Turkey Brought EU and US Closer

The European Union and Turkey, gradually moving towards a rapprochement, made great strides on October 3, 2005. Along with the decision to start membership negotiations with Turkey, an extremely controversial negotiating framework was agreed upon as well.

At first glance, there are many provisions open to opposite interpretations in this diplomatic document, as well as certain points against Turkey's interests. However, those who generally oppose the EU interpret the framework document from a very narrow point of view. The fact that international law texts often lead to contradictory interpretations and are even written this way deliberately, is mostly forgotten. The fact that there is a close interaction between international law and politics and current political, economic, social tendencies, and that non-legal factors influence the choice among various interpretations is mostly ignored. A diplomatic instead of a legal document is attributed legal value much beyond what it deserves and this causes a big fuss. In fact, the negotiating framework is in front of us as part of a long-term, political-strategical process. Therefore, the past and future of the document must not be ignored. Neither perceiving the process nor interpreting the negotiating framework in a right way is possible by just paying attention to the words in the documents without taking into consideration the direction and destination of events.

Europe will change, too...

Let’s first take a look at the pre-October 3 period. The Customs Union in 1995, after the pause in Luxembourg 1997 came Helsinki 1999, Brussels 2004 and then Luxembourg 2005. All these dates indicate Turkey's march towards membership. Global circumstances show that the course afterwards will continue in the same way as well. There may be some conjunctural pauses but the long-term process will go on. The gradual rapprochement between the EU and Turkey also demonstrates a process of change for the sides and the reality that it is impossible to stop the change that arises bit by bit. As the sides come closer they change and as as they change they even come closer. This situation which also includes a systemic transformation in world politics is quite different from relations between the EU and Central and Eastern European countries. One European who mentioned the future of Europe recently was French Foreign Minister Phillipe Douste-Blazy, who opposes Turkey's EU membership. Douste-Blazy, in the October 6, 2005 edition of Le Monde, said the following despite the general negativity in his country: "There are two basic projects in front of Europe. One is related to geopolitics, the other is about the political integration of the Union. The world full of dangers requires that we must not disregard geostrategic unity. Who can think of slamming the door in the face of Turkey, a big country with a Muslim population that wants to join the EU? Who could prefer that such a country give up walking on the path of human rights and peace and turn towards ethnic nationalism and fundamentalism? Europe is an economy and democracy project, but above all, it is a peace project."

The fact that the French minister referred to Turkey starting membership negotiations as a contribution to geopolitics and peace is a foresighted approach and this is not an exception in Europe. The number of elites who think this way has already exceeded the number of those who don’t. Had it not been the case, membership negotiations would not have started anyway. They would not have been able to tolerate the fastidious attitudes of the Turkish government. It is quite obvious that they do not want to lose Turkey. Intermediary formulas such as "Privileged Partnership," without any clear-cut content, from now on have no function other than satisfying those left in the minority.

EU with Turkey to Be Stronger Before US

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, one of those in the minority, regretfully emphasized that the EU will turn into a free trade zone following the rejection of the constitution and the start of membership negotiations. However, the EU which is expanding, had already gone beyond a free trade zone. The EU will probably never be able to become a federal state. Yet, it is a fact that it will never deviate from the path of being an effective global actor, contributing to peace, and this target has become more and more obvious. Today, the EU is an institution that makes the biggest contribution to peace operations in the world. The EU has 30,000 troops taking part in this kind of operations outside its territory. 7,000 of them are serving in Afghanistan. The EU has taken over all military operations in the Balkans from NATO. The thought and research institutes in EU countries, especially the EU Institute for Security Studies, conduct hundreds of researches every year about how the EU can provide its own security and how it can contribute more to regional and global security. Though these have not reflected much on public opinion, they are among issues that occupy the EU most.

According to a report published by the EU Institute for Security Studies in May 2004, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) inevitably will continue to develop in the forthcoming years for two reasons: First of all, instabilities in the world and security risks will be an inevitable focus of interest for Europeans. Secondly, the US needs more of Europe's contributions. The failure in Iraq has made this need more evident. Though hesitations about the political dimension of ESDP continue, Washington no longer opposes Europe’s bid to increase its military potentials and abilities. Turkey's membership will be an important factor for the improvement of ESDP. Such a development will enable the EU to cooperate with the US on more equal terms than today's. What even France is looking for in a multipolar world is not an EU as a US rival but an EU that cooperates with the US on a more or less equal level. Anyway, this strategic consciousness inevitably will be inculcated to [Angela] Merkel and [Nicolas] Sarkozy with Atlanticist tendencies from the other side of the Atlantic. In addition, the EU needs to expand in order not to lose its competitivenes to fast growing giant economies such as China, India and Russia, to invigorate its weakened economy and to stop its serious demographic recession.

Besides all these, the EU delivered two messages to the world by starting negotiations with Turkey: Firstly, the October 3 compromise demonstrated that the EU is not a religion or civilization project but a peace and welfare project. Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan expressed this point with these words, "The common choice has been in favor of an alliance of civilizations." Spain's representative said, "[Osama] bin Laden will regret this result very much." Secondly, after the rejection of the constitution, the EU proved that it has the ability to make vital decisions despite all odds. The rejection of the constitution in referenda certainly showed that the EU's political integration has borders and that a federal Europe will not materialize. However, October 3 also showed that the EU is aware of the risks created by the world political course and that it can make decisions in this area as well. Europe's political elites understand the necessity of Turkey's membership but their public opinions have not reached that level yet. A big task awaits not only Turkey but also European leaders and elites in the forthcoming years. Turkey has been quite successful in the adaptation process so far. However, there are still many things to be done. We have to enhance the protection and implementation of human rights and the principle of the supremacy of the law. We have to put army-civilian relations on a more democratic basis. In as much as Turkey becomes democratic, so will its strategic value for Eurasia and Europe increase.

The big picture is also in favor of Turkey, because...

When we assess the negotiating framework in this big picture, we can reach conclusions very different from narrow interpretations. At first glance, the negotiating framework definitely includes provisions that can cause great difficulties for Turkey. On the other hand, these provisions are open to various interpretations. Besides, the negotiating framework also gives the sides the chance to take a step back. In international law, interpretation cannot be abstracted from international political-strategic tendencies. In the negotiations, two types of issue will be put in front of us: The first type will be related to the acquis and will not be open to negotiation in terms of fundamentals in the classic sense. They will be accepted as principles. The second type will be problems that can only be resolved by the common efforts of the disagreeing sides, such as the Cyprus, Aegean Sea and Turkey-Armenia problems (including the tragic events in 1915, too). This kind of problems will be open to all sorts of negotiations and diplomatic pressure in terms of their nature. They cannot be understood or solved otherwise. Did we not witness how negotiations, diplomatic attempts and even pressures worked on the Cyprus issue on October 3? We can be sure that we will experience many similar excitements during membership negotiations. These negotiations may even be suspended at times. However, let’s be sure that this kind of political problems ultimately will not obstruct Turkey's EU membership. These will be concluded either during the negotiation process or after membership materializes. Because, the solution -- especially on Cyprus -- favors both Turkey and the EU. Otherwise, the island will remain divided and the Turkish army will not leave. As for the Aegean Sea, most of the disagreement points on Turkey's membership will automatically be replaced by cooperation anyway. Even today we see that Turkey-Greece relations have begun to thaw.

As for the "permanently available preventive measures" and some temporary amendments EU countries can have recourse to Turkey, even if today they are intended to be implemented sine die (but this is not the case), will be meaningless if they are still in effect when the circumstances change. For instance, since unemployment in Turkey will end when investments increase, migration to other EU countries with the aim of finding a job will stop and the function of the restriction of free circulation will automatically disappear. As a matter of fact, even if Turkey becomes a member under these restrictions, it will participate in EU organs and the decision-making processes as a big country with full authorization and will have the chance to influence decisions substantially. If these restrictions are still in effect at that time, it can work from inside to remove them and even get some allies that need Turkey's support on other issues to annul the restrictions. Is it necessary to remind of the fact that this is the way things work in the EU? Turkey and the Europe are experiencing the difficulties of initiating a big change. Both sides have identity problems peculiar to themselves. Even this much shows that negotiations will be very hard. There is no need to be pessimistic if we can get rid of the burden of conjunctural negativities and look at long-term tendencies. Turkey is rising, the course of events is good. That the EU needs Turkey is becoming more and more evident, but Turkey, too, must fulfill its responsibilities. We must not cause unnecessary tension. Let’s remember that the other side has huge problems as well. Leaving the negotiating table should be a last resort.

October 21, 2005

ALI L. KARAOSMANOGLU, Professor at Bilkent University

26.10.2005
http://www.zaman.com/?bl=commentary&alt=&hn=25764