(Via Milinet)
Still the Nation's 9-1-1 Force?
Marine Corps Gazette April 2000
By Mark Cancian
"Your 911 Force will continue to answer the Nation's call..."
Source: Concepts and Issues, 1999
It is an article of faith among Marines that the Corps
is the
nation's 9-1-1 force, ready to handle any mission on a moment's
notice. It is written into speeches, Congressional testimony
and
doctrine. But is it still true? As the post-Cold World has
evolved,
the Marine Corps has come to handle only contingencies requiring
less
than a battalion or, if battalion sized, lasting less than a
month.
Anything larger or longer goes to the Army or Air Force. The
Marine
Corps' limitation is that it is
stretched so thin by its MEU(SOC) and unit deployment schedules
that
it has little slack with which to take up unexpected
requirements.
So when the nation dials 9-1-1, it frequently gets a busy signal
from
the Marine Corps.
This situation did not result from an explicit series of
choices but
evolved over time. Is it what Marines intend?
Hearing this criticism Marines will rush to point out
all the real
world contingencies that the Corps has participated in, often
alone.
These objections are valid up to a point. In the last few
years
there have been NEOs in Eritrea, West Africa and Albania,
humanitarian operations in Central America and Kenya, stability
operations in Haiti, no fly zone enforcement in Bosnia and Iraq
plus
participation by a wide variety of small detachments in
presence,
peace enforcement, and counter drug operations all over the
world.
The Marine Corps still accomplishes a lot.
Nevertheless, Marine Corps participation in these
contingencies has been severely limited in duration or scope.
Of
the dozens of operational events that have occurred in the last
five
years, most have involved deployments of relatively small
detachments
-- FAST units providing site security, radar detachments for
counter
drug surveillance, helicopter detachments for MIA recovery. The
larger deployments have been short term -- SPMAGTFs for security
in
Los Angeles, for disaster relief in Florida after Hurricane
Andrew,
for fighting fires in western US. MEU(SOC)s participate in a
variety
of operations. Generally, their participation consists of
sending
teams ashore for some limited purpose -- NEOs, site security,
disaster relief. Occasionally the entire MEU(SOC) will be
committed
ashore, but for a very limited time -- e.g., Provide Comfort in
1991,
or to shield the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia in 1994.
However, there is always a lot of pressure to reembark
the
MEU(SOC). Indeed, at times there seems to be almost an
inversion of
priorities -- MEU(SOC)s detach from real-world contingencies and
reembark aboard ship, so they can continue to provide
"presence".
More often the MEU(SOC) will be dispatched to some potential hot
spot
in case it is needed, but is not actually committed. There have
been
a few exceptions. Most prominent is the long commitment of F-18s
and
EA-6Bs in the Balkans to enforce a no fly zone. Camp security
for
migrant operations in Guantanamo is possibly another.
Nevertheless,
this rule of thumb seems to hold: short of mobilization, any
Marine
commitment of a battalion or larger is limited to a month's
duration.
And not since Somalia has the Marine Corps committed a force
larger
than an MEU.
Somalia seems to have been a turning point. For
Operation Restore
Hope in 1992-1993 12,000 Marines deployed for five months,
providing the
operation's spearhead and establishing a lodgement for follow-on
Army and
coalition forces. In this the operation followed classic Marine
expectations. However, having established a secure lodgement,
the Marines
believed they were ready to redeploy after a month but were
trapped in a
long "sustainment" phase lasting an additional four months. The
experience may have soured Marine planners on such
interventions. In
any case this model of operations -- Marines kick in the door
and
others follow -- has not been not repeated -- not in Haiti,
Bosnia,
or Kosovo.
Most recently there was the near-MTW in Kosovo, a
conflict without
allied casualties but requiring a force employment equivalent to
an MTW of
air power and, before Serbia capitulated, threatening to require
a major
ground element as well. The Corps sent 26th MEU(SOC) and some
late-arriving air elements. The MEU(SOC) sent small teams
ashore during
the conflict to help with refugee relief and then, after the
capitulation,
conducted stability operations for a month before reembarking.
The flying
squadrons got 220 missions in before the conflict ended (except
for the
EA-6Bs which, as national assets, participated heavily from the
beginning).
By contrast the Army sent 5,000 troops in Task Force
Hawk, and
those troops are still there, separating factions, rebuilding
the
society and maintaining the peace. The Air Force committed
about 500
aircraft and flew about 20,000 sorties. Indeed, for the Air
Force
Kosovo was an MTW, a
regional war, requiring reserve activation, stop-loss and a
large
expenditure of munitions.
Kosovo illustrates the fundamental point that the Army
and Air
Force have taken over the major burden of real world
contingencies. And
they are not shy about letting the world know:
Because of its unique capabilities, the Army has been
called upon
to be the principal engine for executing the National Military
Strategy.
America's Army has provided more than 60 percent of the people
who have
participated in major military operations since 1989 -- this
fact
underscores the Army's role as the indispensable element of
America's
military might...Putting Army boots on the ground is the surest
way to
shape the international security environment in ways favorable
to US
interests...Today's Army has an unprecedented capability of
projecting
ground combat power on short notice. (Report of the Secretary of
the Army,
Jan 1999)
The Air Force helped meet the nation's security needs
during 1998
by operating across the spectrum of peace and conflict in every
corner of
the world. Deployments continued at four times the old, Cold
War
pace...The speed, range, and flexibility of aerospace power used
in new,
imaginative ways by highly skilled, trained and dedicated
personnel were
crucial to success...In Kosovo we demonstrated we could deploy
to some 20
bases with seeming effortlessness, and on short notice,
transform a base
with no U.S. facilities into a fully operational base within
hours to
a few days. More importantly, we demonstrated that we could
also
turn sorties quickly...(Report of the Secretary of the Air
Force, Jan
1999 and remarks,
Nov 1999)
One effect of this new division of labor is that the
Army has
become the nation's expert in operations other than war. It has
4+ years
of experience in Bosnia, 1+ year in Kosovo, 5 years in Haiti,
endured the
worst fighting in Somalia and has dozens of teams deployed
worldwide. The
Marine Corps rightly points to the Small Wars Manual and the CAP
program in Vietnam as evidence of its traditional focus on
operations
other than war. But these are now historical curiosities. No
one in
the Corps today has any personal connection to these
experiences. To
be fair the Corps
continuously has small teams operating around the world --
teaching small
boat operations in South America, augmenting embassy security in
Kenya,
providing counterdrug radar support. However, small teams
intermittently
deployed do not produce the same base of experience in
operations other
than war as having 20,000 soldiers continuously on the ground in
the
Balkans.
Another effect is that two long standing Marine Corps
self-images
have been, if not invalidated, at least weakened. One self
image is that
the Marine Corps, with its expeditionary, forcible entry forces,
kicks open the door, and the Army's heavy, war winning forces
follow
through.
Although rarely occurring in history, this has been a staple of
Marine
Corps strategic thought since World War II. Now the Army and
Marine Corps
both kick in the door, and the Army follows through.
The second self image is that the Marine Corps
comprises a medium
weight force between Army light forces and Army heavy forces.
For a long
time this was true. Army light forces were very light -- highly
deployable but lacking firepower and sustainability. Army heavy
forces were war winners but took a long time to deploy.
However,
with an expeditionary Army learning to task organize and deploy,
the
distinction is fading.
Why has this happened? This happened because the Cold War
ended, and the
world changed. In particular, three things occurred:
o More real world contingencies. The end of
the Cold War
made the world safe for regional conflicts. Neighbors who had
been
held in check by their superpower patrons were now unrestrained.
Further, the
United States could now take action in many circumstances where
before it
was constrained either by the Soviet Union directly or by the
fear of
committing its limited military forces to secondary theaters.
As a result
the demand for expeditionary forces has greatly increased.
o An expeditionary Army and Air Force. The
Army and Air
Force have not ignored these changes. Once almost totally
focused on the
Soviet threat in Europe, now they recognize the need for a
global
expeditionary capability. The Army, for example, has built an
extensive
prepositioning program, both afloat and ashore, that is designed
to deploy
its forces rapidly to likely combat theaters and that is now
larger than
the Marine Corps' prepositioning program. The Army strongly
supported the
Air Force's C-17 program, enhancing its ability to deploy
rapidly by air.
As a result the program will likely grow beyond its original
goal of 120
aircraft. The Army also pushed the program for building
specially-configured sealift transports (LMSRs) to move
equipment rapidly
by sea. The last ships of that program are now being completed.
Finally,
the Army is beginning to develop rapidly deployable medium
weight forces,
designed, in the words of the new Chief of Staff, "to put a
combat capable
brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division on the
ground in 120
hours, and five divisions in 30 days."
The Air Force is also developing an expeditionary
capability. The
centerpiece is the Air Expeditionary Force, 10 groupings of Air
Force
units that prepare cyclically for deployments, much like the
Marine
Corps' unit deployment program. As the Air Force describes it:
We are building a very, very rapidly deployable force
that has the
capacity to pick up and move very quickly, tailored to the needs
of the
situation -- from humanitarian operations to a shooting conflict
anywhere
on this globe -- with a capacity to project power when and where
it is
needed... The new Expeditionary Aerospace force (AEF) concept
will provide
tailorable units with unparalleled responsiveness and punch
...[and]
represents a revolutionary way of providing aerospace power to
warfighting
regional commanders. (Remarks by General Michael Ryan, Air
Force Chief of
Staff May 1998 and Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, Jan
1999)
o An unchanged Marine Corps. At the end of the
Cold War
the Marine Corps believed that, since it had always focused on
global
expeditionary operations, its traditional structures and
processes would
fit well in the post-Cold War world. It was not entirely wrong.
Its
forward deployed units have been on the cutting edge of emerging
crises.
From Desert Shield to Somalia to innumerable NEOs and
humanitarian relief
operations the Corps has led the way. What the Corps did not
anticipate
was the number, scope and duration of these contingencies. When
thinking
about a post-Cold War world most Marine Corps planners had in
mind the
contingencies of the Cold War -- Lebanon in 1958 or the
Dominican Republic
in 1965. These lasted only a few months and were relatively
infrequent.
The reality has been quite different.
Looming over all the Corps' operational decisions is
the high
level of PERSTEMPO in the FMF. (PERSTEMPO is defined as the
amount
of time an individual is away from home station.) Using the
Marine
Corps' standard measure of Deployment Tempo (DEPTEMPO), FMF
units are
away from home about 50% of the time. However, this measure
undercounts time away because it includes only absences of more
than
10 days. Other measures yield different numbers but the message
is
always the same -- the Corps'
PERSTEMPO level is high and at the edge of breaking the force.
During the
late 1970s and early 1980s the Navy and Marine Corps pushed
their
PERSTEMPO over customary limits in trying to cover a variety of
global crises. The result was sagging morale and low retention.
Since then both services have adamantly limited PERSTEMPO. This
is
the right decision on many grounds -- taking care of the troops,
maintaining retention, supporting families. However, it also
limits
participation in unforeseen contingencies. Normal peacetime
operations -- MEU(SOC) deployments, unit deployments to Okinawa
and
customary exercises -- keep the Corps on the ragged edge. Short
of a
true national emergency it has no capacity to spare for
unforeseen
contingencies and must cede these to other services.
What is to be done? There is nothing wrong with the current
situation.
The Army is doing a fine job in its many deployments, from
Kuwait to the
Balkans. The Air Force has successfully conducted multiple
no-fly zones
as well as a major air war in Kosovo. Whatever problems the US
may be
having in its new role of global policeman, the problems are not
caused by
any deficiencies in its armed forces.
Still, there is a price. Both the Army and the Air
Force are
feeling the strain of increased operations. Both cite the large
increases
in PERSTEMPO since the end of the Cold War as primary reasons
for
recruiting and retention problems. Even though their PERSTEMPO
levels are
still not as high as the Marine Corps', they feel the strain
more. Their
traditional structures and personnel policies are not designed
to maintain
a high level of deployments nor do their personnel expect to
spend
extended periods in an expeditionary environment. To compensate
the
Air Force developed the AEF concept, and the Army has been
relying
heavily on
reservists.
Nevertheless, many Marines sense that the Corps'
contribution to
the Post-Cold War operations is too narrow.
So what to do?
One obvious solution is to expand the Marine Corps.
This would
give it the additional units it needs to meet both its current
commitments
and unexpected contingencies. Furthermore, additional units
would ease the
stress of high optempo. However, expanding the Marine Corps has
some
severe difficulties. Aside from the problem of paying for a
larger force,
there is the problem of recruiting more Marines. Alone among
the
services, the Corps has been meeting its recruiting goals and
has
pointed to this with great pride. This success affirms that the
Corps' often
countercultural policies -- emphasis on personal transformation
not
economics, physical challenge, universal infantry training,
gender
segregated basic training -- resonate with a large number of
today's young
people. However, this recruiting success has required enormous
effort and
has sometimes been a near thing. In some months the Corps has
barely made
quota. It is not at all clear that the Corps could recruit even
more
Marines. And would it be worthwhile to even try? Any
recruiting failure
would be cited by the Corps' critics as evidence that its
policies were
"out of step" and needing change. Further, recruiting more
Marines
requires taking yet more of the Corps' finest NCOs out of
operating units
and making them salesmen (recruiters). If an organization puts
more and
more effort into maintaining its size instead of accomplishing
its
mission, doesn't it have its priorities backwards?
Another possibility is to realign billets internally
and thus put
more Marines in deployable units. The Corps is already doing
some of this
through its Installations Reform initiative. (See Col. David
Clifton,
"ACMC Issues Installations Reform Business Plan", Marine Corps
Gazette,
Sept 1999). Through contracting out of food service operations
the Corps
saved 500 billets which were given back to the FMF. Many more
opportunities exist, but the decisions become progressively
tougher. One
person's outsourcing opportunity is another person's core
competency
requiring an in-house work force.
There are also opportunities within the FMF. Last
year's Force
Structure Planning Group made a series of recommendations on
billet
reductions, enough to field two additional infantry battalions
and their
support. However, the major economy entailed migration of
combat service
support units from the divisions and the wings to the FSSG.
Many
commanders are reluctant to give up their organic support. The
problem
with internal realignments is that someone has to give up
Marines, and no
one is enthusiastic about doing that. As a result the process
is
stalemated.
Another approach would be to use existing units
differently. For
example, units on Okinawa could be regarded, not as committed
forces, but
as a strategic reserve. Whenever a crisis required more force
than the
on-scene MEU(SOC) could handle, then units could be shipped in
from
Okinawa. These units are highly ready, fully manned and
trained, and
expecting to be deployed. There is enough force on the island
that
deployment of a few units would not strip it completely.
Indeed, their
presence on Okinawa is a continuous irritation to the local
community and
any opportunity to reduce loading is a benefit. However, moving
units
around is never easy. These units belong to CINCPAC who would
certainly
resist deploying them to other theaters. There is also the
continuing
concern that reducing presence in Northeast Asia will send the
wrong signal
to North Korea.
Finally, the Corps could vary its deployment policies.
The
Commandant's guidance calls for "deploying units of varying
scale --
small, mid-sized, or large -- using a variety of means: aboard
amphibious
shipping, as Maritime Prepositioning Forces, by strategic
airlift, or
through a combination of these methods." If the Corps wants to
deploy
units of larger size or for longer durations in some situations,
then it
must deploy smaller units in other situations. Thus a MEB might
deploy to
the Balkans but to compensate only a SPMAGTF would deploy for
some other
commitment where a BLT or MEU was customary.
Conclusion. There is nothing wrong with the current
state of
affairs. The Corps is providing a narrow but vital service to
the nation
and is doing this superbly. The Army and Air Force are learning
to become
expeditionary forces and are making major contributions to the
nation's
post-Cold War security, though at some internal cost. This is
not another
Marine Corps v. Army roles and missions duel. Indeed, the
Commandant and
Army Chief of Staff have vowed to work together and see no
overlap of
service missions. The question instead is whether the Marine
Corps is
contributing as much as it could. Given its large size, high
level of
training, and expeditionary orientation, the Corps could, and
probably
should, be participating more in contingency operations. The
challenge is
how.
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