15 March 2007
''Intelligence Brief: The Implications of Strategic Withdrawal from Iraq''
 he Los Angeles Times on Monday reported that a Pentagon official told the newspaper that the United States was working on contingency plans in case its surge policy in Iraq fails. The plans call for a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops in conjunction with increased military training of Iraqi forces. The contingency plan corresponds with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' testimony before the U.S. Congress recently, where he stated that a failure of the surge policy would result in withdrawing U.S. troops "out of harm's way." These statements demonstrate that the United States is prepared to cut its losses in Iraq and to adapt to a new security reality in the Middle East should it become clear that the Iraq intervention has failed.
The likelihood of the surge strategy succeeding is slim. It is not the specific strategy of the surge itself that is prone to failure. Indeed, the current strategy being employed by General David Petraeus follows classic counter-insurgency doctrine by protecting areas already under U.S. control and by clearing and holding areas of the country that are either under insurgent control or under insurgent influence. In having U.S. troops commit themselves for longer periods of time to certain towns and villages, they are better able to maintain security in cleared areas. Once each area is secured, these troops then oversee the influx of development aid and projects that should, according to counter-insurgency theory, turn each respective population away from the insurgency. It is a long process that takes time and resources since the counter-insurgents must move from section to section until the entire country is pacified and under control.
The problem in the case of Iraq is that it is simply "too little, too late." The increase in troops will add about 21,500 soldiers to the 141,000 already in the country, yet the new total number of troops is still not enough to effectively push back the tide of the insurgency throughout Iraq.
In addition to the lack of troops, there is also the issue of time, which will handicap any U.S. strategy that prolongs a sizeable intervention in Iraq. As PINR warned in July 2003, just a few months after the U.S.-led intervention, "Iraqi militants are well aware that when dealing with democracies, especially ones with prosperous societies such as the United States and United Kingdom, it is best to create high casualties in order to weaken the resolve of the home populations." This outcome is exactly what occurred, and with public opinion resolutely against continued large-scale involvement in Iraq, there is not enough time to allow an effective counter-insurgency strategy to work.
Therefore, if it becomes accepted that the surge strategy has failed, the United States will have to fall back on strategic withdrawal. While that scenario will affect U.S. interests negatively, there will be no other options for the United States to pursue. Furthermore, the United States will still be able to protect its interests after it begins withdrawing troops from Iraq. It can monitor developments on the ground from secure bases, and work to influence political developments in the country. Its forces can continue to monitor the threat from al-Qaeda and other militant Islamist groups in Iraq and dispose of these enemies through small-scale raids and surgical strikes.
It is true that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would serve as an ideological victory for al-Qaeda and radical Islamists, emboldening the movement. Yet in Iraq, only a small portion of insurgents are hard-core jihadists who are solely in the fight to attack U.S. interests. Instead, many of the Iraqi insurgents fighting with al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups are doing so purely out of their mutual short-term interests in removing U.S. troops from the country. If Washington begins to reduce its footprint in the state, it is likely that many Iraqi insurgents will turn their guns inward in an attempt to seize power in Baghdad. This, in turn, could mark a reduction in the number of fighters involved with al-Qaeda in Iraq.
As for the hard-core jihadists, the United States will need to continue its anti-terrorism efforts in monitoring and tracking these figures, and striking them when possible. Again, the best scenario for the United States would have been for Iraq to turn into a vibrant, free market democracy. That outcome would have served as an ideological defeat for al-Qaeda, yet this outcome appears impossible and simply delaying withdrawal is not a realistic strategy, nor one that serves U.S. interests.
When assessing the involvement of outside powers in Iraq's progression, the fact remains that the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq opened the door for Iran to better achieve its interests in the Middle East. This was a significant side effect of the war, and one that should have been better anticipated by decision makers in Washington. That being said, while Iran can be expected to increase its influence in Iraq even further after a U.S. withdrawal, it does not mean that Iran will be able to use Iraq to increase its regional power greatly. The United States will still be affecting political outcomes in Iraq and will be employing its military to protect the regional status quo. A strong U.S. posture in the region will deter Iran from making excessive geostrategic gains in the Middle East. Washington has already begun this strategy, seen through its January decision to beef up its navy in the Persian Gulf. [See: "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Moves to Regain Leverage over Iran"]
The bottom line is that withdrawing the majority of U.S. forces from Iraq will not necessarily be a disaster for U.S. interests. The failure to achieve the original mission in Iraq has already occurred, and the United States has already suffered a significant loss of its interests. Withdrawing troops from the country may not make matters much worse.
Instead, upon withdrawal the United States can begin to pursue operations more in line with its capabilities, using technology to eliminate potential Islamist threats and using its overt and covert elements to work toward a stable government in Baghdad. As for Iran, it is already benefiting from the situation, and a withdrawal of U.S. troops will not suddenly tilt the chessboard in Iran's favor provided that Washington takes adequate steps to contain the country in the region. Regardless of what happens in Iraq, the United States can be expected to maintain its dominance in the Middle East and work to prevent Iraq's instability from spreading outward.
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of enquiries@pinr.com. PINR reprints do not qualify under Fair-Use Statute Section 107 of the Copyright Act. All comments should be directed to comments@pinr.com. |
