The challenge of a single Muslim authority in Europe

A single Muslim authority is slowly developing in Europe today

The author discusses the preconditions for such an authority and the advantages it might bring both to Muslims and to Europe as a whole.

Introduction

Authority is real, is ever present among humans and is indispensable for the training
and educating of humanity. It is exercised in many ways and in many degrees. It has
to justify itself not merely by the exercise of power and by the ruder kinds of penalty;
it has also to meet the demands of human reason, to satisfy the requirements of the
human conscience and to prove itself the guide, the counselor and the friend of
humanity. The will must find in it purpose, guidance and energy; the heart must find
in it something to stir the emotions, to win the affections and to arouse the higher
passions of love and desire. And the intelligence must find in it truth, principles and
reality [7, p. 254].

This article has been written as a particular response to the question of Muslim authority in
Europe. The question is this: what is the foundation of Muslim authority in Europe with
respect to Muslim faith, morals and civil life? Of course, it is not possible to go into all the
details relevant to this question in an article, but it is possible to open a discussion about
theological foundations, historical description and a Muslim social contract, which may
make the case for a single Muslim authority in Europe.

The theological foundations

There are three basic theological foundations of Muslim authority: the ‘aqi¯dah, the
shari¯’ah and the ima¯mah.

They correspond to Muslim faith,1 morals and civil life. The word ‘aqi¯dah means to
‘knit’, ‘knot’, ‘tie’ or ‘fasten with a knot’. Theologically, it designates the Muslim creed
[23], doctrine and the personal article of faith declared in the formula of the personal
confession, the shaha¯dah: ‘I confess that there is no God but Allah and I confess that
Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger.’2 This confession is the personal commitment of every
Muslim in any place at any time. It is a Muslim’s personal identity through his or her
continuity of memory: it is always there in his or her heart. And it is his or her authority in
personal feelings about God and about faith as a universal principle of the God-human
relationship.

The second theological foundation of Muslim authority is the shari¯’ah. Literally, the
shari¯’ah means ‘water hole’, ‘drinking place’ or ‘approach to a water hole’. ‘The word
shari¯’ah is common to Arabic-speaking people of the Middle East and designates a prophetic
religion in its totality, as is evident in such phrases as shari¯’ah Mu¯sa¯, shari¯’ah al-
Masi¯h (the law/religion of Moses or the Messiah) [20, p. 321]. Thus, the shari¯’ah is more
than a personal commitment and more than the continuity of memory as personal identity.
The shari¯’ah is the communal commitment and the community identity that is the continuation
of the collective memory. It is the continuity of memory of ‘the Noahide
covenant, which is God’s perpetual relationship with mankind after its near destruction in
the Flood’ [13, p. 34]3 and the Sinaitic covenant, which is God’s Ten Commandments
revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai.4
In the shari¯’’ah as their Weltanschauung, Muslims have their covenant with God, a
covenant that is the same in content if not in form as the previous covenant contained in the
Old Testament of Moses and the New Testament of Jesus. I cite here an extensive quotation
from the Holy Qur’an in order to show that there is common ground in the idea of
the authority of the covenant among the three Abrahamic traditions—Judaism, Christianity
and Islam—as God Almighty says to the Prophet Muhammad:

1 By ‘faith’ we mean God’s gift of personal belief; by ‘morals’ we mean a person’s inner understanding of the difference between good and evil, right and wrong; and by ‘religion’ we mean theology as ‘‘the study of God and his relation to the world especially by analysis of the origin and teachings of an organized religious community’’ (See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1981, s.v. ‘theology’). Thus, morality implies some kind of religiosity, but religiosity is not necessarily consistent with morality.
2 The Arabic version of the Shahi¯dah is Ashhadu an li¯ ili¯he illallah wa ashhadu anna Muhammdan
rasulullah.
3 I have found very useful Novak’s distinction between a covenant as a perpetual relationship between two parties, the terms of which are not negotiated and wherein the violation of covenantal stipulations does not terminate the covenant; and a contract which is not perpetual, which can be negotiated and which can be terminated. See Novak [13, pp. 31–34].
4 It is interesting to note here a reflection from a contemporary American politician about the importance of ‘the old story of God’s covenant’: ‘‘The Cartesian approach to the human story allows us to believe that we are separate from the earth, entitled to view it as nothing more than an inanimate collection of resources that
we can exploit however we like; and this fundamental misperception has led us to our current crisis … The old story of God’s covenant with both the earth and humankind, and its assignment to human beings of the role of good stewards and faithful servants, was—before it was misinterpreted and twisted in the service of the Cartesian world view—a powerful, noble and just explanation of who we are in relation to God’s earth’’[5, p. 218].

49. And in their footsteps We sent Jesus the son of Mary, confirming the Law that
had come before him. We sent him the Gospel. Therein was guidance and light, and
confirmation of the Law that had come before him. A guidance and an admonition to
those who fear God.
50. Let the people of the Gospel judge by what God hath revealed therein. If any do
fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, they are (no better than) those
who rebel.
51. To thee We sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the scripture that came before
it, and guarding it in safety. So judge between them by what God hath revealed, and
follow not their vain desire, diverging from the Truth that hath come to thee. To each
among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If God had so willed, He
would have made you a single People, but (his Plan is) to test in what He hath given
you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to God. It is He that will
show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute (Q. 5:49–51).5

Hence, this Islamic covenant, the shari¯’ah, is perpetual, it is not negotiable and it is not
terminable. It is perpetual because it is God’s infinite (azali¯) word in the past; it is not
negotiable because it has a power to enforce obedience; and it is not terminable because it
is infinite (abad) into the future.

The fiqh (Islamic applied law) is not the shari¯’ah. Rather, it is a particular understanding
of the shari¯’ah. Thus, the fiqh (understanding) of the shari’ah of a particular person or
group is not perpetual, it is negotiable and it is terminable. The shari¯’ah is the perpetual
principle on the basis of which each and every generation of Muslims has the right and the
duty to make judgments about good and evil, right and wrong, in the context of its time and
space in accordance with its own experience. Hence, the shari¯’ah is the Muslim’s authority
in morals,6 coupled with the authority in faith, the shaha¯dah.

So far we have discussed what might be called the transcendental aspect of Islamic
authority, i.e., faith as God’s gift to a human being and the covenant as God’s commitment
to a human community. The third theological foundation of Islamic authority, the ima¯mah,
which has to do with Islamic authority in civil life, is more immanent than transcendent in
the sense that it refers to human authority that functions with the help of divinely created
faith and morality. The word ima¯mah suggests the notion of leading people in a certain
direction, as does, for instance, a prayer leader—the Ima¯m, the Muslim preacher [1]. But
the concept of the ima¯mah in the sense of the immanent authority in civil life has enormous
significance in the context of the history of Islam. In fact, the question of the imamate as
the ‘supreme leadership’ of the universal Muslim umma [21, p. 859] after the death of the
Prophet is the central issue of the current situation not only in the Muslim centre, but also
in the Muslim periphery, Europe included.

I have designated the imamate as the third theological foundation of Islamic authority in
civil life because it is a part of Islamic judicial theory as well. The imamate is a human
product based on personal faith, established by collective moral commitments and maintained
by political power. It is a historical process that can go in different directions, some
of which may be in sharp contradiction to the faith and morals of Islam. These contradictions
of the imamate are realities contrary to the moral ideals of the shari’ah law. It is
because of the dialectic of these historical realities and the moral ideals of the imamate that
Muslim history as a whole is moving in one or the other direction. But because of, or
despite this, it is the undeniable right and duty of a Muslim to carry out his or her noble
moral values wherever he or she lives and to find individual and collective well-being in a
state and society that promotes social justice. Thus, the imamate is a Muslim’s authority in
civil life to the extent that intelligence finds in it truth, principle, and reality.

Historical description

It is in the problem of the historical description of the imamate as the legitimate Muslim
authority that I see the greatest challenge to establishing a European Muslim imamate as a
way of institutionalising Islam in Europe. But before we come to that issue, let us examine
the historical overview of authority in Islam of Dabashi [3].
In his book Dabashi has brought to our attention the charismatic and post-charismatic periods in Muslim history, based on Max Weber’s assessment of that phenomenon. He tells us that in the period
following the Prophet Muhammad’s charismatic authority, three main notions of authority
emerged: the Sunnite doctrine of the authority of the routinisation of the (original) charisma;
the Shi’ite doctrine of the authority of the perpetuation of the charisma; and the
Kharijite doctrine of the authority of the dissemination of the charisma.
7 This typology of post-charismatic Muslim history helps us to understand the current crisis of global Muslim leadership. It seems nothing has changed since the time of the first Caliph,
Abu Bakr (according to the Sunnites), or the first Imam, ‘Ali (according to the Shi’ites).
8 Nor is the rebellious mind of the Kharijites as entirely defeated as was once thought.9
Historically, the Sunnite doctrine of the authority of the routinisation of Prophet
Muhammad’s charisma (risa¯lah) has dominated Muslim history because it has been able
‘‘to justify itself not merely by the exercise of power … [but also] to meet the demands of
human reason, to satisfy the requirements of the human conscience, and to prove itself the
guide’’ [7, p. 252]. However, the Sunni institution of the Caliphate did not survive because
it lost the vigour of its Islamic religious identity. Instead, Sunnite political thought has been
greatly influenced by ideologies of ‘‘racial, national and secular identity’’ [8, p. 937].
On the other hand, the Shi’ite doctrine of the authority of the perpetuation of the
charisma, although not predominant in mainstream Muslim history, has not only survived,
but also expanded its influence through the Imam Khomeini’s revolution in 1979.
In the meantime, the world has been reminded of the old political radicalism of the
Kharijites, who seem now to be more radical than their original mentors. But there is no
single solution to Muslim authority, not only in Europe, but also with respect to global
Muslim leadership. There cannot be the Sunnite authority of routinisation without the
Shi’ite authority of the perpetuation of charisma. And there cannot be the Shi’ite authority
of the perpetuation without the Sunnite authority of the routinisation of the charisma.
Otherwise, both the Sunnite and the Shi’ite doctrines of authority will be replaced by the
Kharijite doctrine of the authority of the dissemination of the charisma.
There is nothing wrong with bringing the Sunnite and Shi’ite concepts of authority
together with the objective of creating a global Muslim authority that is capable of coping
with the challenges of Muslim integration in the contemporary world. It is too risky for the
7 Although the concept of charisma is Christian, Dabashi has succeeded in convincing us that it can be helpful in explaining some aspects of Muslim sociology as well [3, pp. 47–49].
See also Glassman and Swatos.
8 For more on the Shi’ite concept of authority see [2, 12].
9 On the origin, development and doctrine of the Kharijites, see [9, p. 1074].

Muslim global community to be left at the mercy of Kharijite political thought, which
might lead Muslims to undesired isolation. There is therefore no reason for the Shi’ite not
to accept the logic of the Muslim majority, in the sense of the reality of Muslim history,
which is not perfect because it is human, not divine. Of course, it is, for the time being,
utopian to think that a single Sunnite-Shi’ite global authority is possible, but I see no other
way forward for future Muslim generations than to come together to fuse the intellectual
and spiritual energy of these two main branches of Islam into one acceptable global
Muslim authority. Europe or the West in general, is a good place for such a dream. It is
here in Europe that Muslims have the opportunity to experience the power and beauty of
universal Islam. It is here that Muslims can appreciate the importance of familial bonds and
community solidarity in a civil society in which things are ordained in accordance with
‘‘the State (which) is an ethical institution…for the good of the community, and in the
interests of the higher values. Authority and loyalty must go hand in hand in every State
which is worthy of the name’’ [7, p. 252.

The Muslim social contract

With this general assumption of the state as an ethical institution we may proceed to the
notion of the Muslim social contract in European democratic society, which is open to
‘‘agreement between its equal members’’ who have ‘the prior human rights of the citizens
of that society’ [13, p. 1].

Let me repeat here what I have already stated in my Declaration of European Muslims.
10 Europe is neither da¯ru-l-isla¯m, the house of Islam, nor da¯ru-l-harb, the house of
war. Europe is da¯ru-l-sulh, the house of social contract.11 The land of Europe is da¯ru-l-sulh
because it is possible to live in accordance with Islam in the context of the social contract,
‘the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association’
[16, p. 11].
It is not difficult to prove that the idea of a contract, social or otherwise, is a legitimate
one. There are many doctrinal and historical documents that support the concept of sulh
(peace, [re]conciliation, settlement, accord and contract) as the opposite of harb (war,
warfare, fight, combat, etc.).
The very idea of Islam is peace with God, with His Messenger and with the rule of law:
‘‘God does call to the House of Peace ...’’ (Q. 10:25). The servants of al-Rahma¯n are those
who walk on the earth with humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say,
‘‘Peace!’’ (Q. 25:63). It is in the spirit of these Qur’anic verses that the Prophet Muhammad
made treaties with the Bedouins at al-Hudaybiyya, with Jews and Christians at al-Madinah,
and with the neighboring kings of Abyssinia, Persia and Byzantium. The rightful caliphs
have faithfully followed the example of the Prophet and, in turn, they have been followed
by good Muslim rulers throughout the history of Islam as well. This historical fact of the
social contract, which began with Muslim goodwill towards other nations and religions,
has been well documented by Hamidullah [6].

As we have said, we have no difficulty in proving the validity of the theory of contract
because we can confidently claim that it is a genuine part of Islamic doctrine and history.
Available on the website of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina: www.rijaset.ba.


Our difficulty lies, however, in the lack of a genuine concept of the social contract that
could be applied in the context of a European environment and that would guarantee the
status of Islam as a way of life and of Muslims as citizens of Europe.
First, Muslims have to understand Europe as a house of peace, not a house of war.
Second, Muslims have to be clear that their minimum claim is to be free from social
interference in their cultural life and that their maximum claim is for social recognition
because of their positive contribution to the common good of European society as a whole.
And thirdly, Muslims have to establish a single Muslim authority that can speak for both
Islam as a world religion and Muslims as good citizens of Europe.

We should add that a contract is based on the dictates of reason, whereas a covenant
is based on the will of the heart; that is, faith. Therefore, we define the Muslim as a
person with an allegiance to God as an act of the will of his or her heart (faith); and we
define the citizen as a person with a duty to the state as an act of the dictates of his or
her reason. Through the covenant persons give their heart to God and receive inner
security; through the contract they give their reason to the state and receive social
security as inhabitants of a city or town. Citizens are entitled to the rights and privileges
of free persons, they are members of a state, native or naturalised persons who owe
loyalty to a government and are entitled to protection from it for their life, religion,
freedom, property and dignity.

It is estimated that approximately 30 million Muslims live in Europe today. They
comprise three different groups: indigenous Muslims; emigrant Muslims; and native
Muslims. Indigenous Muslims are those who have a long historical background in Europe,
such as the Muslims of Bosnia [10, 11], Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria and so on.
Emigrant Muslims are those who have migrated to Europe as either students or workers
and have settled permanently in all the Member States of the European Union. Native
Muslims are the children of Muslim emigrants parents as well as those Europeans who
have recently entered Islam. All these groups have one thing in common Islam. They
differ, however, in their experience and expectations of life.

Indigenous Muslims carry the burden of history on their backs and expect to be supported
in their struggle for religious and cultural continuity in Europe. Emigrant Muslims
are making the effort to establish themselves in Europe and expect to overcome the status
of strangers in Europe. And native and converted European Muslims struggle to preserve
their Islamic identity in a challenging European political, economic and cultural environment
and expect that somebody will tell them how to be proud of their faith and their
European heritage.

What is to be done so that the shared values of Islam can become a common ground for
all Muslims in Europe? It is now time that we seriously consider a way to institutionalise
the presence both of Islam as a universal religion and Muslims as global citizens. It is clear
to everyone that for the representation of Islam and Muslims to exist only on a voluntary
level in Europe would be misleading inasmuch as it would be contrary to Muslim dignity
and European peace. It is not enough that Europe recognises the presence of Islam on its
territory. Muslims deserve more than that. They deserve that their presence be legalised in
the sense of creating a political and economic climate in which European Muslims can
represent themselves through the institutions that should have both governmental support
and public acceptance.

Muslims in Europe need a single Muslim authority for two ontological and two historical
reasons:

12 For more on Islam and Muslims in Europe, see [15, 18, 19, 22].

The ontological reasons:

(1) The divine origin of the Qur’an is the reason why the divine call for the covenant with
humans is perpetual, not negotiable and not terminable; humans need to learn how to
keep their promise to God at all times and in all places.
(2) The personal confession of faith (the shaha¯dah) and the collective moral commitment
(the sharı¯’ah) must find expression in the practical function of leadership (the
ima¯mah) as the human way of discipline and loyalty to the common good of civil
society.

The historical reasons:

(1) A Muslim social contract in Europe is the best way for the Muslim community to
safeguard its historical place in the European democratic societies, which are
committed to the rule of law and the protection of the human rights of their citizens
who, in turn, must accept the duty to work for the good of the society in an orderly
and organised way.
(2) Muslims in Europe should meet this historic challenge to change long-standing
Muslim patterns tribal, ethnic and national conceptions of Islam which are not
functional in today’s global world. Instead, the Muslims in Europe have an historic
chance to create a new version of the global imamate, one that is based on universal
Islamic identity.

Conclusion

To sum up, this article has argued that the ontological justification for a single Muslim
authority in Europe can be found in the idea of covenant, and it is the responsibility of
Muslims to further elaborate on this notion. The historical vindication for a single Muslim
authority in Europe can be found in the notion of contract, the responsibility of Europe or
the State of Europe ‘‘to satisfy the requirements of the human conscience, and to prove
itself the guide, the counselor, the friend of man’’. The recent move of the Republic of
Germany towards ‘organising’ Muslims into the Islamic Conference has shown how
important it is that Muslims in Europe feel that they are also hosts here, not only guests.
Hence, despite the fact that both the Muslim community and European society feel the
need for a single Muslim authority, it is still unrealistic to imagine that such an idea will be
realized soon. The reason is that the Muslim community is not yet mature enough to
undertake such a project because of the lack of inter-Muslim trust and the fear of losing its
cultural autonomy.

As for European society, it is also still too immature to comprehend the significance of a
single Muslim authority for the sake of overall European peace and security. Nevertheless,
the process towards the creation of a single Muslim authority in Europe is already
underway, moving forward slowly but surely despite those Muslims who do not like the
strong social discipline that would come with the regulation of the Muslim community
outside of the main lands of Islam. Despite the European political establishment, which
still believes that the question of Islam and Muslims in Europe is a temporary issue, a
single Muslim authority in Europe will come sooner or later because of need by young
European Muslims who are capable of seeing their Islamic identity as prior to their national
or ethnic identities, and who are comfortable with their European identity co-existing with
their Islamic upbringing.


Mustafa Ceric
Published online: 12 January 2008
Center for European Studies 2007

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Mustafa Ceric, PhD is the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
48 M. Ceric