Somaliland - City girl vs. Nomadic girl
http://www.flickdrop.com/viewvideo/280320/Somaliland___City_girl_vs__Nomadic_girl/
Mental health in Somaliland
http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2007/03/03/world/20070305_MENTAL_SLIDESHOW_1.html
www.theage.com.au, January 7, 2008
Somalia's forgotten victims of America's 'war on terror'
by Andreas Rologas
WHO doesn't know about the 2 million Iraqi refugees huddled in the streets of Damascus or Amman? Or the other 2 million internally displaced Iraqis forced to seek sanctuary within Iraq? Yet who knows the number of displaced people being added to the "war on terror's" bitter harvest in Somalia?
Somalia, unlike Afghanistan, is not just another forgotten war; Somalia is an invisible war. It has become a war that, for large parts of the world, doesn't even exist.
Since the "war on terror" disembarked on the shores of Somalia, the capital Mogadishu has not seen a day's peace. Thousands of civilians have been killed as the United States-backed Government and the Ethiopian military battle the deposed Council of Islamic Courts and its allies.
Somalia's recent descent into violence began when the CIC, backed by small businessmen, traders and merchants — and, according to their enemies, Eritrea and al-Qaeda — set out to return order to Mogadishu by challenging the various warlords who for more than a decade have terrorised the population of Mogadishu and surrounds.
By mid-February 2006 the usually quarrelsome warlords became so worried by this challenge to their anarchic order that they formed a united front. The warlords — ever attuned to Washington's antennas — denounced the CIC as merely an al-Qaeda shop window, giving sanctuary to wanted al-Qaeda militants — a charge consistently denied by the CIC leadership. It was, as the warlords well knew, all Washington needed to hear to start shovelling arms in their direction.
And so the misery began.
Yet, despite American and Ethiopian arms, the warlords couldn't defeat their foes as most of the population had long ago sided with the CIC. So, on June 5, 2006, the CIC took complete control of the capital. They quickly brought a level of peace and security not seen for decades.
They also tried reassuring the Europeans and Americans that they were not out to build an Islamic state, while some of its more zealous elements passed their time by trying to clamp down on supposed Western vices such as music and cinema. Washington had received a bloody nose, yet the Americans weren't done yet. The relative peace was to be short-lived.
The embers had barely begun to die down in the capital when Ethiopian troops and tanks began conducting "incursions" into Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government stationed in Baidoa. The TFG, which was set up in 2004 under UN tutelage, had always been weak and since its creation marginalised by the warlords.
The hardliners within the CIC responded to these provocations by threatening a military "jihad" against Ethiopia if the troops didn't leave. By late October the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, was announcing that his country was "technically at war" with the CIC.
The inevitable would come to pass, on Christmas Eve 2006. US-backed Ethiopian troops launched their own "pre-emptive" strike in the name of the "war on terror" into southern Somalia. The objective: to parachute the TFG, littered with many of the previously defeated warlords, into Mogadishu to replace the CIC.
In the face of overwhelming firepower the Islamists, encouraged by allied clans, retreated without much of a fight. By early January, Mogadishu would fall to the Ethiopian military.
A few days later the American hand in the invasion became overt when an AC130 gunship blasted some supposed "al-Qaeda militants" fleeing the capital. Witnesses would later relate that perhaps 70 or so nomads were blown away instead. No comprehensive investigation has ever been set up to ascertain the truth.
Mission accomplished?
Towards the end of January last year, a triumphant Zenawi announced the removal of 200 troops from Somalia as the first part of a complete withdrawal. This would be his equivalent of George Bush's "mission accomplished" moment over Iraq. By April 2007, an Iraq-style insurgency was well under way. Ethiopia, rather than reducing its troop presence, has increased it.
It is believed that during the April fighting more than 200,000 people fled Mogadishu alone. Many thousands more have since joined them as attacks against the Ethiopian military and the TFG increased.
According to a report from the UNHCR in November, "60% of the population, or some 600,000 people, are believed to have fled from the lawless Somali capital, Mogadishu, since February". The "war on terror" has become one of the biggest instruments for displacing people in the world today, yet the emptying of 60% of the population of Mogadishu has barely registered outside Africa.
Condoleezza Rice, on a recent visit to Ethiopia, reportedly called for a "ceasefire agreement". So after encouraging the invasion and actively arming the disgraced warlords, the US now seeks to broker peace. But the US will only talk to "moderates".
In a recent interview with Der Spiegel, the chairman of the Islamic courts, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed — who is considered a moderate — was asked why he doesn't call a ceasefire: "I'm powerless to do that. The popular uprising against the hated Ethiopian occupation troops — which every Somali patriot must see as his enemies — can't be stopped."
The occupation, by Somalia's long-time adversary Ethiopia, has heralded predictable results. It has created thousands of orphans, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and only increased the misery of this blighted land. The "international community" must call for a complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, followed by encouraging negotiations between the TFG, the clans of the south and the CIC.
The world is not listening to Somalia's screams under the boot of the war on terror, or if it is, does not seem to care.
The hardliners within the CIC responded to these provocations by threatening a military "jihad" against Ethiopia if the troops didn't leave. By late October the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, was announcing that his country was "technically at war" with the CIC.
The inevitable would come to pass, on Christmas Eve 2006. US-backed Ethiopian troops launched their own "pre-emptive" strike in the name of the "war on terror" into southern Somalia. The objective: to parachute the TFG, littered with many of the previously defeated warlords, into Mogadishu to replace the CIC.
In the face of overwhelming firepower the Islamists, encouraged by allied clans, retreated without much of a fight. By early January, Mogadishu would fall to the Ethiopian military.
A few days later the American hand in the invasion became overt when an AC130 gunship blasted some supposed "al-Qaeda militants" fleeing the capital. Witnesses would later relate that perhaps 70 or so nomads were blown away instead. No comprehensive investigation has ever been set up to ascertain the truth.
Mission accomplished?
Towards the end of January last year, a triumphant Zenawi announced the removal of 200 troops from Somalia as the first part of a complete withdrawal. This would be his equivalent of George Bush's "mission accomplished" moment over Iraq. By April 2007, an Iraq-style insurgency was well under way. Ethiopia, rather than reducing its troop presence, has increased it.
It is believed that during the April fighting more than 200,000 people fled Mogadishu alone. Many thousands more have since joined them as attacks against the Ethiopian military and the TFG increased.
According to a report from the UNHCR in November, "60% of the population, or some 600,000 people, are believed to have fled from the lawless Somali capital, Mogadishu, since February". The "war on terror" has become one of the biggest instruments for displacing people in the world today, yet the emptying of 60% of the population of Mogadishu has barely registered outside Africa.
Condoleezza Rice, on a recent visit to Ethiopia, reportedly called for a "ceasefire agreement". So after encouraging the invasion and actively arming the disgraced warlords, the US now seeks to broker peace. But the US will only talk to "moderates".
In a recent interview with Der Spiegel, the chairman of the Islamic courts, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed — who is considered a moderate — was asked why he doesn't call a ceasefire: "I'm powerless to do that. The popular uprising against the hated Ethiopian occupation troops — which every Somali patriot must see as his enemies — can't be stopped."
The occupation, by Somalia's long-time adversary Ethiopia, has heralded predictable results. It has created thousands of orphans, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and only increased the misery of this blighted land. The "international community" must call for a complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, followed by encouraging negotiations between the TFG, the clans of the south and the CIC.
The world is not listening to Somalia's screams under the boot of the war on terror, or if it is, does not seem to care.
Andreas Rologas is a freelance writer.
http://www.time.com/time/techtime/200406/news.html
SOMALIA: Maadey Suufi: "The worst experience of my life”
Photo: Hassan Mahamud Ahmed/IRIN
Madeey Suufi, standing in front of what is left of his home where his family was killed when a shell hit
MOGADISHU, 2 January 2008 (IRIN) - Maadey Suufi, a 27-year-old father from Buur Hakab, fled his home 10 years ago because of drought and insecurity. Since then, he has lived in an overcrowded camp for the displaced in the Suuq Ba'ad area of north Mogadishu, where he raised a family. But, then tragedy struck:
"Life was difficult and we had to struggle to make a living and we managed as best as we could. I met and married my future wife in the camp.
"We had four children and were expecting the fifth when it all ended.
"On Sunday evening [30 December] I went to buy a few things at a nearby shop when shells started landing in our area.
"I quickly returned but our small home was no longer there. My wife who was nine months pregnant and my four children [aged between eight and two years] were dead. There was not a single body, but pieces of them all over the place.
"I could only tell which was which by the size of the limbs, but some parts were so mutilated that we could not figure out who it belonged to.
"It was at night so I had to stay and guard their body parts from the stray cats and dogs. It was the hardest thing to do to sit and look at what is left of the people you loved most in this world.
"On Monday morning my neighbours and the nearby mosque came to help me bury them. It was hard to bury them since the bodies got mixed up.
"I am a religious person and that has sustained me. I do believe that everything happens for a reason and my family is dead for a reason.
"But this is the worst experience of my life. I don’t have a family or a place to call home. I don’t know what I will do, but I cannot go back to that place [the camp].
"What happened to me happened to other Somalis. I pray to God to lift this curse on us.”
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=76066
Professional Somali Women Discuss Culture and Politics
The Ladies of Mercy Corps Somalia
BY JEREMY BARNICLE | December 13, 2007
Fausiya, Mulki, and Asha (left to right) work for Mercy Corps' Somalia office. Photo: Jeremy Barnicle/Mercy Corps
I assumed Somali women would be quiet and shy — a little tough to engage in an interview.
Maybe that wasn't very thoughtful or culturally aware of me, but Somalia is a conservative Muslim country with a rural lifestyle that has suffered years of violent conflict and desperate poverty. Our three Somali female staff all wear a full hijab, the traditional head covering and full-length dress worn in many Muslim communities. People even warned me not to wear short sleeves and not to try to shake hands with a woman. So hopefully readers can understand my assumptions, if not forgive them.
I spent an hour with the three women of Mercy Corps' Jamame office to get a better idea of what it means to be a Somali woman, and realized that all my assumptions were wrong. As the ladies walked in, the first thing Mulki, our finance officer, did was look me in the eye, extend her hand, and give me a good firm shake.
Let's get some basics out of the way. Where are you from, what's your educational background, what's your marital status?
Mulki Ali Mohammed, finance officer, 18: I am from Kismayo [a city about 25 miles from here] but I live here in Jamame for the job. I finished secondary school and had additional training in accountancy. I was also trained in HIV/AIDS counseling and human rights, through non-profits. I'm not married.
Asha Adbdulle, finance assistant, 24: I'm from Jamame and I graduated from secondary school here, specializing in agriculture. I'm also not married.
Fausiya Omar, administrative assistant, 22: I am also from Kismayo, but my family was in Uganda during the war, so I did my secondary school there. I am not married either.
What do you think are the biggest challenges for Somali women?
Mulki: Rape. Kidnapping. Torture. Threats, in general.
Fausiya: Men abuse women. Even in the city there is no difference — it's like that everywhere.
Asha: Everywhere in Somalia, women don't participate in meetings and things. Men say women are nothing, only housewives. There are some opportunities for women, but not much.
Fausiya: In other countries women give speeches and attend meetings — they have a voice — but that's not really the case here in Somalia.
Mulki: Women can participate, but they don't really have the education and knowledge for the men to listen to them. The lack of education is really the big obstacle.
What could you do about the lack of education?
Mulki: I think it could be solved with better government.
Fausiya: Better schools.
Mulki: Better security.
Fausiya: I think it really is about security — that's the big one.
Asha: We — women like us — can advise the other women and teach something to the ladies.
Mulki: It's hard because even if we advocate for women, lots of women will tell us, "No, we can't do that."
Fausiya: Yes, lots of women wouldn't want to hear the advice we give.
Fausiya: There is some hope though. There are women's groups in Kismayo who set up women's schools and study groups, so I am glad to see that at least in the city, the situation is moving in the right direction.
You all have good jobs at Mercy Corps. As a Somali woman, what are your prospects for having a career?
Mulki: Before I get married, my partner would have to accept my working. Only if he accepts that will I agree to get married.
Fausiya: They used to say that girls needed to stay inside — that God said we could never go outside. But it's different now. I agree [with Mulki] that you need to make it clear to [a potential husband] from the start.
Asha: About 80 percent of Somali girls don't go to school. They get married young, and if they don't finish school they wash dishes and sit around the house.
Fausiya: My mother runs a business transporting wood, so I see a woman doing business.
Mulki: And because of the war, there are no universities and bad schools, so it's hard for lots of girls.
What's so special about having a job?
Mulki: When I saw the job announcement for this job at Mercy Corps, it said that hiring women was a priority. That made me know this would be a great place to work. When I found out I passed the application's exam, I was very happy — and I have already had additional training.
I also had to move from Kismayo [her hometown] to take the job, so I am living on my own as well. My family was a little concerned, but I call my family every day and tell them I am OK.
Who do you admire?
Asha: I admire myself — I want to see the Somali ladies become more like us.
Fausiya: I admire people who are modern and well-educated — I want to be an educated woman.
Mulki: I want to be like the Somalia women who abroad. I can leave this situation — where nothing is suitable — but elsewhere I can get a great education, good security and get good jobs. Even if I stay in Somalia, I want to be like those girls.
What do you do for fun?
Fausiya: I listen to music — usually slow American music. I like reading novels. I watch Mexican telenovelas on satellite TV. When I am in Kismayo, I love to go sit on the beach for a few hours and go swimming with my sisters. We go on Fridays for a few hours.
The beach? What do you wear? Do you have a hijab for the water?
Fausiya: We don't have to wear the hijab because there are few men on the beach on Fridays — they are usually at the mosque. It used to be that girls would get kidnapped, but it's better now.
Mulki: That's interesting because I spent my whole life in Kismayo but I've only been in the ocean twice. I am kind of afraid of the sea; I don't really know how to swim.
Asha: I like to watch TV — mostly the news.
Mulki: I listen to the news on the radio. I love to watch football — I'm a Liverpool fan. I also attend football games in Kismayo. I even play football at my brother's house. When I go into the house, I throw my hijab off and then I can play. I also read history books and romance novels. It's one way to learn something about love, too. We all listen to radio call-in shows when they are talking about love. When I can, I like to go on the Internet and do instant messaging with Fausiya.
What do you see yourself accomplishing in your career? Do you want to run a business or a non-profit or be president?
Fausiya: I don't care much about politics. I just want to keep my job and become the admin officer for this Mercy Corps office. I always encourage myself to keep at it.
I want to advocate for other Somali women and girls. I want them to be able to carry themselves in a proud way, and if they see women doing important work here, they'll want to go to school more badly.
I want to be a big shot in Somalia!
Mulki: Saying you want to be president of this country is like digging your grave, so I'd like to be some kind of manager.
Asha: Now I am the finance assistant. Next I want to be finance officer, then I want to be a finance manager, here or somewhere else. We have a saying here:
If money is lost, nothing is lost.
If time is lost, something is lost.
If hope is lost, everything is lost.
I have hope — I have lots of hope about the future!
Mercy Corps - Dept. W - 3015 SW First Ave - Portland, OR - 97201
Helping Somalia's marginalized minority
BY JEREMY BARNICLE | November 5, 2007
Two of Borini's Somali Bantus break up clay-rich soil so it can be moved and shaped into a flood levee. Photo: Jeremy Barnicle/Mercy Corps
Borini, Somalia — Even by Somali standards, the local Bantus have it tough.
Descendants of slaves taken from farther south along Africa's eastern coast, Somali Bantus look different than other Somalis (darker skin, coarser hair) and fall outside the traditional Somali clan system, and therefore have been a marginalized population for as long as they've lived here.
"These people have suffered greatly during the way," says Abdi Yussuf, who oversees Mercy Corps' work in Borini, a Bantu village. "Rape. Murder. The Bantus got it worse than any other group."
Somali Bantus are so threatened that several years ago the American government agreed to resettle about 12,000 refugees in the U.S. Recognizing the special situation of the Bantus, Mercy Corps has made them a priority for its work in southern Somalia — including here in the bright-green village of Borini.
Sprawling mango trees, maize stalks, banana plants and groundnuts sprout from fertile soil fed by the Juba River. Nature is more than dominant here: there are no roads, health clinics, latrines or even wells for water. Most residents of Borini live off what they grow, and pray that neither drought nor flood ruins the harvest.
"Bantus are the classic marginalized population," says Mohammed Wardere, a veteran aid worker who has worked all over East Africa. "They have no power and no one does anything for them."
There are two behaviors that make Bantus so vulnerable: they tend not to arm themselves, which makes them an easy target for militias and bandits, and they tend to settle near rivers, which in this part of Somalia flood regularly.
It's the latter challenge — flood protection — that Mercy Corps is helping address in this community.
I arrive in Borini to a riotous Bantu greeting: about a hundred children dancing and chanting, "Welcome, welcome, a visitor has come!"
As a backdrop for the kids' performance, the village's men are digging clay and the women are moving it to a rapidly expanding levee. Two men with pickaxes hack away at a massive clay-rich anthill and they have a call-and-response song going with the women below.
I ask a Somali colleague what the song is about. He says he's not sure, but it has something to do with "struggle."
The adults are participating in a Mercy Corps cash-for-work program, in which the community decides on a high-value infrastructure project and Mercy Corps provides technical guidance, tools and wages for the workers.
Borini, like some of its neighboring riverside villages, decided that shoring up its levees was the most urgent project. The rainy season is approaching and it's clear to me that without the levee, the spot where I'm standing would soon be underwater.
"Twice a year Borini is flooded," says Ayub Hassan, the village teacher and chairman of the village committee. "When we finish these cash-for-work embankment projects, we will be flood-free from then on."
About 40 people from the village's poorest households are paid $2 a day — the standard daily wage for manual labor in this part of Somalia — to build clay-core embankments in weak spots along their side of the Juba River.
Beyond protecting the homes and fields of Borini from flooding, the cash-for-work program is providing some much-needed income for families here.
"We used to eat one meal a day," says Omar Gedi Mohammed, as he and his wife Shukri usher me into their mud and thatch roof home to meet their four kids. "Now we are eating three, and the children have more energy."
http://www.mercycorps.org%2Fcountries%2Fsomalia%2F1923
SOMALIA: Aid appeal broadened to cope with massive displacement
Displaced by the fighting in Mogadishu. Aid agencies are asking for $406 million to help the needy in Somalia
NAIROBI, 11 December 2007 (IRIN) - Massive displacement of civilians in the escalating conflict in Somalia this year has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in a country already reeling from years of civil strife and natural disasters, aid agencies said in their appeal for US$406 million to fund life-saving assistance and protection for more than 1.5 million people in 2008.
Fighting between forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is backed by Ethiopian troops, and insurgents, intensified in Mogadishu in early 2007. The capital has witnessed some of the bloodiest fighting, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence, since Somalia descended into factional warfare after the overthrow in 1991 of the regime headed by the late Muhammad Siad Barre.
An estimated 600,000 people have fled Mogadishu because of the violence and most have been forced to live in squalid settlements outside the city with little or no food, water, shelter or medical care.
"We are confronted with a new crisis combined with an acute chronic humanitarian crisis," said Philippe Lazzarini, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Somalia, at the launch of the 2008 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia.
The renewed unrest had added to the misery of people hit by drought, floods, poor harvest, malnutrition and disease, especially in areas where internally displaced people from Mogadishu have sought refuge, according to the appeal document.
"An estimated 83,000 children [excluding those in displaced families] are moderately or severely malnourished in south/central Somalia. These children are at increased risk of death in a country where, already, one in 12 children will die before his or her first birthday and one in seven will die before reaching the age of five," humanitarian agencies said.
Problems of access have compounded the severity of the crisis in Somalia, especially in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. Humanitarian workers have had to contend with extortion, piracy, illegal taxation by armed groups, harassment and the threat of roadside bombs.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which has been providing medical and nutritional care to internally displaced persons (IDPs) around the town of Afgoye, about 30km south of Mogadishu, said mortality rates were worrying.
"In Hawa Abdi, a camp with 32,000 IDPs, where humanitarian assistance is available, the mortality rate of children under five is more than twice the emergency threshold - 4.2 deaths per 10,000 people per day, and the global mortality rate is 2.3 deaths per 10,000 people per day. Diarrhoea is the main cause of death in the camp (over 50 percent) due to disastrous sanitary conditions," according to an MSF statement.
Somalia's newly appointed Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, better known as Nur Ade, promised that his government would facilitate the work of relief agencies, while urging them to respect the rules and regulations of the country. He also urged the broadening of the mandate of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia to include helping to deliver humanitarian aid.
Other priorities of humanitarian agencies in Somalia in 2008 include protection of civilians, promotion of human rights, especially among vulnerable groups, including IDPs and children, and strengthening the capacity of local groups to provide social services and respond to disasters.
Eric Laroche, outgoing UN resident humanitarian coordinator for Somalia, said he was optimistic that the 2008 appeal would receive a generous response.
"There is no doubt that the profile [in the international community] of Somalia has been rising a lot in the last six to 12 months," he said. Failing to respond to the needs of the deprived people of Somalia could lead to undesirable consequences, such as young people resorting to acts of terrorism, he added.
Donors provided about 70 percent of the estimated $260 million appeal for Somalia in 2007.
Tackling Piracy in Somali Waters: Rising attacks impede delivery of humanitarian assistance
By Sana Aftab Khan
Frequent pirate attacks in Somalia have been threatening commercial shipping and fishing and impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) jointly issued an appeal in July 2007 for action to halt piracy off the coast of the country. Both UN agencies have been pushing the UN Security Council to ask the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to help tackle the problem.
Delivery of supplies by sea has been a logistical and security challenge since the collapse of the last national government in 1991 due to the rise in the frequency of pirate attacks. This has resulted in higher shipping costs and a significant reduction in the number of cargo vessels in the water. WFP Executive Director Josette Sheeran stated that close to 80 per cent of its assistance to Somalia is shipped by sea, "but because of piracy we have seen the availability of ships willing to carry food to the country cut by half". There were 15 attacks on ships in or near Somali waters from January to July 2007-two of these on WFP-contracted vessels, wherein a security guard was killed-compared to 10 such attacks in 2006. WFP hoped to deliver food assistance for 1 million people in Somalia, as already high levels of malnutrition had worsened with predicted crop failures. Ms. Sheeran also stated: "Pirates may have a romantic image on the silver screen these days, but the picture might not be quite so pretty from the point of view of someone stuck in a camp for internally displaced people in Somalia, dependent on food assistance for survival."
Somalia: drought, floods, violence and crop failure
In a presidential statement in March 2006, the Security Council responded to reports of piracy, encouraging UN Member States with naval vessels and military aircraft operating in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant against pirate attacks and to take action to protect merchant shipping, especially vessels transporting humanitarian aid. Due to rising attacks in 2007, IMO undertook a number of steps, including intensifying its coordination with WFP and the navies operating in the Western Indian Ocean region, to bolster assistance to merchant ships. IMO suggested that the Council could act beyond its presidential statement and request Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to give consent to ships to enter the country's territorial waters when engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers.
IMO Secretary General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos requested UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to raise the issue of Somali piracy to the Security Council so that it could ask the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to address the problem. In conjunction with other multi-faceted initiatives taken by IMO to address the issue effectively, "this latest high-level approach to the Security Council, through Mr. Ban, will, I believe, help considerably in alleviating the situation, especially if support and assistance to ships is enhanced", he stated.
Ms. Sheeran said that much more needs to be done to address the problem of piracy, adding that WFP has been much encouraged by the IMO actions and was "grateful for the continuing presence in the seas off Somalia of naval forces from several nations". However, WFP "would like to see a more coordinated and robust approach to dealing with the problem of piracy from the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, from neighbouring countries that have influence and from the African Union", Ms. Sheeran emphasized. All those addressing the problem, including WFP, "need to explore how these resources can be brought more heavily into play to protect shipping and thereby the delivery by sea of life-saving humanitarian assistance."
Somalian Camps Photo WFP/Peter Smerdon
Somalia has suffered ongoing crises of drought, floods, wars and instability for many years. Conditions for Somalis and refugees and internally displaced persons in the region have been being worsened by current rising inflation rates, predictions of major crop failures and rising violence. These already dire circumstances make dealing with piracy in Somali waters even more crucial.
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/073107_somalia.htm
Consolidated Appeal for Somalia 2008
10 December 2007
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following a series of shocks in the first half of 2007, Somalia has experienced a drastic deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The spring Gu rains of 2007 performed poorly, while violence in Mogadishu escalated, giving rise to massive displacement. These two devastating developments unfolded in the context of a long-standing humanitarian emergency and a sixteen-year absence of effective central government and basic social services. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization/Food Security Analysis Unit post-Gu Assessment, 1.5 million people are in need of assistance and protection, an increase of 50% since the start of 2007.
As 2006 came to a close, the livelihoods and food security situation showed signs of improvement. However, the conflict and tensions of early 2007 quickly reversed any improvements in food security. In January, Transitional Federal Government troops, backed by Ethiopian forces, took control of much of South/Central Somalia from the Islamic Courts Union. Despite hopes that the arrival of the Transitional Federal Government would establish law and order in the capital, violence subsequently escalated between insurgents and Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian forces. Despite political efforts, the cycle of violence shows no signs of abating. The fighting has been the worst since the civil war of the early 1990s; hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands more have been injured, with human rights abuses committed by all sides. The conflict has caused massive displacement from Mogadishu. As of 1 November, there are an estimated 450,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia, in addition to the estimated 400,000 protracted IDPs.
Following Security Council Resolution 1744, African Union Mission in Somalia troops arrived in the country in March 2007. The Mission’s mandate was extended in August for another six months, whilst Security Council discussions continue on the possibility of a United Nations peace-keeping mission to Somalia. In July and August, the Transitional Federal Government held a forty-five-day National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu, bringing together over 2,000 representatives from throughout Somalia. In the relatively stable zones of Puntland and Somaliland, violence erupted in October over the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag, displacing well over 20,000 people; insecurity in South/Central and other factors have the potential to further destabilise either or both of the northern zones.
Somalia is thus in the midst of both a new crisis and the chronic humanitarian emergency that has gripped the country for years. The combined effects of poor Gu rains, conflict, displacement and diarrhoeal diseases have severely exacerbated the food security situation and caused an alarming rise in acute malnutrition rates. The deterioration in the nutrition situation has been particularly marked in regions that absorbed large numbers of conflict-related IDPs – namely, Lower and Middle Shabelle, traditionally the most agriculturally productive areas. An estimated 83,000 children are moderately or severely malnourished in South/Central, a figure that excludes IDPs, among whom malnutrition rates are often higher. These children are at increased risk of death in a country where, already, one in 12 children will die before his or her first birthday and one in seven will die before reaching the age of five.
Given the current humanitarian situation in Somalia, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have agreed upon three strategic priorities to guide humanitarian action in 2008:
§ Save lives and provide assistance to 1.5 million people identified as being in a state of Humanitarian Emergency or Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis[1] or as internally displaced, including an estimated 400,000 protracted IDPs and approximately 450,000 newly displaced;
§ Improve the protection of, and respect for, the human rights and dignity of vulnerable populations – with a special focus on IDPs, women, children, victims of trafficking, and marginalised groups – through effective advocacy and the application of a rights-based approach across all sectors;
§ Strengthen local capacity for delivery of basic social services and for disaster preparedness and response.
In the coming year, humanitarian partners have committed to strengthening an integrated multi-sectoral approach in Somalia. Geographic priority areas have been identified and coordinated actions will focus on these. The urgent need for an integrated approach to emergency operations and disaster risk mitigation is underscored by the deteriorating malnutrition situation and chronic nutrition crisis. As malnutrition is multi-causal, it must be addressed in a coordinated manner that includes feeding centres, primary health care, access to clean water, livelihoods support, education and finding durable solutions to recurring vulnerabilities. Additionally, the humanitarian community will continue to focus on building technical and operational capacity of Somali partners, enabling a more sustained delivery of assistance and services in a continually volatile operating environment in which levels of access are either limited or are subject to change.
Long-standing obstacles to humanitarian access continue – including extortion, piracy and roadblocks – while new obstacles and threats are increasing. Humanitarian workers have been harassed and arrested and now face dangers such as roadside bombs. More than 30 security incidents targeting United Nations staff or assets were recorded between April and September, while NGOs recorded 37 incidents in which they were directly targeted between January and September. Both United Nations agencies and international NGOs report that national staff are being increasingly targeted. In order to improve the conditions for provision of humanitarian assistance and protection, and to raise the profile of Somalia internationally, humanitarian partners will increase advocacy efforts across all sectors in 2008. The humanitarian community must do all that it can to ensure that Somalia does not become a forgotten crisis. However, humanitarian action can have a lasting impact and form a basis for early recovery only if security improves and real progress is made in the reconciliation process.
Unlike the 2007 CAP, the 2008 CAP does not contain an Early Recovery Pillar. Emergency assistance and early recovery/development will be bridged through the CAP’s complementarity with the United Nations Transition Plan. The latter covers 2008-2009 and is the UN framework for planning and implementing recovery and reconstruction, supporting the transition to normalisation and ownership of development, and bringing Somalia out of chronic humanitarian emergency.
The 2008 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia seeks $406,235,651 for 155 projects from 13 United Nations agencies, 28 International NGOs and 21 Local NGOs. Partners have indicated that $26,528,117 is already available for their proposed projects, leaving an outstanding requirement of $379,707,534. Just over $46 million of this total is for 22 projects also included in the UNTP; these are flagged as such throughout the CAP document. CAP projects fall within the nine clusters of Access and Security; Agriculture and Livelihoods; Education; Food Security; Health; Nutrition; Protection; Shelter; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), the two support sectors of Logistics and Coordination, and the areas of Emergency Preparedness and Multi-sector for refugees and returnees. Cross-cutting issues of gender and HIV/AIDS have been integrated into sectoral strategies as appropriate. The need for balanced sectoral funding is more relevant than ever to enable greater integration of response in 2008 to address chronic humanitarian crises. Long-term funding commitments are also needed if partners are to address underlying causes of such crises as well as emergency needs.
Some Basic Facts about Somalia
Population 7,960,000 (United Nations 2007)
Under 5 mortality 135/1,000 (UNICEF 2006
Life expectancy 47 years (UNDP/World Bank Socio-economic Survey 2002)
Prevalence of undernourishment in total population 36% (UNICEF 2006)
Gross national income per capita $226 (UNDP/World Bank Socio-economic Survey 2002)
* Percentage of population living on less than $1 per day 43.2% (Somalia MDG Report 2007)
* Proportion of population without sustainable access to an improved drinking water source 71% (UNICEF 2006)
* DPs (number and percent of population) 850,000 (10.8%) (UNHCR 2007)
* Refugees 658 (UNHCR 2007)
* In-country 1,081 registered asylum seekers …
* Abroad 245,000 (UNHCR 2007) (Yemen, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania only)
* ECHO Vulnerability and Crisis Index score (V/C) 3/3 (Most severe rank)
* Maternal Mortality 1,044/100,000
* Infant Mortality 86/1,000
* People living with HIV/AIDS 40,000
* 0.299 (UNDP/World Bank Socio-economic Survey 2002
http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?MenuID=10484&Page=1630
FSAU Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Brief - Focus on Post Deyr Season Early Warning, December 2007
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/DPAL-7A7EKV-Full_Report.pdf/$File/Full_Report.pdf
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7273
Somalia (2007)
Population: 8,900,000
Capital: Mogadishu
Political Rights Score: 7
Civil Liberties Score: 7
Status: Not Free
Ratings Change
Somalia’s political rights rating declined from 6 to 7 due to the consolidation of power—especially in Mogadishu—by the Islamic Courts Union, which was not a freely elected government accountable to the people and which worked to limit political participation.
Overview
For much of 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist movement, expanded its control over southern Somalia and largely routed the forces of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government, which was based in the town of Baidoa. After months of speculation about the extent of Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia, Ethiopian leaders in late December declared that their goal was to crush the Islamists and support the transitional government. By year’s end, Ethiopian and government troops had captured Mogadishu, the capital, and driven the ICU to the southernmost portion of the country.
Somalia gained independence in 1960 as an amalgam of former British and Italian colonies populated largely by ethnic Somalis. A 1969 coup by an army general, Siad Barre, led to two decades of instability, brutal civil strife, and the manipulation of clan loyalties for political purposes. Somalia was also plagued by natural disasters including floods, drought, and famine. When Barre’s government was toppled in 1991, the clan-based militias began fighting each other, and Somalia has lacked an effective central government ever since.
Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took some 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted a UN humanitarian mission led by U.S. forces. The intervention soon deteriorated into urban guerrilla warfare with the Somali militias, and over 100 UN peacekeepers, including 18 U.S. soldiers, were killed. The $4 billion operation was eventually terminated, and international forces had departed by March 1995. Civil conflict continued over the subsequent decade with varying degrees of intensity.
In 2000, many of the faction leaders agreed to participate in a Transitional National Government (TNG) established at the Conference for National Peace and Reconciliation, hosted by neighboring Djibouti. The conference charter called for a three-year transitional government with a 245-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA). In August, the TNA elected Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as transitional president. The TNG and more than 20 rival factions signed a ceasefire in Kenya in October 2002, an initial step toward establishing a lasting federal system. Serious fissures in the process developed over the next year, as some factions launched their own power-sharing negotiations in Mogadishu.
The political process was revitalized in 2004 at another conference in Kenya, which resulted in the establishment of a 275-seat parliament, the Transitional Federal Assembly, and a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The country’s four largest clans were each given 61 TFA seats, and an alliance of minor clans took the remaining 31. The members in October elected controversial Ethiopian-backed warlord Abdullahi Yusuf to serve a five-year term as the first transitional president. Yusuf had previously been the leader of the breakaway region of Puntland. A month later, he appointed Ali Muhammad Gedi as his prime minister.
Despite the political process, clashes between rival factions continued and hundreds of civilians were killed. The TFG moved from its base in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2005 and established itself by early 2006 in Baidoa, a town about 155 miles north of Mogadishu.
In 2006, a fierce battle for control of Mogadishu broke out between an alliance of warlords and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a local Islamist group. Critics of the ICU, including Ethiopia and the United States, accused it of links to the terrorist network al-Qaeda. The ICU alleged that the United States was violating a UN weapons embargo by supplying arms to the anti-ICU warlords. By June 2006, the ICU had taken control of Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia, gaining a popular following for its promise to deliver law and order. The TFG in Baidoa feared it would lose any claims on control of the country and called for the intervention of East African peacekeeping troops, a move bitterly opposed by the ICU. Some Somalis warned that the involvement of regional troops would lead to a prolonged conflict, since neighboring states had supported different factions in Somalia, undermining their neutrality. There are credible allegations that Ethiopia’s enemy Eritrea supported the ICU by providing arms to the movement. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on December 6 calling for a force of regional troops to support the TFG, but the measure had not been implemented by year’s end.
Meanwhile, the ICU had taken control of the southern city of Kismayo in September and appeared poised to move on the small territory left to the TFG. By November, peace talks between the TFG and ICU had broken down. Ethiopia said it was obliged to repel the ICU threat, and in December Ethiopian troops were openly deployed in Somalia. A major Ethiopian and TFG offensive ensued late that month, and by year’s end the ICU had been driven from Mogadishu and forced to retreat to the extreme south of the country.
Somalia is a poor country, and the economic problems Somalis face are compounded by both civil strife and natural disasters. The majority of Somalis are pastoralists or subsistence farmers. In the cities, because of the lack of government regulation, businesses and telecommunications industry have continued to function with some success. The absence of central authority since 1991 left a void that allowed businesspeople to enter the market without bureaucratic hurdles.
Since May 1991, the northwestern region of Somaliland, roughly comprising the territory of the former British colony, has functioned with considerable stability as a de facto independent state, though it has not received international recognition. The region of Puntland, in the northeastern corner of the country, has also been relatively autonomous since 1998. However, unlike Somaliland, it has not sought full independence, declaring only a temporary secession until Somalia is stabilized.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Somalia is not an electoral democracy. The ICU, which controlled large swaths of the country for much of 2006, had not publicly committed to creating democratic institutions. Nationwide elections have not been held since the 1969 military coup, but 3,000 representatives of various clans and civic and religious groups chose an internationally recognized transitional parliament in 2000. A new, 275-member Transitional Federal Assembly was convened in 2004, which elected Abdullahi Yusuf to a five-year term as president. The transitional government controlled only a small portion of southern and central Somalia for most of the year. The country has no effective political parties, and the political process is driven largely by clan loyalty.
As in most countries experiencing long-term civil strife, corruption is rampant in Somalia. Transparency International did not rank Somalia in its 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index.
Somalia’s charter provides for press freedom, but journalists face threats and harassment. In the second half of 2006, there was an increase in the frequency of attacks on journalists, both by the ICU and the TFG. After the ICU took control of southern and central Somalia, the relative freedom that journalists enjoyed when the situation was more lawless was replaced by an atmosphere of fear. In one case, award-winning Swedish freelance journalist and photographer Martin Adler was murdered in June while filming a demonstration in Mogadishu. Also that month, the TFG shut down local radio station Radio Shabelle after it reported that a few hundred Ethiopian troops had entered Somalia. In November, Abdulahi Yasin Jama, a journalist who worked for two private radio stations, was detained for three days after he also reported that there were Ethiopian troops in Somalia. The ICU in September began closing critical radio stations and detaining journalists. The private Radio HornAfrik and Radio Simba were both temporarily shuttered for their critical reporting. Radio HornAfrik was told it could resume broadcasting if it agreed to stop playing romantic music and refrained from critical reporting about the ICU.
In December 2006, the New York–based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) expressed its concern over the rising attacks on journalists as the conflict intensified. CPJ criticized the ICU for not permitting the head of the independent National Union of Somali Journalists to leave the country. At the same time, the organization also chided the TFG for shuttering Radio Warsan, which at the time was the only remaining private station in Baidoa, for its critical reporting.
Somalia is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, but there is a small Christian community and some followers of traditional African religions. Even before the ICU’s rise to prominence, religious freedom was limited, and it dwindled further after the Islamists took power in most of the country. While some of the ICU leaders stressed that their aim was to restore law and order in Somalia and not to impose a strict interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law), the courts acted with varying degrees of conservatism, and the overall effect on personal freedoms—particularly those of non-Muslims and secular Muslims—was negative.
Academic freedom faces some restrictions similar to those imposed on the media, and there is no organized higher education system in most of the country.
Xenophobic sentiment escalated after the ICU took power, increasing the operating risks faced by foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other agencies. In September 2006, an Italian nun who had lived in Somalia for decades was murdered in a hospital along with her bodyguard by unidentified gunmen. Even though the situation is dangerous and chaotic, there are still several local and international relief groups and NGOs operating in the country. The state of civil conflict has made broad economic and labor policies impossible to establish, but Somalia’s informal economy still functions and the country has an extensive telecommunications sector.
The ICU had dominated the judiciary in Somalia before it seized political control. Much of the popular support it built up was due to its ability to establish a semblance of law and order in the war-torn country. The courts of the ICU interpreted Sharia with varying degrees of severity, but some judges have been accused of supporting an al-Qaeda or Taliban style of leadership.
Prior to Ethiopia’s attack on the ICU, human rights abuses occurred on a regular basis in Somalia. However, the outbreak of more intense warfare raised the possibility of abuses on a larger scale. Extrajudicial killing, torture, and arbitrary detention are common. Under the ICU, residents faced imprisonment or more severe forms of punishment for ordinary activities that were considered un-Islamic. During the first few days of war with Ethiopia, there were media reports of high civilian casualty rates and the threat of a humanitarian crisis as residents fled the violence.
Discrimination in Somalia is generally clan based, rather than ethnic or religious, since most Somalis share the same ethnicity and faith. Clan loyalty means that the larger, more established clans are able to dominate political and social life and harass those from smaller clans.
Travel throughout Somalia is restricted by poor security, and the situation worsened as fighting involving the ICU, government forces, and Ethiopian troops intensified.
Women’s groups were instrumental in galvanizing support for Somalia’s peace process. The country’s new charter prohibits sexual discrimination, but women experience intense discrimination under customary practices and variants of Sharia. The ICU’s advances in 2006 threatened to amplify the influence of the latter. UN agencies and NGOs are working to raise awareness about the health dangers of female genital mutilation. Various armed factions have recruited children into their militias.
Freedom of the Press 2007
Draft Country Report and Ratings
May 1, 2007
Somalia
Status: Not Free
Legal Environment: 27
Political Environment: 34
Economic Environment: 24
Total Score: 85
In principle, Somalia’s charter provides for freedom of the press, but with the lawless nature of Somali society, many of the local clan leaders have typically disregarded this in favor of a more aggressive approach to critical reporting. In 2006, the environment in which the media operated experienced a noticeable deterioration with the escalation of the armed political conflict between the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Baidoa and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which took control of much of Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu beginning in June. According to the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), 2006 was the most dangerous year for press freedom in Somalia in more than a decade.
In October, the ICU announced a 13-point code of conduct for the media which would effectively serve to eliminate press freedom in the areas under its control. If this were implemented, it would prohibit the publication of articles that could create division between the ICU and the public, require journalists to reveal their sources, and forbid media outlets from receiving foreign funding. However, the ICU eventually agreed to discuss this proposal with the media before it could be passed; at year’s end no aspect of the code had been formally approved or implemented. Despite such legal setbacks, the ICU was still able to severely curtail the freedoms of the independent press in 2006 and generally helped to cultivate an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship that pervaded Somali journalism throughout the country.
In 2006, the number of violent attacks, arbitrary arrests, and instances of censorship noticeably increased. The NUSOJ logged 30 such cases—10 more than they had recorded in 2005. The most egregious of these occurred in June, less than three weeks after the ICU seized control of Mogadishu, when Martin Adler, the award-winning Swedish freelance journalist and photographer, was shot in the back and killed while filming a pro-ICU demonstration in Mogadishu. Despite ICU promises that his killer would be brought to justice, at year’s end no one had yet been identified or arrested. Among a wide number of other press freedom violations that occurred in territories held by the Islamists, in September the ICU began closing critical radio stations and detaining journalists. Private Radio HornAfrik and Radio Simba were both temporarily shuttered for their critical reporting. Radio HornAfrik was told it could begin broadcasting if it agreed to stop playing romantic music and refraining from critical reporting about the ICU.
Intimidation and harassment of the media was not unique to Mogadishu or the ICU. In fact, self-censorship was a particular problem in Baidoa where journalists were expressly targeted by the TFG for reporting on Ethiopian troops in Somalia prior to their announced entry on December 20. Such instances included the June closure of Radio Shabelle, a local radio station, and the October arrest and temporary detention of Abdullahi Yassin Jama, a journalist with Radio Warsan and the Somalia Broadcasting Corporation.
Despite the high number of press freedom violations reported in 2006 throughout Somalia, many more incidents are believed to have gone completely unreported, often out of fear of reprisal or an acceptance of the futility of attempts to bring perpetrators to justice. In fact, near total impunity currently exists in Somalia for perpetrators of crimes against the press; in the last two years, no suspects have been arrested for any of the multiple instances of harassment, intimidation, murder, abuse, or torture of journalists. This is particularly deplorable in the case of the two journalists murdered in 2005; BBC correspondent Kate Peyton and Duniya Muhyadin Nur, a reporter for the Somali-based radio station Capital Voice, were both shot and killed while working in and around Mogadishu.
Photocopied dailies and low-grade radio stations have proliferated in Mogadishu and elsewhere since 1991, and some 20 private newspapers and a dozen radio and television stations exist in the country.
Nonetheless, a number of outlets ceased operations in 2006 or censored the subject matter of their reporting. Of those that continue to operate, many have been accused of bias, particularly in their coverage of the war or ethnic and inter-clan rivalries. The infrastructure for journalism in Somalia is relatively undeveloped as many journalists work with little to no pay and most are employed without a written contract. Unlike many other African nations, Somalia has a rich internet presence which is fueled predominantly by the Somali diaspora in the West and Gulf states. Nevertheless, due to pervasive poverty, less than 1 percent of the domestic Somali population has been able to access this resource. While online community has traditionally operated unhindered, there were reports in 2006 that the ISU monitored internet activity closely.
In 2006, the status of press freedom was visibly better in the two self-proclaimed autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland than in the rest of the country, although restrictions are still harsh and coverage of political and security issues is particularly perilous. The Puntland charter provides for freedom of the press “as long as they respect the law.” In January, Radio Las Anod, the only radio station in the region of Las Anad of Sool was temporarily closed and all employees were briefly detained for violating the Puntland Vice President’s order not to sell anything from Somaliland; they had broadcast misinformation about a children’s measles vaccination program originating from Somaliland. In Somaliland, liberal decrees nominally guaranteeing press freedom do not prevent the local administration from continuing to harass and detain journalists. In June, soldiers from the Somaliland Criminal Investigation Department arrested the editor of a popular newspaper on accusation that he had published an article written by an American reader; the editor was released the next day, but only following persistent demands by human rights groups. Separately, in March the government in Somaliland, gave its permission for Hargeisa Cable Television to begin operating an independent broadcast in the region; until 2006, the Somaliland government had maintained a monopoly on broadcast television media.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/somalia_FTP_07.pdf
Africa addresses the Somali Pirate Problem
17 Dec 2007
'Somali pirates in mid-attach'
While piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb continues to target commercial fishing and cargo ships, holding them for ransom and looting their cargo and personal possessions, the existence of this criminality in the region continues to make transiting cruising sailors understandably very very nervous.
The following release by Africa Press is therefore welcome news:
The Association of the Port Management Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) is in full support for the establishment of a maritime force possibly as a maritime component of the Africa’s stand by Force against piracy on the high seas.
The Association Secretary General Mr. Jerome Ntibarekerwa says the issue of the possibility of the regional maritime force being established to check the nagging pirate problem in Africa has been debated exhaustively.
‘’This has been the latest debate as Somali waters remain a major danger zone to fishing cruise and cargo vessels.
In a policy statement carried out in the latest PMAESA newsletter entitled ‘Our Ports’’ Ntibarekerwa called for a bilateral and multilateral engagement in the form of continued conferences, exercises and joint operations.
‘’Those opportunities will help foster good relations, share and standardize best practices and develop information and intelligence regime,’’ he says.
Earlier this year, some ship operators in the Kenyan port city of Mombasa had suggested that the government should provide armed escort to commercial ships plying between Mombasa port and Somali waters. The demands followed the capture of Mombasa based vessels by Somali pirates as they delivered relief food for the UN World Food Programme.
However, Transport Minister Chirau Ali Makwere, ruled out such as arrangement, citing international conventions to which Kenya is a party.
In February, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and the transitional government of Somalia proposed the formation of a joint task force to conduct anti-piracy and collective reporting activities.
Two weeks ago, a leading sailors welfare organization the Seafarers Assistance Programme (SAP) supported the United Nations Security Council’s decision to address piracy and armed robbery facing vessels sailing off the coast of Somalia.
SAP national co-coordinator, Andrew Mwangura, warned fishing vessels to keep away from Somali waters, apart from being in danger, the presence of such vessels in Somali was largely illegal and contrary to the UN convention of Law of the sea. ‘’It was a great joy to see the Taiwanese fishing vessel, Ms Cheng Fong Hwa 168 calling on Mombasa port two weeks ago after spending more than six months in captivity in Somalia,’’ Mwangura said.
He said the ill-fated vessel and her 16 crew members comprised two Taiwanese, two Phillipinos and 12 Chinese were hijacked by Somali gunmen on April 18 this year while on a fishing expedition in Somali fishing grounds.
They were released after Taiwanese ship-owners paid a ransom.
Narrating their six-month ordeal, the crew said the pirates shot and injured one crewmember a few days before brutally exempting another.
The pirates robbed them of their personal belonging before releasing them.
Mwangara said fishing in Somalia coastal line waters was illegal and all foreign fishing vessels must stay away ‘’since illegal fishing vessels are using Mombasa port as their port of convenience, we call upon the Kenya maritime Authority to reactivate port state control on fishing vessels in accordance with the international plan of Action (IPOA) against illegal fishing,’’ he said.
IPOA calls for landing of illegal caught fish to be prohibited by all states and access to point or its facilities denied for illegal fishing vessels. It also calls for detention and arrest for illegal fishing vessels should they enter seaports.
by Leo Odera Omolo, API/APN /Sail-World Cruising
http://www.sail-world.com
Somalia: Tragedy and Opportunity
By Michael McClennen, Guest Contributor
27 December 2006
The tragedy unfolding in Somalia has the potential to destroy thousands of innocent lives and livelihoods. At the same time, it holds within it the seeds of international peace. We must urgently decide which side of the conflict to support, and our decision may well have immense repercussions for international relations in the 21st century.
The key point is this: The "legitimate" government of Somalia is composed of those very warlords whose lawless ways have terrorized the country for more than a decade. It has no popular support whatsoever, and controls only the territory around one small town. A new government recently came into being, seemingly with broad popular support. It has extended its sway with relatively little bloodshed over most of the country, and has been able to establish stability, rule of law, and economic revitalization.
What objection could anyone find to this wonderful state of affairs? Apparently, the objection of our country, and of many others around the world, is that the new government is "Islamist" and bases its code of law on the Sharia code. Notwithstanding this dire label, the reality on the ground (according to published reports) is that multiple points of view are represented in the government - some which advocate strict imposition of traditional Islamic social standards, but others that are much more liberal. Unfortunately, the pressures of war undoubtedly will increase the prestige and influence of the conservative faction, driving out those who are more liberal. International support for the new government, by contrast, could well produce the opposite effect.
This past weekend, the neighboring country of Ethiopia sent troops, tanks and bombers into Somalia in support of the "legitimate" government, which actually has no popular legitimacy, and against the "Islamist" government, which has the support of most of the populace.
Mogadishu was bombed and civilians were killed. The reaction of the international community so far has been a resounding silence. This is, essentially, a show of support for the Ethiopians. By failing to support the Islamist government, we are essentially playing into the hands of the conservative faction, pushing this society in the very direction that we do not want it to go. If we do not give them aid, they will perforce turn to whoever will offer it, and we all know who that will be. The notion that this new movement is contaminated by "terrorism" and "Islamic fundamentalism" thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy!
At this point, we have the option to respond to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with the same attitude we had toward the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or to the Serbian invasion of Croatia: namely, to condemn it as an illegal intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and to exert international pressure in the form of military aid and sanctions to bring the invasion to a close.
By dropping our support for the government of ex-warlords, and instead putting our confidence in the popularly supported government, we will accomplish three things. First, we will uphold the principles of international law, which are the foundation of international peace. Second, we will strengthen the hands of the more-liberal and international thinkers in the new government, weakening the hands of those who would proclaim holy war and invite holy warriors from other lands to aid them. Third, we will provide powerful evidence to the Muslim world that we intend to treat all nations of the world under the same set of standards, no matter what faith they profess.
By giving this newest of the world's governments the benefit of the doubt, we can demonstrate that we will judge it by what it is able to accomplish and by how it treats its citizens, rather than prejudging it by the claimed basis of its authority.
Bluntly, we must decide either to be true to the principles of democracy and international law that we espouse, or to demonstrate unequivocally that we consider any government based on Islamic principles to be illegitimate on its face. Our choice is clear: peace on one hand; on the other, a gauntlet thrown in the face of nations representing almost one-quarter of the earth's population. If we continue in our policy of silence - or worse, throw in with the Ethiopians - we will deal a terrible blow to the fragile international accord.
The choice is ours, and we must make it while we still have a chance.
http://zimbabwechaos.blogspot.com/2006/12/somalia-tragedy-and-opportunity.html