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Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2001 14:59:53 EDT
Subject: MILINET: Carlsonâ??s Raid on Makin Isl and--Col D. W. Haughey, USMC(Ret)
To:
Carlsonâ??s Raid on Makin Island
by Col David W. Haughey, USMC(Ret)
The Marine Corps Gazette gratefully acknowledges
PRIMEDIA Enthusiast
Publicationsâ?? permission to reprint this
article which originally appeared in
American History Illustrated, October 1983.
The war news in America in 1942 was bleak. Our
navy had lost the bulk of its
striking power, with the exception of the
carriers, at Pearl Harbor. German
U-Boats prowled the Atlantic and exacted a
terrible toll on United States
shipping. American outposts such as Guam and Wake
Island had already fallen
to overwhelming Japanese forces in December 1941,
and other U.S. forces in
the Philippines surrendered in early May 1942.
Although the U.S. Navy won the
most important naval battle of the war off Midway
Island from 4â??6 June, the
full impact of the victory, which put the
Japanese Navy on the strategic
defensive, was not yet fully appreciated by the
Pacific Fleet staff. Most
Americans thought the Pacific Ocean was rapidly
becoming a Japanese â??lake.â??
In August 1942, however, two events were to take
place that would capture the
imagination and hope of the American people. The
first was the landing of the
1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
Islands on the 7th; the
second was a daring raid on Makin Island by two
companies of the 2d Raider
Battalion on the 17th and 18th.
Makin Island (see Map 1) is actually an atoll in
the Gilbert Islands, roughly
triangular in shape, running northeast to
southwest. Butaritari, the
principal island, is located at the southwest
point, just below the main
lagoon entrance, and is approximately eight miles
long by less than one-half
mile wide. The entire island is covered by a
thick growth of coconut palms
which extends to the water line. On 10 December
1941, the Japanese Navy
occupied Makin and set up a seaplane base. This
base represented the
easternmost output of Japanâ??s defense line in
the Pacific area. In August
1942, the 2d Marine Raider Battalion raided
Butaritari.
Marine Raider battalions represented a new type
of unit, born out of a need
to take offensive actions. Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, often considered
a military romantic, championed the creation of
commandos in order to
overcome the military conservatism of his
generals. From the beginning,
Americans were interested in these forces.
Articles on commando activities
ran in major U.S. newspapers and magazines. As a
result, the Commandant of
the Marine Corps dispatched officers to England
to study commando
organization and techniques.
Nothing more was done until Pearl Harbor.
Thereafter, the rush of Japanese
victories reproduced for Americans the same sort
of conditions that first led
the British to â??special warfare.â?? Some way
was needed to strike back, if
only by means of weak, token gestures. The Marine
Corps in particular came
under heavy pressure to mount such attacks.
Applying the pressure was none
other than President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a
friend of Churchill.
Early in Februrary 1942, the Commandant, MajGen
Thomas Holcomb, decided to
organize two raider battalions, one on the east
coast and one on the west
coast. The basic mission of these two new raider
units was threefold: to be
the spearhead of amphibious landings by larger
forces on beaches generally
thought to be inaccessible; to conduct amphibious
raids requiring speed and
surprise; and to conduct guerrilla-type
operations for protracted periods
behind enemy lines.
LtCol Merritt A. Edson and Major Evans F. Carlson
(see Figure 1) received
their orders. Each was to organize, train, and
command a Marine raider
battalion. The two men were very different, and
so were the battalions they
formed. Carlson organized the 2d Raider Battalion
at Camp Elliott near San
Diego, CA. Its executive officer was Maj James
Roosevelt, son of the
President. With particular emphasis on physical
conditioning, the 2d Raider
Battalion trained extensively in hit-and-run
tactics, hand-to-hand combat,
demolitions, scouting, â??fire teamâ?? tactics,
night operations, handling of r
ubber boats, and rigid field discipline.
Evans Carlson merits special attention. Born on
26 February 1896 in Sidney,
NY, he was the son of a Congregational minister
and spent his formative years
in New England. At 16 Carlson misrepresented his
age and joined the Army for
3 years of uneventful service. In 1916 he was
recalled for duty in the
Mexican border disturbances. Shortly after the
United States entered World
War I, Carlson was commissioned and rose quickly
in rank to captain, although
he saw no combat duty. For a time after the
armistice he worked on GEN John
J. Pershingâ??s staff. Carlson considered making
the Army a career, but the
prevailing Army attitude was that one never
initiated any consequential
action of his own. Since this tendency was
antithetical to his beliefs, he
decided to resign in 1919.
Restless and unhappy as a civilian, Carlson
elected to rejoin the military
service. The War Department informed him that he
could return to duty, but
only as a second lieutenant. If he accepted the
offer, he would be outranked
by those of his colleagues who had stayed on
active duty. Since Carlson did
not want to add this burden to his mounting sense
of failure as a civilian,
he enlisted in the Marine Corps as a private in
1922.
Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1923,
Carlson served in various
domestic and foreign assignments, including a
tour as an intelligence officer
in Shanghai in 1927 and a tour in Peking from
1933â??35. In 1935 he was
promoted to captain and assigned to the military
guard as the
second-in-command for President Rooseveltâ??s
retreat at Warm Springs, GA.
There he formed a friendship with the President
which led to a private
correspondence when he returned to China for a
third tour of duty as an
observer with the Chinese armies fighting the
Japanese.
Boldly slipping through the Japanese lines,
Carlson joined the 8th Route
Army, the principal Communist force in northern
China. He became friends with
Chu The, the commander of the 8th Route Army,
Chou En-Lai, and Mao Tse-tung,
the spiritual leader of the Chinese Communists.
They spent many hours
discussing the war and the role of both the
Americans and the Communists.
One day after a column of 600 men completed a
particularly arduous 58-mile
march without sleep, Carlson observed that not a
single man had dropped out.
It was a feat unprecedented in his experience.
Carlson believed the secret
lay in ethical indoctrination. Each soldier knew
that his performance of duty
was an essential step in attaining the victory
that would assure freedom for
all. That experience changed Carlsonâ??s approach
to leadership.
Carlsonâ??s outspoken praise of the Communistsâ??
discipline, elemental
democracy, and resolute determination to defeat
the Japanese contrasted
sharply with the Nationalist regime of Chiang
Kai-shek. His superiors began
to muzzle his reports. Because he felt so
strongly about the issues, Carlson
knew he had no choice but to resign. And, in
April 1939, he officially did.
For the next two years, he traveled in the United
States and again in China.
Along with several periodical pieces, he wrote
two books, The Chinese Army
and Twin Stars of China, about his experiences
and observations. He knew,
however, that war between Japan and the United
States was inevitable.
Therefore, Carlson requested a Reserve commission
as a major and returned to
active duty in April 1941.
Although his reputation as a maverick was well
established, Carlson was
promoted to lieutenant colonel early in 1942 and
given command of the 2d
Raider Battalion. As a commander he drew heavily
upon the observations of his
experiences in China. For example, â??gung-hoâ??
meetings became commonplace
occurrences in his battalion. In these meetings
he stressed the need for all
Marines to work together. Everyone, regardless of
rank or billet, was
encouraged to speak their mind. Carlson wanted
each man to know why he was
there and what he was fighting for. Gung-ho
meetings became his form of
ethical indoctrination.
Besides Carlsonâ??s unconventional leadership
methods, which also included
abolishing the NCOsâ?? and officersâ?? messes,
several other actions stirred up
bitter feelings among senior Marine officers.
Carlson had free reign to
select any enlisted man or officer for his
battalion. Naturally, no commander
wanted to lose his best men to another command.
Moreover, Carlson made a
unilateral decision to organize his ten-man
squads into â??fire teamsâ?? of
three men each in order to enhance the squad
leaderâ??s fire control
capability. He wanted additional automatic
weapons to make his fire teams
even more potent, and requested a variety of
nonstandard equipment such as
knock-down bicycles, special boots, poles with
buckets to carry heavy
equipment loads as the Chinese did, outboard
motors, and Canadian antitank
rifles.
Carlsonâ??s well-known association with the
President aroused the ire of many
fellow officers. They looked upon his â??eyes
onlyâ?? reports for the President
from China as circumventing the time-honored
chain of command. When Jimmy
Roosevelt became his executive officer, some
senior Marine officers must have
viewed this assignment with jaundiced eyes.
Finally, many individuals, both
in and out of the Marine Corps, firmly believed
that Carlson was a Communist.
His well-publicized association with the Chinese
Communists aroused
suspicions that haunted him until he retired from
the Marine Corps in July
1946.
Having completed its basic training, Carlsonâ??s
2d Raider Battalion was
transferred in May 1942 to Camp Catlin on Oahu,
Hawaii, where it was placed
under the direct operational control of ADM
Chester Nimitz,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CinCPac). Nimitz
decided to use the raider
battalion for hit-and-run operations, using
submarines as transports. Carlson
immediately began training his raiders to make
practice landings. Soon they
could disembark with all their weapons and
equipment and, undetected, make
night landings in rubber boats equipped with
outboard motors. These motors,
however, failed in rough surf because the coils
and magnetos were exposed.
Equipment with enclosed electrical components was
continually requested but
never made available. The lack of a reliable
outboard motor would play a
critical role during the raid on Makin Island.
Nimitzâ??s staff began planning a raid on the
Makin atoll in July 1942. S
pecifically, the mission was to collect
intelligence, destroy enemy
installations, capture prisoners, and, most
importantly, divert Japanese
attention from the 1st Marine Division landing on
Guadalcanal. Using aerial
photographs, CinCPac constructed a mock-up of the
islandâ??s wharves, roads,
and buildings at Barberâ??s Point, Oahu. Carlson
and his battalion began
intensive planning and training for the raid.
Numerous practice night
landings were made during July until every raider
knew from memory the
details of the plan, the island terrain, the
location of each building, and
the direction of every road. Naval intelligence
reported that 250 Japanese
were on Makin, and that a shore battery covered
the entrance to the lagoon
where there was a good protected anchorage.
Actually, only 43 Japanese of the
62d Guard Unit, Combined Special Naval Landing
Force under the command of
Chief Warrant Officer Kamemitsu, were on the
island.
On 8 August 1942, 222 officers and men embarked
on the USS Argonaut and USS
Nautilus for Makin. The trip was uneventful and
also uncomfortable as
evidenced by the numerous cases of heat rash and
heat prostration that
developed during the voyage. The raiders were to
disembark at 0300 on 17
August 1942, assemble alongside the submarines
until the two companies were
organized, and then move onto Butaritari.
Withdrawal from the island was
scheduled to take place no later than 2100 that
same day. If the raiders had
not returned by that time, Task Force Commander
John Haines would decide
whether to wait or return to Pearl Harbor without
them. (See Figure 2.) If
the raid was successful, Little Makin, a less
important part of the atoll,
would be raided the following morning.
Unfortunately, almost every one of Carlsonâ??s
plans went awry from the
beginning. On the night of 16 August, the raiders
encountered rain squalls,
heavy swells, and an onshore wind. The rubber
boats from the Argonaut were
loaded and launched. Immediately the heavy sea
drowned the outboard motors
out. Carlson was then advised that the tide was
moving the submarines toward
the reef and they would have to start backing
away. This meant that the two
company commanders would not be able to assemble
alongside the submarines and
would probably lose control of their men. When no
alternatives seemed
possible, Carlson issued the order to disembark
from the Nautilus with
instructions for both companies to follow his
boat to the beach.
Although the outboard motors were inoperable, the
raiders paddled with all
their strength to land at 0530 as planned.
Fifteen of the 18 boats reached
opposite Government Wharf where they were quickly
hidden by sand and palm
fronds. Lt Oscar Peatross and his 11 men failed
to get the change of plans
and landed their boat at the original beach about
1 mile south of the main
body. The two other boats landed just north of
the main body. The mix-up in
the landing required reorganization on shore, but
before it was completed,
one man accidentally fired his weapon. The
element of surprise was now lost.
One company moved across the island to control
the coastal road and to seize
the Government House and Government Wharf. The
other company stayed in
reserve and protected the left rear. Alerted by
the gunshot, CWO Kamemitsu
informed his headquarters and started his small
force up the coastal road by
truck and bicycle toward the Government House. A
firefight developed near the
native hospital. The tenacious enemy defense
included four machineguns, a
flamethrower, two grenade launchers, infantry
armed with automatic weapons,
and supported by well-concealed snipers.
About this time in the rising light, the raiders
spotted a 3,500-ton troop
transport and a small patrol boat entering the
lagoon. Carlson radioed the
submarines and requested that they surface to
fire their 6-inch guns.
Although communications eventually broke down,
the Nautilus, shooting blindly
at the ships with only a compass bearing
furnished by Carlson, fired 65
6-inch shells into the lagoon. Through a
combination of excellent gunnery and
amazing luck, both vessels were sunk.
Carlson renewed the attack, but the Japanese
snipers proved to be a
formidable problem. From 0730 to 1130 the action
consisted of a series of
small-unit movements. Just before noon two
Japanese reconnaissance planes
circled over the fighting area for 15 minutes,
dropped 2 bombs, and then
departed. Soon thereafter, a small force of
Japanese made a banzai attack
down the center of the island. The raiders
quickly repulsed the attack,
killing most of the Japanese.
At 0120, 12 planes appearedâ??2 Kawanishi flying
boats (about the size of a
U.S. PBYâ??4), 4 fighters, and 6 reconnaissance
bombers. They bombed and
strafed the island for over an hour without
inflicting any real damage on the
raiders. One Kawanishi flying boat and one
reconnaissance seaplane landed in
the lagoon; the Kawanishi brought about 35 to 40
reinforcements. However,
both aircraft were shot down during takeoff.
Meanwhile, Lt Peatross proceeded to carry out his
initial orders to
rendezvous with a platoon from Company A at the
church. They found the church
empty. Then Peatross and his men moved toward the
main body of the raiders,
but they were soon brought under intense
machinegun and rifle fire. In the
process of knocking out the machinegun and
killing several Japanese, three
men were killed and most of the others wounded.
Peatross decided to pull back
to the ocean side of the island. He also sent a
runner to Carlson to notify
him of their circumstances. When no linkup with
the main body took place
after several hours, Peatross returned to the
Nautilus with his men.
Carlsonâ??s raiders held a poor position in the
thick brush. Their fields of
fire were limited, and they were subjected to
heavy sniper fire, so Carlson
ordered his men to pull back a few hundred yards.
As the Japanese infantry
followed, more Japanese planes arrived at 1630
and bombed the area just
evacuated, wounding some of the enemy advance.
Time, however, was running
out. Though the raid had inflicted heavy damage
and casualties on the
Japanese, the mission had not been fully
accomplished. Carlsonâ??s orders were
to return to the submarines by 1930. With too
little time to complete the
mission, he ordered a retreat.
The withdrawal from combat was orderly. Carlson
and Roosevelt said goodbye to
the natives who had helped them, and arranged to
have the dead raiders
buried. By 1915 all the boats were lined up on
the beach with those on either
flank entering the water first. The first was
Carlsonâ??s. The effort to return
to the submarines was an unmitigated disaster.
Unfortunately, the rapid
succession of the breakers, combined with their
great force, proved too
formidable for even the highly trained raiders.
After nearly an hour of
struggling, in which almost all the weapons and
equipment were lost, about
two-thirds of the raiders gave up, and were
washed ashore. With a few
salvaged weapons, the men posted a security
perimeter. One of the guards
spotted an eight-man Japanese patrol and fired,
killing three of them. The
rest apparently ran away. With the possibility of
Japanese reinforcements
arriving in the morning, the raidersâ?? prospects
seemed dreary.
The feeling of helplessness at this point marked
the low ebb of the raid. At
midnight Carlson called a meeting of his officers
and some of his men. What
should they do? Try the surf again? Hide on the
north end of the atoll?
Surrender? When one raider thought surrender was
in order, Carlson suggested,
â??Lookâ??you take anyone you want and go out and
find someone to surrender
toâ??and then you have the right to come back
here and tell the men, and the
men will have an opportunity to express their
views.â?? The raider went out,
but came back with the news that he could not
find any Japanese. Carlson then
asked, â??Is there anyone else who thinks we
ought to surrender?â?? No one
mentioned it further, and the idea was abandoned.
After daylight, a group of men fought a terrible
battle with the surf and
made it to the submarines. A little later another
group was organized and
also succeeded in reaching the submarines.
Approximately 70 raiders remained
on the beach. During the remainder of the day,
however, they completed the
rest of their mission with the exception of
capturing prisoners. Carlson
found his dead and confirmed once again with the
native chief that they would
be buried.
With his wounded men, Carlson decided not to try
the ocean side again, but
opted to get out through the lagoon side. The
Japanese had no coastal guns
covering the lagoon.
When darkness came, Carlson, after much
difficulty in identifying himself,
made contact with the submarines. He arranged for
them to pick him and his
men off Flink Point at the west end of the
lagoon. His men reported that
everyone seen that day was loaded in the
remaining rubber boats and an
outrigger canoe. The trip took 3 very difficult
hours. Forty hours had
elapsed since the raiders first left the
submarines.
The wardroom on the Nautilus was cleared so that
four Marines could be
operated on. In addition, the officers turned
over the staterooms to the
wounded. Under the most austere and difficult
conditions, the Navy doctors
performed magnificently.
In the chaos of the 2-day operation, 9 men were
somehow left behind.
Remarkably, they eluded capture for nearly a
month after the Japanese
returned in forceâ??a relief expedition of more
than 1,000 men landed on Makin
the day after Carlson and his men departed.
Eventually caught, the nine
raiders were taken to the 6th Base Force
Headquarters on Kwajalein. Early in
October Vice Admiral Hirokai Abe was informed
that any transfer of the
prisoners to Japan would be impractical.
Consequently, Abe had the raiders
formally executed on 16 October 1942. After the
war, the admiral was tried
for his war crimes in a court in Guam; he was
found guilty and hanged.
The raiders accomplished most of their mission
objectives. They destroyed the
valuable Japanese radio stations, 700â??1,000
barrels of aviation gasoline, and
all useful military stores. Although the total
number has been estimated to
reach 300, the raiders counted about 85 enemy
bodies. In addition to the two
planes that were shot down, two ships were sunk
by expert, if not lucky,
gunfire from the Nautilus. Moreover, the Japanese
reinforcements, who landed
on Makin on 19 August 1942, may have been
diverted from the Solomon Islands.
The biggest impact of the raid, however, was the
electrifying effect it had
on the American people. Less than a year later,
Hollywood enshrined Carlson
and his raiders forever with the movie Gung Ho,
starring the
southern-drawling, cowboy hero, Randolph Scott.
Followed by Marine Raiders in
1944, which starred Robert Ryan and Pat
Oâ??Brien, these cinematic efforts
ensured the raiders their fair share of glory.
Although in many respects Carlsonâ??s raid was
successful, the operation
invited criticism. First, no prisoners were
taken. At this stage of the war
the prisoners could have provided invaluable
information, although we know
that no important Japanese were on Makin. Also,
as a result of the
treacherous and disastrous efforts to return to
the submarinesâ??extending the
operation on Makin by a dayâ??the planned raid on
Little Makin Island did not
take place. Of later importance, the raidersâ??
excursion into the Gilbert
Islands may have stimulated the Japanese into
fortifying Tarawa. The Marines
were to pay a terrible price in the November 1943
assault on that bastion of
Japanese strength.
In the true military sense, the Makin raid, as
well as the famous Doolittle
raid, were insignificant. No one should overlook
the fact that the war in the
Pacific overtook the need for raider battalions.
Their special skills were
not needed as the Marine Corps expanded to six
divisions. But at the time,
America needed something to cheer about, and
Makin filled the bill. This
bold, offensive action revived national spirits
and sent a clear message to
the Japanese that they had truly â??awakened a
sleeping giant.â??
>Editorâ??s Note: Originally published in
American History Illustrated, October
1983, dba PRIMEDIA Enthusiast Publications, 741
Miller Drive, SE, Suite D-2,
Leesburg, VA 20175. Subscription:
800â??829â??3340; outside the U.S.:
904â??446â??6914.
Â
>Col Haughey retired from the Marine Corps in
1994. He currently resides in
Murray, UT.Back to top
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