pete sheridan (Login redcoat1941) Registered Users 67.133.163.108
After re-reading the M-L thread...
October 27 2008, 3:37 PM
...all's I got to say is: When Oddball traded his Shermie for that clapped-out Tiger, Negative Waves Moriarity (his driver) thought he'd gotten the fuzzy end of the lollipop.
but it became apparent pretty early that the historical truth was not that important to a number of the participants..... For myself, I thought Steve did a good job explaining the Americans screw-ups, and the German screw-ups were just mentioned as part of the context. The fact is, the German General Staff told Hitler they would not be ready to fight a major international war until 1947-48. He got into WW2 about 9-10 years too early, and the Germans were not ready, period. John Kennon used to say the Germans conquered Europe with some of the worst tin cans ever foisted on an armored force, and when they got their hands on real tanks (Panthers and Tigers) they couldn't hold onto a single yard. Why Germany, the land of machine tools, did not obtain the epicyclic ring gear cutting machines to make durable Panther final drives, I'll never understand. If they had, hundreds of Panthers that had to be abandoned or destroyed due to final drive failures might have survived to fight later.
As has been mentioned (by Steve in his new book, among others), there are many and varied reasons for the success or failure of a weapons system or strategy. Amateurs study tactics (and raw specifications); professionals study logistics. Germany, a nation of 50,000,000 people, got into a world war with Allied nations totaling some 325,000,000 people, and production centers far away from German bombers. Even to think they could have won is a delusion, period - it was never going to happen, it could not have happened. Even if the Russians HAD lost Moscow, they would have kept on fighting. Adolf Hitler lost the second World War the day he crossed the Russian border. Yes, we pounded the bejeezuz out of the German production centers, but to be honest, the month the Germans produced the most aircraft, tanks, and vehicles was November 1944, just six months before the whole thing collapsed. The bombing campaign had mixed results until we got smart about what the most effective targets were: fuel and transportation.
Only 25% of the German army was motorized - and this was the army that would conquer the world? That couldn't have happened either, not limited to the speed of horse-drawn units. The German scientists and weapon designers did come up with a host of innovative and often individually superior weapons, but it was an edifice on a foundation of sand - they used slave laborers and prisoners of war to build many of their weapons and vehicles. How idiotic is that? The all-wood Focke-Wulf Ta 154A night fighter was cancelled because the slave laborers and prisoners making the glue to stick it together discovered the glue was very sensitive to acid content, which would weaken it. They collected urine, added it to the glue batches, and Ta 154s made with the glue disintegrated, some in mid-air and others in landings. The program was cancelled due to these problems, and sabotage of other weapons was endemic, especially where it was not immediately obvious. I once owned a 1944 VW Kubel, built by slave labor in large part, and I would not characterize the fit and finish on that as "superior German engineering and craftsmanship."
Well, let them have their fun. We won - it was in all the papers.....
would you rather have crewed a Sherman or a Panther? Breakdowns may lose wars, but they don't get crews killed.
I think of it this way. If I were a general who wanted to win a battle, I'd choose to have many Shermans over a few Panthers. However, if my goal was to survive that battle in an individual tank, then I'd take the better gun and armor and let the rest sort itself out.
I was under the impression that the lot of a soldier, and that is pretty much ANY soldier, ever, does not include much of a choice over his weaponery...
PzKpfw III and IV tanks felt the same way: they wanted to get into Panthers also. Of course, there weren't enough to go around. It's certainly true that the Panther, in armor and gun, was considerably superior to the Sherman (and also the 76mm T-34s), but it is also true that the relatively poor mechanical performance of the heavier German tanks would have prevented German armor units from participating in "blitzkrieg" offensives over any distance at all, because in most cases, the tanks would have broken down before reaching the objective. Thus it turned out that the Panther and the various Tigers were really much better as defensive weapons, letting the enemy come to them - certainly this is how most of the armored encounters on the Eastern front appear to have played out.
There is also the issue of comparing the 33-ton Sherman medium tank to 45- and 56-ton German heavy tanks. The T-34 is considered by some historians to have been as good overall as the Panther, or perhaps second place (due to numbers and better availability), yet the Russians lost some 20,000+ of the T-34s. Somehow, this has never resulted in as much criticism of the T-34 design. The failures of the Sherman, when they occurred, were the result of a fatally flawed armored doctrine, as Steve pointed out. Supposing the US Army had also embraced the German view that the best weapon against tanks was a better tank. We could have built the M10/M36 hull with Sherman armor (2.5"-3" glacis, 1.5"-2" sides and rear) and armed it with a license-built 17 pdr main gun. It would have been the American Panther and we could have had a thousand of them in France in 1944. Even the M4A3E2 Jumbo could have been built in at least a thousand examples for use in the armored divisions (instead of just 254) and armed with the 17 pdr. As an infantry support tank, the Sherman was arguably the finest of the war, and that was the role for which it was designed.
The whole point of Steve's book was that the true measure of a weapon system depends on not only the weapon itself, but the quality of the crews, training, supply, and tactics. So, yes, the Sherman technically - in armor and armament - was not the equal of the Panther. In every other way, it was superior, and that is why we won. Overall, by the fall of 1944, the better armored divisions had learned the lessons of combat, and they were quite able to deal with most of the German tanks through better numbers and appropriate tactics. And, after the Battle of the Bulge, many more Shermans were 76mm models, more HVAP (TD) ammo was available, and the uparmored versions were much better protected and combat survivable. This helped lead to victory in Europe.
Steve also pointed out that some units were far more effective users of their tanks. Belton Cooper's book "Death Traps" does paint a grim picture of Sherman losses, BUT 3rd AD lost twice as many tanks as 4th AD. Why, I have no idea - tougher combat tasks, poor use of tanks, poor tactics, bad luck - all those could have been reasons. But there's no doubt 3rd AD was a heavy casualty division. And, Cooper concentrated on the losses of Shermans; there is no account of the losses to the German side. According to Steve, the Allies lost 3500 tanks during the Normandy campaign; the Germans lost 2000, a 1.75:1 ratio. On average in the ETO, every time a Sherman was knocked out, one crewman was killed and some others were injured. As the war in Europe progressed, US forces met more and more German heavy tanks (Panthers and Tiger I/II), so the losses did mount for some units. As hard as it was on the crews, we had the tanks to replace losses. The Germans often did not. The Sherman did have its technical deficiencies; so did the Panther and Tiger I/II. In the end, our problems mattered less; we won.
...and having nothing to do with our hobby. But I wonder if we haven't gotten too good for our own good--when attacked by 20 fanatics armed with fifty bucks worth of Wal-Mart boxcutters, we retaliate with a military campaign costing 750 billion dollars to date, without achieving what our leaders keep calling "victory". And too sad to laugh at: the frightened old ladies all over America who are expecting the "Islamists" to over-run us any day now--and no one (least of all the media or the candidates)bothers to mention the military impossibility of such an occurrence.
Bruce: I think you'd like Robert Kershaw's "Tank Men". In fact, you'd love it. It goes through the whole Sherman vs Panther, quality vs quantity, tactics, loss ratios, etc., as well as paint a pretty grim picture of what it was actually like inside a tank in battle. The point about the huge T34 losses is also explained in the book as a result of Soviet tank tactics; basically charging the enemy head on. The Tigers could knock out a T34 from 1,500 yards, a Panther 2,000 yards. A T34 needed to be within hundreds of yards to have any chance against either, so they plain rushed them. The book describes a battle in which the Russians appeared 200 yards from Germans and drove straight in among them.
The huge tank losses in Normandy are also misleading as it's not comparing like for like. Of the 3500 allied tanks, how many were destroyed by Panzerfausts, 88s and mines? And how many of the 2000 German tanks were bombed, strafed or simply abandoned or blown up by their own crews? It wasn't a pure tank vs tank engagment by any means, so comparing the two numbers doesn't show the true picture.
raw numbers like that aren't useful outside of the context. On the other hand, the Germans were the defenders, with the numerical advantage that goes with that, in some of the worst tank fighting country in Europe (bad for the Germans too). Neither side did extraordinarily well in the bocage. The Sherman's deficiencies in armor and gun did cause cause a lot of casualties later on, but again, some divisions seemed to have suffered vastly worse than others. I haven't read all of Steve's book, so I don't know if he explains what were the reasons for 3rd AD's huge losses. Again, if we had decided earlier we needed a better tank, we could have had one. The Germans loved the Sherman's reliability and general usefulness. When they captured some M4A1s in North Africa and tested them, they weren't nearly as critical is we are nowadays. And they loved Shermans as tow and recovery vehicles to retrieve their broken-down armor. I'll order a copy of "Tank Men" and throw it on the pile of books to get through before I kick off.....
Add to this something I learned watching a documentary on the Canadians in NW Europe. The documentary-maker interviewed a Canadian tank commander with 17 Panthers to his credit. (I believe it was 17 just in the Normandy campaign). He said in a matter-of-fact voice that it was easy to kill a Panther with a 75mm gun. Just aim at the mantlet and deflect the shell down into the driver's compartment.
in an old AFV News that the Germans found a notice in a knocked out Firefly to the effect that the bottom of the Panther mantlet was a prime target due to the thin hull top plate. That notice confirmed to the Germans what they had already realized, and led to the development of the chin mantlet for the Panther in the fall of 1944.
Our Canadian troops have always been innovators in time of war. It comes from making do with nothing. I just finished Fred Majdalany's book on "The Battle of Casino". In it he describes how a group of cunning Canadians crossed the Rapido. Previously a group from the Indian Division had completed a bridge across the Rapido. "Shortly after this an ingenious and unorthodox piece of work by Canadian tank men and engineers made a second bridge available. To the astonishment of the infantry, a tank moved slowly towards the river carrying on its hull a a completed Bailey bridge. It was followed by a second tank with its front coupled to the end of the bridge to keep it level. The first tank dipped slowly into the river, drove towards the middle and sank with dignity - the crew abandonning ship. The second tank then pushed the bridge across to the far bank where it was quickly secured."
This is why 2500 under-equipped (We can't afford helicopters since our current government pissed away a 12 billion dollar - (when our dollar was equal to the US dollar) surplus) troops have done better than 180,000 Russians who didn't have to observe the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan. As for boxcutters I don't think our guys are that well armed. Without making a political statement I think we all know what this nonsense is about - oil & greed. Sometimes I wish I was living in a time 70 years ago when you could at least recognize the bad guys instead of wondering if you were supporting them........
It's done - "One Click" is great for impulse purchases.... I forgot to answer the rest of the post. Yes, most likely a majority of the losses in Normandy, on both sides, were not tank-vs-tank actions. The bocage country was made for anti-tank guns, though it also sometimes prevented the rapid moving of those guns. I have no doubt that a significant part of the Allied tank losses in the Normandy campaign were the result of mines, AT guns, etc. On the German side, they had to deal with the Allied air forces, long range artillery, and for a time, naval gun fire - and they HATED the Piper and Stinson "Grasshoppers" because when they saw those small planes, they knew big bad stuff was on its way, anything up to and including 14" naval guns from the channel fleet. Panzer Lehr was worse than decimated as a fighting unit for a time, losing most of its tanks to aerial and naval bombardments. No, the Germans had just as zippy a time in the bocage as we did.
As for the huge Russian casualties, yes, I should have made it clear that Russian tactics were the primary reason: Soviet "banzai" attacks were no less costly than the Japanese ones. On the other hand, it should put to rest the myth that Shermans burned because of the poor protection for the fuel. All those burning T-34s were diesel-powered; it was the ammo that burned most often, and the fuel usually followed on after the crew compartment was nice and toasty.
The arguments showed some ignorance of some basic points.
October 29 2008, 2:59 PM
The German defeat did not hinge at Stalingrad, or later, as seem to be the assumption in the discussion.
Given the ratio of forces and their intended treatment of Russian civilians and especially prisonners, the Germans lost the war in the Fall of 1941 when they failed to take Moscow by delaying this specific campaign by a month or two to try to secure the oil fields in the soutern area of the front. The mud in the tracks froze just in time to save Moscow...
Apparently little known is that the entire purpose of attacking Russia was to take its oil reserves, this from a 1971 interview with Minister of Armaments Albert Speer himself.
Moscow was such a centralized road hub to any meaningful displacement in Russia, that despite being unrelated to oil its fall would have almost garanteed a German victory. Hitler, however, was fixated on the medium term implications of oil, and ignored his pleading Generals who understood the short term necessity of taking Moscow.
Still, even with this mistake, the Sring of 1942 drive to deprive Russia of the Bakou oil fields could have spelled doom for Russia, IF Russian populations and soldiers had the hope of being treated decently! By this time they were well aware of German atrocities...
They fought like lions because the Germans stupidly gave them NO alternative but to fight to death!
Let's remember the hatred Russian populations had for their regime, a hatred which the German completely failed to exploit...
So the Bakou operation failed, and from then on it mattered little that the German industrial policy was less than 100% efficient, given their penchant for complexity.
It was closer than many think, but not for the expected reasons.
As far as the tank themselves, the Tiger 1 had a 10 to one kill ratio versus the T-34/85, five to one against the 76mm Sherman whose shells were not more powerful but had twice the effective penetration range.
The Tiger II upped this to 11 to one at a much lower production cost because its thicker armor was of much inferior heat treatment quality to the Tiger 1... This had a serious price on its side protection however...
Both had poor mobility up hills and high consumption, but still had the same daily availability of 80% plus; the same as any other German tank, once their respective bugs were ironed out, which happened rather quickly on the tiger II...
These tanks ran out of petrol, they were not in themselves impractical. The kill ratio against Russians speaks volumes, as does their soft ground wide track mobility against the U.S. Shermans... Which cost the allies dearly in the Market Garden defeat (While Eisenhower hesitated for FOUR months, until the GERMANS attacked)...
There is in fact more to be said against the production of the Mk IV when compared to the cheaper and better Stug III...
...I wonder (and I'm sure there's info somewhere)how many of them could have been built rather than the more complex Panthers and Tigers. And how many more of these low-slung nasty little buggers could have been hiding in the bocage?
there are qualitative differences in forces optimized for defense versus offense. The StuG III and IV were not ideal vehicles to mount any sort of offensive campaigns because the lack of traverse put them at a disadvantage when operating in the open, as would have to be done in an offensive action. The StuG III/IVs were effective precisely because Germany had gone to the defensive by the time the long-barreled AT StuGs appeared. StuGs are essentially tank destroyers, but better armored and somewhat more versatile since they were easier to use from ambush. Also, despite claims of 80% reliability or availablility for German tanks, this was not the experience of the Panther or Tiger battalions. During actions, the percentage of serviceable vehicles often fell below 50%; it was the repair operations during lulls, or in rear areas, that restored most battalions to 80-100% of established strength. As has been mentioned, it was the insane and somewhat desperate Soviet tank tactics that resulted in the enormous casualties among the T-34 units in WW2. Throwing hundreds of medium tanks in open assaults against well-positioned heavy tanks produced exactly the same results as throwing massed infantry against German machine guns had done in WW1.
Further, the increased weights of all the German late war tanks created huge problems for the recovery and repair crews. Even the initially reliable PzKpfw IV was a cropper mechanically by the ausf H and certainly ausf J, due to the heavier 80mm frontal armor and longer guns. The best German medium tank of the war was the PzKpfw III, and the Germans really wanted to continue with them, but the turret ring and upper hull were too small to mount a larger gun. Col. Kniepkamp of WaPruf 6 tried to get an advanced PzKpfw III/IV designed but, as with the US, production needs overrode the desirability of getting a better medium tank. And they needed one, because the Panther and Tiger would always be limited production vehicles due to their complexity and cost.
Obviously, this whole subject is very complex, with many facets, and partisans are already sharpening their knives and lighting the torches to advance on the heretics. On the other hand, while the Germans did best postulate the value of the true MBT, and the Panther was the best early design for the MBT, it had few other lasting effects on armor design. The KV and JS heavies, T26, and Centurion, all were much more direct ancestors of the modern MBTs. They all featured space-engineered hulls, independent suspensions, rear-mounted engines with integrated transmissions, and generally lower silhouettes. The Panther was as tall as the Sherman, but wider. All the late-war and post-war advanced models were lower. Someone oughta write a book....
That reliability rating varies depending if we are looking at early production or late production, but I have no quible with the fact that the Tiger's mobility was mediocre, that they were mechanically fragile if driven rougly, for a long time without maintenance pauses or up even modest hills, and that they caused huge headaches being towed from battle or transported over bridges, all these points generally making them less suitable for the Western front.
My general point is that in spite of the above, they were actually a cost effective investment, allowing a strong defence of crucial areas, with little investment in manpower to crew, conceal and protect them, thus allowing these ressources to go elsewhere. They were not often used like that, mind you, but even so still managed to give a good account of themselves. I think if we want to find inefficiencies in German tanks we are better served to look elsewhere...
Which brings me to the notion that turret-less tanks are not useable for offensive purposes. Here I don't claim to hold anything more than an armchair General's opinion, but this notion needs to be re-examined in the case of a nation fighting with an inferior industrial output. Wittman, who often used his Tiger offensively, made a central part of his tactics to use the turret as little as possible. ALL german tanks had regenerative steering; just how big a disadvantage could the lack of a turret be for offensive purposes?
On the contrary, when the objective is more narrowly focused by the necessity of an attack, I would think the lack of a turret is a lesser hindrance than one would think. True, against concealed AT artillery lying alonside a road, I can see where the turret helps. Maybe I need to drive a tank...
On the other hand, for defensive purposes I can see all sorts of reasons why a turret-less tank is a bad idea, precisely for the ambush role usually associated with Stugs and Jagdpanzers... To point the gun the engine must be started, giving away the position with a puff of smoke. Then the engine must be kept on idle for long periods of time with no useful forward motion... Then there is the greater danger of a fixed position being outflanked compared to when you are moving... Only the low silhouette seems in favor for this type of use.
I think in a pinch a turret-less tank CAN be used to attack, and its defensive advantages are slimmer than usually imagined...
In addition, if one considers the later introduction of the Joseph Stalin, then it becomes obvious the Jagdpanther becomes far more useful than the Panther itself, and this may even extend to the Jagdpanzer IV, which has the same gun as the Panther but on a far lower silhouette.
I have read on numerous occasions that the army was never really happy with the Panther, and the Panzer IV has never struck me as a particularly cost-effective use of ressources.
Then again there is the Sherman, which only really came into its own as the limited-production Firefly, as even the 76mm often faltered against German armor.
There are other tanks that can be criticized for their cost effectiveness, in my view, and this probably AHEAD of the Tigers...
The Js-II, at a mere 45 tons, with a turret, good mobility and a (claimed) ability to penetrate the Panther front hull at over 2500 m, while the reverse is supposedly true at less than a few hundred yards, seems to me like an anomaly among WW2 tanks. The Js-III remained the world standard until the 1970s, but I still wonder; is there anything that compares to the Stalin in WWII? Even more puzzling is that it didn't seem to do spectacularly well most of the time... Does its paper efficiency have something to do with the newer space usage Bruce mentionned? How does the Pershing compare to it? Or better yet, the Super-Pershing?
As for my beloved Jagdtiger, I realize my argument makes it neither good for offence nor defense, as it doesn't even have a low silhouette. I hasten to add I never considered it in the same league as the Tiger II in cost-efficiency. If nothing else it might have been useful against the Js-II and IIIs, but other than as a modeler, I can't say I would have invested too much in it...
It also occurs to me that a mine field might force an attack to follow a narrow cleared path, in wich case being turreted is an obvious advantage.
I was also told by a Canadian tanker in a hobbyshop once that the disappearance of the hull Mg was due to the more frequent use of a hull-down defensive position by modern doctrine, where only the turret is exposed.
He stated that most modern Soviet tanks could only communicate with the section commander, not beyond, unlike the section commander himself. He also added that modern Soviet tanks were pretty much something you did not want to be in in combat against NATO... And air superiority was NOT the issue here... That strikes me as a strange decline from the Js-II/III era, does it not? What has happened to Russian tank design since then? Tom Clancy drove and examined the T-72, and he couldn't stop ranting on how much of a piece of junk it was. He wouldn't even allow the staff to close the hatch on him, for fear of injuring himself on the many sharp pieces of metal everywhere inside... Yet he found Russian artillery superbly made...You also couldn't contrast more his opinion of the M-1... It seems something has happened to Russian armor. I wonder what.
I wish there was a REALLY good tank simulator program for PCs and Macs covering this sort of combat, in the same vein as Steel Beasts Pro, which is very impressive. I can't tell you how many hours I have wasted trying to master just the gunnery, let alone the tactical use of my Leopard 2, and even with laser ranging and automatic lead, Night vision and UAVs telling me where the bad guys are, I can't hit squat..... Now that is sitting in my warm, stable, spacious (relatively) studio, no noise except the PC fan, no barked shins or trapped fingers, no staying awake for 48 hours, I can hit the pause button and wander off for a coffee, I can pee when I want and into a WC, rather than when the TC says I can and then into an empty shell case.... And the bad guys are only going to make me try again with a low score, rather then turn me into offal. But even then, if we could actually try out these various tank designs, including all the relevant factors, the results might be quite interesting. In Il2, I certainly came to appreciate the differences between handling a turning fighter like a Gloster Gladiator, in comparison with a zoom and boom P47, or an Me163 against a wall of B17s....
Statistical analysis of combat records is always going to interesting, but so easy to misinterpret, or worse, bend to fit preconceptions. And there are going to be hundreds and hundreds of combats where the outcome was down to some other factor than simply armour thickness or engine reliability. That sort of approach makes the whole question no more than a glorified session of Top Trumps!
I always thought it was interesting that the gunner who nailed Wittmann had never fired a shot in anger before, and only a few rounds with his 17 pdr on a range before heading to France. Sherman Ballyragget famously rammed a Tiger II and the German crew bailed out and ran away. A significant number of German tanks in Normandy were just abandoned, often in perfectly servicable condition. Armour thickness, or engine quality, or gunnery optics, played no part in such losses, but losses they still were. Reading a lot of Delaforces books on various British units in the NWE campaign often show a respect for the German heavy tanks, but a far greater fear of mortars and 'Moaning Minnies', and an understanding that well-hidden PaKs and StuGs were far more likely to be encountered, and just as dangerous. And having overwhelming control of the air, and therefore AOP-directed artillery, provided the Allies with a very powerful method of dealing with enemy concentrations, as well as limiting supply and movement. Again, critical factors that have nothing to do with the specific qualities of individual vehicles.
If I may use a hockey analogy. I once played against a team which from their stats were a great-looking team on paper, far better than us. But hockey is played on ice....... We kicked their butts.
It's not just the quality of the equipment, but the quality of the men (and women) that are using it.
We are dealing with differences of opinion here...
October 31 2008, 8:33 PM
and that is all. I can assure everyone here that Steve not only has complete access to all the US archival material on WW2 armor development for the US, but also a great deal of the WW2 and later Soviet-Russian archival material on Soviet tank development, tacics, and history. He has written extensively on Russian armor subjects, working with some of the best informed Eastern European armor experts and historians, such as Janusz Magnuski in Poland (who do you think "James Grandsen" was). There is probably no one in this country who could have done a more thorough job of analyzing American, German, and Russian armor at this time, all from primary sources. This book is not his opinion; it is backed up by more data than most of us will ever see.
...I think Steve's reputation is more than secure with the TOTS mob. The more questionable "opinions" seem to be on M-L. As an aside, Steve should be rightfully proud to have stirred up so much emotion (unless, of course, some of those posts were his sneaky method of ginning up sales .
Although I'm very glad to see that this discussion on here is much more civilised than the one on M-L, I'm getting a bit confused... What are we discussing?
Best tank? Tank tactics?
As far as I'm concerned, the best tank ever is the Swedish Strv-103, which is basically a StuG IV with an added metal bar "schurzen" at the front (which was top secret). Or at least, that's the line they fed us when I was growing up... It even has a rearwards driver so it can run away quicker, very useful when you're neutral.
you guys were late to the party.....look at all the WW2 German heavy armored cars with the "reverse assistant drivers." They could back up as fast as they went forward.
Don't worry Bruce, that's what I meant!! It irritated me mightily that Stevens book could get 'rubbished' because his conclusions didn't square with someone elses preconceptions, or so it seemed. It was a knee-jerk reaction to that forest of apologists who try to imply the allies won 'unfairly', by using 'inferior' tanks in unsportingly large numbers. They really get my goat!!
Good points..... I had a long discussion last night with Mark Gilmore with some very interesting comments. One, I misspoke about 3rd AD. They lost almost twice as many tanks as 2nd AD rather than 4th AD, and that is significant because they both still had the old large AD TO&E of four armored battalions and were the same size with the same equipment. So this makes an even better comparison between similar divisions. Second, the bocage did NOT favor artillery and aerial bombardment once the two sides had closed in the hedgerows, because the lines were too close to each other. The Germans held defensive positions, traditionally giving them a large numerical advantage in forces. They also excelled in the issue and use of mortars. Indeed, the majority of American infantry casualties in the hedgerow country was the result of German mortar use.
Here is the interesting thing Steve found. According to a series of US Army studies done after the war, using both US and German after-action reports, 60% of the German infantry casualties in Normandy were caused by American and British infantry small arms. That's right; we outfought them. While it is true that, over the course of the war, German troops inflicted far greater casualties on their enemies than they suffered, much of that advantage was on the Russian front where, early in the war, truly dysfunctional and political leaders often ordered mass infantry and tank assaults against prepared German defenses. Later in the war, when much better Russian commanders were in control of the battlefield tactics, this sad ratio declined. But on the Western front, it just wasn't that high in most cases. But sometimes, German tactics and doctine led them astray and that is what happened in Normandy.
The bocage was mostly hedgerows surrounding open fields. The roads were narrow, unsuitable for tanks on both sides - if you got caught on the road, there was nowhere to go. So, much of the battle was a duel of infantry, supporting armor, and light artillery (mostly mortars). The Americans were successful in pushing back the Germans in many areas, even though the Germans had a defense built around the MG42 LMG, probably the best light machine gun of the mid-20th century. But, in making the LMG the basis of the infantry squad's firepower base, the Germans lagged in developing better weapons for the rest of the squads. Most German infantry in Normandy were equipped with the WW1 designed Mauser 98k, a bolt-action rifle with 5 rounds. The US infantry was equipped with the M1 Garand semi-auto rifle with 8 rounds, a much higher rate of fire, and the ability to fire multiple shots without disturbing the rifleman's aim.
What happened was that when the Americans succeeded in pushing the Germans out of a sector, the Germans' doctrine entailed an immediate counterattack to regain the ground and take the offensive. The problem was the Germans now had to cross those open fields, and the MG42 was not a good portable weapon; the recoil made it hard to control while walking or moving. So, the German troops lost a significant part of their firepower during the assault and the slower firing American weapons were better suited for the defense and took a heavy toll of the German attackers. The result was heavier than necessary losses for the German units. It wasn't just the tanks.....
As for the Allies unfairly producing so many weapons and trucks and stuff, well, stuff happens. And one final shot about Steve's qualifications: Mark has done a lot of research in the National Archives, and told me it is virtually impossible to find any files on US military technical history that don't have Steve's name on them as being checked out for research. He has been everywhere.....
