The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts
African Affairs 2007 106(424):357-390
Ken Menkhaus
Ken Menkhaus is Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, USA
Somalia's catastrophic humanitarian crisis of 2007, in which up to 300,000 Mogadishu residents were displaced in fighting pitting Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces against a complex insurgency of clan and Islamist opposition, was the culmination of a series of political miscalculations and misjudgements on the part of Somali and external actors since 2004. They resulted in a cascading sequence of political crises which plunged Somalia into increasingly intractable conflicts. This `tragedy in five acts' includes the flawed creation of the TFG in late 2004, which emerged as a narrow coalition rather than a government of national unity; the failure of a promising civic movement in Mogadishu in summer of 2005 to challenge the power base of warlords and Islamists in the capital; the disastrous decision by the US government to encourage an alliance between its local counter-terrorism partners in Mogadishu, producing a war which led to the victory of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in June 2006; the radicalization of the CIC over the course of 2006, which guaranteed a war with Ethiopia; and the Ethiopian offensive against the CIC in late 2006, leading to its occupation of the capital, a complex insurgency against Ethiopian forces and armed violence which produced what the UN described as a `humanitarian catastrophe'. In virtually every instance, key actors took decisions that produced unintended outcomes which harmed rather than advanced their interests, and at a cost in human lives and destruction of property that continues to mount.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22author%3AK.+author%3AMenkhaus%22
August 6, 2007 The New Republic
Occupational Hazard
The other failed invasion.
`Take off your veil! " the Somali soldier shouted at the woman in the mostly empty street.
Steadying his assault rifle with his right hand, he ripped away the woman's black niqab with his left. "Why are you coming so close to us? You have explosives?" He leveled the muzzle of his gun against the bridge of her nose. Her mouth, suddenly embarrassed and exposed, broke into a jester's forced grin.
"I just want a juice," she pleaded. Except for a handful of armed soldiers, the only other person on the deserted street was a man selling mango juice from behind a table. (A few weeks earlier, the stall he had operated for 14 years had been blown up.) The woman held up her empty palms and
backed away. The soldiers let her be and hustled back to their waiting Jeep.
We were in Tawfiq, the most contested neighborhood of Mogadishu, where soldiers of the current Somali government are busy trying to root out militia members of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC),
which ruled Mogadishu for six months last year and managed to bring relative peace for the first time in 16 years. It was overthrown late last year by a force sent by neighboring Ethiopia with America's tacit blessing. Now the UIC's military wing, the shebab ("youth"), has retreated into a
maze of shallow bunkers and sandy berms in the Tawfiq neighborhood from which the Islamist group drew most of its local support. A sign on a daub wall nearby advertised the (now closed) new falluja caf‚-named after the Iraqi city razed by the Americans in late 2004 where the insurgency continues to simmer.
The government soldiers' overreaction to the woman buying juice is at least somewhat understandable. The first real suicide bomber in Somalia's history blew himself up last September, in a failed attempt to assassinate President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, whom many Somalis see as a puppet of Ethiopia and, by proxy, the United States. Since then, suicide bombers have detonated every few months.
During its brief tenure, the UIC had defeated Mogadishu's U.S.-backed warlords and quelled the clan divisions that riddle Somali life. It also set up sharia courts to administer justice and instill order in the name of Islam. To some degree, it worked. Somalis backed the UIC less for religious reasons than because, for the first time in almost two decades, Mogadishu wasn't a free-fire zone.
But the UIC had a much darker side: The shebab dug up and tossed out the bones of more than 700 dead Italians from an "infidel" cemetery and forced men to shave their heads as punishment for un-Islamic hairdos. They banned watching the World Cup and chewing the popular leafy stimulant qat. The head of the UIC's shura council, Sheik Hassan Aweys, was the military leader of Al Ittihad
Al Islami, which launched several attacks against Ethiopia in the 1990s and had links to Al Qaeda. Also, in the second half of 2006, hundreds of foreign fighters reportedly arrived in Somalia
to fight alongside the shebab. The UIC harbored several members of Al Qaeda, including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the elusive mastermind reportedly behind the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in
neighboring Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 225 people.
And so, last Christmas Eve, the Christian-led government of Ethiopia invaded and-supported, later, by U.S. air strikes-successfully dislodged the Islamist UIC, largely because it believed
(correctly) that rebels backed by its enemy, Eritrea, were using Somalia as a staging area for attacks. The result is an occupation by Ethiopian soldiers that fuels the local insurgency, th reatens to destabilize the Horn of Africa, and offers Al Qaeda an additional talking point in its campaign to persuade Muslims that the West has declared war upon them. Many of the region's Muslims saw the Ethiopian invasion as a Christmas present from Ethiopia's leaders to America's. "When the Americans started backing the Ethiopians around Christmas," one woman who supported the courts said, "we started calling the Ethiopians kafir, or infidels."
"The occupation in Somalia is having roughly the same effect as in parts of Iraq," John Prendergast, an analyst at the International Crisis Group and founder of the enough Project, says. "We know by now that the one thing that unifies Somalis and brings them into the streets for
guerrilla-style operations is occupation."
In other words, Somalia is shaping up to be a third blundered front, after Afghanistan
and Iraq, in the war on terrorism. As in Iraq, the overthrow of the UIC government has left widespread chaos in its wake. In the streets of Mogadishu, grazing cows and children sniffing glue compete to eat from piles of garbage. Qat is back too: Few dare to travel after 3 p.m., the hour
at which government soldiers begin to chew. While qat is ostensibly a stimulant, the glassy, pink eyes of soldiers in the late afternoon, and their indifference to pulling the triggers of their automatic weapons, make it seem a soporific.
Casualties from the occupation and insurgency fill the 60 beds of a local hospital. When I visited, I met Abdi Ghani Mohammed Ali, a 30-year-old English teacher who clutched the drainage tube protruding from his abdomen. Out of work since war shut his school some months ago, Abdi sold mobile phones to Ethiopian soldiers to support his family.
One day, he told me, the Ethiopians shot him, stole $1,000, and left him in the street to die. An 18-year-old boy had been admitted to the hospital several days earlier bleeding from his rectum.
He had been gang-raped by government soldiers who belonged to one of Somalia's rival clans. ("It's not sexual; it's about power," an onlooker said.) A woman in intensive care was waiting for her sister, shot during a carjacking, to wake from a coma. "Under the Islamic courts," she said, "it wasn't possible for anyone to do this." Meanwhile, in the crowded room next door, a woman named Rogia poked at the cast on her right knee, where she had been shot by an Ethiopian sniper.
"The Ethiopians hate our religion," she said. The hospital's one doctor was slightly embarrassed but translated for her nonetheless: "Muslims wouldn't do anything like this."
This is certainly how Al Qaeda would like the world's 1.3 billion Muslims to view what's happening in Somalia. In early 2007, Ayman Al Zawahiri called for attacks against the occupying Ethiopian
soldiers using "ambushes, mines, raids, and martyrdom-seeking campaigns to devour them as the lions devour their prey." But his message wasn't meant merely for Somali ears; it was also intended to inflame Muslims worldwide by suggesting, once again, that the Christian West is
at war with Islam.
Al Qaeda's interest in Somalia dates back to the early '90s, when, according to a recent report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, an "Africa Corps" made up of a dozen or so Al
Qaeda members set out for Mogadishu from nearby Sudan. "Al Qaeda saw Somalia as being really crucial long before the U.S. did," explains Lawrence Wright, author of The Looming Tower. "They look at the Horn of Africa as the gateway to the Red Sea: Egypt and Saudi Arabia are their main prizes." But, like the American peacekeepers sent by President Clinton in the early '90s, Al Qaeda's Africa Corps members found the failed state too problematic to build the infrastructure
they needed. Their jihad ideology, moreover, was a tough sell among the Sufi-influenced Somalis, and it was hard to tear militants away from their clan loyalties and salaries. The Africa Corps letters make fascinating reading, tracing the evolution of Al Qaeda's mission from combating Somali communism to confronting "crusaders."
Al Qaeda has claimed some public relations victories in Somalia, notably Osama bin Laden's boast that his foot soldiers helped to bring down a Black Hawk helicopter and kill 18 American Rangers in
Mogadishu in October 1993. That attack, he bragged later, set the "paper tiger" of the United States alight. And, as terrorism expert (and tnr contributor) Peter Bergen notes, Al Qaeda's first act of terrorism, the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Aden, Yemen, targeted American soldiers staying there- soldiers on their way to Somalia. "Al Qaeda saw Somalia as part of the American grab for Muslim lands that began in Saudi Arabia," Bergen says. "When you talk about `cutting off the head of the snake,' where do you begin? Somalia."
In the end, though, resentment toward the U.S.-backed occupation may prove to be a greater estabilizing force for the entire region than Al Qaeda ever was, especially in Kenya, where the war on terrorism is directly linked to the rise of radical Islamic identity.
In the name of chasing a few bad men, the Christmas invasion played into millennia of distrust between predominantly Christian Ethiopia (40-50 percent of the population is Muslim) and Somalia,
which is almost 100 percent Muslim.
"The popular perception is that Christian soldiers are occupying a Muslim land," says Roland Marchal, a senior research fellow at Sciences-Po in Paris. Ethiopians see Somalia as a haven for Islamic militants and insurgents backed by Eritrea, which would like to overthrow the repressive Ethiopian regime. But they also play up this analysis to encourage U.S. backing for their efforts to destroy the rebels. In 2002, during a visit by Senator Arlen Specter, Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi called the U.S. war on terrorism "something of a godsend." As Ethiopian Envoy to Somalia
Fesaha Shawal recently explained, "Ethiopia and America have a common strategy, a common thinking, and a common enemy."
It's a point on which both sides concur. Ahmed Mohammed Hashim, an emaciated 25-year-old shebab foot soldier, told me, "Ethiopia is our first enemy. Right now, they go into our mosques with their shoes on; they shit and pee there." Second is the Ethiopia-backed interim government, "because it is illegitimate." And third: "America. America is the father of our enemy. America is using the Ethiopians to take over our country, and we're against them."
When I visited one head of the interim government, Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, at his home, he argued that the de facto alliance between Ethiopia and the United States would eventually
work to everyone's benefit. Surrounded by armed, glowering teenagers belonging to his clan in the heavily fortified Mogadishu neighborhood that one Somali journalist called the Lime Zone (to
Baghdad's Green), Gedi told me: "The United States government is very cooperative. ... Somalia is a very important country from a geopolitical point of view in the war on terror."
A few hours later, a suicide truck bomber crashed through the gate of his compound, killing six people and injuring ten more. The prime minister was rushed to an undisclosed location. It was
at least the third attempt on his life, and a great opportunity for spin. Soon after, my phone rang. It was the prime minister calling me directly-apart from the photographer Seamus Murphy, I was evidently the only Western journalist in Mogadishu. "This bombing will make the international community pay attention," he told me. "It is the mark of Al Qaeda."
Eliza Griswold
Eliza Griswold is a fellow at the New America Foundation and the author of a recent collection of poems, Wideawake Field.
Somalia's al-Qaeda Link., By: Perry, Alex, Time South Pacific, 7/2/2007, Issue 25
Osama bin Laden has been urging Al-Qaeda followers to open up shop in Somalia for years, but there was always doubt about whether that call would resonate in a largely secular nation with a historic wariness of Arab interference. No longer. After January's attacks by Ethiopia--which were backed by U.S. air power and aimed to reduce the threat of terrorism--an increasingly international Islamist presence has flourished in the country, drawn by the chaos of post-invasion Somalia and the chance to strike back at the U.S. and its ally Ethiopia. In Mogadishu, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi told TIME that an alliance has formed among Somali nationalist rebels, remnants of the overthrown Islamic government, and rebels from the Ethiopian border region. U.S. officials accuse Eritrea, which has fought several wars against Ethiopia, of lending troops to the insurgency. Other observers say hundreds of foreign jihadists are arriving in Somalia. Transitional federal government President Yusuf Abdullah has accused Iran and Pakistan of funding the rebels, while others in Mogadishu point to Libya, Egypt and disgruntled elements within the Somali diaspora.
The fighters have been adopting al-Qaeda tactics at times. The Ogaden National Liberation Front, a Somali rebel group, killed nine Chinese oil workers and 65 Ethiopians at a rig in eastern Ethiopia in April. A diplomat in Nairobi warns of a "third front in the war on terror." The parallels to Iraq, which the U.S. alleged had links to al-Qaeda, only to invade and create them by sowing chaos and anti-U.S. sentiment, are plain. "America's aggression helped us a lot," explains jihadi commander Mohammed Mahmood Ali in Mogadishu. "We got a lot of support from that."
By Alex Perry
A 'failed state' that functions., By: Nevin, Tom, African Business, Jul2007, Issue 333
Somalia has no government to speak of or functioning official institutions and it is battle scarred and chaotic but, and here is the surprise, it works remarkably well. Tom Nevin explains
Superficially and by reputation, Somalia is the quintessential failed state. Closer inspection of this African horn country's born-again economy however, reveals a unique determination to survive and the universal resilience of the entrepreneur.
More recently it has had to face the added challenge of an armed insurgency in the south, invasion by rampaging Ethiopian troops, air attacks by US fighter jets and street battles in the capital Mogadishu. But, as a nation, it still works better than many of its peers in Africa and the world is wondering why. Businesspeople there say the lack of bureaucracy helps to get things going faster and more efficiently.
"After the autocratic regime of Siad Barre fell in 1991, the country collapsed into civil war. Peace has been established in some regions, but Somalia has only limited government in the northwest and no recognised government in the south. In these circumstances the private sector has been surprisingly innovative," say Tatiana Nenova and Tim Harford, both economists at the World Bank, in a report.
Competition thrives in markets where transactions are simple, such as retail and construction. In more complex sectors, such as electricity supply and telecommunications, the private solutions are flawed but impressive.
Prices are attractive compared with those in other countries. In extremely difficult circumstances the private sector has demonstrated its much-vaunted capacity to make do. To cope with the absence of the rule of law, private enterprises used foreign jurisdictions or institutions to help with some tasks, operating within networks of trust to strengthen property rights, and simplifying transactions until they need neither. This is where the Islamic courts, later to become the focus of attacks by the US, came into their own.
Somalia's private sector experience suggests that it might be easier than is commonly thought for basic systems of finance and some infrastructure services to function where government is extremely weak or absent.
Peter Davis of the US-based Ethical Corporation agrees. "Despite the chaos and the lack of any central government," he says, "Somalia has one of the most efficient telephone systems in the region. It takes just three days for a landline to be installed, compared with the waiting time of many years in neighbouring Kenya where a stable, democratic system has been in place for half a century."
Businesspeople in Somalia and intrigued observers from other parts of Africa and the world have come to the consensus that it is the lack of bureaucracy and other government interventions that lets things happen quickly and efficiently.
According to the World Bank, Somalia now has 112,000 fixed lines and 50,000 mobile subscribers, up from a total of 17,000 lines in 1991. Competition between rival suppliers has resulted in some of Africa's lowest call costs. In addition, problems such as allowing calls between different networks are resolved through the Somali Telecoms Association. This body, based in Dubai, represents all the telecoms companies, as well as the International Telecommunication Union.
Creative approaches
"Only when it comes to public goods or to private goods with strong spillover effects - roads, monetary stability, a legal system, primary education, a cross-border financial system - does the state seem to be sorely missed," say Nenova and Harford. "But even here the private sector has developed creative approaches that partially substitute for effective government. As a result, Somalia boasts lower rates of extreme poverty and, in some cases, better infrastructure than richer countries in Africa.
Despite the chaos and the absence of a state structure, other sectors are also operating successfully. In supplying electricity, enterprising companies are bridging the governance gap.
"There is no functioning national grid so entrepreneurs have divided cities into manageable sectors and provide electricity on a local basis using generators bought overseas," reports Davis. "These providers offer households a menu of choices, including daytime, evening or 24-hour supply, and charge per light bulb."
He says local businesspeople find it easier to do business in a country where there is no government. "There is no need to obtain licences and, in contrast with many other parts of Africa, there is no state-run monopoly that prevents new competitors setting up. Keeping prices low is helped by the absence of any need to pay taxes."
Competition keeps prices low
Somali entrepreneurs have used three methods to compensate for the lack of effective government regulation. "First," say Nenova and Harford, "importing governance by relying on foreign institutions - for example, for airline safety, currency stability and company law. Second, using clans and other local networks of trust to help with contract enforcement, payment and transmission of funds; and third, simplifying transactions until they can be carried out without help from either the clan or the international economy."
Many local companies have teamed up with such international giants as Sprint of the US and Norway's Telenor providing mobile phones and building new landlines. Keen competition has forced prices down to well below typical levels in Africa. Public water supply is limited to urban areas, but a private system extends to all parts of the country as entrepreneurs build concrete catchments, drill private boreholes or ship water in from the cities.
In 1989 the national air carrier operated just one airplane and one international route. Today the sector comprises 15 firms, more than 60 aircraft, six international destinations, more domestic routes and many more flights. "But safety is a concern," report Nenova and Harford. "Airports lack trained air traffic controllers, fire services, runway lights and a sealed perimeter against stray animals; and checks on aircraft are inadequate." Carriers operate out of Djibouti, Dubai and Nairobi using the facilities there to check aircraft safety.
Generally speaking, commercial enterprises are able to satisfy consumer demands unencumbered by government interference.
"The government post and telecoms company used to have a monopoly," says a spokesman for one telephone company, Telcom Somalia, "but after the regime was toppled, we were free to set up our own businesses. We saw a huge gap in the market, as all previous services had been destroyed. There was a massive demand."
While Somalia exists in a law-and-order vacuum in the western sense, there is a functional court system that ensures that bills are paid and contracts are enforced through the thread of justice that binds the country's traditional clan system. Disputes are commonly settled at the clan level, by traditional systems run by elders and with the clan collecting damages. Such legal measures are free and fast, and sometimes the justice can be rough and unfair. Security is a neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood watch that keeps order in the patchwork of hundreds of fiefdoms run by rival warlords.
The hawala system, a trust-based money transfer structure used in many Muslim countries, moves around $1bn into Somalia each year, and it works surprisingly well allowing Somalis working abroad to send money to family members in even small and remote towns.
Social welfare today, as it has been for generations, is a clan matter. Clan members look after each other and the saying goes that an injury to one clan member is an injury to all. The strength of the clan system can also become the cause of conflict as various clans fight for scare resources, or to carve out territories for themselves.
Selected development indicators for Somalia and comparative economies
Legend for Chart:
A - Indicator
B - Somalia
C - West Africa
D - Neighbouring countries A B C D
Per capita household income ($) 226 501 438
Population living on less than $1/day (%) 43 45 47
Roads (thousands of km per million population) 3 3 3
Telephones (per million people) 15 9 10
Population with access to safe water (%) 21 59 60
Adult literacy rate (%) 81 49 35
Statistics circa mainly 2002/03.
Source: World Bank
PHOTO (COLOR): Somali entrepreneurs are required to improvise, make do and mend. Here, an aged truck that is little more than a chassis and engine loaded with charcoal, distributes this vital fuel to urban customers.
PHOTO (COLOR): Left: A lack of formal banking services means Somalis, at home and abroad in the diaspora, must rely on traditional systems such as hawala to move money.
By Tom Nevin
No peace, more terror., Economist, 6/2/2007, Vol. 383, Issue 8540
A violent Islamist threat is far from over
Dateline: NAIROBI
In march and April about 400,000 Somalis fled their capital, Mogadishu, as Ethiopian forces backing Somalia's transitional government razed whole districts in an attempt to destroy the country's remaining Islamist militants. That offensive came only months after the Ethiopians claimed to have defeated Somalia's ruling Union of Islamic Courts in a stunningly swift campaign at the end of last year. Despite Ethiopia's latest claims of success, the country is in as perilous a state as ever.
Peace-making is still fraught. A national reconciliation conference of clan elders planned for June 14th will not take place, partly because Mogadishu remains too dangerous for any public gathering. Little is expected of a forthcoming meeting of Somalis and foreign countries' representatives in London. One stumbling block is that Somalia's president, Abdullahi Yusuf, and his prime minister, Mohamed Gedi, are still reluctant to talk to the more moderate of their Islamist opponents. Instead, they seem keener to divide and rule, especially the powerful Hawiye clan which predominates in Mogadishu.
In any event, it is uncertain whether the Islamist militants are in a mood to negotiate; despite their losses, they are becoming more effective. The remnants of the Shabab, the Islamic Courts' zealous armed wing, are more aggressive and better organised than before. Ethiopia says its troops killed at least a thousand Shabab fighters in March and April, though human-rights groups say most of the 1,670 recorded dead were civilians. Either way, the ferocity of the Ethiopian offensive forced the Shabab (meaning "youth" in Arabic) to adopt Iraqi-style insurgent tactics, carrying out hit-and-run raids, planting land mines and even using suicide bombers, all of which are new to Somalia. Western intelligence sources say the Shabab has turned itself from a conventional outfit that was clobbered in conventional fighting into a terrorist-type group using the al-Qaeda cell system: 20-30 men in a cell, rotating in and out of the front line, with better intelligence and more sophisticated training.
This is bad news for most Somalis--and for Uganda. It has 1,500 peacekeepers in Mogadishu as part of an African Union mission which is supposed to replace the Ethiopians, whom most Somalis detest as invaders. The Ugandans were to have been backed up by other African forces but none has shown up. Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, has resolved to keep his troops, five of whom have been killed, in the line of fire.
But without a comprehensive agreement over Somalia, the present maelstrom could draw in more east African countries and also America, which has already sent special forces to hunt for al-Qaeda suspects there. Al-Qaeda has long tried to incite a jihad against "Christian" Ethiopia and to foster terrorist cells on the Swahili coast, particularly in Kenya. A religious war in Ethiopia looks unlikely right now; Christian-Muslim relations seem fairly stable. But no one knows what success al-Qaeda has had in finding recruits among Kenya's coastal Muslims. Plainly, potential terrorists can still move easily back and forth between Kenya and Somalia. Islamist terrorism in Addis Ababa and Nairobi now seems horribly likely.
PHOTO (COLOR): The child of a failed state
NEW STATESMAN | 21 MAY 2007
New front in the war on terror?
Christopher Thompson
Regional African wars rarely excite much media interest and Ethiopia's invasion into neighbouring
Somalia has been widely greeted with a collective sigh. Even reports of civilian bombardment and
television pictures of refugees have failed to elicit much response; events across the Red Sea in Iraq have constantly overshadowed the violence elsewhere.
But, with the world's gaze averted towards the Middle East, the United States government has
quietly opened up another front in its war on terror, in East Africa - catching many innocent people in the crossfire.
Central to the new strategy is the use of Ethiopian jails in the "rendition" and interrogation of
terror suspects. Hundreds of these, including Britons, have been held incommunicado by the Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities on suspicion of terrorism, according to US-based Human Rights Watch.
In what has been described as "Africa's Guantanamo", the organisation accuses Washington of complicity in the maltreatment of these detainees and of using Ethiopia as a proxy ally in Somalia.
Ethiopia's official rationale for its December invasion was to restore order in a country that has been without a central government since the 1991 collapse of the dictatorship led by strongman
Siad Barre. The Ethiopians claimed they were "invited" to invade by Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government, which had been prevented from entering Mogadishu, the de facto capital, by fighters from the militant Union of Islamic Courts, which held sway there at the time. And the US has had its own score to settle.
"The US gave [Ethiopia] the green light and logistical support ... similar to Israel's intervention in Lebanon," says Cedric Barnes, a member of the international affairs think-tank Chatham House's Horn of Africa group. "It was after al-Qaeda suspects for the [1998] bombing of its embassies in Nairobi [Kenya] and Dar es Salaam [Tanzania]."
The stakes were raised when the US used air strikes against three al-Qaeda leaders attempting to
flee into Kenya in January, killing scores of civilians. Later, the Pentagon admitted the bombs may
have missed their target after none of the intended was found dead. At the same time, US special
forces, along with Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities, were arresting more suspects in operations along the Kenyan- Somali border in December 2006 and January 2007. An unknown number were subsequently "rendered" onwards to Ethiopia.
Last month, Ethiopia's foreign affairs ministry acknowledged that 41 people were held "after being
captured by the joint forces of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ethiopia". It added that 29 were listed for release, including four Britons, and that there were no "secret" prisons.
But, according to manifests shown to the New Statesmanby Human Rights Watch, at least 85 people were deported from Kenya to Somalia on three flights chartered by two little-known airlines, African Express Airways and Sudan's Blue Bird Aviation, on 20 and 27 January and 10 February.
The other 44 captives remain missing.
In April, a man called Ali Jog, a blue-eyed, blond-haired Danish Muslim convert, was released from
Ethiopia after being captured in Somalia and flown to a jail in Addis Ababa. Jog appeared on none of the flight logs - sparking fears that Ethiopia is holding more prisoners than it admits.
One human-rights activist disputes Ethiopia's figures, saying there are "up to 300 prisoners".
Activists believe that many of these are more likely to be opponents of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's government than terrorists. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing the exact number of
prisoners. They are kept in secret detention that bears all the hallmarks of a Guantanamo-type
policy: cross-border transfers without judicial proceedings, military tribunals, abusive
conditions and the prospect of indefinite imprisonment. "They are being held incommunicado -
like Guantanamo - so we represent their families because we've had no contact," says Jonathan
Hafetz, the New-York-based lawyer acting on behalf of Amir Meshal, a US citizen.
Meanwhile, there are reports that western intelligence agencies are taking advantage of these
conditions - and, by extension, Ethiopia's poor human-rights record - to conduct clandestine
interrogations.
Last month, the US government conceded that interviews with the detainees have produced "valuable
information" but denied the detentions were part of a covert rendition programme.
In an eerie echo of US strategy during its post-invasion "roundups" in Afghanistan, Halima
Hashim, a Kenyan citizen who fled Somalia after the bombardment in December, told the UK humanrights organisation Reprieve that the US had been paying off locals in return for captured foreigners. According to Hashim, after she took refuge in a Somali hospital, Ethiopian troops entered, and seized the records. "Then, they came back and took foreigners out of the hospital," she said. "At that time, the Americans and Ethiopians were buying foreign nationals from the Somali people."
Research by the US-based Seton Hall University School of Law concluded that 66 per cent of
the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay seized in Pakistan were handed over to the Americans for a
bounty. Five years on, not one of those prisoners stands charged
with a crime.
The Mayor of Mogadishu., Time South Pacific, 5/21/2007, Issue 19
Trying to lead Somalia's war-ravaged capital, Mogadishu, can't be easy. But new mayor Mohamed Dheere has a plan. First: improve security by requiring citizens to hand over their weapons. Critics say that won't work in a city where civilians are wedged between warlords, Islamists and Ethiopian-backed forces, but Dheere's staff insists disarmament is on track. Some businessmen have already handed over 25 boxes and 20 sacks filled with weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles, and 150 firms have pledged to do the same. Dheere's next test? Protecting those who can no longer protect themselves.
west & Central AFRICA - MARCH 2007
Instability In Somalia Brings Multiple Risks
BMI View: Kenya is faced with increasing security risks. Instability in neighbouring
Somalia brings dangers in itself, but Kenya's strategic alliance with the US and explicit
backing of the transitional government in Somalia may be exposing the country to more substantial risk.
Typically, alliance with Washington is regarded as a strategic plus. Indeed, political and security partnership with the US has its benefits in terms of potential military support
and aid inflows. However, Kenya's ties with the US are also a source of additional vulnerability
for the country, particularly amid overt recent US involvement in southern Somalia, which may well have resulted in increased support for the Islamist Islamic Courts Union (ICU) among the Somali
population, and increased resentment toward the US and its supporters.
Kenya has suffered attacks from extremist groups in the past, with al-Qaeda claiming
responsibility for the 1998 Nairobi bombing, which killed several hundred people, and the 2002 Mombassa bombing of an Israeli owned hotel. The US maintains that those responsible are still operating in the region. Now, regional security is very much back in the public eye, following the ousting of the ICU from Mogadishu, and US airstrikes against alleged al-Qaeda linked cells in
southern Somalia.
A fleet of US Navy ships has been stationed off the coast of East Africa to prevent members of the ICU from fleeing Somalia, while Kenya has closed its border with Somalia and bolstered its military force in the area to prevent potential threats from entering Kenya. Security forces have been under instruction to prevent any Somalis from entering and have already sent back hundreds of asylum seekers and arrested dozens of alleged Islamist fighters. While Kenya's desire to prevent instability from spilling over into its territory is understandable, its co-operation with
the US is exposing it to potential strikes from Somali militias. Moreover, Kenya's Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju has stated Nairobi's support for the Somali transitional government.
Washington has carried out a number of airstrikes on suspected terrorist cells in southern Somalia, and the US embassy in Nairobi has re-issued an East Africa threat of terrorism warning, stating that al-Qaeda operatives may `relocate' within the region after being driven from southern Somalia. Local press reports have suggested that a Kenyan helicopter escaped fire from Somali
mercenaries in early January, and further attacks cannot be ruled out.
Although the violence has subsided somewhat recently, with the expulsion of the ICU from Mogadishu, we are concerned about the sustainability of the situation, as there is strong domestic support for the Islamist movement, and we could see further unrest over the coming years.
Moreover, while the validity of the alleged link between the ICU and al-Qaeda is hard to substantiate, arguably al-Qaeda now has greater incentive to step up its activities in the region in light of US attacks. If the attacks continue, the ICU could very well accept whatever assistance al-Qaeda offers. Indeed, the ICU has reportedly instructed its fighters to retreat into Somali towns in order to prepare for a guerrilla-warfare type of insurgency - a form of fighting that al-Qaeda has significant experience in.
Aside from security issues, the situation has been and will likely continue to be a major strain on government resources, given the extent of refugee flows into the country. Increased border patrols and humanitarian support, despite being subsidised by the UN, are placing a burden on the state. At the height of violence earlier in 2006, the UN estimated that between 100-1,000 refugees
were crossing the border each day into northern Kenya, bringing the total number up to around 160,000. A Somali child based in the Dadaab refugee camp contracted the first known case of polio in Kenya in 20 years, and this is one example of the risks posed by the refugee flows.
Meanwhile, the impact that the ascendancy of the ICU will have on the Muslims on Kenya's east coast is uncertain. Certainly, there is some anti-government feeling among parts of the relatively impoverished east coast community, particularly over their perceived lack of political representation. This, combined with possible resentment over the government's supportive stance
of the transitional government in Somalia could be a source of domestic instability, although we feel that the risks here are quite limited.
BMI View: We expect economic growth of 5.2% this year, down from initial government
expectations of 6.0% growth in 2006. While economic activity will remain strong, it will suffer from the slowdown in global growth we expect this year. Tourism, construction and the IT sectors will likely be among the best performing areas of the economy.
2005 2006e 2007f Latest Period 2008f
Nominal GDP, US$bn [3] 18.70 23.00 26.20 - - 30.20
Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [1,4] 5.8 5.1 5.2 - - 4.1
Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [4] 7.6 13.0 10.0 15.6 Dec 9.0
Exchange rate KES/US$, ave [5] 75.55 73.20 74.50 72.16 Oct 74.00
Lending rate, %, eop [5] 12.88 11.59 11.00 - - 11.00
OPEC basket, US$/bbl, ave [2,6] 50.64 60.87 54.50 - - 50.50
Budget balance, % of GDP [4] 0.1 -3.4 -2.4 - - -1.4
Imports, US$bn [4] 5.41 5.95 6.43 1.80 Jun-Aug 7.00
Exports, US$bn [4] 3.24 3.56 3.92 0.93 Jun-Aug 4.35
Trade balance, US$bn [4] -2.17 -2.39 -3.70 -0.87 Jun-Aug -2.65
Current account, US$bn [4] -0.50 -0.80 -0.60 -0.34 Jun-Aug -0.40
Forex reserves (- gold), US$bn [5] 1.80 2.07 2.36 - - 2.77
Foreign debt, % of GDP [7] 31.1 25.2 20.5 - - 19.3
Notes: e/f = BMI estimate/forecast [1] Latest data is annualised [2] Global assumptions correct when forecasts generated.
Sources: [3] Central Bank of Kenya [4] Central Bank of Kenya/IMF [5] IMF [6] OPEC [7] IMF/BMI calculation
Africa Briefing N°45.26 January 2007
Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b45_somalia___the_tough_part_is_ahead.pdf
Islamic Courts Union
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Islamic Courts Union
Participant in the Somali Civil War
Territory controlled by the ICU at the height of their power, December 2006. Originated as Unaligned Islamic sharia courts movements Became Popular Resistance Movement (PRM) Allies Mujahideen organizations, including Al Qaeda, Various Muslim and anti-Ethiopian nations including Eritrea (alleged) Opponents Clan-based warlords,Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism,Juba Valley Alliance,
Transitional Federal Government.
Somali Civil War
Revolution (1986–92) – UN intervention (1992–95) – Attempts at Reconciliation (1991–2004) – Consolidation (1998–2006) – Rise of the ICU (2006) – Ethiopian intervention (2006–present) – Islamist insurgency (2007–present)The Islamic Courts Union (ICU, Somali: Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga, Arabic: اتحاد المحاكم الإسلامية Ittihād al-mahākim al-islāmiyya) was a group of Sharia Courts who united themselves to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as head of the ICU. They are also known as the Joint Islamic Courts, Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Somalia Islamic Courts Council (SICC)[1] or the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC)[2] and Western media often refer to the group as the Somali Islamists.
Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern Somalia and the vast majority of its population, including most major cities such as Jowhar, Kismayo, Beledweyne, and the capital Mogadishu. Only the arid Northern regions (Puntland, Somaliland), and the furthest interior regions of the south were outside their control. In December 2006, the ICU lost much territory after defeats at the battles of Baidoa, Bandiradley, and Beledweyne, retreating to the capital, Mogadishu. On December 28 they abandoned Mogadishu, leaving the city in chaos while they moved south towards Kismayo, which allowed the TFG and Ethiopian troops to take over the city.[3] After a stand at the Battle of Jilib, the ICU abandoned the city of Kismayo on January 1, 2007. Stripped of almost all their territory, it is speculated the ICU will pursue guerrilla-style warfare against the government.[4]
History
Before the second battle of Mogadishu After the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, a system of sharia-based Islamic courts became the main judicial system, funded through fees paid by litigants. Over time the courts began to offer other services such as education and health care. The courts also acted as local police forces, being paid by local businesses to reduce crime. The Islamic courts took on the responsibility for halting robberies and drug-dealing, as well as stopping the showing of what it claims to be pornographic films in local movie houses. Somalia is almost entirely Muslim, and these institutions initially had wide public support. The early years of the courts include such outfits as Sheikh Ali Dheere's, established in north Mogadishu in 1994 and the Beled Weyene court initiated in 1996. They soon saw the sense in working together through a joint committee to promote security. This move was initiated by four of the courts - Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshadda and Hararyaale - who formed a committee to co-ordinate their affairs, to exchange criminals from different clans and to integrate security forces. In 1999 the group began to assert its authority. Supporters of the Islamic courts and other institutions united to form the ICU, an armed militia. In April of that year they took control of the main market in Mogadishu and, in July, captured the road from Mogadishu to Afgoi.[5] Their system of government, controlled by judges, is known as a krytocracy.
Eritrean assistance
According to the United Nations and various sources the Eritrean government started to arm and finance ICU for many years.[6] Along with Ethiopian rebels; like OLF, according to a BBC 1999 report, Eritrea sent "shiploads" of arms to the ICU and other rebels in Southern Somalia. It also reported that the Eritrean government sent "Eritrean advisers" as well as Eritrean "engineers and mine-laying experts."[7] After many denials from the Eritrean side, the deadlock ended when the Islamic Courts Union leader Aweys admitted that the Eritrean government has been assisting ICU.[8] After the Somali transitional government defeated the Islamists and took back Mogadishu, Somali television showed Eritrean soldiers captured in Mogadishu.[9] Additional Eritrean fighters were killed by Somali security officers in June 2007. [10][11] A governor of one of Somalia's southern districts further confirmed the continued alliance of Eritrean fighters with Al-Qaeda & ICU militants.[12]
According to Los Angeles Times, various ICU fighters were caught before they tried to escape to Eritrea.[13] Many of the ICU leadership and jihadist leaders are believed to have found refuge in Eritrea.
Other Foreign fighters
Various foreign fighters were said to be helping the ICU. Particularly since suicide bombing tactics are not common even among extremist Somali muslims, the rise of self-sacrificing bombers indicated deeper foreign jihadist assistance.[14] In January, Somalia said they defeated as well as arrested many Arab fighters.[15] Also in June, many foreign pro-ICU fighters were trying to run away by boats when they were detected in the Puntland region. The governor of the region told the media that the Islamist fighters arrived to cause trouble and assured that the Puntland troops were searching for them.[16] The U.S. military also targeted more jihadist and Al-Queda cells, particularly the bombers of U.S. embassy in Kenya.[17] According to BBC, the Pentagon said a high level Al-Qaeda member from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was captured in Somalia and transferred to the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay.[18][19]
After conquering Mogadishu
Flag used by various ICU militiasIn the year 2000, the courts formed a union of Islamic courts, partly to consolidate resources and power and partly to aid in handing down decisions across, rather than within, clan lines.[20] Yet the ICU remained firmly established in the Hawiye clan.[21]
As the courts began to assert themselves as the dispensers of justice they came into conflict with the secular warlords who controlled most of the city. In reaction to the growing power of the ICU, a group of Mogadishu warlords formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). This was a major change, as these warlords had been fighting each other for many years. By the beginning of 2006, these two groups had clashed repeatedly, and in May 2006 it escalated into street fighting in the capital, claiming the lives of more than 300 people. On 5 June 2006, the ICU claimed that they were in control of Mogadishu.[22]
Meanwhile, in the United States the Bush administration neither confirmed nor denied support for either side. However, it was reported that American officials had anonymously confirmed that the U.S. government was funding the ARPCT, due to concerns that the ICU is linked to al-Qaeda and is sheltering three al-Qaeda leaders involved in past terror attacks, including the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.[23]
On 6 June 2006 the ICU further claimed it was in control of all the lands up to 100 kilometers (62 miles) inland from Mogadishu. The warlords were reported to have either been captured or to have fled the city, abandoning most of their weapons, with the majority fleeing to Jowhar, which was taken by the ICU militia on 14 June.[24] This brought ICU in control of much of the weaponry in the country, which made a resurgence by the warlords difficult without outside support. The ICU also controlled significant territory outside the capital, including the important town of Balad. In mid-August, ICU militiamen swept into the port town of Hobyo, 500 kilometers north of Mogadishu, meeting no opposition.[25] The ICU organized a clean-up campaign for the streets of Mogadishu on 20 July. This was the first time litter and rubbish had been collected in the entire city since it collapsed into chaos over a decade earlier.[26]
On July 15, 2006, the Islamic Courts reopened Mogadishu international airport, which had been closed since the withdrawal of the international forces in 1995. The first airplane chartered by the Arab League flew from the airport for the first time in 11 years picking up Islamic Courts delegates to the Sudanese capital of Khartoum.[27]
On August 15, 2006, the ICU captured Haradhere, some 500km northeast of Mogadishu, which had become a safe haven for pirates, who had forced shipping firms and international organisations to pay large ransoms for the release of vessels and crews.[28]
On August 25, 2006 the Islamic Courts reopened historic Mogadishu seaport, which was formerly one of the busiest in East Africa but had been shut down for 10 years.[29]
On October 5, 2006 the Islamic Courts declared the formation of the supreme Islamic Sharia court of Banadir province, ending all tribal Islamic Courts in the capital.[30]
War with Ethiopia
On December 8, 2006, the Islamic Courts Union claimed to have been involved in heavy fighting with Somali transitional government forces, backed by Ethiopian troops. On December 21, heavy fighting erupted between ICU forces and Ethiopian-backed forces. The battles happened initially in two areas - the military base of Daynuunay and the military base of Iidale.
The ICU made calls for jihad against Ethiopia,[31] which were met by international mujahideen volunteers arriving in Somalia.
The ICU lost a considerable amount of territory after defeats at the December 20 - 26 battles of Baidoa, Bay region, Bandiradley, in Mudug, and Beledweyne, Hiran region, retreating to the capital, Mogadishu.
Resignation of leadership
Main article: Fall of Mogadishu
On December 27, 2006, after a brief skirmish earlier in the day at the Battle of Jowhar, the leaders of the ICU, including Sheiks Hassan Dahir Aweys, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Abdirahman Janaqow resigned in a capitulation recognizing the new state of affairs in Somalia. They issued the following decisions:
1. It is national duty to protect the sovereignty and the integrity of Somalia and its people.
2. The ICU allows that Somalis should have the option to determine their future and would be ready for taking over the responsibility.
3. The Islamic Courts Union agreed not to allow anyone to create violence in Mogadishu and anybody that is found guilty would be brought before the law and would be taken for the suitable punishment according to the Islamic Sharia.
4. The ICU fighters are responsible for establishing the security and stability in the Somalian capital Mogadishu.
5. Lastly, the ICU is calling on all the Islamic fighters in Somalia, where ever they may be, to maintain security and stability in their localities and get ready in the police stations and other security installations.[32]
On December 28, the ICU withdrew from the capital. Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamad Gedi stated the legislature would shortly declare a period of martial law.
Pursuit of the ICU
After abandoning control of Mogadishu, leaders from the ICU proceeded to fortify the Jubba River valley area including the towns of Jilib and Kismayo. Days later, on December 31 Ethiopian and Somali forces attacked Jilib, after which the Islamists abandoned Kismayo.
In January 2007, as the ICU retreated, its leaders vowed to wage guerrilla war. They were pursued to Ras Kamboni, where they were militarily engaged by Ethiopian and Somali TFG forces. Kenyan and US forces enforced a border patrol and naval blockade, followed by US airstrikes against suspected Al Qaeda members embedded within the ICU militias.[33]
On January 10, a report by Somali presidential chief of staff, Abdirizak Hassan stated the US airstrikes had killed Al Qaeda member Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, and leaders of the Islamic Courts Union including Abduallahi Moalim Ali (former chief of security for Mogadishu), Abdirahman Janaqow, and a third unidentified person. The bodies had reportedly been recovered by Ethiopian military personnel.[34] Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was later confirmed by US forces to have survived the US air raid on 8 January 2007.
Europe-based terror cells
Terrorist cells in Somalia that were hiding & training foreign terrorists, who were planning attacks in the UK, were unmasked in June 2007. [35] After Ethiopia and the Somalia government drove out the Islamic Courts Union various terrorist cells were discovered and attacked with the help of American planes in neighboring Djibouti.[36][37] According to US Department of State, a number of al-Qaida terrorists, responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, are in Somlia.[38] In the latest raid targeting terrorist cells, "key intelligence about terrorists still planning attacks in the UK and elsewhere in Europe" were uncovered.[39]
Islamist insurgency
Main articles: Islamist insurgency in Somalia (2007–present) and Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations
After their fall from power, many Islamist militiamen went into hiding. Many attacks were carried out against Ethiopian and TFG troops, and the group was reformed as the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM).
Structure and composition
Background
Current Event: The ICU has undergone dramatic and rapid changes. Given their loss of control over Mogadishu and much of the rest of the country, this section may refer to the organization in the past tense. This reflects how the courts were run prior to their retreat from Mogadishu. However, the ICU is still an existing organization. The status of their leaders and their present organization may be subject to change and speculation.
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Executive Chairman of the Islamic CourtsThe ICU is a union of Sharia law courts. These courts formed out of the chaos of the 1990s to administer justice in the districts in which they were established. Due to the chaos in Somalia, each court maintained a large militia to act as both police force and military. In February 2006, 11 of these courts chose to pool their military resources in order to take over Mogadishu. (See Second Battle of Mogadishu)
Map showing the political structure of the ICU at the peak of its influenceEach member of the ICU is a Sharia judge in charge of a specified court in a particular district of Somalia, and it is up to him to determine how Sharia law is enforced. These interpretations can either be very literal or very broad, with various Hadiths being either regarded or disregarded, and correspondingly has led to varying levels of liberty and repression. Some courts do not enforce beyond what the Quran requires; others have beaten people for watching bollywood and western movies or playing "licentious" music. One famous allegation that was cited numerous times, yet was denied by the ICU, was that there was a ban on the viewing of football (soccer) matches.[40]
In order to organize the courts into a more coherent organization, rather than a like-minded collection of independent judges, a "Supreme Islamic Court of Banadir" was created, with the most senior judges forming this high court. This court dealt with wide issues, as well as foreign relations, and commanded the ICU military forces as a whole. The chairman of the Supreme Islamic Court is Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. A consultative Shura council chaired by Sheikh Hassan Aweys approved the decisions made by the Supreme Islamic Court, and therefore was called the "real power" in the ICU, though the Shura could not act unilaterally. In simplistic terms, this made Ahmed the "President" of the ICU and Aweys the "Prime Minister". When Ahmed was otherwise indisposed (visiting a foreign country, ill, etc.) Sheikh Abdirahman Janaqow was the Acting Chairman.
Below the Supreme Council and Shura Council are the regional courts spread throughout the country, which govern over the day to day issues of justice and law. These courts have enormous independence, and so the laws and regulations in ICU territory can vary wildly from town to town based on the particular moderation or radicalism of the local court.
ICU Chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is seen as a moderate and repeatedly declared the objective of the ICU was the restoration of order after 15 years of violence. However, of the eleven courts composing the Union, two had reputations as radical. One was led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is on the U.S. list of terrorism suspects as the former head of the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) group, which has been linked to al-Qaeda. Western diplomats are also concerned by a second leader, Adan Hashi Ayro, who was trained in Afghanistan and whose militia has been implicated in the deaths of five foreign aid workers and a BBC producer. Suspects from the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings are believed to be hiding in Somalia, and to be aided by the ICU [1][2]. There were also been reports of foreign mujahideen fighting alongside the ICU. In response, the U.S. provided funding for the secular warlord alliance due to these fears. However, Somalia has little history of radical Islam and the ICU had not embraced the most extreme forms of Islamic law, such as amputation of thieves' hands.[5]
Hizbul Shabaab
The Hizbul Shabaab, also known as Al-Shabaab, or simply as "Shabaab", is the Youth Wing of the ICU. It is a radical and somewhat independent organization under the ICU umbrella which is integrated quite tightly with the ICU armed forces, acting as a sort of "special forces" for the ICU.
The Shabab has caused difficulties for the ICU in maintaining a good international image on a number of occasions due to their hot-headedness and zealousness, such as abducting critical journalists, harassing overly-hip youngsters, and most infamously, murdering wounded JVA soldiers in a Bu'aale hospital.[41]
The ICU formally apologized for each of the incidents, and attempted to make it clear that these actions did not reflect ICU policy. Nevertheless, these incidents gave their opponents excellent propaganda ammunition, and aided the global perception of the ICU being like the Taliban.
Relationship to other Somali powers
The major powers in Somalia included the Transitional Federal Government, the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) in the south, plus the autonomous Puntland in the northeast and self-declared independent Somaliland in the northwest. In the midst of the conflict, Galmudug was formed in direct response to stem the rise of the ICU. The ICU was opposed by all the other factions, except for Somaliland, which remained generally neutral throughout the conflict.
As a result of the collapse of the warlords' power, the four warlord representatives in the transitional government were stripped of their cabinet posts. The transitional government is based in Baidoa, 250 kilometers from Mogadishu. After the ICU victory in Mogadishu, the transitional government voted to request foreign peacekeepers from the African Union in a mission known as IGASOM. The African Union supports the transitional government, though it did not provide forces to defend it against the advances of the ICU. The ICU rejected the need for peacekeepers, arguing Somalia needs aid, not more external troops. The Interim Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi stated he wished to meet with the ICU leaders.[42] This resulted in the Treaty of Khartoum of 5 September 2006, in which it was agreed the ICU and the Transitional Government would be merged; however, the ICU insisted on the precondition Ethiopian troops would leave the country beforehand. Ethiopian forces did not withdraw, and the treaty agreement fell apart.
The JVA was overrun in the south, and Kismayo was taken. The remaining JVA forces aligned themselves immediately with the TFG. In December 2006—January 2007, as part of the TFG's army, they retook the lost territory of the south.
In November 2006 the Islamic Courts said Puntland's forces had carried out a pre-emptive strike against their fighters who were gathering on the edge of Puntland near Galinsoor.[43] The government of Puntland has vowed to resist any attack by the Islamic Courts.[44] Later, Puntland entered into combat with the ICU at the Battle of Bandiradley, which expelled the ICU from the central interior.
Suicide bombers
While the Transitional Somali government was still in Baidoa, various suicide attacks were targeted against the ministers by the ICU. After the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union, some suicide bombers were mixed with the insurgency against the Somali government forces and AU forces. In early May 2007, an ICU suicide bomber was caught by the African Union forces stationed at the Mogadishu seaport.[45] Another suicide bomber of the Islamic Courts Union also made a Martyr video tape adopting Al-Qaeda's tactics.[46] [47]The video showed a man praying from the Koran before bombing himself, exploding near Ethiopian troops and Somali government forces.[48] Another suicide bomber striked the Somali PM's house killing around 5 people and wounding many in June, 2007.[49] The Prime Minister was not harmed.
Noted ICU leaders
Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys is the head of the shura council of the ICU. Aweys is former leader of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Since November 2001, he has been named under Executive Order 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activities.
Shaykh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is the leader of the ICU. Ahmed was born in Chabila, Somalia and studied at Libyan and Sudanese universities. He is from the Abgaal branch of the Hawiye clan. He has also worked as a secondary school teacher of geography, Arabic, and religious studies. He speaks Arabic, Somali, and English.
Shaykh Hasan Hersi "Al-Turki" is formerly leader of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI); he goes by the name of "Al-Turki" or "The Turk". Since 2004, Hassan Al-Turki has been designated under US Presidential Executive Order 13224 for terrorist financing.[50]
Shaykh Yusuf Siad Inda'ade (or Inda Ade) served as deputy and financier for Hasan Dahir Aweys. He had been the chief of security of the Islamic Courts.[31] He is controversial for the fact that he was a former warlord who occupied Lower Shabeele in 2003. He later allied himself with the Islamic Courts. The Islamic Courts advanced to central and south Somalia regions, including the Kismayo area, before Inda'ade pledged his support, giving them control of Lower Shabelle region.[51] In December 2006, during the intense fighting with Ethiopia, he was not present and was on pilgrimage in Mecca.
Sheikh Mukhtar Robow who goes by the name of "Abu Mansur", was the deputy chief of security for the Islamic Courts. He had been credited with being instrumental in the victory of the Second Battle of Mogadishu against the ARPCT (CIA-backed warlords). In December 2006, during the intense fighting with Ethiopia, he was not present and was in pilgrimage in Mecca.
Professor Ibrahim Hassan Addow (M.Ed, Ph.D) was the head of foreign affairs department for the ICU. He lived in the United States and worked as an administrator at American University in Washington, D.C., before returning to Somalia in 1999. He is the dean of Benadir University in Mogadishu and had respresented the Islamic courts in its negotiations with the Somali transitional government.[52]
Shaykh Fuad Mohamed Qalaf was the head of the department of youth and education in the ICU. He lived in Sweden for ten years and was an imam at a mosque in Stockholm before returning to Somalia in 2006.[53]
Social policies
The Islamic Courts' original mission was to bring social justice and combat iniquity. However, after capturing Mogadishu, its mission transformed into imposing Sharia law all over Somalia and changing the constitution.
In the year 2000, the courts formed a union of Islamic courts, partly to consolidate resources and power and partly to aid in handing down decisions across, rather than within, clan lines.[20]
In an interview featured in the BBC Online Somali section in June 2006, Sheik Sharif Shaykh Ahmed said "the union of Islamic courts was established to ensure that Somali people suffering for 15 years would gain peace and full justice and freedom from the anarchic rule of warlords who refuted their people to no direction." After capturing Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts had enacted a series of decrees and laws that had temporarily brought hope for Somali expatriates, local minorities and women.
On October 5, 2006 the Islamic Courts had declared the formation of the supreme Islamic Sharia court of Banadir province. The announcement ceremony was attended by all Islamic officials; both consultative and executive councils, intellectuals and civil society members and took place in the former Somalian presidential palace in central Mogadishu. That announcement from the central Islamic Court was destined to end all tribal Islamic Courts in the capital.[30]
On November 17, 2006, the ICU had banned the use, sale and transportation of khat altogether and the Islamic Court of Kismayo banned the sale of cigarettes. This was a controversial move as it was the main source of income for many war widows and orphans and a huge import-export business.
Alleged military support to the ICU
In November 2006, a UN arms monitoring group released information that all groups in Somalia were given logistical support by a dozen countries.[54] Those countries claimed those allegations. These are the allegations documented by the UN monitoring group:
Djibouti: According to that report, the government of Djibouti has provided military uniforms and medicines in support of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). On July 30, 2006, a Djibouti Airlines aircraft landed at an airport in Mogadishu with medicines and military uniforms intended for ICU. The true nature of the cargo was disguised, and it was presented as being from the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti to conceal its origins. After the cargo was unloaded, the aircraft proceeded to Mogadishu's main airport.
Egypt: The government has allegedly provided training in support of ICU. On July 26, 2006, a meeting took place in Mogadishu between officials from ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the residence of ICU finance chief Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. According to the report, the meeting resolved that military training be provided to about 3,800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks, near Bal'ad town, north of Mogadishu.
Eritrea: The Eritrean government allegedly provided at least 28 separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment. It also gave troops and training to the Islamic Courts Union. On April 26, 2006, a shipment of arms destined for ICU consisting of AK-47 assault rifles, PKM machine-guns, RPG-7s and ammunition arrived on a dhow at the seaport of El Ma'an. On May 6, 2006, an Eritrean Antonov military aircraft landed at Dhusamareeb in the Galgaduud region of Somalia. Awaiting the landing were about 75 people, five lorries and two Land Cruisers. The aircraft carried anti-aircraft guns which were loaded onto the lorries. On May 9, 2006, a dhow arrived at the El Ahmed seaport, and on board were fighters from Pakistan and the Oromo Liberation Front of Ethiopia. The fighters remained on the dhow. Five of the 75 people associated with the receipt of the anti-aircraft guns on May 6, 2006, boarded the dhow, along with some of anti-aircraft guns. ICU member Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow", one of the leaders of the Hizbul Shabaab (youth movement), took possession of the arms and military uniforms.
Hezbollah: The Hezbollah movement has been reported to provide military training to ICU and has made arrangements with other states on behalf of ICU for the latter to receive arms. In mid-July 2006, ICU apparently sent about 720 men to Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah against the Israeli military. The Somali force was personally selected by ICU's Hizbul Shabaab (youth movement) leader Aden Hashi Farah "Eyrow." One of the selection criteria was an individual's combat experience, which might include experience in Afghanistan. In exchange for the contribution of the Somali military force, Hezbollah arranged for additional support to be given to ICU by the governments of Iran and Syria.
Iran: The UN monitoring group stated that Iran has provided at least three consignments of arms and ammunition and medical supplies and the services of three medical doctors to ICU. On July 25, 2006, an aircraft containing a shipment of arms arrived at the Baledogle airport and was met by ICU head of the security affairs, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad "Indohaadde," and the chairman of the Dayniile Islamic Court, Sheikh Hussein Janaqow. The UN monitoring team says that the arms shipment consisted of machine guns and M79 grenade launchers. On August 17, 2006, a large dhow containing foods and arms destined for ICU arrived in El-Adde seaport, Mogadishu. The arms consisted of 80 man-portable, shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles and rocket launchers.
Iraq: US-backed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) accused to supplying several Russian made weapon such as AK-47, RPG-7, and sent several Iraqi commandos to Somalia. Some Somalian who were captured by US army in Iraq claim that the Somalia Islamist made the connection with Iraqi government although have good link with Washington.
Libya: Furthermore, the UN monitoring report states that the Libyan government has sent military aircraft to Somalia and has provided training, funds and at least a consignment of arms in support of ICU. On July 24, 2006, a delegation of military officers arrived at the Baledogle airport and on July 26, 2006, participated in a meeting in Mogadishu with ICU officials and visiting Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of ICU finance chief Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. On July 31, 2006, a vessel with arms and foods for ICU docked early in the morning at the seaport of El-Ma'an.
Russia: Russian-made arms were sold to both sides of the conflict in Somalia.
Saudi Arabia: Furthermore, the document states that Saudi Arabia has given logistical support in the form of foodstuff and medicines intended for use by the ICU. On June 11, 2006, a C-130 aircraft left Jazan for the Baledogle airport. But the government said the flight had taken place for "medical" reasons. On August 14, 2006 , seven trucks containing logistical supplies, including foods and ammunition, left Mogadishu for an ICU location in the central regions of Somalia. Accompanying the convoy were 320 ICU fighters sent to reinforce fighters in the central regions.
Syria: On July 27, 2006, 200 ICU fighters were transported by aircraft to Syria for training in guerrilla warfare.
United Arab Emirates: According to the report, the financial support came from the government of United Arab Emirates.
Venezuela: No evidence that Venezuela provided any support but condemned the intervention by Ethiopian and US attack.
Alleged recruitment of Kenyan Muslims
On January 10, 2007, Kenyan North Eastern Provincial Commissioner (PC), Kiritu Wamae revealed the circulation of an intelligence report with the names of up to 4,000 Kenyan Muslim youths who were induced to join the ranks of the Somali Islamic Courts Union's jihad by offers of $400. The majority of the youths were from Garissa district. Scores were killed in the fighting. Others now seeking to return to Kenya may face treason charges. Leaders of the Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslim (Supkem) voiced vehement objections to the PC's allegations, and threatened to hold protests in a week.[55]
Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts
The Islamist militia that now controls Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, has emerged out of a judicial system funded by the powerful business community to try and bring some law and order to a country without a government.
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is the moderate chairman of the courts
But over the past two years, the Union of Islamic Courts has emerged into Somalia's strongest fighting force - forcing the warlords who have controlled the capital for the past 15 years into retreat.
BBC Somali Service editor Yusuf Garaad Omar says they are the most popular political force in the country.
There are 11 autonomous courts in Mogadishu, some of which have periodically tried to clamp down on robbery, drugs and what they say are pornographic films being shown in local video houses.
At first they concentrated on petty crime but by the mid 1990s they had progressed to dealing with major crimes in north Mogadishu.
Thieves had their limbs amputated and murderers were executed.
Mr Garaad says that despite protests from human rights bodies, north Mogadishu residents were pleased to enjoy law and order - in stark contrast to south Mogadishu, where crime was rampant.
The system has since further expanded and the Islamic courts also validated transactions such as the purchase of houses and cars.
They also oversaw weddings and divorces and expanded their authority across most of the capital, while staying out of politics.
"They were really trusted by the people, who had no other institution to go to," Mr Garaad says.
Clan courts
The Islamic courts say they want to promote Islamic law rather than clan allegiance, which has divided Somalis over the past 15 years.
However, all but one of the 11 courts is associated with just one clan - the Hawiye, who dominate the capital, but they are divided into sub-clans.
In order to avoid accusations of clan bias, each court would try members of their own sub-clan, wherever the alleged crime was committed.
Some clan elders in north Mogadishu have now set up their own court, independent of the union.
Al-Qaeda links?
The union's public face is its chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate who sought to assure Somalis and the international community this week that the Islamic Courts were no threat and only wanted order.
Mr Ahmed, 32, is a law graduate from Libya and former secondary school geography teacher.
Many Somalis have turned to Islam during the years of anarchy But the union does contain radical elements.
Two of the 11 courts are seen as militant; one is led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, on an American list of terrorism suspects because he used to head al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which was linked to al-Qaeda.
Mr Aweys says al-Itihaad no longer exists and also denies accusations from some western diplomats and observers that there are training grounds for Islamic fighters in Somalia.
He is, however, strongly critical of the United States and its "war on terror".
Western diplomats are also concerned by Afghanistan-trained militia commander Adan Hashi Ayro, whose militiamen have been implicated in numerous killings of Somali nationals, as well as five foreign aid workers and a BBC producer, Kate Peyton.
Hated
But Somalia is a strongly Islamic country and many people support the courts.
During the years of warfare and anarchy, many Somalis have increasingly turned to their faith for some sort of stability.
Sheikh Aweys denies there are al-Qaeda training camps in Somalia
One visible sign is that before the civil war began in the 1980s, very few women wore headscarves in Mogadishu.
Now, almost every woman wears a headscarf and an increasing number are wearing veils covering their faces, with just narrow slits for the eyes.
Even those Mogadishu residents who are wary of Islamic extremism may welcome a single group being in control of the capital for the first time in 15 years, saying there will at least be some authority.
And most will prefer Islamic preachers to the warlords who have repeatedly fought over and in many cases systematically looted the city since 1991.
BBC Somali analyst Yusuf Garaad Omar says the warlords were hated - even more so because of the widespread belief that they were being backed by the US.
The US has not been well thought of in Somalia since its humanitarian intervention went disastrously wrong - leading to the death of maybe 1,000 Somalis and 18 US troops in 1993.
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm
Terrorism Focus, Volume 3, Issue 23 (June 13, 2006)
Leadership Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts Union
By Fredrick Nzwili
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is viewed as a moderate.
The crisis in Somalia may be entering a new phase. A union of Islamic courts has taken control of the lawless capital, Mogadishu. On June 4, after months of intense fighting, militiamen loyal to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, expelled the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) from Mogadishu. Last week, after pushing the ARPCT warlords out of the capital, the ICU asserted its authority by establishing three new Islamic courts in Mogadishu in areas previously controlled by warlords (Somaliland Times, June 6). They also advanced toward the warlord stronghold of Jowhar, a town 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu, sending fears that Somalia was headed for extremist Muslim leadership.
A fluent Arabic speaker, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is viewed as a moderate belonging to an anti-fundamentalist Sufist group known as Ahl Sunnah wal jama'ah. Ahmed taught Geography, Arabic and Religious Studies at Juba Secondary School before being nominated as the leader of the ICU in 2004. He was born in January 1964 in Chabila, a town in Central Somalia, and educated in universities in Libya and Sudan (Asharq al-Awsat, May 17).
His deputies Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Adan Hashi Ayro, however, are militants who initiated al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), a charity organization—with a militant wing—accused of having links with al-Qaeda. AIAI was responsible for small-scale attacks against Ethiopia in 1996 until Addis Ababa launched cross-border raids and successfully weakened AIAI's operations (Terrorism Monitor, February 19, 2005). Since gaining control of Mogadishu, Ahmed's assurance to the international community that the ICU is against terrorism has reinforced his moderate position. Nevertheless, the West has remained reserved about trusting Ahmed due to the presence of Aweys and Ayro inside Ahmed's faction. According to Ahmed, the courts seek to enable the Somali people to choose their country's destiny, terming the ICU takeover as a popular revolution and a response to years of anarchy and plunder by the warlords. He also clarified that the ICU would not start a Taliban-style system of government.
Traditionally, Somalia has had non-violent Islamic courts. With the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991, however, warlords, clan elders and religious leaders established new forms of authority that aimed at restoring law and order. In 1996, members of AIAI, mainly from south Mogadishu, established a new type of ruling system that refused to acknowledge the warlords' supremacy; additionally, they provided protection to businessmen who had been overtaxed and harassed by various militants. From the outset, the Islamic courts were more popular than the warlords' militias, since the warlords carried out countless kidnappings—while demanding huge ransoms—and partook in numerous killings. In 2004, the separate Islamic courts joined to form the ICU. The members built a joint militia with 400 men and 15 "technicals" (trucks fitted with guns). Presently, Mogadishu has 11 independent Islamic courts, which try and punish crimes under Sharia law. Criminals' limbs are amputated for lesser crimes, while those thought to have committed more serious crimes, such as murder, are executed (each court has a militia that acts as its police force).
Since 2004, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, 61, has appeared as the most powerful and outspoken religious figure in the ICU. According to Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) MP Awad Ashara, Aweys is a former prisons colonel who started preaching in the late 1970s. At the formation of the Joint Islamic Courts Council in 2000—the merging of Mogadishu's independent courts in south Mogadishu—Aweys automatically became the council's secretary general. The merger of the courts' militias raised the largest force in Mogadishu (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue Report, July 2005). After his name appeared on the U.S. list of the most wanted terrorists, however, Aweys disappeared only to resurface in 2004 to run Ifka Halanka, a powerful court in Malka, south Mogadishu.
Aweys' group, AIAI, has been opposed to the TFG since its creation (SomaliNet, September 5, 2005). Around June 2005, Aweys accused the TFG of selling the country to enemies such as Ethiopia, and indicated that he was preparing for war. He had called for jihad, warning that his faction would not be mere spectators in the Somali crisis. Ashara told The Jamestown Foundation that Aweys, who is opposed to "man-made laws" in favor of Sharia, is using the courts for selfish gains. Although Ashara says that Aweys enjoys some support in Mogadishu, he said Aweys could soon face resistance for those opposed to his interpretation of the Sharia courts.
Working with Aweys is Adan Hashi Ayro, a militia commander of one of the courts. He is considered an extremist Muslim and was trained in Afghanistan. He came to the fore following the recent attacks that involved the desecration of Italian cemeteries in Mogadishu and was blamed for killing five Western aid workers and BBC journalist Kate Peyton last year. He is largely viewed as a newcomer on the Somali scene, being mentored by Aweys. Reports in 2005 said that Ayro and Aweys were running camps where religious extremists received military training. The training also included indoctrination into fundamentalist ideology aimed at advocating jihad in Islamic states.
The true nature of the ICU is emerging. They have already closed down makeshift cinemas to prevent people from watching the Soccer World Cup. They have also broken-up groups watching the soccer matches (Daily Nation, June 12). This may be just the beginning. If they continue to clamp down on Somali society, and refuse to be more democratic, they will likely meet increased resistance from the population, making them just as unpopular as the warlords.
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/
Online NewsHour: Update | A Profile of Somalia's Islamic Court
Posted: June 8, 2006
Islamist Control of Mogadishu Raises Concern of Extremist Future for Somalia
Islamic militias that recently took control of the Somali capital Mogadishu after nearly a decade of warlord rule are drawing widespread support among Somali citizens for their efforts to stabilize the troubled nation.
But some Bush administration officials fear the militias could steer Somalia toward Taliban-style Islamic fundamentalism.
"[Our] first concern, of course, would be to make sure that Somalia does not become an al-Qaida safe haven, doesn't become a place from which terrorists plot and plan," President Bush said after learning of the Islamic militias' takeover in the capital.
Analysts watching developments in Somalia, and Somali expatriates, claim the U.S. fear of a fundamentalist regime in a country known for its moderate religious beliefs is unfounded.
"I'm not too concerned that [the Islamic courts] will be able to impose the kind of draconian rules that the Talibans or anybody of that ilk have done to their people," said Abdi Samatar, a geography professor at the University of Minnesota who was born in Somalia, said on the June 6 NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
"What's relatively very refreshing about this group is the fact that they have committed themselves to say that they are not interested in becoming ministers; they are not interested in becoming government, but what they want to do is create the conditions in which the Somali people ... could be able to have determination as to which way they want to go," Samatar said.
The Islamic court system, under which the militias fighting in Mogadishu operate, emerged in the 1990s after rebel warlords seeking to depose former dictator Mohamed Said Bare descended into infighting in the capital and elsewhere. With no national police force to impose law, the warlords turned to the Islamic courts for stability, according to Lee Cassanelli, an historian and Somalia expert at the University of Pennsylvania.
Empowered by clan leaders and the warlords now fighting them, the courts helped resolve disputes within clans, in some cases using Sharia law to execute criminals and cut off the limbs of petty thieves. The clans and warlords provided the courts with armed militias to help enforce their decisions.
"They were vehicles for drawing on the Islamic sheikhs to help mediate internal disputes," said Cassanelli. "Some of them acquired a prestige and respect among the populous because they were seen to be outside of the petty fighting."
In 2000, the courts formed a union of Islamic courts, partly to consolidate resources and power and partly to aid in handing down decisions across, rather than within, clan lines.
Since then, the Islamic Courts Union has come to be seen among Somalia's citizens as the provider of daily services in a continually unstable country.
"The thing that makes the Islamic courts very popular, the areas they control you can walk at night," said one Somali-American, who declined to give his name for fear of reprisals against his family back home. "The areas the warlords control, you can't walk. You can't carry a mobile phone; they'd take it from you. They even can rob you and kill you."
According to diplomats and analysts, the Islamic courts are responsible for the few schools that are open in the capital as well as some hospitals.
Despite this, according to Cassanelli, the United States still does not trust the Islamic Courts Union. "We think they are breeding grounds for terrorists," he said.
Many Somalis are convinced that the CIA has been funding the warlords in their fight against the militias, further boosting support for the Islamic courts because of a growing anti-U.S. sentiment.
Former Clinton administration official John Prendergast, who analyzes Somalia and other African countries for the International Crisis Group, told Reuters evidence suggests the CIA is providing the warlords with up to $150,000 a month in supplies. Others claim the Ethiopian government, working in tandem with the United States across the border, also is sending in truckloads of arms.
While the State Department has neither denied nor admitted to backing the warlords, some officials claim Somali Islamists could be harboring terrorists and blame bombings across the border in Kenya on efforts launched in Mogadishu.
Two militants associated with the courts, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Adan Hashi Ayro, have been accused of heading militias linked to al-Qaida and of carrying out murders against Somali citizens and foreign nationals including BBC producer Kate Peyton, the BBC reported.
"There are no fugitives from al-Qaida or any other organization, as the U.S. and Ethiopian intelligence services are claiming, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, head of the Islamic Courts Union, said in an interview with the Arab daily news service Asharq Alawsat in May.
In June, Ahmed told the BBC's Arabic news service the courts symbolize a "revolution by the Somali people after 16 years of anarchy and killing, plunder and kidnapping."
"This body is not a political one. Rather we want to give power back to the Somali people so it can make its own decisions and decide its own destiny," he said.
Ahmed, who emerged in the late 1990s as a neutral mediator respected by many of Somalia's clans and now seen as a hardliner by Western governments, was appointed head of the Union at its formation and now serves as its chief spokesman.
While he has promised not to steer the country in a fundamentalist direction and to refrain from seeking a post in the government, only time and talks between the Union and the largely ineffective transitional government serving in exile outside the capital, will tell.
"The best resolution that I could see that could work is if the Islamic courts talk to the government, the government comes to Mogadishu and the fear of the American government's involvement is lifted," the Somali expatriate, who did not want to be named, said.
The international community also should step in and take advantage of the lull in violence and the recapture of Mogadishu to help the Somali people, said Samatar.
"[The Islamic Courts] want to invite all the international community to come to Mogadishu and look at every cranny and nook to be able to see if there are terrorists. ... I think we call their bluff and call them on their word," he said.
Cassanelli, who has studied Somalia for 30 years, said he is not as worried as some in the State Department about terrorists taking hold in Somalia and the country turning to religious extremism.
"Somalians are very pragmatic people ... there wasn't this huge new wave of Islamist sentiment, people were just getting fed up with the warlords. Anything's got to be better."
---- By Kristina Nwazota, Online NewsHour
www.pbs.org/newshour
Somalia’s Islamists
Africa Report N°100
12 December 2005
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Somalia’s long civil conflict and lack of central governing institutions present an international security challenge. Terrorists have taken advantage of the state’s collapse to attack neighbouring countries and transit agents and materiel. The country is a refuge for the al-Qaeda team that bombed a Kenyan resort in 2002 and tried to down an Israeli aircraft. Since 2003, Islamist extremists have been linked to murders of Somalis and foreigners. If governments are to counter the limited but real threat of terrorism in or from Somalia, they need to align closer with Somali priorities – the restoration of peace, legitimate and broad-based government, and essential services – and make clear that their counter-terrorism efforts are aimed at a small number of criminals, many of them foreigners, not the Somali population at large.
Somalis in general show little interest in jihadi Islamism; most are deeply opposed. Somali militant movements have failed to gain broad popular support, encountering instead widespread hostility. The most remarkable feature is that Islamist militancy has not become more firmly rooted in what should, by most conventional assessments, be fertile ground.
Nevertheless, since the collapse of the government in 1991, a variety of Islamist reformist movements have sprung up inside the country – some inspired or sponsored by foreign interests. The vast majority are non-violent and opposed to ideological extremism. The largest groups, notably Jama’at al-Tabligh and the Salafiyya Jadiida, practise missionary activism aimed at steering lax Muslims back towards the true path of their faith. A much smaller proportion, including Harakaat al-Islah and Majma’ ‘Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, are politically active but not extremist, struggling rather to influence the future of the Somali state and its political system. By far the smallest reformist groups are those composed of jihadis, such as the now-defunct al-Itihaad al-Islaami and the new, nameless one fronted by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro.
Other, ostensibly Islamist entities have more complex origins and agendas. The Shari’a (Islamic law) courts that have sprung up across southern Somalia over the past decade began as essentially clan-based institutions intended to restore security and order in a stateless society. Attempts to unify and coordinate the court system, however, have been in large part politically motivated, and some courts have been hijacked by jihadi leaders. This kind of cooperation, combined with independent sources of funding, has allowed some courts to exercise greater independence from their clans, and since early 2005, the Shari’a court system in Mogadishu has been pursuing an aggressive political and social agenda.
The growth of courts, charities and businesses with an apparently Islamist character has sparked fears in some circles of a conspiracy to transform Somalia into an Islamic state. In reality, the Islamist activists are a diverse community, characterised more by competition and contradiction than cooperation, making a broad-based conspiracy implausible.
Islamist extremism has failed to take a broader hold in Somalia because of Somali resistance – not foreign counter-terrorism efforts. The vast majority of Somalis desire a government – democratic, broadly-based and responsive – that reflects the Islamic faith as they have practised it for centuries: with tolerance, moderation and respect for variation in religious observance. Ultimately, there is no better way to confront jihadism than to assist Somalis in realising such a government.
That is, of course, more easily said than done. Repeated attempts over the past fifteen years to rebuild the Somali state have ended in failure, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in October 2004 seems determined to repeat past mistakes. Somalia’s international partners must resist the temptation to back one faction of the divided TFG and struggle instead to breathe life into the transitional federal charter, revive the defunct parliament and establish a broadly inclusive government of national unity. Unless they are prepared to take up this complex challenge, they may continue to score victories in their battles against terrorism in the Horn while losing the wider war.
Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2005
http://www.crisisgroup.org/