Somalia comes full circle
2007-08-31 Ethiopia and Eritrea are fighting a proxy war in Somalia. With the US also conducting its global "war on terror" in the same arena, ignoring the more important clan-based realities on the ground in typical Washington fashion, Somali citizens are caught in the crossfire of the worst violence they have seen in 17 years of chaos and anarchy.
Against the backdrop of the closing ceremony of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, the capital Mogadishu has been at a standstill since 29 August. Security is tight and few, if any, cars can be seen on the streets. Somali and Ethiopian troops are at every street corner with their fingers on the triggers of their Kalashnikovs. Explosions and gunshots continued throughout the 29th and 30th , according to an ISA representative in the city.
While the US is fighting what it views as another front in the "war on terror," the conflict in Somalia is in reality about local clan-based rivalries and a struggle for regional predominance, particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
In December 2006 and January 2007, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to support the interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was struggling to push back Islamist rebels from the capital, Mogadishu, which they had seized last year.
In January, the TFG, backed by the US, the UN and, more tangibly, Ethiopian forces retook control of Mogadishu from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and the violence since then has escalated markedly, resulting in hundreds of deaths and the displacement of an estimated 400,000 people.
Though the ICU was theoretically disbanded, its extreme elements established a coalition of insurgent groups that have launched a wave of attacks on Ethiopian and TGF forces in the capital. That coalition is believed to include the ICU's Al-Shabaab militia. What essentially happened when the Ethiopian and Western-backed TFG retook control of Mogadishu was that the dissolved ICU's leadership was returned to clansmen.
"The Court's defeat signals the return of clan-based politics to southern Somalia. Whereas the Courts drew their support predominately from the Hawiye clan, the TFG is widely perceived as dominated by Darod clan interests. TFG leaders reinforced this perception by pursuing policies that further alienated the Hawiye clan […] Hawiye alienation and TFG inadequacies left a vacuum into which the Courts expanded between June and December 2006, bringing a degree of peace and security unknown to the south for more than fifteen years […] Communities seemed prepared to tolerate a strict interpretation of Sharia law in return for peace and security," according to a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) think tank.
"Politically, Somalia has now been returned roughly to where it was when the TFG was formed in October 2004. The government is weak, unpopular and faction ridden, and the power vacuum in southern Somalia is rapidly being filled by the same faction leaders and warlords the Courts overthrew less than a year ago," the report continued.
In March and April, Ethiopian forces launched two major offensives in Mogadishu, leaving a trail of insurgent and civilian casualties in their wake.
Chiming in, the US conducted air strikes in January on targets in southern Somalia and in June in northeastern Puntland - the first US military involvement in the country since 1994. Those attacks were aimed at international terrorists who are believed to have sought shelter with ICU elements in those regions.
According to Terrence Lyon, Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Al-Shabaab is an extremist group largely composed of Somali youth, many of them diaspora from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and even Canada who "became very radicalized in the last decade or so and have gone back to Somalia to carry out what they would call jihadist activities in Somalia."
"There are not that many of them, hundreds perhaps. They are quite violent; they are engaging in roadside bombs. It is very difficult for the government in Mogadishu to expand its own authority beyond a very small area. There are these enemies that are created by the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia and its inability to withdraw," Lyon was quoted as saying in a 22 August article published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
Proxy war, regional rivalries
Ethiopian and Eritrean denials that they are fighting a proxy war in Somalia ring hollow (even a cursory glance at the facts on the ground and the two countries historical rivalries are enough to make an educated deduction here) and US military intervention in the name of the "war on terror" is both narrow-minded and dangerous.
From 1998 to 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody border war that resulted in a border commission awarding a symbolic town in the border region, Badme, to Eritrea. However, Ethiopia, feeling empowered with its new status as a US ally in the "war on terror," has failed to comply with the agreement, and Washington has not found it politic to pressure it to do so. Eritrea, of course, holds the US responsible for the failure to resolve the border issue.
"That leads Eritrea to be frustrated and one manifestation of that frustration is that Eritrea began to support anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia and within Ethiopia. And Ethiopia sends its troops into Somalia, in part, because it sees Somalia as a link to the Eritrean threat. Either way, Eritrea worries about Ethiopia so much that Eritrea will use Somalia to send insurgents into Ethiopia until Ethiopia is able to do something about it," Lyon told the CFR.
Eritrea has also reacted by targeting US diplomats in Asmara, arresting US Foreign Service personnel and opening diplomatic pouches for inspection. The US has responded to this - as well as to apparent evidence that Eritrea has been providing Islamic forces in Somalia with military aid - by threatening to place Eritrea on its list of state sponsors of terrorists. Last month, a UN monitoring group said massive shipments of arms, including surface-to-air missiles were making their way from Eritrea to Somalia. Eritrea denies those accusations. The UN report also criticized actions by Ethiopian troops in Somalia, accusing them of using white phosphorous bombs that killed both insurgents and civilians in Mogadishu in April.
These threats emanating from Washington come on the heels of a damning Human Rights Watch report, accusing all sides of committing war crimes in Somalia.
Ethiopia is also keen to solve its problems in the Ogaden, a predominately Somali-populated region of Ethiopia where clans such as the Sheikhal, Hawiye and Marehan are fighting for secession from Ethiopia under the "Greater Somalia" concept. Ethiopia has stepped up attacks in the region, as has the Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front, which Somali clans call a liberation movement and Ethiopia dubs a terrorist group.
While Ethiopia focuses on the extremist elements of the ICU's connections to Eritrea, the US focuses on the ICU extremists' alleged connections to al-Qaida.
"The United States characterizes itself as a strategic partner to Ethiopia but then becomes implicated or connected to regional rivalries. When Ethiopia engages in conflicts in Somalia or in the Ogaden right now, it often causes as a consequence an alienation of many of the Somali people, increasing recruitments of anti-American Islamist groups, and in that way complicates Washington’s global war on terrorism," the CFR quoted Lyon as saying.
Widespread abuses
None of the parties appear be making a significant effort to distinguish between enemy combatants and innocent civilians, who are being used as human shields by the insurgents against Ethiopian forces, who have little if any regard for what or whom they are targeting.
"Since the major fighting ended in April, Ethiopian and Somali government forces have routinely violated the rights of civilians on the streets of Mogadishu," Human Rights Watch said in a press release accompanying the release of its 113-page report on 13 August. "Effective counterterrorism can only be built on respect for basic rights and an end to impunity for serious crimes."
"Ethiopian, Somali and insurgent forces are all responsible for rampant violations of the laws of war in Mogadishu, causing massive suffering for the civilian population," the press release said.
Insurgents, in their almost daily attacks on Ethiopian and TFG forces in the capital, have launched numerous mortar attacks from the city's populated residential neighborhoods. According to Human Rights Watch, insurgents have indiscriminately fired mortar rounds into civilian areas, deployed forces in densely populated neighborhoods, targeted civilian and TFG officials for assassination and summarily executed and mutilated those it has captured.
Ethiopian forces, HRW said, have indiscriminately bombarded heavily populated areas of Mogadishu with rockets, mortars and artillery. "Its troops on several occasions specifically targeted hospitals and looted them of desperately needed medical equipment," the group alleged. HRW also documented cases of Ethiopian forces "deliberately shooting and summarily executing civilians."
"Somali transitional government forces played a secondary role to the Ethiopian military, but failed to provide effective warnings to civilians in combat zones, looted property, impeded relief efforts for displaced people, and mistreated dozens of people detained in mass arrests," according to the HRW report.
Ethiopian offensives in March and April targeting these insurgent strongholds – situated in the midst of civilian populations - with rockets, mortars and artillery resulted in hundreds of innocent deaths, according to the HRW investigation.
Reconciliation
A National Reconciliation Conference was launched earlier this summer, but little, if any, progress has been made. The conference was purportedly intended to work towards unity and to include groups that are not represented in the current interim government, such as the alienated Hawiye clan.
Without the Hawiye clan's participation, little progress can be made because of is massive influence in the country.
"It's [the Hawiye clan] a large clan and can really be a spoiler if you choose a government that does not recognize their interests," Lyon told the CFR. "Also, you have to include elements of the Islamic Courts. The Islamic Courts certainly did have some elements that were quite radical and were tied to international Islamic movements like al-Qaida, but it also had a large number of local leaders and moderate Islamists who simply saw the Islamic Courts as a vehicle to build law and order in their communities. The question is whether those more moderate elements can be split off from the more violent elements to build a broader-based government."
"The process of reconciliation has been extremely difficult and very slow to move ahead. It will require a power-sharing agreement, which means the leaders of the current Transitional Federal Government will have to give some of their power to those they regard as their enemies," Lyon said. "That's a very difficult outcome to arrive at. In Eritrea, some of the Transitional Federal Government leaders from Somalia who are anti-Ethiopian have organized themselves in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, opposing this reconciliation process and the Ethiopian role in Somalia. So, you can see how the Ethiopian-Eritrea rivalry complicates the search for a peace in Somalia."
The current violence could precipitate a type of anarchy and chaos that will be devastating even for Somalia - which has not had a functioning government since 1991 - if the international community fails to intervene in an appropriate manner.
The TFG must make moves to cement its legitimacy, firstly by looking to replace Ethiopian forces with international troops. The pubic does not accept the Ethiopian occupation of their country, and no government supporting this option will succeed. It must also take a sincere step towards reconciliation by including Hawiye and other alienated clans that have the power to make unity a reality. In return, those clans must move to subdue their extremist elements and push their moderate leaders to the forefront in the name of peace.
Finally, the US must re-evaluate is dangerously narrow purview of the conflict as a stage on the global "war on terror" and intervene in a way that recognizes the clan-based realities on the ground - realities that have much more to do with territorial control than with jihad. It must also balance its relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea in a way that ensures that this proxy war, being fought with Somali citizens caught in the crossfire, does not escalate to a region-wide conflict that would only serve to strengthen existing jihadi elements.
http://isaintel.com/site/index.php?
BBC, 1 September 2007
Ethiopia 'blocking MSF in Ogaden'
By Martin Plaut
Aid agencies say roads have been closed
International aid agency Medecins Sans Frontiers has accused Ethiopia of denying it access to the country's eastern Ogaden region. The barren region has recently been the scene of a fierce conflict between government troops and rebel forces.
The exclusion follows an order to the Red Cross to stop operations in Ogaden.
The rebels accuse the government of imposing a blockade and creating what they described as a man-made famine. Ethiopia denies imposing no-go zones.
UN mission
Ogaden, stretching eastwards from the Ethiopian highlands deep into Somalia, is known as Region Five by the Ethiopian government.
A conflict has been raging in the area since April, when fighters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a Chinese-run exploration team, killing 74 people.
The ONLF, which draws its support from Somali clans, accuses the authorities of imposing a blockade on five districts, choking off commercial trade.
Aid agencies say roads have been closed. Prices are reported to have risen sharply.
An unpublished report by one aid organisation shows that local people produce only a quarter of the food they need, trading their livestock to pay for the rest.
Locals say that the Ethiopians are now escorting some government authorised traders into the area, but there are fears that villagers accused of supporting the rebels may not get access to the food.
Some contraband trade is getting through, on the backs of donkeys, but not in very large quantities.
The UN is now deeply concerned, and has published a map showing the areas of fighting.
It includes areas described as being under a commercial food embargo and one area in which villagers are being forcibly relocated, though the government denies imposing any no-go zones.
A UN team - which is now in the region - should throw more light on what is taking place, if they can have unrestricted access to areas of conflict.
Ethiopia, Somalia: Reconciliation Conferences and Threats
August 30, 2007
http://www.stratfor.com/
The Somalian government's reconciliation conference ended Aug. 30 in Mogadishu, yielding contradictory reports on how helpful the conference was toward achieving reconciliation.
By contrast, a rival peace conference to be held the weekend of Sept. 1 in Eritrea will produce one certainty: Leading Somalian Islamists will threaten Ethiopia once more, which will force Addis Ababa to continue its intervention in Somalia in order to pre-empt that threat.
The rival reconciliation conference to be held in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, will involve Somalians from the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC), which controlled much of southern and central Somalia until Ethiopia's December 2006 intervention. Participants including Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, a political leader of the SICC, probably will criticize the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, likely demanding Addis Ababa withdraw its forces or face renewed war. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the militant head of the SICC who spoke up earlier the week of Aug. 26 for the first time in several months, probably also will criticize the Ethiopian government though with greater vehemence. Aweys said Somalians are naturally able to reconcile without external meddling, and included a loose threat calling on his Islamist forces to fight what he describes as the Ethiopian occupiers.
Regardless of the progress or lack thereof by Somalia's transitional government toward peace and reconciliation, the Ethiopian government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi will perceive the statements and demands made by the SICC exiles -- particularly Ahmed and Aweys -- participating in the Asmara conference as clear national security threats. Addis Ababa will furthermore not take kindly to these demands and threats originating in the Eritrean capital. Ethiopia already has a very tense relationship with Eritrea, which it accuses of directly supporting anti-Addis Ababa insurgents in Somalia and inside Ethiopia.
During the upcoming Asmara conference, the SICC exiles could very well talk of the law and order and religious observances they intended to bring -- and could bring back -- to Somalia in 2006. But threats by Ahmed and Aweys of renewed war with Ethiopian forces in Somalia will force Ethiopia to redouble its efforts in Somalia to defeat its enemies, whom it would fully expect to take aim at Ethiopian targets in Ethiopia should the Islamists ever regain control in Somalia. Absent Ethiopian forces operating in Somalia and given the transitional federal government's security weaknesses and perceived lack of popular legitimacy under Somalian President Abdullahi Yusuf, the danger of a return to power of the SICC -- which has been dispersed but not defeated -- remains clear and present.
Eritrea: President Isaias Dismisses As Baseless Anti-Eritrea Accusation By U.S. State Department Officials
Shabait.com (Asmara) 31 August 2007. Asmara
President Isaias Afwerki dismissed as baseless anti-Eritrea accusation by U.S. State Department officials, and underscored that it emanates from the failed strategy they pursued in Somalia.
The President made the remarks in an interview with Aljezeera TV yesterday. He pointed out that so-called talks that "Eritrea is supporting the Islamic Courts Union" is astonishing when viewed against claims that "the ICU has been destroyed and wiped out." President Isaias further indicated that the US State Department officials are resorting to such unfounded allegation and defamation in a futile bid to justify the mistakes they had committed.
Pointing out that the situations in Somalia is the outcome of US open invasion and intervention through its mercenary agent, the Ethiopian regime, he underscored that if the desired target is to enable the Somali people reconstitute their country, the UN should play its due role.
As regards the Eritrea-Ethiopia border issue, President Isaias noted that the issue had reached legal conclusion through the Boundary Commission's final and binding ruling in accordance with the Algiers Agreement of 2002. He went on to explain that the implementation of the ruling has been hindered for the past 5 years due to non-compliance of the TPLF regime and those who prop it up.
In reference to the meeting organized by the Boundary Commission that is scheduled to take place in The Hague on September 6, the President stressed that provided the implementation of the ruling is carried out in its legality, there would be no issue for new crisis between the two countries.
On relief aid, President Isaias said that "we will request aid when needed, but we will not accept any party that tries to enforce it on us." He elaborated that Eritrea is currently exerting vigorous efforts to achieve food security.
The President said that for the US to ensure its strategic interests in any part of the globe, it should be through fostering civilized and constructive relations, as well as mutual respect and positive engagement, and not through threat and intimidation. In this regard, he reminded the US to mend its behavior.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200709010032.html
“U.S. Will Declare Eritrea as State Sponsor of Terrorism”, says US Assistant Secretary of State
Aug 31 2007. Daya Gamage – Asian Tribune
Washington, D.C. 01 September (Asiantribune.com): “The immediate thing that has raised the focus on U.S.-Eritrea relations is the United States has evidence that the Eritreans have been providing military assistance to the Islamic Courts in Somalia, to groups the United States regards as affiliated with al-Qaeda, to groups that are attacking Ethiopia, the U.S. strategic partner in the region. So the United States has ratcheted up the pressure to say “Eritrea, you must stop this assistance you’re providing to these groups that the United States regards as terrorists in the Horn of Africa,” was what Terrance Lyons, Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution, George Mason University told in an interview with Council on Foreign Relations.
In the face of earnest US threat to add Eritrea to the list of states sponsoring terrorists as announced in a briefing two weeks ago by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer made some critical observations of Eritrea.
The assistant secretary indicated that the United States government is likely to declare Eritrea as a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’.
The Bush administration is preparing a case to designate Eritrea a "state sponsor of terrorism" for its alleged support of al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militants in Somalia, the top U.S. diplomat for Africa said August 17 press briefing in Washington.
Officials are now compiling evidence of Eritrean backing for the extremists to support the designation, a rare move that would impose severe sanctions on the impoverished nation and put it in the same pariah category as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, said Jendayi Frazer, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs.
"We have to put together the case against them, that information is being collected right now," Frazer said. "The information so far that we've collected is fairly convincing about their activities in terms of 'state sponsor' of terrorism."
Frazer, speaking at a briefing called to discuss deteriorating relations between the United States and the increasingly authoritarian country, said Washington agreed with a recent report by U.N. experts that found Eritrea to be the primary source of weapons and cash for Islamist insurgents in Somalia.
"We do have intelligence that affirms what's in the monitoring report," she said, adding that while the information is being collected Eritrea has a chance to change its behavior and avoid the designation. "What we cannot tolerate is their support for terror activity, particularly in Somalia."
The U.N. report says the Islamist insurgents in Somalia have enough surface-to-air missiles, suicide vests and explosives to sustain their war against the internationally backed Somali government, largely due to secret shipments from Eritrea.
It says Eritrea has shipped a "huge quantity of arms" to the insurgents, known as the Shabab. The shipments continued despite U.N. efforts to bring peace to Somalia and the deployment of African Union peacekeepers.
The "state sponsor of terrorism" designation is rarely used and represents a near death sentence for diplomatic relations with the United States. Those on the list are banned from receiving all non-emergency U.S. aid and subject to a host of financial sanctions. It also penalizes people, firms and third countries that engage in trade with designees.
Earlier this month, the State Department ordered the closure of Eritrea's consulate in Oakland, Calif., in retaliation for curbs placed on U.S. diplomats in Eritrea.
In a report prepared by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee last December it was alleged that Eritrean government was providing direct assistance to Sri Lanka’s separatist Tamil Tiger rebels.
Professor Lyons continued to analyze the situation saying: “U.S.-Eritrea relations are at as low a level as you can imagine. Rhetoric coming out of Asmara and the statements coming from the U.S. State Department are similarly very, very tough. Eritrea’s public statements indicate they hold the United States responsible for Ethiopia not implementing the peace agreement that would award Eritrea the symbolically important town of Badme to its side of the border. The Ethiopia-Eritrea border commission had awarded Eritrea with Badme. Ethiopia has been reluctant to comply with that border agreement. Eritrea thinks the United States, which was a guarantor of this agreement, should compel Ethiopia to adhere to it. It’s difficult to compel Ethiopia for starters and, second of all, the United States has multiple interests with the Ethiopians and is reluctant to do so.
“So Eritrea is enormously angry with the United States for that reason and has responded with some quite outrageous behavior, such as insisting on opening U.S. diplomatic pouches and arresting U.S. Foreign Service Nationals who work at the embassy in Asmara. Of course, it is extremely difficult for the United States not to respond. Those problems have been around for a couple of years.
“The immediate thing that has raised the focus on U.S.-Eritrea relations is the United States has evidence that the Eritreans have been providing military assistance to the Islamic Courts in Somalia, to groups the United States regards as affiliated with al-Qaeda, to groups that are attacking Ethiopia, the U.S. strategic partner in the region. So the United States has ratcheted up the pressure to say “Eritrea, you must stop this assistance you’re providing to these groups that the United States regards as terrorists in the Horn of Africa.”
Terrence Lyons, Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University in an interview with the US-based Council on Foreign Relations described the U.S. policy as it stands right now in this manner, and how the U.S. view Eritrea:
“The United States regards Ethiopia as a strategic partner, particularly in relation to the so-called global war on terrorism, and it is not hard to understand why. If you look at the region, [the United States] has tremendous problems with Sudan, and it has relations with Eritrea that are about as bad as they can be. Obviously, the United States can’t have a strategic partner with a government in Somalia while Somalia struggles to organize itself. Djibouti, with which the United States has good relations and has built military facilities in, is tiny and is never going to be the pillar around which the United States builds a regional strategy. So Ethiopia is it. In particular, Ethiopia and the United States share a common concern about the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia. The United States linked the ICU to al-Qaeda, while Ethiopia saw the ICU as being linked to its rivals in Eritrea. When in late 2006 and early 2007 the Ethiopians moved into Mogadishu, the United States was very pleased and saw that as a victory in the war on terrorism.”
- Asian Tribune -
http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/7201
UN on fact-finding mission in Ethiopia's Ogaden region
08/30/07
ADDIS ABABA (AFP)
A United Nations fact-finding mission on Thursday left for Ethiopia's eastern Ogaden region where the government is battling insurgents amid reports of human rights abuses, an official said.
The UN Development Programme director Ethiopia Sam Barnes said the UN inter-agency mission will "undertake assessments" in the region for one week.
"It will be looking at the potential humanitarian impacts the region may have faced as a result of the violence," Barnes told AFP in Addis Ababa.
The region, bordering lawless Somalia, has been under close scrutiny since June when the army launched a crackdown against Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels.
Human rights groups have accused the Ethiopian army of razing villages and displacing thousands of civilians in the region in the clampdown that followed an April attack on a Chinese oil venture in which 77 people, including nine Chinese nationals, were killed.
The ONLF claimed responsibility for the attack.
The rebel group has accused Addis Ababa of a trade blockade on the region and crimes against humanity, notably on civilians it accuses of hiding rebel fighters.
The ONLF, formed in 1984, is fighting for the independence of ethnic Somalis in Ogaden, saying they have been marginalised by Addis Ababa.
The group was part of Ethiopia's transition government from 1991 to 1995, after the fall of the Marxist regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
But after numerous disputes, it quit and started fighting for the creation of an independent state to be called Oromia[SIC*].
Ogaden, an arid area in the Somali state of Ethiopia, is believed to be contain large quantities of oil and natural gas, but rebel activities have scuppered efforts to carry out conclusive exploration.
http://nazret.com/
UN to examine needs, violence in Ethiopia's Ogaden
ADDIS ABABA (Reuters - 08/29/07) - The United Nations plans to send a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia's Ogaden region where separatist rebels who killed 74 people in an April attack say they are facing the toughest government crackdown in years.
The mission to assess allegations made by the rebels and rights groups of human rights abuses as well as the food, water and health needs of Ogaden's ethnic Somalis is expected to start on August 30.
"It is my hope that the findings of this assessment mission will construct a clearer picture of the humanitarian situation in the region," U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Fidele Sarassoro said in a statement on Wednesday.
"Equally important to us is that the findings of this mission also support the delivery of assistance to the people of the Somali region."
The remote region bordering Somalia has come under growing scrutiny since the government began a campaign two months ago to flush out Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels after they carried out one of their bloodiest attacks on a Chinese-run oil exploration field in April.
Rights groups accuse the military of burning homes, seizing livestock and shooting civilians in its hunt for the ONLF, which wants more autonomy for the area, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas.
The ONLF says a trade blockade is choking food supplies and causing starvation in the region inhabited mostly by nomadic herders estimated to number between four to 10 million.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi calls the ONLF terrorists and says they are funded by neighbour and arch-foe Eritrea. He has repeatedly asserted his right to ensure security throughout the vast Horn of Africa country of 81 million.
The ONLF welcomed the mission saying it was a first step to addressing the "manmade humanitarian catastrophe" in Ogaden.
"We call on the United Nations not to limit the scope of this mission to a humanitarian assessment but to include a preliminary investigation of war crimes being committed against our people by the current ... regime," it said in a statement.
The mission will include staff from the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and the agencies dealing with child welfare, food and health.
Somalia: The need to brake an escalating situation
Written by DO, Aug 28, 2007
When Ethiopian troops defeated Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu last December and January, it looked like a cakewalk. But since then the armed opposition to Ethiopia's presence in Somalia - and to their Somali allies - has grown. In April 2007, Mogadishu was hit by the heaviest fighting in fifteen years.
Getting reliable information from Somalia is difficult and dangerous. But a clear pattern has emerged of serious violations, including indiscriminate use of heavy weapons in densely populated civilian areas and obstruction of humanitarian assistance to displaced, injured and vulnerable civilians.
Since fighting dramatically escalated at the end of March, hundreds of civilians have been killed and at least 300,000 displaced, according to United Nations estimates. Many of those forced to flee are living in desperate circumstances without sufficient food, water, shelter or medical supplies, easy prey to extortion and abuse by the warring parties.
Such a dramatic situation needs to be denounced by the African Union (AU). The ‘‘Irakisation process’’ of Somalia constitutes a real treath to the Eastern Africa region and to the African continent at large. More than a duty, there is a moral obligation for African to address this escalating situation.
Abuses have been perpetrated by all sides in this complex situation: Ethiopian forces, Ethiopia's Somali allies in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and those resisting the Ethiopian intervention, including militias loyal to the Hawiye clan and groups aligned to the ICU.
As tension is getting more and more dangerous, arbitrary detentions and unlawful renditions of individuals of interest has became the order of the day. With Kenyan cooperation, Ethiopia has rounded up scores of "terrorism suspects" who fled the initial Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 2006-January 2007.
The current western-backed Ethiopian approach to Somalia will lead to a mountain of civilian deaths and a litany of abuses. This policy risk precipitated to exactly the sort of human rights disaster in Somalia as the one the West rightly condemns in Darfur. This approach will only strengthen the hand of the extremist minority in Somalia, handing al-Qaida another potential theatre of militant action, and another opportunity to present themselves internationally as defenders of Islam against western aggression.
Washington, London and Brussels are in a blind alley in Somalia. They should rethink a policy which is encouraging serious abuses, and come up with one which prioritises the protection of civilians. They should start by issuing a clear call to all sides in this conflict to observe and uphold the rules of war and human rights standards. In such a context, Africa has indeed a role to play by finding a third way that can really salvage Somalia.
http://www.observer.gm/
Islamist fighters behind attacks on Ethiopia forces in Somalia: Aweys
MOGADISHU, Somalia Aug 27 (Garowe Online) - The most influential Islamic leader in Somalia, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, told Voice of America's Somali service on Monday that the solution to the Somali crisis will come only after Ethiopian troops leave the country.
"The land has been invaded by an enemy who has captured [it] and is killing the people, displacing [the people]," Sheikh Aweys said, referring to Ethiopian forces who deployed into southern Somalia earlier this year to support the fledgling interim government there.
He condemned the international community's silence on the "Ethiopian invasion" of Somalia. "We do not see anyone in the world talking about the mass displacement [of civilians]," Aweys said during the VOA interview.
The Islamist chief refused to acknowledge the legitimacy and authority of the interim government, which he accused of being "created and used by the enemy."
"They [government] have no power here," said Aweys.
He dismissed widespread accusations that Islamist fighters leading the Mogadishu insurgency are responsible for daily attacks on civilians, but admitted that the "muqaawama," believed to be composed of Islamist gunmen, continues to stage attacks on Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu and other parts of the country.
"They [Ethiopians] commit attacks and blame the muqaawama," Aweys said. "The attacks [on civilians] are carried out by the invading enemy who kill people whenever they are attacked, they launch missiles, open fire indiscriminately," he said, adding that Islamist fighters "know the enemy and where the enemy is."
Aweys, who declined to mention where he is, said the solution to the Somali crisis is "very simple."
"The invaders must leave. Somalis are a people who can understand each other, who know each other, who are relatives, one family that does not even need intervention," he said.
Speaking about the Islamic Courts' role in the Ethiopian intervention, Aweys said: "Somalia was invaded because of Islam hate, not because Somali people could not agree [among themselves]."
Aweys justified controversial comments made in December 2006 by Yusuf Indha Ade, defense secretary under the then-ruling Islamic Courts movement.
"He [Indha Ade] was at the frontline of the war when he said this," Aweys said in reference to Indha Ade's declaration of "jihad" on Ethiopia and his threat to attack Addis Ababa.
Sheikh Aweys said Indha Ade's comments did not reflect Islamist policy and that such comment is not enough to say he attracted war.
Ethiopia: A Simple Life?
by Jed Stevenson . 08/27/2007
It’s been two months since I arrived in Ethiopia. It may be another two years before I leave.
What am I doing here? I am engaged in a long rite of passage, the equivalent of the Aboriginal walkabout — a period of voluntary exile, after which (supposedly) I will return to my former home a wiser and more adult person.
For anthropology graduate students, this is a normal part of our education. I have visited Ethiopia several times before, and each time I was taken aback by the suffering and the poverty. I have learned to expect melancholy and depression upon arrival in the country. But this time, I feel an overwhelming sense of well-being.
It’s a matter of perspective. While I pity the plight of many of the people around me, I’m also reminded of my relative prosperity, health and opportunity. If you ever feel like you’ve gotten a raw deal from life, take a trip to Ethiopia.
My happiness can also be attributed to being sheltered from the Western media. In the United States, I feel obliged to follow the news, almost to the point of obsession.
But Ethiopia has only one TV station, and the Internet is available via dial-up at speeds ranging from slow to glacial. The radio and newspapers are the main source of news, and they report largely on national issues. My life in Ethiopia is simpler.
But national news is far from uplifting. Although the rains have been good this year, the specter of famine still haunts Ethiopia. The country occupies a disadvantageous position in the global trade system, and the absence of democracy and freedom of expression at home make parts of Ethiopia vulnerable to famine even when there are bumper crops elsewhere. Since national elections were held in Ethiopia in 2005, half a dozen newspapers have been shut down for criticizing the government.
Last month, the Africa correspondent for The New York Times, Jeffrey Gettleman, was expelled from Ethiopia for interviewing members of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a militia group fighting for the independence of the ethnically Somali part of Ethiopia. (Gettleman did not respond to an e-mail for this article.) The Ethiopian army is also fighting a protracted war in neighboring Somalia, which it invaded with American support at the end of 2006.
Despite these problems, many Ethiopians are maintaining a stoic attitude. They have lived through decades of authoritarian rule, have been mobilized to fight wars on their own turf and have seen their country remapped and rebranded, as when Eritrea gained its independence and a nominally socialist government gave way to a nominally liberal-democratic one in 1991. This history gives them a different perspective on the news than most Americans.
Where Americans are alarmist, Ethiopians are skeptical. While their government plays along with the U.S. in the so-called war on terror as a means of obtaining badly needed foreign aid, most Ethiopians know that terror is as likely to be deployed against them by their own government as by shadowy networks of malcontents.
Spending some time in a country internationally renowned for poverty, suffering and conflict has its upside. It protects against the tendency to paranoid speculation and status anxiety that so afflicts American culture, it helps sharpen one’s ability to distinguish real problems from phony ones and it serves as a reminder that we must count our blessings.
Jed Stevenson is an anthropology graduate student from Colchester, England. He is studying in Ethiopia for the next two years.
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http://www.fews.net/ethiopia
ETHIOPIA Food Security Update August 2007
- Current restrictions on trade and movement in Somali Region could lead to a humanitarian crisis among pastoral and agropastoral populations in Warder Zone, Korahe Zone and parts of Fik, Degehabur and Gode Zones, if restrictions are not lifted or if food aid is not provided.
- Food insecurity in the lowlands of Oromiya region could deteriorate into a humanitarian emergency in the second half of 2007 if sufficient food aid is not provided,especially during the current hunger period (June to September).
Food security summary
A three-week, multi–agency, mid-season Belg/Gu assessment, conducted in Ethiopia’s Belg cropping and pastoral areas found that:
- The performance of Belg rains was very poor in the lowlands of southern Tigray region, the only Belg crop-producing zone in the region. Belg rains were relatively better in Tigray’s highlands. Production deficits in southern Tigray are covered by the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).
Additional assistance is, therefore, not needed.
- In Amhara region, the Belg rains performed well in the eastern parts of North and South Wello zones. However, Belg rains were reported to be below normal in the western parts of these zones. The overall performance of the Belg rains in Oromiya and North Shewa zones of Amhara Region was also reported to be below normal, leading to stunted crop growth, poor seed formation and reduced yield. Because Belg crops represent up to 80 percent of total production in parts of North Wello, South Wello and North Shewa zones, poor Belg crop performance in these areas could lead to up to nine months of food deficit. In addition to the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) beneficiaries in these areas, people requiring emergency food assistance beginning in August due to the poor performance of the Belg season have also been identified.
Figure 1. Percentage of population needing humanitarian
assistance in 2007 (Emergency + PSNP)
Data source: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) and
Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB).
- In Oromiya region, the late start, poor distribution and early cessation of rains led to a very poor Belg performance in the lowlands of Borena, Guji, Arsi, East Shewa, East Haraghe and West Hararghe zones. Production of maize, haricot beans, wheat, barley and teff crops in these areas was very poor or failed. Food security in the lowlands of these zones is particularly worrying, as the poor 2007 Belg season is compounded by the poor 2006 Kiremt (June to September) rains these areas received. Most of these areas are also chronically food insecure and are being supported through the PSNP. However, the number of PSNP beneficiaries is reported to be below the actual number of those in need of assistance, and additional emergency needs were identified during Meher (November) 2006 assessment. Emergency food assistance was not provided, however. Poor performance of these two seasons, coupled with insufficient assistance, has led to the implementation of extreme coping strategies, including sale of draft oxen, renting out of farmland and increased wild food consumption in some of these areas.
- Belg rains were normal to above normal in Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s (SNNP) region, with some heavy rainfall in parts of the region in April and May causing water logging of crops, landslides and flooding. The 2007 Belg season is considered as one of the best in SNNP Region in terms of crop performance, except in those areas affected by flooding and landslide. These areas require immediate emergency food assistance.
- In some areas of the predominantly pastoral Afar region, the onset of the March to May Sugum rains was very late, insufficient in amount and erratic in distribution. Livestock in these areas were reported to have emaciated body conditions and low productivity, significantly decreasing their marketability and jeopardizing pastoral livelihoods.
Employment of extreme coping strategies, including slaughtering of calves to protect mothers, and the death of between 5 and 10 percent of livestock was reported in Chifra, Mile, Ewa and Awra woredas. Serious water shortages were also reported in Elidar woreda of Zone 1, Dallol and Berhale woredas of Zone 2 and Yalo and Teru woredas of Zone 4.
- Asaita, Dupti, Afambo and Kuneba woredas and most parts of zone 3 in Afar region received better Sugum rains during the season. With the start of the Karma (July to September) rains, availability of water and pasture has improved, allowing for improvements in the physical condition and productivity of livestock and contributing to an overall
improvement of food security in these areas.
Based on the findings of the Belg assessment, an estimated 830,000 people in Afar, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP regions require emergency food assistance through the end of the year. Of this total, 650,000 people are in Oromiya region alone. Official beneficiary estimate is expected to be released with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency’s (DPPA) Belg appeal.
Similar to the Meher assessment figures, Belg figures will be used for resource mobilization and contingency planning purposes. Actual needs will be determined on a case-by-case basis, through verification assessments. Areas in Oromiya region are of particularly serious concern because most of the people identified as requiring assistance during the Meher season did not receive it. As June to September is the typical hunger period for most people in these areas, provision of
immediate assistance is critical to prevent further deterioration of food security. Taking more time to conduct another verification assessment will exacerbate the already very poor food security situation.
Seasonal progress
Meher season production, which contributes between 90 and 95 percent of the nation’s total crop production, relies upon the major June to September Kiremt rains. These Kiremt rains are also important for the regeneration of pasture and water in the northeastern pastoral region. The onset of the Kiremt rains was timely, and rains were well-distributed in most western and south western parts of the country. These areas have also received adequate 2007 Belg rains, with some parts of South Omo zone of SNNP Region and parts of Amhara and Afar Regions flooding due to the heavy rainfall in the highlands. However, onset of the Kiremt rains was delayed by about a month in the eastern parts of Oromiya, southern Afar, northern Somali, Harari and Dire Dawa Regions.
Planting of long-cycle crops was carried out on time throughout Meher-producing parts of the country, except in eastern Oromiya, southern Afar, northern Somali, Harari and Dire Dawa regions, where the rains started late. In these areas, planting of long-cycle Meher crops may not be possible, and replanting with short-cycle varieties may be carried out instead.
The overall performance of the Kiremt rains in Tigray, Amhara, Benshangul Gumuz, Gambella, western Oromiya and parts of SNNP regions has been normal to above-normal, with high intensity of rainfall and good distribution (Figure 2). According to the National Metrological Agency (NMA), more heavy rains are expected in these areas in August, which could lead to landslides, water logging of crops and flooding, especially because many of these areas already have soils with a high
moisture content, as they did not experience the normal four-to-six week gap between the Belg and the Kiremt rains.
Heavy rains have also been reported in southern parts of SNNP Region, where Kiremt rains do not normally fall. This could contribute to further flooding.
Figure 2. Estimated rainfall compared to the long-term average
July 1-10 July 10 - 20 July 20-30 August 1-10 Diff from Avg
Source: NOAA Rainfall Image, produced By: USGS-EROS Data Center. Graphics by FEWS NET.
Markets, trade and food access
Cereal prices in Addis Ababa market continued to rise in June, following their normal seasonal trend (Figures 3 and 4). The
June to September period is the hunger period for most of the crop-dependent populations of Ethiopia, except for the few
areas in the country that rely on Belg production. During the hunger period, most poor farmers rely on the market to
purchase staple food.
Figure 3. Retail prices of white maize in Addis Ababa: 13-month trend and 2002-2006 monthly average Source: data archives of FEWS NET/Ethiopia, Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE). Graphics by FEWS NET/Ethiopia.
Notes: (1) Prices are expressed in Ethiopian birr per quintal. (2) One quintal = 100 kg; 1 Ethiopian birr ? 12 US cents Figure 4. Wholesale prices for select staple cereals in Addis Ababa
Source: data archives of FEWS NET/Ethiopia, Ethiopian Grain Trade
Enterprise (EGTE). Graphics by FEWS NET/Ethiopia
Famine Early Warning Systems Network
Compared to the 2002/2006 average (Figure 3), prices for white maize, mixed teff, white wheat, and white barley - the most widely consumed cereals in the country, are significantly higher. These high cereal prices will have a significant negative impact on the food security of poor farmers, as well as on vulnerable urban populations who spend most of their income to purchase food, especially during the hunger season. Food prices are expected to increase further during the coming months, following their seasonal pattern and making it more difficult for poor farmers and the urban poor to purchase food to meet their needs. Provision of recommended emergency food assistance is therefore very important in those areas where Belg performance was poor, particularly in those areas that have already started using negative coping strategies to meet food requirements.
Somali Region Update
Following the mid-June restrictions on trade and movement in Warder, Korahe and parts of Degehabur, Gode and Fik zones of Somali region, the Gu season assessment was conducted in Jijiga, Shinile, Afder, Liban and parts of Gode, Fik and Degehabur where movement is not restricted. After a two-to-three week delay, assessments were also conducted in Warder and Gode zones, where there are restrictions of movement and trade. Korahe and most of Fik zone have not yet been assessed. Results of the assessment in the restricted areas are still not available due to the late start.
Preliminary results from non-restricted areas show that the overall performance of the current Gu rains is below average, and food and cash income is lower than the reference year. However, in most livelihood zones the decline in income is not to the level where emergency intervention is required.
In areas where movement is restricted, it is predicted that, with the current trend in prices of cereals and an absence of or very limited market for livestock, the level of deficit could be as high as 70 to 75 percent. According to the Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative’s monthly food security update, the price of 50 kg of sorghum in Degehabur town was 65 Birr in May, before the restriction. It was 120 Birr in July, almost double. Similarly, the price of 50 kg of rice in Gode town was 240 Birr in May, and has risen to 430 Birr in July, an increase of 80 percent. Although assessment teams have not returned to Addis Ababa and complete information is not yet available, some sources report that there is very little or no food (local cereals or imported food such as rice and pasta) in the markets.
In the absence of food from commercial sources, the DPPA started delivering emergency food aid to parts of the population in two woredas of Warder zone. The DPPA plans to distribute more food in areas within and outside of the restricted zones. This is expected to improve the food security situation in the short term, until commercial activities resume. Since almost all the population in the restricted areas is expected to rely on food aid, the amount of food aid provided should be
increased to cover these needs. The type of food commodities provided should be a complete basket to meet the nutritional requirements of the affected population. Targeting of food aid in pastoral areas has always been difficult. In a situation like this, where other sources of food are not available, extra efforts are needed to ensure that the food aid
reaches all the people that require the assistance.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EMAE-76HKH3/$File/Full_Report.pdf
8 Aug 2007. FAST Update | Somalia | No 2 |
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SOMALIA | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation
Between 18-26 April, the TFG-Ethiopian forces undertook their second massive military operation against insurgents in Mogadishu, which included Islamist fighters and the Hawiye clan militia. The offensive aimed at bringing about a turning point in Somalia’s political struggles. However, the offensive failed (see graph). Insurgency attacks continued, the possibility for a political solution was ruled out and the initiatives of external actors were constrained. The present update briefly assesses the overall situation since the offensive.
Although the military operation initially seemed to be a success, it did not result in the break up of the armed opposition. Consequently, TFG forces had to secure key roads and positions in the capital and AMISOM peacekeeping forces patrolled the city for the first time since their arrival. After a few days of calm, the armed insurgency against the Ethiopian occupiers and the TFG forces resumed again in Mogadishu. From May to early June, insurgents launched multiple attacks on a nearly daily basis targeting the TFG officials and its forces, Ethiopian troops and Ugandan peacekeeping forces. On 16 May, a roadside bomb killed two Ugandan peacekeepers. This was the first targeted attack on peacekeepers. On 17 May, PM Ali Mohammed Ghedi escaped a similar attack when his convoy was ambushed in the streets of Mogadishu. A second attempt on Ghedi’s life followed on 3 June – his residence became the scene of a suicide bombing, which killed seven people.
The response by the TFG-Ethiopian forces to this new wave of violence followed on 5 June. This included the use of heavy armor, the setting up of checkpoints, intensive house-to-house search for weapons and arrests of suspected militants, such as Haji Abdi Omar, the chair of the newly formed Hawiye Elders Congress. The TFG also shut down the two major independent media outlets, the Shabelle and HornAfrik radio stations, claiming that they have fuelled conflict and violence in the country. For several days, the crackdown eased unrest, but the insurgents resumed their activities again on 10 June. The TFG imposed a 7 pm to 5 am curfew on 22 June. Nevertheless, grenade and bomb attacks as well as assassinations have been continuing. Local sources reported that sixteen bombs exploded in the first two nights of the curfew. At present, Mogadishu appears to have returned to the conditions of insecurity, which existed prior to the crackdown. Moreover, attacks by insurgents for the first time since the defeat of the Courts have spread beyond Somalia. On 31 May, Puntland experienced its first insurgency attempt when a group of raiders on two speedboats entered the fishing village of Bargal.
Growing instability also affected other areas of Somalia. On 23 April, heavy clashes in the southern port town of Kismayo between army troops that splintered into clan militias left up to 25 dead. Again on 22 June in Kismayo, a clash over the control of the area involved Majereen and Marehan sub-clan militia and resulted in the death of six people and more than 50 injured. Fighting also erupted between the forces of Puntland and Somaliland in the village of Dahar in the Sanaag region over attempts by both sides to demonstrate control of the place. It ended on April 16, when Somaliland forces retreated.
Local sources reported that the recent offensive in Mogadishu caused at least 1,000 deaths, the displacement of several hundred thousand people and extensive damage of private and public properties. Only approximately a quarter of the total of 400,000 displaced people returned to Mogadishu after the fighting. On 9 July, local sources claimed that the continued insecurity coupled with the recent insurgents’ market attack and the TFG night curfew considerably restricted the
movement of people and hence their livelihood activities. The UN Humanitarian Affairs claimed that TFG security measures and clan clashes delayed humanitarian activities by restricting the mobility of staff and hindering the delivery of relief supplies to affected areas. Human right abuses and war crimes continued throughout the offensive and were committed by both Ethiopian and TFG forces.
Given the demand for immediate power-sharing and political reconciliation, the recent efforts of the TFG executive to consolidate its political power over the transitional institutions and expand its authority through offensive military operations further inhibited the political solution in Somalia.
Before the offensive, the TFG efforts to gain power involving its narrow clan-based National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) faced resistance by its major opponents. From 10 to 17 April, this opposition (including the conciliatory wing of the Islamic Courts, the dissident and fired parliamentarians and the TFG's deputy Prime Minister, Hussein Aideed) met in Eritrea to form an alliance aimed at countering the TFG’s intention of limiting the Mogadishu conference to social reconciliation rather than political power sharing. They further urged an immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. The Hawiye clan elders, who fear being dominated by the Darod clan, have also insisted that reconciliation be based on negotiations among political organizations rather than clans.
There seems to be little hope of a political solution with the core of the Hawiye-based resistance. Instead of building consensus and broadening its base, on 17 April, the TFG leadership engineered the firing of the former speaker of the Transitional Parliament along with 28 other lawmakers who had broken with the TFG over power-sharing talks with the Courts. Furthermore, the TFG also resisted an inclusive dialog with the different Hawiye sub-clans, but instead sought to divide the clan by assigning Abdi Hassan Awale as chief of police in Somalia and Mohammed Dheere as mayor of Mogadishu. Both are former warlords and leaders of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism, and do not represent the Hawiye’s common perspective on the TFG and Darod domination.
Following the offensive, the opposition increasingly turned away from calling for an open, political NRC and moved towards the refusal of this institution and the demand for an immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces, including AMISOM. On 24 May, political opposition groups came together in Eritrea and defined their joint goals. The ensuing statement urged Somalis to boycott the NRC and reasserted that no reconciliation talks should take place before the withdrawal of occupying forces. On 4 June, the opposition groups declared from Qatar that they would not recognize the NRC and that they plan to organize a resistance conference within 45 days. On 12 June, the speakers of the Hawiye clan announced its unification with political opposition groups because they had not been invited to participate in the NRC and the TFG had not responded to their demands.
The TFG offensive not only blocked a political solution, but also the implementation of an alternative, which is the clan-based conflict resolution and reconciliation. After the NRC was announced in January, it was postponed three times but finally opened on 15 July in Mogadishu. However, the first session had to be postponed since opposition leaders did not show up.
Meanwhile, the political situation in Somaliland has been growing increasingly tense in the run up to elections that are supposed to take place in December and April. Failure to convene a new electoral commission, to finalize the 2007 budget, and to reach a consensus on the admission of new political organizations/parties threaten to derail the democratization process that has been going on since the late 1990’s.
The external actors (except Ethiopia) backing the TFG in restoring security and gaining legitimacy as a unifying central authority have been facing a dilemma between support and reconciliation following the resistance of the TFG to initiate genuine power-sharing negotiations. If they support the TFG’s attempts to gain control over Somalia with the traditional political formula, they risk making it an opportunity for the TFG to implement its unsustainable political formula; if they withdraw and let the TFG proceed without support, they risk creating an opportunity for the Courts to come back again in some fashion since the TFG will increasingly loose control. The military offensive sought to break the external actors’ dilemma and to open space for them to reconsider their own involvement. Ethiopia and Uganda called for full deployment of AMISOM troops as pledged by Burundi, Ghana and Nigeria. USA and Western donors reassumed their diplomatic efforts to lobby African states to deploy more troops for the stabilization mission. However, none but the Ugandan forces have been deployed to date. Meanwhile, planning has been initiated for a UN Mission to take over after AMISOM’s recently extended 12-month-mandate has expired.
During May, Italy’s deputy foreign minister, the UN emergency relief coordinator and the US special envoy to Somalia visited Somalia to encourage an inclusive NRC. Following their visit, on 21 May, Yusuf complained that external actors had failed to deliver what they promised for the NRC. On 6 June, the USA-inspired Contact Group (CG), which includes the United States, Western European States, Tanzania, the AU, EU, UN and Arab League, met in London and issued a statement that the TFG had assured that the NRC should be fully inclusive, including those who denounce violence, as long as they are selected by their clan. The CG members also promised to fund the NRC although there was a big budget variation between the TFG estimate (US$ 42 million) and donor pledges (US$ 8.5 million) for the NRC.
Instability will continue to reign in Somalia over the coming months. A political solution, dependant on the openand inclusiveness of national reconciliation, seems the only viable option for stabilization. The delays in the reconciliation process led the country to sink deeper into fragmentation, including the human causalities of ruthless urban warfare in Mogadishu. The chances of stabilization will be determined by how much the TFG will gear the NRC towards inclusive power sharing and genuine reconciliation. Meanwhile, observers fear that TFG and Ethiopian control and the absence of Islamic Court leaders might result in a reconciliation “between the TFG and its allies” with no effect on the security in the country. The TFG currently does not seem to be attracting enough support among the Somali people to continue to exist.
External actors, which are eager to see a stabilized and unified country, should influence the TFG on the content of reconciliation. As the AU peacekeeping forces are already identified as occupiers, immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the replacement of AU peacekeepers with UN peacekeepers could be one possible option.
FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, covering 25 countries/regions in Africa, Asia and Europe. Based in Bern, Switzerland, the program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies, including the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC).
http://www.reliefweb.int/
Aug 6 2007 Ethiopia | No 3 |
Country Stability
Source: FAST event data
ETHIOPIA | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation
During the reporting period the security situation in central Ethiopia remained relatively stable (see graph) but violence increased significantly in the volatile Somali Regional State (SRS). Conflict between the Ethiopian army and the two armed opposition groups, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), reportedly continued.
Following the attack of the ONLF on Abole oilfield in late April, the government security forces launched a vast operation against the ONLF. Aid organizations operating in the SRS confirmed that in three zones the stepped-up military operations gravely effected the on-going relief operations, hampered domestic trade and generally disrupted an already fragile economy. On 18 May, the ONFL claimed that the Ethiopian army had burnt down the town of Laasdoole in Ogaden and killed and displaced dozens of civilians. On 25 May, the Ethiopian military arrested three US journalists from the New York Times who had traveled to the conflict zones in the SRS. They were released a few days later from Addis Ababa. On 20 May, ONLF and OLF reported that their forces had killed 82 and wounded another 75 Ethiopian soldiers in several joint operations in the Warder District of the SRS. On 29 May, a grenade attack on a public ceremony in Somali region’s capital, Jijiga, wounded the regional president, killed five people and sparked a stampede that left a further six dead. Another attack on the same day killed 10 people and wounded 16 in Degahabur. The government accused the ONLF, which denies involvement.
Following the attacks, the government began a new major offensive against the ONLF and announced a complete crackdown on them on 9 June. While fighting continued, on 10 June Afrol News reported that the ONLF's popular support is rising and that it currently poses the strongest military challenge to the Ethiopian army.
Furthermore, an expelled reporter from the New York Times published several pro-ONLF articles that were highly critical of the Ethiopian government.
On 15 June, the regional government of the SRS announced that ONLF-fighters, who had crossed into the SRS, have been captured, dozens have surrendered to the authorities, and consignments of arms coming from abroad have been intercepted.
On 26 June, the ONLF reported an overall civilian death toll of over 100 in a week out of which Ethiopian aerial bombardments alone had killed 40 persons. The ONLF in turn claimed to have killed over 250 Ethiopian soldiers and lost 30 men in clashes in Warder, Degehabur and Babile districts. The government confirmed the continuation of the offensive but denied using its air force to attack suspected ONLF positions. Various sources claim that ONLF also attacked hostile Ethiopian Somali clans and was involved in a resource dispute with Ogaden clans. On 29 June, the OLF military wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), allegedly killed 30 soldiers and captured 9 others at Fulale in the district of Boko, Eastern Hararge zone. The government denies this. Independent verification is not available.
In early July, the ONLF stated that its forces had ambushed a 20-vehicle government convoy near Shilabo, killed 43 government soldiers and captured weapons. On 22 July, the ONLF accused the government of deliberately blocking relief aid meant for the population of the SRS and called for an international investigation. On 24 July, the WFP denied this claim but confirmed that military operations had disrupted trade and hampered food distribution in the affected zones. On 25 July, the regional government ordered the ICRC to cease its operations in the SRS because of alleged collaboration with "rebels."
The government further consolidated its political position although the root causes of its conflict with the legal and armed opposition remained unresolved. A series of carefully crafted legal and political measures and maneuvers were implemented, which allowed for respite from internal and external critique. After months of negotiation with the opposition, the parliament approved a proclamation on the Electoral Law and the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) in June. At the same time, it legislated for by-elections in July to occupy some seats which have been vacant since the election of May 2005 due to the boycott or arrest of elected parliamentarians. The parliamentary opposition criticized the law, deemed it insufficient and mostly voted against it.
Fragmentation within and between the legal opposition parties continued. The CUD in parliament remained divided into two wings – the new CUDP and those parliamentarians following the leadership of the former CUDP not recognized by the NEBE. Both wings continue to be torn by internal conflicts. The UEDP-Medhin, which had declared its intention to abandon obstructionist opposition, claimed in mid-May that the House of People's Representatives had become the center for open dialog between the government and the opposition and progressive views. In contrast, the OFDM, the UEDF, and both CUD groups in parliament complained that the government continued to marginalize the opposition in parliament. The government refused to allow enough time to air their positions, ramroded legislation through parliament without taking into consideration the views of the opposition, and denied them financial support for their work. Local sources claimed that EPRDF executives and state run media consistently condemned legal opposition parties for having different views on proposed government actions and laws.
The internal political scene was dominated by the final resolution of the case concerning CUD-leaders and other political activists arrested in November 2005 in connection with post-electoral violence. The government implemented an elaborated strategy to resolve this issue in its favor. Shortly after the arrests, it permitted a very quietly conducted mediation of the Independent Coalition of Ethiopian Elders. On 11 June, the court found 38 defendants guilty. Within the context of on-going mediation after the verdict, 71 defendants signed a letter in which they accepted that they had a share in the responsibility for the post-electoral unrest and asked the government for a pardon. On 22 June, this letter was handed in utmost secrecy to the prime minister. On 28 June, PM Meles accused Western diplomats of undue political pressure and interference and had insisted that the defendants’ case is in the hands of the judiciary. On 5 July, the prosecutor demanded the death penalty for the 38 defendants found guilty. On 16 July, the court sentenced 35 of the defendants to life imprisonment and stripped them of their civic rights. On 18 July, the state media reported that the Federal Pardon Board had started examining the pardon request. On 20 July, the government announced that it had given a full pardon for the 38 sentenced leaders and activists as they had accepted their responsibility in the post-electoral violence, admitted an unconstitutional attempt to change the government, and pledged to work henceforth within the legal political system. Donors, who had been deeply worried about the sentences passed in the trials of the opposition leaders, adamantly welcomed the pardon.
Ethiopia’s relations with Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan continued to be stable. A simmering border conflict with Sudan was resolved in early July when Ethiopia officially abandoned contested areas along the border of Northwest Ethiopia to Sudan.
The Ethiopian military continued to be present with a large military force in Somalia and strengthened its military presence in Mogadishu in July to protect the up-coming National Reconciliation Conference against attacks of insurgents. Given the current reluctance or at least slowness of African states to deploy further troops for AMISOM, Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia may continue for some time.
The conflict with Eritrea remained unresolved and even took a turn for the worse. Eritrea increased its military presence in the Temporary Security Zone (TMZ) and Ethiopia retaliated by increasing its military presence in Tigray and especially directly south of the TMZ. Eritrea repeatedly warned the international community that a new war could erupt if it fails to secure the unconditional implementation of the boundary decision. The UN Secretary General has also warned of the potential for a new outbreak of hostilities with Ethiopia.
Major donors were critical of the Ethiopian government regarding the human rights situation and the
unresolved post-election crisis. However, this did not affect political relations or the flow of economic aid. Ethiopia signed new agreements with the World Bank and the EU for massive financial assistance for its development efforts.
A political solution to the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the various armed opposition movements is not to be expected given the irreconcilable positions of the two sides. The Ethiopian government only wants to negotiate if the armed opposition renounces violence and promises to work with the existing political system, whereas its armed opponents insist on unconditional and open negotiations. Internationally the position of the Ethiopian government had been greatly strengthened with the pardon of the sentenced opposition leaders. One can expect that this will be positively reflected in further aid commitments. The armed struggle between the
government and the ONLF and OLF will continue and achieve at least a military containment. In regard to Eritrea, the potential for a renewed military conflict has increased but it is unlikely that armed hostilities will break out in the immediate future. The Eritrean side is well aware of its reduced military capacities. Unless the financial and human costs of the Ethiopian military engagement in Somalia dramatically escalate, it is not expected that Ethiopia’s Somalia
engagement will have a destabilizing influence on the internal situation in Ethiopia in the immediate future.
Although the root political conflicts between the government and the opposition remain unresolved, the whole carefully orchestrated procedure resulting in the pardon of the imprisoned CUD-leaders and activists ended with a major political victory for the ruling party. The opposition no longer can use the elections of 2005 and the postelectoral crisis to attack the government, as this would violate the terms of the pardon. Given the condition of the pardon and internal fragmentation, it is highly doubtful whether the released political leaders will manage to re-unite the fractured CUD under their leadership again in the immediate future. They will at most campaign for seats in the National Parliament and in various regional and local councils in spring 2008.
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SUCCESS STORIES
Mar 5, 2006 print
Ethiopia: Choosing Education Before Marriage
Only 38 percent of girls make it to fifth grade
December is harvest time in the Oromiya region of Ethiopia. It is also a popular time for marriage proposals and ceremonies. So it came as no surprise that month when Meseret Anegecha, a studious fourteen-year-old student at the Tajab Primary School, and six other girls in her class received marriage proposals. Meseret’s parents accepted despite her furious protests.
Early marriage of girls as young as 11 or 12 years old is common in Ethiopia. Parents consent to a daughter’s marriage often without realizing its grave consequences, including a higher likelihood of falling into poverty and developing serious medical conditions such as obstetric fistula. Girls who marry young are also unlikely to complete school.
In an effort to prevent early marriages, USAID is funding a project — the Community Government Partnership Program — that connects community and government officials with educators and women’s affairs representatives to teach parents about the dangers of early marriages.
Tajab Primary School is one of the 3700 Ethiopian schools benefiting from this program. When the Girls’ Education Advisory Committee at the school heard of Meseret’s problem, they asked the women’s affairs representatives to join them in approaching her parents. They had little success. They decided to approach the groom to tell him Meseret did not want to get married and that early marriage was not legal or morally right.
The day arrived for “Sedeta,” a tradition in which the groom visits the future bride’s home and produces the dowry. Meseret’s parents slaughtered their finest cow and invited relatives and friends for a feast. But the groom did not come. He told the family he was touched by the committee’s argument that forcing young girls into marriage and disrupting their education is a crime.
“I was persuaded that forcing very young girls into marriage and disrupting their education is indeed a crime and I have made a decision not to marry Meseret,”said the groom after speaking to the Girls’ Education Advisory Committee. Meseret was able to postpone marriage and stay in school to finish her education.
http://ethiopia.usaid.gov/info.asp?IID=75&CMID=23
SUCCESS STORIES
May 20, 2005
Ethiopia:Low-Income Women Plant Gardens
Training on vegetable gardening, irrigation and composting give urban women source of income
Adina and her family are benefiting from a USAID-funded program that provides skills training in planting a vegetable garden and using drip irrigation
Adina, 35, widowed, and mother of two, lives in a heavily populated area in the middle of Ethiopia's capital city, Addis Ababa. Affected by HIV/AIDS and with limited education, Adina was struggling to feed her family. She had no land and few resources to make a living.
Along with 120 other beneficiary families in the area, Adina is the recipient of a USAID-funded program that provides vulnerable and HIV-affected women with the tools, land area, and knowledge to plant vegetable gardens to feed their families and sell the produce to increase household income. Implemented in late 2004 by Development Alternatives Inc. and local NGOs with experience in HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment, the Urban Agriculture Program provides training to women on nutrition, composting, vegetable growing, irrigation techniques, proper hygiene, and counseling on HIV/AIDS. The program works with the local government to secure sites within the city for the garden plots and ensure access to a water source. Extension workers with degrees in agriculture assist the women to plant seeds, care for seedlings, prepare and use compost, and install and maintain the simple drip irrigation systems that ensure moisture to the garden plants. The program supplies the plastic tubs and drip irrigation tubes (serviceable life span is 5 to 10 years) that eliminate the daily backbreaking work of carrying water to the rows of vegetables.
Adina spends at least an hour every day at the urban garden, checking the level of water in the plastic tub, ensuring the drip lines are adequately irrigating the rows of thriving green vegetables she planted two months ago, weeding, and harvesting some of the produce. Adina and other urban gardeners are also forming linkages with local markets to sell excess produce and build their household security. The 18-month project will benefit over 3,000 urban families in Addis Ababa and another 1,500 in the northern Ethiopian city of Bahir Dar.
http://ethiopia.usaid.gov/info.asp?IID=35&CMID=23
News & Views for Anarchists & Activists:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo
Just a few of the stories that should have received more and better coverage in the media. I encourage readers to add other examples. US forces raid Iraq Freedom Congress offices -- again and again. You might think the US government would like a secular, democratic, libertarian, progressive, non-violent, anti-Ba'athist, anti-Islamist, and anti-nationalist, group like the Iraq Freedom Congress. You might think that, but you'd be wrong. US forces have repeatedly attacked the
IFC and assassinated the head of the Safety Forces, whose patrols in Baghdad neighborhoods (population 5,000) have reduced sectarian killings to zero.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8381
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9327
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9476
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9497
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9506
Christian Terrorists
But never referred to as terrorists in the mass media or charged with
terrorism-related offenses.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9484
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9509
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9569
Neo-Nazi Terrorists Murder Protestor at Eco-Camp
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9554
Every serious analysis supports Ron Paul's opinion on the causes of 9/11
The 9/11 Commission, CIA analysts, Middle East experts, etc., all agree that harmful US government interventions in countries like Iraq, Israel/Palestine, and Somalia created the motivation for Islamist terrorists. Nonetheless, the mass media reduce coverage of the issue to soundbites, so that those who make serious analyses do not have time to explain them, and so (in Noam Chomsky's words), sound like they came from Neptune. The media's wingnuts further pounce on Paul on others to misrepresent them as saying that they believe 9/11 was justified, that the civilian victims deserved it, etc.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9091
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9149
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9158
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9160
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9190
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9262
The growth of worker-owned-and-controlled businesses. Supposedly There Is No Alternative (TINA) to corporate capitalism, but some are determined to build the structure of the new society in the
shell of the old:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8669
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8901
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9094
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9181
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9255
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9388
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9530
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9688
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia results in quagmire
The US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia has resulted in a Vietnam/Iraq-style quagmire. The Ethiopian occupiers have now been in Somalia more than three times as long as planned, with no end in sight.
They have also used WMDs against civilians.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8894
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9381
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9461
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9576
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9660
Kansas Mutual Aid shunned from disaster relief.
Anarchist group Common Ground Collective did an excellent job providing disaster relief after Katrina, far better than the government. The government isn't going to let that happen again.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9199
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/9289
Terrorist arson attack against Sedition Books
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8850
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8836
Who hates our freedoms?
Pro-war counter-protestors attack peaceful anti-war protestors.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8863
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo/message/8865
Dan Clore