Islamism /Takfir wa-l-Hijra
Arabic: takfir wa-l-hijra
Other spellings: Takfir wal-Hijra; Takfir Wal Hijra
Originating in Egypt, a violent Islamist organization, today operating in several countries. Takfir wa-l-Hijra is linked with al-Qa'ida, representing its most gruesome aspects.
Takfir wa-l-Hijra is often defined as an extreme Salafist group, but "Salafism" is ambiguous term, and it suffices to describe Takfir wa-l-Hijra as "extremist Islamists". Their views have even equated with Kharijism, the earliest sect of Islam, although they deviate in one important sense; Takfir wa-l-Hijra calls for a society ruled by a Caliph.
Takfir wa-l-Hijra is made up of two Arabic words, the first is the rather uncommon "takfir", meaning to declare other Muslims as infidels, hence being individuals that were permitted to kill. The other word is "hijra" which is the word used for Muhammad flight to Yathrib in 622 (Yathrib would after Muhammad had its Jewish majority killed or enslaved be called Madina ar-Rasul, or Madina).
The organizational structure of Takfir wa-l-Hijra is not known, since the late 1970's they have been a situation of obscurity, only appearing when violent attacks are performed. It may well be a loose network, and it may well be a secret and strictly organized group. It may even be several groups, each fully independent from the other, using the same name. Takfir wa-l-Hijra has no headquarters and no profiled leader, although it is often said that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the supposed number 2 in al-Qa'ida is central in Takfir wa-l-Hijra.
It is not so much their definition of the ideal society that differ Takfir wa-l-Hijra from other Islamist groups, rather it is their means of achieving their goals. They have adopted a technique that for centuries was without any practical importance in Sunni Islam, though surviving in Shi'i Islam and with Taqiyya religions: Taqiyya, the concealment of one's faith.
With the basis of the ideology of Takfir wa-l-Hijra, the followers do things strictly prohibited by Islam, things they do to blend in with the societies they fight. A follower of Takfir wa-l-Hijra willingly take the shape and life of the most secular Muslims, all in order to deceive his or her enemies: Shave the beard, wear a tie, have non-Muslim friends, drink alcohol, eat pork, have open sexual relations etc. These acts have no value in itself, the activist will only do as much as necessary to blend in.
The understanding of taqiyya and takfir involves full freedom to deceive other Muslims, and even kill them, it all being part of a larger plan. If they die in their acts, the reward is the highest a Muslim can hope for; becoming a martyr in Paradise.
In the 1970's the Takfir wa-l-Hijra chose another form of protesting against what they consider infidelity, then especially in Egyptian society. Shukri Mustafa was much inspired by the ideals of hippies and socialists around the world in the same period of time. He called for a total break from the Muslim society, motivating his followers to form isolated, alternative communities, he even promoted living in caves in southern Egypt. This call got many followers, among them a surprisingly high number of women. In order to legitimize their presence, he performed takfir on their families; calling their families kafirs. The families of the women took their case to the courts, and would with that bring an end to his experiment.
History
1960's: Takfir wa-l-Hijra is founded, exact year is not known.
1977: (eller 1971) Shukri Mustafa becomes leader of Takfir wa-l-Hijra, and declares the need to break totally free from the established, secularized Muslim society.
1978: Shukri Mustafa is captured, tried in front of a court and executed.
1981 October 6: Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, is assassinated. The killing is linked to former members of Takfir wa-l-Hijra.
1991 November: Islamists with alleged links to Takfir wa-l-Hijra attacks the Algerian border post of Guemmar. This was a part of the build-up to the Algerian Civil War.
1996: Allegedly, Osama bin Laden is planned killed by Takfir wa-l-Hijra, because of him being accused of liberal views.
2000: 20 people killed while performing prayer in a mosque in Sudan.
2004: Unveiling of a terrorist network in Spain, which planned to blow up a court of law.
By: Tore Kjeilen
http://lexicorient.com/e.o/takfir_wa-l-hijra.htm
Takfir in Morocco
There is an interesting if rather confused piece about takfir movements in Morocco in this months English edition of Le Monde Diplomatique. Its interesting because these movements have drawn little attention in Morocco, since they were born in Egypt in the 1970s and for the most part have not had a very public role elsewhere. They also show the multi-faceted nature of Islamic fundamentalism, with so many factions and different offshoots that it reminds me of the Peoples Front of Judea/Judean Peoples Front/Popular Front of Judea skit in Monty Pythons Life of Brian.
However, I found the article rather confused because while the headline, Morocco: slums breed jihad would lead one to suspect that the argument is that poverty breeds terrorism, most of the article is devoted to explaining the beliefs of the takfiris and the networks theyve created. This is an old dispute when we talk about Islamist terrorism: is the idea in itself violent or is it conditions of living that inspire violence? While the answer is probably a mixture of both, I tend towards the first option. It may be popular to point to the Arab world as have failed its development and try to explain violence as the result of arrested development, but in many cases the key advocates of violence were not particularly poor: think of Muhammad Atta, son of a comfortably middle class engineer, Ayman Zawahri, scion of a prominent family of doctors and theologians, or even Osama Bin Laden, heir to a vast fortune and playboy millionaire until he found his calling. (At the same time, think of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and his origins in Jordanian slums.)
In other words, poverty breeds conditions when idle young men who see limited horizons in front of them may be tempted by a radical ideology. But the ideology has to be there in the first place. And here its important to distinguish between the many different types of Islamism, some reformist, some conservative, some democratic, some autocratic, some progressive, others backwards.
For those who dont know what takfir is, here is a long explanation from the article:
The bomb blast at the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Taba last month confirmed that the cause of global jihad is no longer confined to peripheral areas such as Afghanistan, Chechnya or former Yugoslavia. It is now striking at the heart of the Arab Muslim world, with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco directly in the firing line.
The bomb attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003 revealed the existence of a new form of fundamentalism - takfir. Takfirists are no longer content to fight the United States or the Zionist entity; they brand Muslim leaders, and all their direct or indirect supporters, as infidels (kafir) and condemn them as apostates. They preach political violence as a means of forcing states to return to the laws of God and the society of the Prophet of original Islam. Their aim is not only to overturn unpopular and corrupt regimes but to cleanse the existing political order.
The movement Takfir wal-Hijra emerged in the 1970s after a split in Egypts Muslim Brotherhood; it has inspired one of the main ideologies of violence in the Muslim world, especially since the early 1990s. It is sometimes referred to as Takfiri Salafism and it constitutes a clear break with other Islamist movements that are prepared to engage if necessary in legal political activity aimed at establishing an Islamic state through the ballot box.
The importance that Takfirist doctrine has assumed for armed groups reflects a deep gulf between this extreme fringe of Islamism and countries that are themselves rooted in traditional Islam. In Morocco, where the king is regarded as a descendant of the Prophet, we are witnessing a shift in the boundary between jihadists and their targets within Muslim society. A few weeks before the attacks of May 2003 fundamentalist groups issued a declaration of apostasy against the Moroccan state and Moroccan society and distributed it in mosques in slum districts of Casablanca.
A Salafist activist spoke of Mohamed Fizazi, 57, a primary school teacher, the Moroccan Takfirists theoretician, who was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in August 2003. He said: Fizazi was found guilty of pronouncing the Muslim profession of faith [There is no God but God, and Muhammad is his prophet] differently from others. This comment demonstrates how the Takfirists relationship with Islam has changed and how other Muslims are now considered heretics.
An inquiry conducted after the Casablanca attacks (like the investigation into the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 in Spain) revealed that most Takfirist groups originate in the shanty towns and disintegrating districts of Casablanca, Meknes, Fez and Tangiers. It also showed that extremist groups have a solid, active local base and are not just dormant cells waiting to respond to commands from al-Qaida, even if Osama bin Ladens network has played a major role in providing logistic support and formulating strategy.
Figures for 2002, when more than 166 civilians were assassinated, suggest the extent of Takfirist violence in Morocco. But mass media have taken care not to publicise them and do not much cover the violence, which usually happens in the poor districts. The autonomous activities of local gangleaders - self-proclaimed emirs such as Fikri in Douar Sekouila on the outskirts of Casablanca and Rebaa, a militia leader in the Meknes suburbs, and some dozen others heading local groups - show they act on their own initiative and not always on instructions from somewhere in Afghanistan.
The Takfirists are part of a new generation of Islamic fundamentalists from Moroccos urban slums. Their strongholds are what locals call al-karyan, the disused quarries in industrial zones left to decay after independence in 1956. The shanty towns that have mushroomed there in the past 20-30 years are home to uprooted landless peasants, victims of a rural exodus. Most Takfirists, like the suicide bombers of 16 May, are karyanis, from a class of social outcasts living in the shanty towns.
All of which reminds me of a good friend of mine who was walking down the street of a poor quarter of Cairo with a Muslim Brotherhood activist. A man with a long black beard dressed in traditional robes the marks of the ultra-pious walks by them and throws a dirty look at the Muslim Brotherhood activist. Hes a member of takfir wa al hijra, the Brother says. Then he added, with an air of contempt, extremist!
The point is that there is a real effort that can be done to curb extremism by closing down the sources of funding for the real extremists (mostly Saudi Arabia) while engaging other Islamists in a political dialogue even if some of their ideas are distasteful (as they are to me). In most Arab countries, this is not being done.
P.S. At the risk of contradicting what I said above, Im also pasting an article I wrote a few months after the 16 May 2003 bombings in Casablanca that looks at the slums from which most of the bombers came on the day of a local election. Click more below to see the story.
Morocco torn between security and democracy
Issandr El Amrani in Rabat and Casablanca
Five months after the 16 May Casablanca bombings that took over 40 lives the first Islamist terror attacks in the country Moroccans find themselves at a critical juncture on the road to democratization.
One the one hand, many are eager to continue the democratization process started towards the end of the reign of King Hassan II and that was given a boost by King Muhammad VI when he ascended upon the throne. Feisty opposition newspapers and new political parties flourished.
But the transition period was short-lived. Soon after the September 11 attacks on America, security forces began to regain their influence as the kingdoms traditional elite the makhzen began to worry that Al Qaedas ideas may spread to Morocco too. By the time the 16 May attacks took place, democratization was put on hold.
Some of the educated, Westernized middle class began to think that the democratization process was flawed because it allowed too much freedom for Islamists to operate, including, for the first time, the right for moderates to create their own Justice and Development party, the PJD, which is now the third largest party in parliament.
The king wanted his democracy so much, lamented one pharmacist in Rabat. But now he cant, not with these Islamists.
This reaction is not untypical among Moroccans, for whom the 16 May attacks shattered the conceit that Morocco was protected from the violent politics of neighboring Algeria, which has been hostage to a bloody civil war between the ruling military junta and Islamists for the past decade.
The change in mindset has even been given a name, lapres seize mai the post-16 May era. Many people here have even began to refer to the date much like Americans say 9/11, as a symbol of a critical watershed.
Hence, the heavy-handed approach the security forces have taken after the attacks, cracking down on the entire Islamist movement and arrested 1046 persons many more than could have plausibly been involved with the attacks was met with public approval. A blind eye was turned to the obvious flaws with the lightning trials of those who were arrested, during which judges ignored defendants claims that they were tortured to sign confessions.
The crackdown by the security services is seen by others as a wrong-headed approach, though, focusing on repressing dissent rather than dealing with its roots the countrys chronic social problems.
In Sidi Moumen, the suburb of Casablanca where the 16 May bombers lived, its easy to see what may have led them to embrace radical ideas. There, an entire shantytown sprawls out on top of a garbage heap. Cattle live in the same rickety shacks as people and graze on the garbage, eating rotting vegetable peel and other organic refuse. Electricity is pirated from nearby power lines, and there is no running water, only one central public fountain.
They said after 16 May that they would improve things for us, said Muhammad, a local carpenter. But the only thing that theyve done is build streetlights, and the only reason they did that is so they could better watch us.
On 12 September, the residents of Sidi Moumen, like the rest of the country voted in for local council elections. But apathy in this neighborhood was rife, with many people saying they would not bother to vote, as it wouldnt make any difference anyway.
Even among those who voted, there was disapointment that the PJD did not present itself in the constituency, where it is very popular. Although it came third in parliamentary elections in 2002, the PJD only presented itself in 20% of constituencies in last weeks local elections under pressure from the authorities.
Soufiane, a 19-year-old student from Sidi Moumen, voted for the first time in the recent elections. Dressed in traditional white robes and wearing the embroided white hat favored by the pious, he said he wished he could have voted for the PJD. The other parties, he said, had never done anything for Sidi Moumen.
We dont have cybercafes, we dont have a youth center, he complained. The only options [for young people] are drugs or fanaticism.
The king and his government have made dealing with unsanitary housing, unemployment and education priorities. But critics say change is coming too slow, with the rise of extremism representing a ticking time bomb.
How can we hope to win this the war against the cancer of terrorism while only relying on methods that disregard the law? wrote Abou Bakr Jamai, the editor of the weekly Le Journal, Moroccos most critical newspaper. Equality, respect for the law and democracy are the ingredients that strengthen a society. Its by injecting these medecines that we can rid ourselves of the tumors of terrorism.
http://arabist.net/archives/2004/11/24/takfir-in-morocco/
Root k-f-r
Arabic
Kufr: Unbelief (in Islam) - literally, ingratitude.
kafir: An infidel (non-Muslim).
takfir: Excommunication; declaring a person or group of people non-Muslim.
In mainstream Sunni Islam, it is considered wrong to engage in takfir. Sunni Islam has a general reluctance to spread fitna (sow dissension) or 'backbite'. Furthermore, to declare takfir is to pre-empt Allah's judgement. The Muslim who considers another's actions to be wrong may say so, but will stop far short of declaring that person an apostate from the faith. Similarly, there is a reluctance to resist a leader who prays and does not restrict the observance of the faith.
Even qualified mainstream religious scholars are reluctant to declare takfir except in particularly egregious cases.
Some radical groups have broken this taboo.
Takfiri Those who excommunicate, or 'declare kufr', mainstream Muslim individuals, societies and leaders.
Although nominally Sunni, takfiris reject major aspects of mainstream Sunni religion. They are also apt to reject components of society, culture and law in Muslim countries, which they consider to have slipped back into a pre-Islamic state of pagan ignorance (jahiliyya).
Unsurprisingly, takfiris often support militancy against their regimes.
Examples: The radical medieval Islamic scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah established a precedent for the declaration of takfir against a leader. The Mongols were invading the Muslim lands, and the Mamluks were fighting a Jihad against them. This campaign faced a crisis of legitimacy when the Mongols converted to Islam but continued to attack.
Ibn Taymiyyah said that the Mongols' enforcement of the Yasa law in place of Islamic Shariah reversed their conversion, rendering the Mongols apostate. Therefore it was not only permitted, but obligatory to wage war against them. The political leadership acted upon this fatwa, establishing a valuable precedent for Islamic radicals centuries later.
The 18th Century Islamic Revivalist Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab referred back to Ibn Taymiyyah in constructing an interpretation of Islam that allowed him to fight his fellow Muslims. He condemned many mainstream Muslim traditions (such as Sufism) as bid'a (innovation of the religion) and his followers slew many Muslims for allegedly kufr practises.
However, as a classification, takfiri more usually refers to certain splinter groups that broke away from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.1 1 For more on the Muslim Brotherhood, see our biography of its founder, Hassan al-Banna.
Following the writings of Maulana Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, groups of 'takfiri' Salafis have disengaged themselves from the surrounding society and planned insurrections. The first such group, Takfir wal-Hijra (TwH, Excommunication and Holy Flight/Emigration), was founded by Shukri Mustafa in 1971. The group's strategy was to isolate itself from the general society while building strength for a planned uprising. The plan was unsuccessful, but later Qutbist movements have been inspired by Mustafa's example. In particular, the most important intellectual figure in al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is believed to have been a member of TwH.
There are occasional news reports about takfiris, or about TwH. These are often confused, claiming for example that the group recently arose in Northern Africa. Although there are certainly takfiri radicals in countries such as Morocco and Algeria, TwH was founded in Egypt over thirty years ago.
One common theme emerges in contemporary reports on TwH, or the 'takfiri' ideology. That is that the takfiris privately adhere to austere Islamic beliefs, but are willing to engage in unislamic practises in order to infiltrate kufr society. This particular approach has certainly been adopted by al-Qaeda, and it is a legacy of Abdus-Salam Faraj's challenge to Mustafa's ideology. Qutb had preached that the nascent Islamic jama'ah needed to set itself apart from society, but he vaguely stated that some contact should be maintained. Mustafa taught a radical separation from the kuffar but his followers also travelled to oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia as guest workers, to bring money back to the group. After TwH had been broken up, Faraj declared that the TwH's isolation during a 'period of weakness' was merely a cowardly attempt to avoid the obligation of jihad. His group, al-Jihad, delayed terrorist attacks only for long enough to infiltrate the apparatus of state. However, this model also failed because it did not for training and developing the strength of the organisation.
Al-Qaeda, and associated groups, have synthesised these competing models. The resultant ideology holds that in the absence of an Islamic state, the vulnerable Muslim community must find a geographical location for hijra (Emigration/Flight from kufr) - such as Afghan training camps. However, the new model avoids a prolonged period of inactivity by alternating periods of hijra with periods of coexistence and infiltration with the outside world. This is in fact a brilliant ideological synthesis that turned the intellectually clumsy cult of TwH and the bloodthirsty bravado of al-Jihad into a sophisticated and workable revolutionary system. 2 This paragraph is based on research for the author's thesis; Trevor Stanley, The Quest for Caliphate: Islamist Innovation from Qutb to al-Qaeda, La Trobe University, 2003.
Although the al-Jihad organisation was an ideological antithesis of TwH, it is known that many TwH members joined al-Jihad (possibly including Zawahiri). It is possible that the organisation continued in a shell form, adapting to these ideological changes in direction, or that it continued as a moribund organisation until al-Qaeda operatives took it over (as Rohan Gunaratna seems to suggest).3 3Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 2002, p114.
While the history of the group Takfir wal Hijra is likely to remain murky, we can make some observations about takfiri radicalism, as practised by al-Qaeda and its fellow travellers. As the heirs to a bizaare 1960s and 1970s cult that condemned mainstream Muslim society to apostasy, they bear about as much relation to the Muslim world as the Charles Manson cult bore to the Western world. They are willing to break traditional Muslim prohibitions in order to infiltrate Muslim and Western societies alike. In short, they will be extremely difficult to combat, both for the West and the East.
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Author Trevor Stanley
The author does not claim to be a qualified religious scholar. Muslims should not treat this page as religious guidance. Muslims seeking authoritative information on their religion should seek a recognised Islamic scholar.
Sample citation:
Trevor Stanley, Definition: Kufr - Kafir - Takfir - Takfiri, Perspectives on World History and Current Events, July-December 2005. URL:
http://www.pwhce.org/takfiri.html Downloaded: 2 January 2009
See Also Shirk, Tawhid, Islamism, Ibn Taymiyya, Shukri Mustafa, Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Maududi
http://www.pwhce.org/takfiri.html
What Muslim Jihad Group Tried to Assassinate Osama Bin Laden?
Published on 30 May 2005 | Author PARKER, Janet Louise, D.V.M.,B.S.
In 1995 they attempted to assassinate Osama Bin Laden because they believed he was not radical or fundamentalist enough in his views. He focuses on jihad, as understood by the more traditionalist ulama. (religious leaders)
This group was responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He also made the mistake of working with the traditional ulama. The ulama cooperates with the rulers, often silently accepting the government's politics. The name of this group means "Condemnation and Migration", or "Anathema and Exile" or possibly "Excommunication and Emigration." depending on who you ask.
Many of their members were, in the early 1980s backed, financed, armed and even given travel documents by the CIA, British intelligence and other intelligence agencies in return for their support in the fight against the Russians in Afghanistan. Their members are permitted to disregard the injunctions of Islamic law in order to blend into infidel societies for the purposes of Jihad.
French Intelligence has called these terrorists " the hard core of the hard core: they are the ones who will be called upon to organize and execute the really big attacks." Who are they? They are the Takfir wa'l-Hijra.
The Takfir Wal Hijra was founded in Egypt in late 1960s as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of the extremist Egyptian Jihad organization, was the brain and the ideologue of the Al-Qa'ida organization, and many believe it is he who leads bin Laden.
Takfir militant dogma is the founding concepts on which the Jihad terrorist's network is based. The total number of Takfir members is unknown but could be in the thousands.
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was a leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s who was tortured and executed by President Nasser for his book Milestones (ma'alim fil tariq) which reinterpreted traditional Islamconcepts to justify a violent takeover of the state. His reinterpretation of traditional Islamic concepts was the catalyst for the rise of radical Islamic groups. The Takfir leader, Shukri Mustafa (1942-1978), was a disciple of Sayyid Qutb, and was seen as the promised mahdi who would found the new Muslim community, conquer the world, and usher in God's final reign on earth. Osama bin-Laden is a mahdi-like figure who has achieved mythical proportions. His austere and devout life-style, zeal for Islam, reported exploits, legendary riches, and international renown have exaggerated his popular appeal to Muslim fundamentalists.
The Takfir use concepts such as Jihad (holy war), Takfir (refutation), jahiliyya (state of ignorance), Istishhad (Martyrdom, including by suicide), and Shahid (Martyr) to justify armed resistance and violent takeovers of government from corrupt regimes as well as indiscriminate acts of terrorism against all perceived enemies. They believe in using suicide missions as legitimate tools.
Very few mature, intelligent and responsible European Muslims want to join the Global Jihad. So recruitment efforts by the Takfir in Morocco emphasize that a criminal background is not an obstacle in joining the Jihad. Experience with forgery, credit-card fraud, and knowledge of arms dealers and people traffickers are essential skills for terrorists. Besides the Takfir do not discourage prospects that drink, chase women, or are otherwise bad Muslims, since they can obtain their salvation through Jihad and martyrdom. This fits into the Takfir concept of "taqiyya," or use of deceptions that include blending into non-Muslim societies French Intelligence experts during the investigation of the bombing spree in France in 1995 established links between Algerian GIA cells in Europe and Mujaheddin leaders in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Six of the French terrorist suspects who allegedly were planning to blow up the US embassy in Paris were believed to be members of Takfir wal Hijra.
The Algerian GIA has long been known to run organized criminal networks for drug trafficking. Many Takfir converts were involved in drugs and pretty crime and were recruited while serving a prison sentence. Takfir members are very secretive, and they do not attend the existing Mosques. They shun all other Muslims as heretics. The Takfir cells in the Parisian suburbs are extremely well organized and disciplined. The Islamist networks in France largely consist of first or second-generation immigrants from North Africa with a working or middle class background.
But the bomb attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003 further revealed the existence of nidus of Takfir members in Morocco. These terrorist bombers had not gone to the Afghanistan Darunta camp for training. The only training they received was done by themselves over weekends. They had so many technical difficulties in the bomb making process that they eventually were forced to postpone the bombings. But the solution to their bomb-manufacturing problems was found on the internet, allowing them to build explosive devices the day before the operation. The amateur ineptitude of the bombers did not discourage these home schooled terrorists from being eventually successful.
There are estimated several hundred Takfirists in Morocco but many more sympathizers. This extremist group has a solid, active local base and are not just dormant cells waiting to respond to commands from al-Qaida. These Takfirists are no longer content to fight the United States; they label even Muslim leaders, and all their direct or indirect supporters, as infidels (kafir) and condemn them. The Takfir encourage political violence as a means of forcing states to return "to the laws of God and the society of the Prophet of original Islam".
In 2002 there were more than 166 Moroccan civilians assassinated by Takfirist violence. In Morocco this violent jihad organization has its strength in the in shanty towns on the edges of cities which are inhabited by clandestine inhabitants who have no official abode and no identity documents. The Takfirist militia essentially rules the poor districts of Morocco with merciless coercion of the inhabitants.
Takfir membership means an irrevocable break with family, local authorities and society itself. Once that step has been taken, the Takfirists can organize their transition to violent action, which they describe as combating evil and doing good. Moroccan Takfirist groups are characterized by a lack of any unified leadership. Even though Osama bin Laden's network may have played a major role in providing logistic support and formulating strategy, these self supporting cells act autonomously.
Since the organizational links to Osama Bin Laden are not as clear, it is more difficult for security forces to track their activities.
References:
Akerboom, E. S. M. (2003). Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands. General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD). AIVD (2002). Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands. From Incident to Trend. General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD).
AIVD (2004). Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands. General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD).
Belaala, Selma "Morocco: Slums Breed Jihad" Le Monde Diplomatique November 2004
Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and The Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, (London: al-Saqi, 1985), pp. 95-96, 150.
Manfred Gerstenfel, "Radical Islam in The Netherlands: A Case Study of a Failed European Policy", Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 14 2 January 2005,
http://www.jcpa.org/index.htm
Marie-France Etchegoin, "Le Takfir au service de Ben Laden"
Nouvel Observateur - N°1928 Semaine du 18 octobre 2001 -- N°1928 - Dossier MERIA Journal, Volume 3, No. 3, of September 1999, David Zeidan of London University described Radical Islam in Egypt by comparing two groups, the Society of Muslims (Takfir wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama'at al-Jihad): < <span class="link">http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a1.html
Muhammad Abdessalam Faraj, Al-farida al-gha'iba, translated, in Jansen, G.H., 1986.
The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 163-164. Murphy, Brian AP Religion Writer "Ultra-radical Muslims draw scrutiny" Boston.com news, November 20, 2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/11/20/ultra_radical_muslims_draw_scrutin?
Nabeel T. Jabbour, The Rumbling Volcano: Islamic Fundamentalism In Egypt (Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1993), pp. 143-157;
Nabeel T. Jabbour, The Rumbling Volcano: Islamic Fundamentalism In Egypt (Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1993), pp. 143-157; Sammy Salama & Kathleen Thompson, "The Historical Roots of Current Terrorist Tactics and Methods" November 21, 2003, (Sammy Salama sammy.salama@miis.edu)
http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031121.htm Sayyid Qutb, "Social Justice in Islam" in Shepard, W. ed., Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of 'Social Justice in Islam' (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 309-311.
Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Ma'alim fil Tariq), English Translation (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990), pp. 130-137.
Taarnby, Michael " "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. "Trends and Perspectives" Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, January 14, 2005 Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, Denmark, mtj@hum.au.dk
Zeidan, David `The Islamic Fundamentalist view of life as a perennial battle", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 26
http://www.criminology.com/articles/jihad_assassination.doc
A shining light on Alshabaab
There is no doubt we Somalis are being tested with calamities such as civil war, lawlessness, death, displacement, hunger and merciless foreign occupation along with coldblooded warlords and dreadful leaders. These are calamities that disorient the smart and learned among us let alone the general population.
We are also familiar with the resistance against the Ethiopian occupation that is going on in Somalia specially the south and central Somalia. All Somalis worthy of their name and their nation wants a Somali free of occupation, strong and serving its people. We know most of the resistance against the Ethiopian occupation is run by people that the western and non western media alike calls them Al-Shabab. However, the term Al-Shabab applies to all the groups fighting against the Ethiopian occupation.
For the short-term this united front against Ethiopian military occupation of Somalia is helpful but for the long term (when Ethiopia with draws from Somalia) this alliance of convenience will not stand for reasons I would enumerate here.
First, there is a significant group with in Al-Shabab that has ideologies that are foreign to Somalia and in fact to Islam as a whole. This group and their new recruits are formerly known as TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA. They do not pray the congregational prayers if their members are not leading; they do not eat the meat if their members do not slaughter it. They do not let their daughters be married to non members. They are tightly knit group that sees it self they are the only true Muslims and the rest of Somalis are Kufaar (disbelievers) or semi-disbelievers.
According to their creed, killing those who they see them against their ideologies are allowed. They believe the rulers of all the Islamic countries are disbelievers and thus are fare game to assassinate or otherwise harm them. Anyone they believe is associated with the current rulers or makes peace with them or even have a meeting with them is fair game to be shot without asking what was his motive. If they see an emerging leader that could threaten their scheme they would preemptively kill him before he even gets a chance. Those include Islamic preachers or Imaams, former military and intelligence officials familiar with their activities, people involved charities and non for profit organizations that have good reputation within the population and tribal chiefs who are seen uniting figures.
This group is extreme in all aspects of their life, they are extreme in their worship of Allah, they are extreme on their daily activities in that they only deal with their members in terms of business or otherwise. They make lawful what is unlawful and make lawful what is forbidden. For example, according to their creed it is permissible to lie, steal, embezzle and kill if they see as not belonging to their closely guarded group.
They actively recruit young enfranchised youth, they marry them to one of their members, they give financial help and some kind of career and the previously disenfranchised one feel close affinity and sense of belonging and worth with them. When this love is established with the new recruit, their ideologies are unleashed upon the unsuspecting victim and most of those who fall victim to this ruthless group rarely can escape their grip for several reasons. The number one reason is, they are brain washed and hardly question their actions. Secondly, if they leave the group, their wife, children and all their belongings are taken by the group. Thirdly, if they remain within the reach of the group while they are excommunicated, they would certainly be assassinated by a newly recruited member.
Currently, this group has grown in strength since the Islamic courts have been ousted by the Ethiopians. This particular group TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA has in the past appeared in different times from the time of Ali, the third Islamic Caliphate to this day and has been a cancer to society. With them a society cannot simply function without their total elimination or at least wiping them out significantly that they are not threat to the general population. The time of Ali, it has been reported that he burned them that only few who run away survived them who made their home the modern day Oman which they are called IBAADIs and they are the ruling elite over there even though they have significantly changed their character.
In Somalia, if we are not careful and be watchful of this group, we face more danger than the civil war we have been tested with. I believe many Somalis are oblivious to their hidden agenda and are beating the drums for them. But a rude awaking are in store for Somalis if we really do not see the distinction between freedom fighters and the deadly cult of TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA.
It is worth noting, that this group does not call themselves this name TAKFIR WAL-HIJRA as it gives them away and most Somalis whether they are Akhwaan Muslimiin, Suufiis, Itixaad, Wahaabi or otherwise would immediately leave their company. Rather they are more sophisticated than that, they in fact hide within anyone of these groups as long as it serves their interest. If they see, their interest is more served with alliance of the people of Tawhiid as in this current case they would use it, but if they see their interest is served hiding among the Sufis they would also do it.
Somalis all agree that Ethiopian invasion needs to be fought and our land be liberated but we must also be careful this group that is bent on destroying the peace and tranquility that the true Islamists have built over the years.
The trade mark of this group is calling anyone who disagrees with them a Kaafir. They secretly kill those they see are obstacle to their grand agenda. They would even kill mostly while they are emerging from the Mosques. They call for global Jihad that does not have borders; they would agitate and try to start wars that are not necessary as they can only work in total anarchy. They would create events between tribes that have some suspicions between them to make sure they kill each other and while the population is busy in that situation they further their agenda.
They are connected to their global group and sometimes take direct orders from overseas leaders who may not even be Somali nationals. They create sense of insecurity by creating events that would attract the attention of the world media such as destroying Christian graves, Churches or sometimes beating up people playing soccer. They would even declare a Jihad against a neighboring country even though they might not have an inch of land. Any one who opposes their method and madness is Kaafir that can be killed.
I am calling all Somalis to make the distinction between Islamists who want a country that is free; at peace with it self and its neighbors that can function as modern nation from the TAKFIRI group who want to perpetuate wars, death, destruction and export insecurity around the world. The later would not realize a Somali nation and would keep our nation in a perpetual limbo while the former would bring about a civilized nation that is among equals with its peers.
Abu Abdullah Al-Haaj
E-mail: abulhaaj100@gmail.com
http://www.somalilife.com/vbforum/showthread.php?p=768129