(Via Milinet)
Proceedings
April 2000
Interview: James Webb
On the eve of the premiere of the new Paramount Pictures movie,
Rules
of Engagement, the film's creator, executive producer, and
co-writer
talked recently at his office overlooking the Iwo Jima Memorial
in
northern Virginia with Naval Institute editor Fred L. Schultz.
The
self-described iconoclast discusses the machinations of
Hollywood and
its prevailing attitudes toward the military, his service as
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy, the
gap
between civilian and military cultures, and his opinions about
the
current condition of military leadership.
Proceedings: Obviously, the subject of rules of engagement plays
heavily on the readers of this magazine. How did the new film,
Rules
of Engagement, come about?
Webb: I conceived the idea in 1989, when Scott Rudin began
producing
after having been president of production at 20th-Century Fox.
He had
read Bob Timberg's article in Esquire, which was the seminal
article
for his book, The Nightingale's Song. We had a discussion that
boiled
down to the notion of military loyalty. Timberg's article had
struck
him, when it mentioned that, although I did not particularly
like
Oliver North, if I'd been working in the White House at the time
of
the Iran- Contra activities, I would not have let him do what he
did.
This led to a discussion of Marine Corps loyalty, as opposed to
what
you see in the civilian world. I made a comment that basically
was:
"In the Marine Corps, loyalty means you will die for somebody
even if
you don't like them." He said, "You know, there's a movie in
that."
The whole issue of the rules of engagement weighed heavily on my
mind: first, from having fought in Vietnam; second, from having
represented a so-called "war criminal" for six years, which was
written about some time ago for the Naval Institute Press [Gary
Solis, Son Thang, 1997]; third, from having been a journalist in
Beirut when the Marines were there, with unbelievably ridiculous
rules of engagement; and fourth, from having been Secretary of
the
Navy during the Persian Gulf incidents of 1987 and 1988.
The theme has run deep over the past 40 years, and I thought we
should show the American people what the modern military has to
deal
with on a daily basis, when it is placed in politically complex
environments. So I came up with an idea, using a Marine
Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) having to rescue an embassy under siege, because the
government of that country, as a protest against something the
Americans had done, pulls away its police protection. The MEU
commander must make a decision to fire into a crowd after some
of his
Marines are killed. He then becomes, on one hand, something of a
hero. But on the other hand, he is court-martialed for murder.
The
loyalty then plays in when he sees he's in trouble, and a lot of
people are trying to take advantage of him for political
reasons. He
sees that the one person he really trusts to defend him is a
Marine
whose life he saved in Vietnam and who was shot up badly and
became a
Marine Corps lawyer.
Proceedings: Does the movie resolve anything about rules of
engagement?
Webb: As originally written, this film would have been harder on
the
viewer. You'll still be debating, when you walk out of the
theater,
whether what the MEU commander did was right. The thing I'm
proudest
of, in terms of what has survived through the filmmaking
process, is
the kind of rhetoric that you're going to hear. I refer
especially to
one speech, delivered by Samuel L. Jackson: "No matter what
happens
here, do you realize I will never command anything again? And do
you
know what that means?" The average civilian in this country has
no
comprehension of what command is. Halfway through this film, the
viewer knows that, whichever way it goes for this guy, he has
lost
the most precious thing to him, professionally--the right to
command
troops. That, to me, is emotionally satisfying. World War II is
easy
in Hollywood. There has never before been a film that expressly
addresses the modern American military and the issues it faces.
Proceedings: Why do you think the public is so ignorant about
what a
combat commander has to go through?
Webb: The level of ignorance is extremely high. A big part of
that is
because Hollywood has become, in many ways, the articulator of
our
culture--to ourselves and to the world. Right now, 60 percent of
the
money Hollywood makes is in international sales. If you look at
the
films that have been done about the U.S. military--anything
after
World War II--they are simplistic on these issues, and they are
not
positive. You see a repetitive theme, either about the
corruption of
U.S. military
leaders or the depiction that Americans just shoot things up,
without
restrictions.
The conversations I've had with the people in Los Angeles
responsible
for marketing this film have been quite informative. They had no
comprehension that we had any restrictions on us, even in a
place
like Vietnam. Where does the average American get his
information?
From the movies.
Many people have asked me over the past ten years what the hell
I'm
doing, working with Hollywood. I don't think I'm going to do
this
solely or forever, because most of the things you hear about
Hollywood are true. It's a very difficult place on philosophical
issues and also because of the competitive nature of the beast.
The
Writers' Guild typically registers about 34,000 screenplays a
year,
and they make 260 feature films. The process of getting your
product
through that system in some ways depends on quality, but in a
lot of
ways it depends on relationships and political content. So
people who
have more traditional
views have a very tough time there. What has survived in this
film, I
think, is going to be good for the country and will be
satisfying for
people who care about the military.
Proceedings: Take us through your on-and-off relationship with
this project.
Webb: For nine years, I was the sole writer and co-producer with
Scott Rudin, who did Angela's Ashes, Sister Act, The Firm, and
Sleepy
Hollow. He's one of the dominant producers in Hollywood, and
he's
very content-oriented. When Billy Friedkin became the director,
Scott
was doing Angela's Ashes and Sleepy Hollow in England. So
Friedkin
brought on Dick Zanuck, the son of Darryl Zanuck, to produce. At
that
point, with Scott off in England, they formed their own ideas.
They
brought in
another writer and, without my direct involvement, came up with
some
changes to the story. Some of them were things that I may not
have
done myself, but that's Hollywood.
I found two scenes deeply objectionable, and I communicated that
to
them. Without going into detail, one scene involved the Marine
Corps
in Vietnam, the other involved the Vietnamese community in the
United
States. Those two constituencies, for lack of a better term, are
more
important to me than making a movie. I could just see people
saying,
"Webb went to Hollywood and sold out. He's turning his back on
the
people he says he cares about."
So it was sort of like "SecNav, round two." [Webb resigned as
Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration.] I took my
name
off my own film. Luckily, over the course of the next year, as
they
shot the film and edited it, either they had second thoughts
about
what I had said, or they decided on their own. It doesn't
matter;
they realized that those two scenes would have been extremely
bad for
the film. So they edited both of them down to the point that
they
were acceptable. I went to a screening, and I agreed to come
back on
as executive producer, with a "story by" credit. In the process,
I
lost my screenwriting credit.
Proceedings: Based on what we've heard, that is extraordinary in
the
movie business. Maybe they did realize that they were going to
alienate the Marine Corps, a major portion of the potential
audience.
Webb: Probably the most unfortunate occurrence in the shooting
of the
film was that Dale Dye was technical adviser. In my view, he
should
have been more loyal to the Marine Corps and backed me on what I
said. This was my movie, and he never even called me to talk
about
the fact he was on the project. It was very clear to me where
his
loyalties were. If there's anybody I'm really disappointed in,
it's
not the Billy Friedkins and the Dick Zanucks of the world. What
do
they know about the
military? It's people like Dale Dye, who should have known that
he
did not have the experience to make the judgment that he made,
which
cost us an entire year of wrangling. Most people in Hollywood
think
that Dale Dye was an infantry Marine. He was not.
Proceedings: How serious is the apparent gap between the
civilian and
military cultures?
Webb: To start, it depends on how you comprehend or perceive the
problem. Tom Ricks's book, Making the Corps, is representative,
I
think, of many people who have not served in the military, who
have
gone to elite schools, and who are part of the ruling veneer in
this
country. Their worry is that the military is becoming more
dangerous
as a separate entity. And the military is beginning to view
itself,
through its leadership, as a separate entity.
In my view, the danger is the other way around. And it's been
that
way for 30 years. But it's become more markedly so during this
particular administration. The elites of this country have been
separating themselves from the obligations of serving and have
less
and less comprehension of the military. As a result, they have
more
of a cavalier view of how the military should be used. They have
very
little personal or emotional connection to military service.
I started seeing this 20 years ago, when I was a committee
counsel in
the Congress. Typically, members of Congress had some military
service; the staffers typically did not. When things really got
bad,
and we started Indian Ocean commitments around 1979, it may as
well
have been the Mexican Navy out there when it came to explaining
what
was going on to the staffers. By the way, the same is true in
the
media. The typical reporter 20 years ago didn't have military
service, but his or her editor did. Now, most members of
Congress and
most editors lack military service. Where do they go to get that
understanding? That's part of the problem.
The other part of the problem is that senior military leaders
have
been unable to perceive this change as it relates to their
responsibility for articulating how the military operates.
They're
still ten years behind, with most of them believing that it is
somehow a political act to confront the political process when
the
political process needs to be confronted. As little as 10 or 15
years
ago, the uniformed people could back off a bit, because the room
in a
typical congressional hearing was inundated with people who
understood the basics. The military leaders didn't need to state
them. They need to state them now. And when these
statements come from people outside the process, they do not
have the
same impact as they do when they come from people in uniform.
The
Marine Corps has done very well. The other services have not.
The danger, to me, is real, and it comes from a veneer that's
been
defined by academic background and class. We have moved from
issues
of race to issues of class in this country, very subtly. And
people
are only now beginning to comprehend it.
With studies like the Triangle Study of the so-called military
elites, people had better be paying close attention to the exact
words being used and how the military is being defined from the
outside. To coin the phrase "military elites" is a pretty
dangerous
thing, a contradiction in terms. You're not born to be an
admiral,
even though some believe they were. More than any other
institution
in this country, the military is basically a socialist
meritocracy.
You work your way up; you are evaluated on intangibles; and
you're
rewarded not with pay but with things like command. And when
they
start characterizing a military elite, and then carefully carve
it
away, the next step is going to be to carve the leaders away
from
their own troops. Just watch.
Watch out for these civilian-designed attitudinal surveys that
go
straight to the troops. The intellectual elites in this country
want
to say that the military elites don't understand their own
troops;
their troops have evolved as society has evolved, and these
intellectuals know what's best for the military. That's what's
going
to happen.
Proceedings: Might that be a root problem in regard to
recruiting and
retention?
Webb: I would argue that the problem--from the evidence of the
Marine
Corps and from being out and talking to the people who really
care,
who want to lead--is not that the leadership is too traditional.
It
has become too obedient to the political process to the point
that it
will not define the military culture to the political
leadership.
[Commandant of the Marine Corps General] Bob Barrow saved the
Marine
Corps. He was the guy, back in 1979, during the Carter
administration, who really drove the stake into the ground and
said,
"This is what the Marine Corps is. If you don't like it, fire
me. If
you don't like what I'm saying, fire me." Barrow wasn't the
first guy
to say it, but this was a defining moment for the Marine Corps.
And
the Marines have said, basically, "We know who we are; we know
what
our traditions are; we know
how to lead; we know how to fight; and we're going to take care
of our
people."
When members of the other services see the leadership at the top
cut
into the political process, that's when you get the sort of
confusion
that I see. Maybe there are people who write for Proceedings who
have
different views, but to me that seems to be the difference
between
the Marine Corps and the other services. And it does affect
recruiting and retention.
Proceedings: You've been a vocal critic of military leadership,
and
you were especially tough in your 1996 speech at the Naval
Institute's Annual Meeting. I'm sure you remember that. Has
anything
changed since then?
Webb: Yes, I remember. Let's back up to that speech. The biggest
problem at the time was the cascading effect of the Navy's
leadership's failure to defend its culture after the Tailhook
incident. In 1992, I wrote a piece for the New York Times,
basically
saying that the problem wasn't the Navy's culture. The problem
was
the admirals who were standing there saying we have a flaw in
the
culture, or who were allowing the civilian process to say that
we had
a corrupt culture.
If that were true, if the Navy's culture was permanently flawed
and
that was what caused Tailhook, then every one of those guys
should
have resigned. And if the culture wasn't structurally flawed, if
this
was an isolated incident that happened in one part of a hotel,
where
some people got out of hand, then they should have spoken up,
and the
whole thing might have taken a different turn. You tell me that
what
happened in a mosh pit at a Woodstock celebration last summer
was
less notorious than what happened at Tailhook? That was much
more
notorious. There were actual rapes in the mosh pit at Woodstock
'99.
But where were the media?
Obviously, there was something else going on at Tailhook. Some
agenda
leftists were seizing the event to break the Navy culture. And
the
admirals stood silent, when the civilian leaders were saying
that the
culture was broken. The admirals created that culture. They were
a
part of it. If they didn't agree with what the civilians were
saying,
they should have spoken up.
This wasn't something that I got up every day and made a speech
about. When we reached the point where promotions that already
had
been approved through the sacrosanct promotion process were then
required to have a second look by a group of Senate staffers,
then
something was inalienably wrong with the Navy's leadership.
I brought my 14-year-old son with me to that Naval Institute
conference. When I got there, I told him, "I do not want to make
this
speech; I don't know how people are going to react to it. But it
has
to be said." And this became quite an education for him over the
next
several months.
When you ask whether things have changed since that speech, I
think
that the tragedy of Admiral [Jeremy M.] Boorda's suicide, the
visibility of what happened to [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
Admiral]
Stan Arthur, and the things that were written about them caused
a
sort of second look at what was being done to the Navy. I think
that
gave the Navy some breathing room for a number of reasons. But I
think--or would have hoped--that with that breathing room, there
would have been a lot more aggressive argument from the top
leadership of the Navy regarding force structure and other
important
issues.
I don't see how you can have a United States Navy with 300
ships--no
matter how efficient each one of those ships might be--and still
perform what needs to be done on behalf of the nation's
security,
especially if we are going to be the nation that we say we are.
Again, it's a question of having the uniformed leadership at the
top
understanding that it's different now; it's different than it
was ten
years ago, and they need to be saying it. Some of them are, but
most
of them aren't.
Proceedings: What would you say your biggest accomplishment was
in
your public service?
Webb: It's hard to say. I was a committee counsel for four years
in
the Congress, and that was a time when veterans' issues were
extremely visible. I think probably the most important thing
that I
did was to create the legislation that countered the Carter
discharge
program.
After President [Jimmy] Carter had given amnesty to all the
draft
evaders, he turned around and created a program that would have
upgraded hundreds of thousands of discharges of people who were
deserters, attitude cases, etc. I worked day and night for six
months
on that. And we eventually brought what we called "historical
standards" to any of those discharges. We could not stop the
Carter
administration from upgrading the discharges, but we could stop
people from getting veterans' benefits, unless they met
historical
standards. That was very important to preserving the dignity of
the
people who had served. It was
unbelievably emotional and contentious. We were right, in my
view.
It's hard to look at a guy who lost his arm, telling you, "I
went to
Vietnam. My cousin deserted. And now they're going to give my
cousin
veterans' benefits." He said, "I never felt any bitterness
toward my
cousin, except that they're going to treat him the same way they
treat me." Those were the distinctions that we were having to
deal
with. I could write a book on how a bill becomes a law just
based on
that piece of legislation.
I think the most important thing I was involved with in the
Pentagon,
when I was ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] for three years,
was
the creation of the Reserve Affairs Staff. We had all seven
guard-reserve components, all four active services, plus
political
and career civilians all on one staff. And making that
work--where we
became central to resourcing mobilization, manpower flow, and
medical
care--was a tremendous leadership experience.
My goal as Secretary of the Navy was to reinvigorate the
admiralty
and give it more responsibility. I think we did that in a number
of
different ways. And toward the end, even though I fell on my
sword, I
made some speeches that still resonate about the United States
as a
Pacific nation and why we are a maritime nation; not in the
sense of
having to ram four aircraft carriers up through the Kola
Peninsula,
but why we need this force structure in the day-to-day
operational
environment in which we exist. By having fought that issue, and
refusing to back down on it, I can still talk about it with some
veracity.
Proceedings: Did you know you were "falling on your sword" at
the time?
Webb: No. We almost had it done. I've been criticized for being
intransigent, because I resigned. But you don't survive four
years in
Congress, putting 20 bills a year through the House floor, by
being
intransigent. When I was ASD, over three years on the Defense
Resources Board, we lost only one issue.
We argued the issue over which I resigned for three months. I
had
written a paper in 1984, laying out exactly how I believed the
force
structure of all the services should change, moving into the
21st
century. And I was the first guy in the [President Ronald]
Reagan
administration to argue that we should reduce our ground and
tactical- air presence in NATO. So this wasn't just more bucks
for
everybody; it was a plan for how to reconfigure the U.S.
military. As
I said, for three months we negotiated how to meet this $11
billion
decrement that we had been given, without dropping force
structure.
[Secretary of Defense Frank] Carlucci basically came in and
said, "I
want everybody to give up force structure." To him, it was,
"when
times are good, everybody gets more; when times are bad,
everybody
gives something up." My view was that if we could survive the
decrement and keep force structure intact for one year, people
would
understand that the Navy, in the current environment, is
different
from the other services. That was the gamble. And we were so
close.
Proceedings: What was your biggest regret during your public
service?
Webb: Having resigned as Secretary of the Navy. That's it.
Proceedings: Why did you decide to leave public service and go
into
literature and filmmaking?
Webb: From the time I left the Marine Corps, I've done both. I
have
an unwitting career. Actually, I wrote my first book after my
first
year in law school. It was a small book on Micronesia and
American
strategic interests in the Pacific.
So I just became fascinated with writing and started Fields of
Fire.
From that point forward, I'd write for a while and then do
something
in government for a while. When I resigned as Secretary of the
Navy
in 1988, I was asked by the Republican National Committee to run
against [Senator] Chuck Robb (D-VA). They offered me $400,000
start-up money. Part of me was saying, "If I run for the Senate,
people are going to forget what I just did. They're going to
think I
resigned just so I could make more noise and run for the
Senate."
Then I also sat down and thought that if I were to go into
government
at any level beyond where I'd been, I should be financially
secure. I
also thought that I should have all of my curiosities basically
taken
care of. You're a prisoner when you're in government at that
level.
Even when I was SecNav, I was locked up in some of the best
hotels in
the world. You could travel all the way to the Philippines, but
you
couldn't go see anything. I'm lucky enough now that I can get
people
to pay me to go
places I want to go and see things I want to see.
And then there's the side of me that loves to make stories. As I
said, particularly on the film side, if you really care about
the
cultural issues, the place where our culture is being
articulated is
Los Angeles. I've been in and out of there for ten years. I'm
not
saying I'm going to do it for the rest of my life. And at some
point,
I might go back into government. I haven't decided.
Proceedings: Do you have the same type of relationship with the
filming of Fields of Fire as you had with Rules of Engagement?
Webb: Having learned how Hollywood operates and feeling how
important
the Vietnam story is, especially because it's never been done
right,
I decided to do Fields of Fire outside the studio system. It's
harder. But if you sell a story or a novel into the studio
system,
into what they call "development," they own it; they own it
creatively, they own every one of those characters, and they can
do
anything they want. All they have to do is pay you out.
With Fields of Fire, the only reason to go through this drill
was to
try to get it right. It's a much harder way, but it's going to
be
much more satisfying in the end. It took me an entire year to
get the
rights to shoot this in Vietnam, right in the An Hoa Basin,
where I
was. We got the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] to play themselves.
And
the Marine Corps is going to help us. The problem is that there
are
very few people in Hollywood, on the development or on the money
side, who connect emotionally with a positive view of Vietnam
service. It's taken me a lot longer than I ever thought it
would, but
we're very close. I think we're going to get it done this year.
Proceedings: What advice would you give to young people who are
contemplating a military career?
Webb: First of all, I think you've got to make that decision for
yourself. My son just turned 18 and is very interested in going
into
the Marine Corps. I'm really proud of him for that. But, at the
same
time, if he were doing it purely because somebody else wanted
him to,
then he would be in the wrong place.
That aside, I really wish we had more of a citizen soldiery. I
wish
we had more people in the country going through the military,
because
it's the greatest experience in the world in terms of helping
you
understand the cultural makeup of the country and how you can
work
together. Whether you're in for 3 years or for 30, you take that
back
to your community, and you have a totally different
understanding of
this country by having served. There's no greater thing a young
person can do than to be responsible for other people in the
military
environment. It helps you learn who you are, how to make
decisions,
and how to lead.
Whether someone going in should remain for a career is a big
leadership question. I wouldn't even put that on a young person.
I'd
put that on the admirals and the generals. We get so many good
people
in the U.S. military, and we always have, with a few small blips
here
and there. Even in bad times there are some really great people
coming in the military. And the question always has been whether
they
are inspired, whether the leadership and the nation will
convince
them that what they're doing is important. Napoleon said that
there
are no bad regiments; there are only bad colonels.
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