archipelago. Specifically, Baylies wrote: "I was instructed by my own Government to demand reparations and indemnity for captured vessels. -- The right to capture in some measure depended upon the right to sovereignty -- Buenos-Ayres claimed the sovereignty --therefore it was certainly proper -- for me to endeavour to shew the Government of that nation that it was not theirs -- and to set forth the British title in all its strength."[84]

The absence of an Anglo-American government conspiracy seems to be confirmed further by two subsequent developments. First, in 1839 the State Department (in an internal report) criticized Baylies for, among other things, endorsing the British claim in order to undermine the Argentine government's position.[85] Second, after occupying the Islands, Great Britain also moved, in due course, to restrict American coastal fisheries in the archipelago.[86]

Did the behavior of the American representatives in Buenos Aires and of Master Commandant Silas Duncan in the Falkland/Malvinas precipitate, or at least facilitate, the British decision to take over the Islands? More specifically, did the British government act out of concern that the negotiations between Argentina and the United States over the Lexington affair could prejudice British aspirations to the Islands or that, failing an agreement, the United States might move to seize the Islands? Or, did the British government interpret the U.S. opposition to the Argentine exercise of sovereignty over the Islands as an indirect expression of support for the British claim?

As early as 1829, the Duke of Wellington expressed -- in response to a proposal by a British official to reclaim the Islands before Argentina could consolidate its control over them[87] -- some concern about the "injury which will be done to [Great Britain if] ... either the French or Americans should settle upon these islands."[88] Accordingly, some Argentine critics of U.S. policy point to the fact that the U.S. actions did not go unnoticed by Great Britain.[89] Indeed, Fox reported to London, as early as December 1831, Slacum's expression of the U.S. opposition to the Argentine claim to the Islands.[90] Moreover, the captain of HMS Rattlesnake saw the damage caused by Duncan to the Argentine settlement and Parish reported it to London.[91] Great Britain also deliberately informed Baylies of its claim to the Islands to ensure that the U.S. minister's negotiations with Maza did not prejudice the British interests and protested once more the Argentine exercise of sovereignty over the Islands just as these negotiations collapsed.[92] It is therefore quite possible that the actions of Slacum, Duncan, and Baylies might have precipitated the British move.

Yet, while the conduct of U.S. officials might have affected the timing of the British occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, there are at least three reasons why one must not exaggerate the impact of the United States and Baylies in shaping British policy toward the Islands. First, while Van Buren's instructions to Forbes denied the Argentine claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, they did not go so far as to support the British claim to them.[93] Second, Baylies's offer of a quid pro quo to Fox whereby the United States would recognize British sovereignty over the Islands if Great Britain would allow American vessels to continue to fish and seal in the archipelago had no impact on the British decision to take over the Islands. Fox's letter of 15 October 1832, reporting Baylies's offer, arrived in London in mid-January 1833, well after the British government had dispatched the vessels that took over the Islands on 3 January 1833. Third, while U.S. actions represented a challenge to the Argentine claim to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Great Britain did not need to wait for such a challenge. In the 1830s, President Monroe's admonition notwithstanding, the British almost certainly did not operate on the assumption that they required American approval to pursue their own foreign policy objectives in South America.[94] Great Britain had its own long-standing strategic interest in the Islands, both as a base near the Strait of Magellan and as a convenient stopover point (and eventual coaling station) on the way to Australia and New Zealand, and did not seek U.S. permission to take them.[95]

In conclusion, while there was no Anglo-American conspiracy to support a British occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the U.S. government in the early 1830s did oppose the Argentine attempt to consolidate its effective possession of the archipelago -- thereby facilitating, if not precipitating, the British takeover of the Islands. The United States did so not out of a conscious preference for the British claim, but in an opportunistic attempt to maintain access to the lucrative resources of the archipelago.

In this context it is understandable why some Argentines find unconvincing the U.S. government's purported position of neutrality on the question of whether Argentina or Great Britain possesses the stronger claim to the Falkland/ Malvinas Islands,[96] and why some Argentines could even believe that American foreign policy supported a British takeover of the Islands.[97] First, Great Britain occupied the Islands in early 1833, at a time when the United States had diplomatically and militarily opposed the Argentine claim to them. And second, the United States did not invoke President Monroe's warning against any future European colonization in the Americas, effectively accepting the British argument that their claim to the Islands preceded President Monroe's 1823 proclamation -- the very fact that Argentina disputed. Indeed, when the Argentine minister in Washington, Carlos Maria de Alvear, presented in 1839 a formal note to the U.S. government protesting the actions of Duncan, Secretary of State Daniel Webster responded by saying that the Argentine protest could not be entertained at that time because the right of Argentina to the Islands was being contested by Great Britain "upon grounds of claim long antecedent to the acts of Captain Duncan."98

As a brief epilogue, it is worth noting that after taking over the Islands, Great Britain not only moved to restrict the activities of American vessels fishing, sealing, and whaling in the area but also seized two of them in 1854. This time the United States responded by questioning the legitimacy of the British claim to the Islands --another apparent demonstration that its motivation in this dispute had been access to the fisheries and not support for Great Britain. More specifically, navy captain William E Lynch of USS Germantown told the British governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands that he knew the Argentine government strongly denied the British claim of sovereignty over the Islands and that, according to the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790, England had forbidden itself from ever taking possession of the Islands.[99] On this occasion, however, the United States did not believe maintaining access to the Islands' fisheries to be worth a confrontation with Great Britain and did not, of course, execute another naval incursion against the Islands.


1. See Foreign Office, "Message of the Government to the House of Representatives of the Province of Buenos Ayres, relative to the occupation of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) by Great Britain, 24 January 1833," British and Foreign State Papers (hereafter BFSP), 20:1194-97.
2. See John M. Belohlavek, Let the Eagle Soar: The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln, NE, 1985), 190-91; and Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (1941; reprint, Boston, 1963), 72-74.
3. See Francis Baylies to Edward Livingston, 23 April 1833, in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, vol. 1, Argentina, ed. William R. Manning (Washington, 1932), 179-80 (hereafter DCUS, with all references to vol. 1, Argentina, unless otherwise indicated). See also Mario Tesler, Malvinas: Como Estados Unidos provoco la usurpacion inglesa [Malvinas: How the United States provoked the British usurpation] (Buenos Aires, 1979); H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), 228-31; and idem, Argentina (New York, 1969), 257-58.
4. For some of the fairly comprehensive bibliographies on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands see A Selective Listing of Monographs and Government Documents on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in the Library of Congress, Hispanic Focus, no. 1, comp. Everette E. Larson (Washington, 1982); Roberto Etchepareborda, "La bibliografia reciente sobre la cuestion Malvinas (Primera Parte)" [Recent bibliography on the Malvinas question (first part)], Revista interamericana de bibliografia 34 (Spring 1984): 1-52; idem, "La bibliografia reciente sobre la cuestion Malvinas (Segunda Parte)" [Recent bibliography on the Malvinas question (second part)], ibid. (Summer 1984): 227-88; Larman C. Wilson, "The Impact of the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict upon the Inter-American System, OAS and Rio Treaty: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography," Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, Anuario juridico interamericano 1983 (Washington, 1984): 295-343; and U.S. Navy Department Library, "The Falkland Islands: Background to Hostilities: A Selected Reading List," Bibliographic Bulletin no. 16 (25 May 1982).
5. See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History, preface and intro. J. C. J. Metford (London, 1982), 438-55; Harold E Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York, 1964), chap. 8; Adolfo Saldias, Historia de la Confederacion Argentina: Rozas y su epoca [History of the Argentine Confederation: Rozas and his times], vol. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1951), chap. 19; Paul B. Goodwin, Jr., "Initiating United States Relations with Argentina," in United States-Latin American Relations, 1800-1850: The Formative Generations, ed. T. Ray Shurbutt (Tuscaloosa, 1991), 102-21; Paul D. Dickens, "The Falkland Islands Dispute between the United States and Argentina," Hispanic American Historical Review 9 (November 1929): 471-87; and Tesler, Malvinas.
6. This study does not judge which country has the stronger claim to the Islands. Such a legal evaluation was discussed by the author in a previous work. See Christian J. Maisch, Un analisis juridico e historico de la disputa anglo-argentina sobre las Islas Malvinas [A juridical and historical analysis of the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Malvinas Islands] (Lima, 1995).
7. Great Britain, A Collection of All Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce between Great Britain and Other Powers (New York, 1969), 3:234-35 (see specifically 235; hereafter, where the text includes a quote or refers to a specific point made in the source, the exact page number or numbers will appear in parenthesis following the inclusive pages for the entire document). Please note that, to the extent possible, all quotations have been reproduced respecting the style and spelling of the texts as found in the sources used, including cases of apparent spelling errors.
8. The Duke of Wellington to Sir George Murray, Walmer Castle, 25 July 1829, in Enrique Ferrer-Vieyra, An Annotated Legal Chronology of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands Controversy (Cordoba, 1985), 69-70 (69) (emphasis added).
9. Great Britain, A Collection of All Treaties of Peace 3:234-35 (235).
10. Ibid., 235-36 (236). For the text of these declarations in Spanish see Espana, Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio que han hecho con las potencias extranjeras los monarcas espanoles de la casa de Borbon des de el ano de 1700 hasta el dia [Treaties, conventions, and declarations of peace and commerce made with foreign powers by the Spanish monarchs of the Bourbon Dynasty from 1700 to the present] (Madrid, 1843), 519-20.
11. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 366.
12. Frederick Lord North was under a great deal of pressure from his parliamentary opposition, led by the much more bellicose William Pitt, who had promoted the British effort to settle the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. For further information on the alleged "secret promise" made by Lord North's government see Enrique de Gandia, "Las Islas Malvinas y la clausula secreta de 1771" [The Malvinas Islands and the secret clause of 1771], in Academia Nacional de la Historia, Los derechos argentinos sobre las Islas Malvinas [The Argentine rights to the Malvinas] (Buenos Aires, 1964), 21-34; Jose Torre Revello, La promesa secreta y d convenio anglo-espanol sobre las Malvinas de 1771 [The secret promise and the Anglo-Spanish convention about the Malvinas of 1771] (Buenos Aires, 1952); and Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, chaps. 7-8.
13. Foreign Office, the British charge d'affaires to the Buenos Ayres minister, 19 November 1829, BFSP 20:346-47.
14. Foreign Office, "Convention between Great Britain and Spain, relative to America -- Signed at the Escorial, 28 October 1790," ibid. 1:663-67 (666) (emphasis added).
15. Argentina claimed the Falkland/Malvinas Islands under the international principle of territorial succession. Great Britain accepted this principle in Article 1 of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, when it recognized the independence of the Thirteen Colonies of North America. For a text of the 1783 Treaty of Paris see Charles W. Eliot, ed., American Historical Documents: 1000-1904 (1910; reprint, New York, 1938), 174-79 (175).
16. Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982 (Boulder, 1984), 65-66 (65). Hoffmann and Hoffmann draw on the account published in London in 1825 by an officer of the British Royal Navy, Captain James Weddell, of HMS Jane, who witnessed the event after having been invited by Jewitt on board Heroina.
17. The Falkland Islands and Dependencies, No. 152/83 -- Classification 7(c) -- September 1983, p. 2, Great Britain, Central Office of Information, Reference Services, London.
18. Foreign Office, the Buenos Ayres minister to the American charge d'affaires, 14 August 1832 (enclosure) -- Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832, BFSP 20:422 (footnote).
19. See Foreign Office, "Great Britain and Buenos Ayres Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 2 February 1825, ibid. 12:29-37.
20. Foreign Office, "Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832," ibid. 20:421 (footnote).
21. See Hoffmann and Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute, 65-72. See also Diccionario Enciclopedico Abreviado Espasa-Calpe [The abridged encyclopedic dictionary Espasa-Calpe], 7th ed. (Madrid, 1957), s.v. "Malvinas."
22. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 26 November 1831, BFSP 20:314-16 (footnote on 314-15). A copy of this decree did reach the U.S. government. See Martin Van Buren to John M. Forbes, in DCUS, 3-4 (3).
23. Foreign Office, "Convention between Great Britain and Spain, relative to America -- Signed at the Escorial, 28 October 1790," BFSP 1:663-67 (see Article 6 on 666-67). See also Foreign Office, "Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832," ibid. 20:369-436 (414-17).
24. Foreign Office, the British charge d'affaires to the Buenos Ayres minister, 19 November 1829, ibid. 20:346-47 (346).
25. The Duke of Wellington to Murray, 25 July 1829, published in Ferrer-Vieyra, An Annotated Legal Chronology of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands Controversy, 69-70 (70).
26. Murray to the Duke of Wellington, 23 July 1829, in ibid., 68-69 (69). A thorough analysis of the British decision to occupy the Islands is beyond the scope of this paper but is under review by the author for a separate study.
27. Van Buren to Forbes, 10 February 1831, DCUS, 3-4 (4). Forbes died shortly after receiving Van Buren's instructions without implementing or responding to them. Baylies suggests -- drawing upon earlier unsubstantiated accusations made by the U.S. consul in Buenos Aires, George W. Slacum -- that Forbes did not implement the instructions because his friends and associates stood to benefit from the success of the Argentine settlement on the Islands. Although possible, this allegation seems unlikely given Forbes's long record of integrity. Unfortunately, neither the diplomatic correspondence available at the U.S. National Archives nor the collection of John M. Forbes Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress (which is incomplete) help explain why Forbes did not implement or respond to Van Buren's instructions. For Baylies's allegations against Forbes see Baylies' "Private and Confidential" letter to Livingston: Baylies to Livingston, 20 June 1832, Reports of Clerks and Bureau Officers of the Department of State, 1790-1911, RG 59, National Archives Microfilm Publication (NAMP) M800, reel 2, National Archives, Washington, DC. For Slacum's original allegations see Slacum to Livingston, 28 October 1831, RG 59, NMAP M70, reel 4.
28. Foreign Office, "Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832," BFSP 20:369-436 (370).
29. Hoffmann and Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute, 76.
30. See Slacum to Livingston, 28 October 1831, RG 59, NAMP M70, reel 4.
31. See Van Buren to Forbes, 10 February 1831, DCUS, 3-4.
32. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 21 November 1831, BFSP 20:313. The Spanish-language version of this and most other correspondence between the U.S. envoys and the Buenos Aires government cited in this study can be found in Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata [Republica Argentina], Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Coleccion de documentos oficiales con que d gobierno instruye al cuerpo legislativo de la provincia del origen y estado de las cuestiones pendientes con la Republica de los Estados Unidos de Norte America, sobre las Islas Malvinas [Collection of official documents with which the government informs the legislative branch of the province about the origin and status of the matters pending with the republic of the United States of North America about the Malvinas Islands], 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1832).
33. Tomas Manuel de Anchorena to Slacum, 25 November 1831, DCUS, 70.
34. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 26 November 1831, BFSP 20:314-16 (314).
35. Forbes protested vigorously the capture of the American schooner Rampart off the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by D. Jewitt (captain of the Argentine ship Heroina) in 1821. For information on the capture of Rampart and the subsequent negotiations between Forbes and the Argentine government regarding privateering see Forbes to John Quincy Adams, 10 March 1821 (569-72), Forbes to Bernardo Rivadavia, 14 September 1821 (583-84), Rivadavia to Forbes, 15 September 1821 (584-85), minute of a conference between Forbes and Rivadavia, 17 September 1821 (585-87), Rivadavia to Forbes, 6 October 1821 (590-91), Forbes to Adams, 8 October 1821 (591), and Daniel Brent to Forbes, 19 February 1822 (145), all in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, ed. William R. Manning, vol. 1 (New York, 1925).
36. As gleaned from their correspondence, Forbes's personality was quite different from that of Slacum. During Forbes's long tenure of service in Buenos Aires from 1820 until his death on 14 June 1831, he demonstrated diplomatic restraint in his sensitive detachment from the convulsive domestic political power struggles of the emerging Argentine state. Forbes served as a special agent of the United States at Buenos Aires from 1820 to 1823, as secretary of the U.S. legation from 1823 to 1824, as acting charge d'affaires from 1824 to 1825, and finally as charge d'affaires from 1825 until his death on 14 June 1831. Dictionary of American Biography, s.v. "Forbes, John Murray (1771-1831)."
37. See Forbes to Van Buren, 27 August 1829, RG 59, NAMP M69, reel 4. Further evidence of the often tense relationship between Forbes and Slacum appears in Forbes to Henry Clay, 5 January 1827, (enclosure) [handbill prepared by Forbes of his correspondence with Slacum concerning their dispute over Slacum's attempt to appoint unilaterally an acting consul in his absence, dated 10 November 1826], Slacum to Forbes, 31 October 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 2 November 1826, Slacum to Forbes, 4 November 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 6 November 1826, Slacum to the Argentine minister of foreign affairs, 6 November 1826, the clerk of the Argentine Department of Foreign Affairs to Slacum, 6 November 1826, and Slacum to Forbes, 6 November 1826, all in RG 59, NAMP M70, reel 4. The existence of the handbill cited above was also reported to the State Department by Slacum. See Slacum to the U.S. secretary of state, [n.d.] June 1829, RG 59, NAMP M70, reel 4. See also the correspondence between Forbes and Slacum concerning their earlier dispute over Slacum's treatment of U.S. citizen John H. Duffy, in Slacum to Clay, 10 May 1827 (enclosures) -- Slacum to Forbes, 14 August 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 17 August 1826, Slacum to Forbes, 23 August 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 3 September 1826, Slacum to Forbes, 4 September 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 6 September 1826, Slacum to the Argentine minister of finance, 6 September 1826, Forbes to Slacum, 7 September 1826, the Argentine minister of finance to Slacum, 9 September 1826, and Slacum to Forbes, 6 November 1826, all in RG 59, NAMP M70, reel 4. See also Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960, 104.
38. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 6 December 1831, BFSP 20:318-19.
39. Foreign Office, Commander Silas Duncan to the Buenos Ayres minister, 7 December 1831, ibid., 319-20 (320).
40. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 21 November 1831, ibid., 313. See also Foreign Office, Commander Duncan to the Buenos Ayres minister, 7 December 1831, ibid., 319-20. As British author V. F. Boyson has noted, justice has never been done to Vernet for his efforts to settle and develop the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Far from being a pirate, Vernet seems to have been a cultivated and enterprising person. This is the impression that one gathers from his own writings, such as the report he prepared on the seizure of the American vessels, and from personal accounts of the man, such as the one given to us by the British naval officer Robert Fitzroy, captain of HMS Beagle (on which Charles Darwin later circumnavigated the world): "The Governor, Louis Vernet, received me with cordiality. He possesses much information and speaks several languages. His house is long and low, of one story, with very thick walls of stone. I found in it a good library, of Spanish, German and English works. A lively conversation passed at dinner, the party consisting of Mr. Vernet and his wife, Mr. Brisbane, and others; in the evening we had music and dancing. In the room was a grand piano-forte; Mrs. Vernet, a Buenos Ayrean lady, gave us some excellent singing, which sounded not a little strange at the Falkland Isles where we expected to find only a few sealers." See Fitzroy's own narrative of his voyage as cited in Paul Groussac, Les Isles Malouines [The Malvinas Islands] (Paris, 1910); Las Islas Malvinas [The Malvinas Islands] (Spanish edition ordered by the Argentine congress) (Buenos Aires, 1936), 26 (footnote 18, in English). For a copy of Vernet's report see Foreign Office, "Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832," BFSP 20:369-436. See also V. F. Boyson, The Falkland Islands (Oxford, 1924), 92-96; and Jose Arce, The Malvinas (Madrid, 1951), 90-91.
41. See Foreign Office, the Buenos Ayres minister to the American consul, 3 December 1831, BFSP 20:316-17 (317); and the Buenos Ayres minister to the American consul, 9 December 1831, ibid., 320-22 (321).
42. Foreign Office, the Buenos Ayres minister to the American consul, 9 December 1831, ibid., 320-22 (322).
43. Slacum to Livingston, 9 December 1831, DCUS, 75-78 (76). See also Slacum to Livingston, 20 December 1831, ibid., 85-88 (86).
44. Henry S. Fox to Baylies, 4 July 1832, Foreign Office Papers, 6/499, Public Record Office (PRO), London.
45. Slacum to Livingston, 20 December 1831, DCUS, 87-88 (86).
46. Ibid., 85-88 (86).
47. The British minister reported this meeting with Slacum to his superiors in London as follows: "A long and angry correspondence has ensued between the Buenos Ayrean Government and Mr. Slacum, which that Gentleman has communicated to me, and of which he will transmit copies to Mr. Van Buren the United States Minister in London, as well as to his Government at Washington." Fox to Henry Lord Palmerston, 31 December 1831, Foreign Office Papers, 118/26.
48. When Livingston succeeded Van Buren as secretary of state, President Andrew Jackson designated Van Buren as U.S. minister to London. The U.S. Senate, however, rejected Van Buren's nomination and he was forced to return from London.
49. See Livingston to Van Buren, 1 August 1831, Martin Van Buren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (Presidential Papers Microfilm, series 2, reel 10); Brent to Charles Bankhead, 13 August 1832, DCUS 7:3-4; Van Buren to Livingston, 28 February 1832, ibid., 227; John Forsyth to Andrew Stevenson, 15 September 1838, ibid., 5; and Stevenson to Forsyth, 5 November 1838, ibid., 241-42. The author is most grateful to Dr. Milton O. Gustafson of the National Archives's Textual Reference Office, and to Mr. Brian G. Beard for their kind assistance in a thorough search of RG 84 to confirm that there is no record of a letter from Slacum to the U.S. minister in London at that time.
50. Carlos Maria de Alvear to Forsyth, 21 March 1839, DCUS, 210-26 (footnote 1, pp. 211-22). Footnote 1 of this letter contains the text of a "memorandum drawn up to describe the conduct of the commander of the United States sloop of war, 'Lexington' in the port of Soledad in the Malvinas Islands." This memorandum collects the testimony of several witnesses to Duncan's actions in the Islands.
51. Manuel J. Garcia to Slacum, 14 February 1832, DCUS, 88-89.
52. See John H. Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861 (Westport, CT, 1985), chap. 2. See also Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 2d ed. (New York, 1944), 198-204.
53. See Walter B. Smith, America's Diplomats and Consuls, 1776-1865 (Washington, 1986), 218. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Ms. Constance W. Blackman of the U.S. Department of State Library for her assistance in the biographical research on Slacum.
54. Foreign Office, the American consul to the Buenos Ayres minister, 15 February 1832 (enclosure) -- Commander Duncan to the American consul, 11 February 1832, BFSP 20:328.
55. Garcia to Slacum, 15 February 1832, ibid., 89.
56. Duncan to Levi Woodbury, 7 December 1831, Letters from Commanders, April 1804-December 1886, No. 139, RG 45, NAMP M147, reel 16; Duncan to Woodbury, 3 February 1832, Letters from Commanders, January-June 1832, No. 28, RG 45, NAMP M147, reel 17.
57. See David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883 (Annapolis, 1988), 153.
58. Contrary to Tesler's interpretation, Duncan's actions were not in accordance with the originally intended U.S. policy response to Vernet's seizure of the American vessels. See Tesler, Malvinas, 18-19, 21-22.
59. See President Jackson's Third Annual Message to Congress, 6 December 1831, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1787-1897, ed. James D. Richardson (Washington, 1896), 2:553. See also Woodbury to George W. Rodgers, 29 November 1831, and 4 January 1832, Letters to Officers, Ships of War, March 1798-September 1868, 20:161, 204-6, RG 45, NAMP M149, reel 20.
60. See Rodgers to Maxwell Wright, 28 March 1832, Letters sent by Captain George W. Rodgers, December 1831-May 1832, Letter Books of Officers of the United States Navy at Sea, March 1778-July 1908, RG 45; and Rodgers to Woodbury, 13 May 1832, (enclosures) -- Rodgers to Vicente Lopez, 24 April 1832, and Lopez to Rodgers, 24 April 1832, Letters from Captains, RG 45, NAMP M125, reel 170.
61. As quoted in Livingston to Baylies, 26 January 1832, DCUS, 4-12 (6) (emphasis added).
62. Woodbury to Duncan, 4 April 1832, 201/2:84, RG 45, NAMP M149, reel 21 (emphasis added). "There was never any formal Court of Inquiry or Court Martial against Master Commandant Duncan for his actions in the Falklands." Telephone interview with Mr. Charles Brodine, historian, the Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC, 13 June 1995. Master Commandant Duncan returned to the United States in October 1832 and went on leave for personal reasons. He died while still on leave in White Sulphur Springs, Virginia (presently West Virginia), on 14 September 1834. For more information on Duncan's life and naval career see Silas Duncan File, ZB Files, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to Mr. Charles Brodine, historian, the Naval Historical Center, for his most gracious and thorough assistance.
63. For Secretary Livingston's instructions to Baylies see Livingston to Baylies, 26 January 1832, DCUS, 4-12; Livingston to Baylies, 14 February 1832, ibid., 12-13; and Livingston to Baylies, 3 April 1832, ibid., 14-15.
64. Baylies to Livingston, 18 May 1832, ibid., 98-99 (99).
65. Baylies to Manuel Vicente de Maza, 20 June 1832, ibid., 99-105 (102,104).
66. Maza to Baylies 25 June 1832, ibid., 106-7.
67. Baylies to Maza, 26 June 1832, ibid., 107-8 (108).
68. Fox to Baylies, 4 July 1832, Foreign Office Papers, 6/499.
69. Fox to Baylies, 4 July 1832, Foreign Office Papers, 6/499.
70. There is no agreement among historians on the discovery of the Islands, but there seems to be some evidence that they were first sighted in the early 1500s. This evidence includes several maps (from as early as 1522), some ship logs (from the first half of the sixteenth century), and a textual reference in the 1541 Islario General [General Index of Islands] of Alonso de Santa Cruz. Copies of the early sixteenth-century maps are at the Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division. See also Armando Cortesao and Avelino Teixeira da Mota, Portvgaliae monvmenta cartographica [Portugese monumental cartography] (Lisboa, 1960); Arce, The Malvinas Islands, 14-26; and Boyson, The Falkland Islands, 16-19. For discussions of the key ship logs see Ernesto Basilico, La armada del Obispo de Plasencia y d descubrimiento de las Malvinas [The fleet of the bishop of Plasencia and the discovery of the Malvinas] (Buenos Aires, 1967); and Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, chap. 1. For information on Santa Cruz's Islario General see Goebel, Struggle for Falklands, 28-33; and Arce, The Malvinas, 19-22.
71. Baylies to Maza, 10 July 1832, DCUS, 111-26 (116). There are some problems with the theory that either British captain Davis or British captain Richard Hawkins discovered the Islands. Besides the fact that there is evidence that suggests that the existence of the Islands was known to Europeans as early as 1522 (as cited in the preceding footnote), there are also problems with the accounts of both Davis and Hawkins. Davis's brief account of his sighting of a group of islands did not provide any latitudinal bearings. Hawkins's account of a supposed subsequent sighting of the Islands in 1594 placed the Islands in latitude 48 degrees south and described them as an inhabited "goodly low," "temperate," and "excellent country." In reality these cold, wind-swept islands lie between latitude 51 degrees and 53 degrees south and had no indigenous population. See Commander B. M. Chambers, R.N., "Can Hawkins's 'Maiden Land' Be Identified as the Falkland Islands?" The Geographical Journal (April 1901): 414-23; and Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 38. For more information on the discovery of the Islands see Arce, The Malvinas, chap. 1; Boyson, The Falkland Islands, chap. 1; M. B. R. Cawkell, D. H. Maling, and E. M. Cawkell, The Falkland Islands (London, 1960), chap. 1; Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, 224; Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, chap. 1; Groussac, Las Islas Malvinas, chap. 2; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute, chap. 2; Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook (New York, 1983), 4-5; and Roberto Etchepareborda, "La cuestion Malvinas en perspectiva historica" [The Malvinas question in historical perspective] in Revista de historia de America 96 (1983): 27-67 (30-32).
72. Baylies to Maza, 10 July 1832, DCUS, III-26 (117-18). For more information on the settlement of the Islands see Arce, The Malvinas, chap. 2; Boyson, The Falkland Islands, 40-54; Cawkell, Maling, and Cawkell, The Falkland Islands, chaps. 2-4; Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, chaps. 5-8; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, Sovereignty in Dispute, chap. 3; and Enrique Ruiz-Guinazu, "Islas Malvinas: Descubrimiento y ocupacion" [The Malvinas Islands: Their discovery and settlement], in Academia Nacional de Historia, Los derechos argentinos sobre las Islas Malvinas, 11-20.
73. Maza to Livingston, 8 August 1832, DCUS, 141-45 (142).
74. Maza to Baylies, 14 August 1832, ibid., 147-52.
75. For a copy of this report see Foreign Office, "Report of the Political and Military Commandant of the Malvinas, 10 August 1832," BFSP 20:369-436.
76. Baylies to Maza, 18 August 1832, DCUS, 152.
77. "Minute of a Conference between Maza and Baylies, 27 August 1832," ibid., 155-57 (156).
78. "Minute of a Conference between Maza and Baylies, 27 August 1832," ibid., 155-57 (157).
79. Maza to Baylies, 3 September 1832, ibid., 158. Even though a new U.S. consul, Eben Ritchie Dorr, was accredited in 1834, the United States had no full-fledged diplomatic envoy in Buenos Aires until 1843, when Harvey M. Watterson was appointed special agent of the United States in Buenos Aires. See Manuel de Irigoyen to Forsyth, 10 December 1834, ibid., 186-87; Dorr to Forsyth, 17 January 1835, ibid., 187-88 (footnote 1); and Abel P. Upshur to Watterson, 26 September 1843, ibid., 20-22. For a detailed history of the difficult U.S.-Argentine relationship see Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston, 1990); Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1860 (New York, 1964); and Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914 (Cambridge, MA, 1957).
80. See footnote 46 above.
81. Baylies to Livingston, 26 September 1832, DCUS, 161-65 (164-65) (emphasis added).
82. Fox to Palmerston, 15 October 1832, Foreign Office Papers, 6/499 (emphasis added).
83. Apparently, Baylies made such an ambitious claim to Fox either because he misinterpreted his written instructions or because such a liberal interpretation of his instructions gave Baylies a basis to request a quid pro quo from the British diplomat.
84. Baylies to Livingston, 23 April 1833, DCUS, 179-80 (180) (emphasis added). See also "The United States and Buenos Ayres: Falkland Island Question," "Facts and Suggestions Relative to the Practical Part of the Falkland Island Question," and "Further Observations on the Falkland Island Question," RG 59, NAMP M800, reel 2.
85. The internal State Department report criticized Baylies for his acceptance of the British claims without a thorough study of the history of the Spanish and Argentine claims to the Islands, as well as for his rush to ask for his passport to depart Buenos Aires. Baylies, who was not a career diplomat but a former U.S. congressional representative from Massachusetts, left the foreign service after returning from Buenos Aires and reentered Massachusetts state politics. See "The United States and Buenos Ayres: Falkland Island Question," "Facts and Suggestions Relative to the Practical Part of the Falkland Island Question," and "Further Observations on the Falkland Island Question," RG 59, NAMP M800, reel 2. For more biographical information on Baylies see Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971, s.v. "Baylies, Francis"; and Appleton's Encyclopaedia of American Biography, s.v. "Baylies, Francis." See also Baylies's seemingly defensive account of his actions in Buenos Aires (written in the third person) in Francis Baylies's Apologia: The Falkland Islands Crisis of 1829-1833, ed. Jordan D. Fiore (Taunton, MA, 1982).
86. See Groussac, Las Islas Malvinas, 60-62.
87. See Murray to the Duke of Wellington, Downing Street, 23 July 1829, in Ferrer-Vieyra, An Annotated Legal Chronology of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands Controversy, 68-69 (69).
88. The Duke of Wellington to Murray, Walmer Castle, 25 July 1829, ibid., 69-70 (70).
89. Tesler, Malvinas.
90. See Fox to Palmerston, 31 December 1831, Foreign Office Papers, 118/26. See also Slacum to Livingston, 20 December 1831, DCUS, 85-88 (86).
91. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, 229-30.
92. See Enrique Ferrer-Vieyra, Segunda cronologia legal anotada sobre las Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) [Second annotated legal chronology about the Malvinas Islands] (Cordoba, 1992), 446.
93. Van Buren to Forbes, 10 February 1831, DCUS, 3-4.
94. For the British at the time, what came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine was an offshoot of their own proposal to the United States for a joint communique against a potential intervention by the Holy Alliance in the Americas, not an instrument to curtail British ambitions in the Western Hemisphere. See Armin Rappaport, A History of American Diplomacy (New York, 1975), 88-93; Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), chaps. 18, 19; and Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 72-74. For the text of the Monroe Doctrine see Eliot, ed., American Historical Documents, 277-79. For other studies on the evolution and implementation of the Monroe Doctrine see also Luis Izaga, La doctrina de Monroe, su origen y principales fases de su evolucion [The Monroe Doctrine, its origin and main phases of its evolution] (Madrid, 1929); Belohlavek, Let the Eagle Soar, 55, 178-92; and Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine: 1945-1993 (New York, 1994).
95. The British had expressed an interest in colonizing these islands as a strategic position to harass Spanish trade with their colonies in South America as early as the 1740s and again in the 1760s. See the recommendations of George Lord Anson and of John Lord Egmont, as discussed in Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 194-97, 235-37. See also Murray to the Duke of Wellington, 23 July 1829, and the Duke of Wellington to Murray, 25 July 1829, in Ferrer-Vieyra, An Annotated Legal Chronology of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands Controversy, 68-70. A thorough analysis of the British decision to occupy the Islands is, as noted earlier, under review by the author for a separate study.
96. See Daniel Webster to Alvear, 4 December 1841, in DCUS, 18-19. For a recent statement of the U.S. neutrality policy see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Background Notes: Argentina (November 1994): 5. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Donald J. Cooke, country officer for Argentina, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State, for his assistance with the research on the current policy position of the United States.
97. For example, see Tesler, Malvinas.
98. Daniel Webster to Alvear, 4 December 1841, in DCUS, 18-19 (emphasis added). Earlier, when Argentina presented a formal diplomatic protest to the British government for the seizure of the Islands, the United States did not invoke President Monroe's proclamation either. At that time, the Argentine minister had given to the American diplomats in London a copy of the formal note of protest that he had presented to the British government, apparently in a futile attempt to enlist the support of the United States. See Aaron Vail to Louis McLane, 13 July 1833, DCUS 7:228. See also Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 461-64.
99. Groussac, Las Islas Malvinas, 63. See also Foreign Office, "Convention between Great Britain and Spain, 28 October 1790," BFSP 1:663-67 (666-67).

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The best and more complete argumentation than I have read on the subject.

Thanx for sharing



-------------------------------------------------------
"Las Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas"


"Die Queen!"
George Michael

Here's another argument you can mull over. Possession is 9/10ths of the law.

Sure. I can put a gun of the head of your wife and make her mine. Possession would assure me in any court of law that your wife become my mistress... But, are you reading clearly what I have written?

This is as primitive as Vikings invading shore towns and raping women... This is an argument so primitive and disgusting than in the XXI century should be avoided. Except for drunk hooligans, of course.

Greetings



-------------------------------------------------------
"Las Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas"


"Die Queen!"
George Michael

"Here's another argument you can mull over. Possession is 9/10ths of the law."

This is an important point.

The world cannot go round looking at history books and returning terriritories to former owners.

For a start we don't have enough room for the white Americans, Canadians, South Africans, Australians, New Zealanders... oh and, of course, Argentinians to come back to Europe.

Of course if you unilaterally feel that is right the right way to go we may just be able to squeeze you Argentinians back in and you can give your country back to the remaining native inhabitants.

Before to getting back to American Natives, and so on, it is more persuasive to recall the UN does not apply the holligan's "possession is 9/10 of the law" way of thinking. Again, we just have descended from the trees and only irrational (maybe because of some genetic alcoholism problem) people defend that argument.

For instance, there was the case of people from El Salvador living in the border of Nicaragua for 50 years but into Nicaragua's legal territory. El Salvador argued that they cannot remove the people because (as Malvinenses say) they have been there for a long time. The UN says: legal principles are above occupation. Land belongs to Nicaragua and remains that way. Settlers accept this or move back to El Salvador. There were no doubts about it. There were 4 more cases solved the same way in the past 50 years. This is actual law. Of course, is INTERNATIONAL law, and Brits nor any other country could impose they biased point of view.

Again, population in the island is just a garrison and sheppards that fit in a boat like the Queen Elizabeth II. It would only take 15 days to return them to UK.

Greetings



-------------------------------------------------------
"Las Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas"


"Die Queen!"
George Michael

But the land is under British law and is under British control, so what you says makes no sense, that case has no baring.

Siege of Tobruk - One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting." Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners ... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."

Yes because... Argentina is not under Brits rule, as perhaps you should know...

In the 50's England considered to leave the Malvinas islands to Argentina

04/02/2008 -

Bate Felix/Reuters

Great Britain considered to close its bases in the Antarctic and the Falklands islands in the middle of the decade of 1950, due to its high costs of maintenance and the aggressive reclamations of territoriality of Chile and Argentina, according to known secret documents last night.

The document revelations declassified by the National File take place at moments in which Great Britain and other nations analyze to extend their reclamations on the marine bottom that surrounds to the Antarctic in May of the 2009.

Dead reckoning that the subsoil of the marine bottom of the vast frozen continent is rich in mineral resources and the scientists those are afraid that the ambitions by a piece of the marine bottom untie frictions between nations, that already were seen in the middle of the past century.

The documents were released under a norm that conserves some sensible governmental data under key by 50 years for reasons of national security.

“It is possible that the secretary of Outer Relations can recommend his colleagues of cabinet that the United Kingdom had to retire of the Dependancies of Falkland islands (the Falklands)”, it is read in a document of March of 1957 to the Lord President.

The Antarctica peninsula (the sector that Great Britain protests like own in continent the more cold of the world and del that also takes control Argentina and Chile) was formally well-known like Dependancies of the Falkland Islands (the Falklands).

The question was analyzed in depth by the British government the 14 of rejected March of 1957 and.

“Little solid”. “The reached conclusion was that he would be little solid to consider to make any change in estatus of the sector of the United Kingdom”, it needed in another note.

The United Kingdom wanted to maintain its influence in the Antarctic, but to avoid the costs, after which the United States and the Soviet Union increased their activities in the area, and would face territorial disputes Argentina and Chile.

The report said that Great Britain was spending 160,000 pounds sterling to the year to maintain its 10 bases Antarctic and needed a ship icebreaker that would have cost between 3 and 4 million pounds, to maintain the tempo/rate of the activities of its main rival, Argentina.

Nevertheless, when suspecting that the region could have a vast mineral wealth, the British also wanted to protect the economic benefits that he could represent that territory.

“Like an industrial state, we cannot occur the luxury of being indifferent to the existence of a possible reserve of new vital minerals”, says the document.

British plan B was to propose to leave all the continent frozen under some form of international control.

This later became two years the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, that prohibited all operation of petroleum, gas and minerals that were not for scientific studies.

Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Great Britain, New Zealand and Norway (all near ones Antarctica or with historical bonds) made reclamations before the treaty began to steer. Moscow and the Washingtons did not make reclamations, but they reserved the right to do it




-------------------------------------------------------
"Las Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas"


"Die Queen!"
George Michael

So we all know if the invesion of '82 did not take place the Flaklands would have gone to Argentian. Thatacher would not have won her second term. And a Nasty military dictatership in Argentina would have stayed on.
So stop going on about it as its your own fault.

Argentina is not under Brits rule

But the Falklands are under British law, so your example is a bad one. There are no similarities, no international law involved.

In the 50's England considered to leave the Malvinas islands to Argentina

Yes and the Argentines screwed that up by invading, don't you feel silly now?

Siege of Tobruk - One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting." Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners ... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."

Brits are pigs and pirates. Don't expect any fairness in the Malvinas.



Would you trust this man"

Thanks for your constructive contribution, as always.

Brits are pigs and pirates. Don't expect any fairness in the Malvinas.
----------------
So you rather say you lost from pigs and pirates than to actually say you lost from the best?


Mobile airpower

"The enemy dies relaxed," observed a Lockheed Martin manager.

I didn't lose from anyone. I'm a neutral observer, but I call it a PIG when I see one.

And one more thing....FAWK YOU JASON..!!!



Would you trust this man"

Landos

OH DEAR, are we having a hissy fit.

When it comes to the British you've never been a "neutral observer" in your entire inadequate life.

What a fu>king joke.

Landos please, some civility, he is a mod now so a little less on the rough side.

Siege of Tobruk - One German POW said: "I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting." Rommel wrote of seeing "a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners ... marched off close behind us—immensely big and powerful men, who without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle."

"Neutral observer!"

LOL!

Landos, you are the most fluent speaker of bullsh*t on this board.


"FAWK YOU JASON..!!!"

And so marvelously eloquent, too!


"What a fu>king joke."

Is that your new signature? Very fitting for the biggest joke on the forum.

I'll continue to bich slap Brits to my dying day. Don't like em! Hate their nations foreign policy. Pirates, rogues and boorish bandits is all they are and ever have been. Steal, steal, steal, all they know. Rip off Chinese, Indians, and numerous other denizens of vulnerable nations-all so they can sip tea and eat crumpets in their fog-bound, oppressive nation.

Time for one of my favorite ole ditties!





Would you trust this man"

Yaawwnn. Honestly your hang up with all things British is pretty "boorish" in itself, must be envy. I don't know why you don't just come out and say how much you want to be one of us. yaawwnn

Yaawwnn. As for being "pirates, rogues and bandits" is concerned i've always quite liked pirates, rogues and bandits. I think that secretly so do you. yaawwnn

Yaawwnn. Anyway, on behalf of all Brits on this forum and everywhere we are all truly gutted that you don't like us and can't imagine how we're gonna get over it. yaawwnn.

You're putting me to sleep with your "boorishness".

Next time you yawn I'll snap a jumper cable onto your uvula and apply 220 volts AC while pissing on your shoes to create a ground. Nothing like watching a Monty Python reject chit his pants while watching the drool flow down his cheeks-now that's entertainment!

FAWK YOU....!!!!



Would you trust this man"

Landos

Quote: Next time you yawn I'll snap a jumper cable onto your uvula and apply 220 volts AC while pissing on your shoes to create a ground. Nothing like watching a Monty Python reject chit his pants while watching the drool flow down his cheeks-now that's entertainment!

What an imagination you have grandma.

Did it take you two days to think that up.

Novel imagination just a bit slow.

Quote: As for being "pirates, rogues and bandits" is concerned i've always quite liked pirates, rogues and bandits.

I've always preferred gypsies, tramps and thieves myself.




www.unmanneduk.150m.com

BRITONS,
DO YOUR BIT
SIGN THIS PETITION!
http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/forces-support

Couple of Porky Pig Brits trying to make like the Faggot Brothers, Frik and Frak.

FAWK YOU...!!!



Would you trust this man"

Landos

Quote: Couple of Porky Pig Brits trying to make like the Faggot Brothers, Frik and Frak.

Frick and who. I obviously don't know as much about faggots as yourself but i'm happy to bow to your expertise on the queer side of life.

What a joke.

Everyone and their brother knows the British invented modern faggotry. You lost the American Revolutionary War because your officers were so busy bending each other over the cannon they couldn't concentrate on the battles. Brits are a queer ethnicity, no question. And they love the violent stuff as well, whips and leather!

Oh yeah, one more thing......FAWK YOU..!!!!!



Would you trust this man"

Wow you are so full of hate,


































and other men's semen. HA! See I can do gay jokes too ya' know



www.unmanneduk.150m.com

BRITONS,
DO YOUR BIT
SIGN THIS PETITION!
http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/forces-support

argie bargy you got your wipped get over it. Care to try again and you will face another crushing defeat.