I agree with almost all of the observations made by Francis. One of the problems at the time was that the members of the Executive Commmittee were not a unified force. In reality I suspect that Gordon McLennan had less in common with Martin Jacques in terms of political outlook than he had with some of those in the CCG. Certainly comrades like Mick McGahey would have reacted strongly at the time of the PPPS battle to the suggestion that the CPGB should change its name and fundamentally change its basic structure. I also believe that a number of Party members were pushed very reluctantly into the CCG and would have far prepared to remain within the CPGB, albeit with reservations on some aspects of policy. The fightback by the EC was fundamentally administrative rather than political and this I believe seriously weakened the Party. Alliances of perceived necessity were made on and around the EC, which I believe some comrades came to regret subsequently.
The only point where I disgree with Francis is that I do believe a minority in the Party leadership were already by the time of the PPPS battle "liquidationist" in outlook. I also believe that the options of those associated with the CCG became very limited - the suspensions and expulsions following the London Dictrict Congress in particular meant that there was no going back. Comrades who wanted to be let back "into the fold" had great obstacles placed in their way and there was also a feeling of solidarity which surrounded them which placed enormous pressure on them not to break ranks.
Sadly, many lessons can now be learned but as Francis points out, you can't replay history. I nevertheless now have deep regrets about the role I played at that critical period in the history of the Party.