OK, I finally saw the pic on the Houston's site. I've had a link to them on my blogroll fora long time now, but sometimes the pictures do not load; I think the blog and the other page I have seen are linked to the main site somehow. That one apparently was one of them. Still, their labeling it as the Houston is not dispositive (please forgive me if I talk like a lawyer; that's my day job); one of the site's devoted to the Force Z attack labels a picture as coming from that attack when several other sources list it as the attack on the British cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall.
The only reason I mention the removal of the topmast was to give some sense of what the mast looked like during the NEI campaign, and how it does not (to my eyes) match what is in that photograph. Marblehead's picture of the Houston at Tjilatjap (again to my eyes) is of a better, clearer quality than this picture. But you are correct that the time it took to develop the pictures is a potential cause of the lack of quality.
My source for the attempted radar installation is Tony Tully (later the author of Shattered Sword), poasted on the Asiatic Fleet's site. According to his (unfinished) version titled "Naval Alamo," Houston was in Cavite having radar installed, some refitting and essential maintenance done when the "War Warning" came out of Washington. The work was halted and she was then sent to Iloilo. This was part of the War Plan Orange to scatter the Asiatic Fleet's ships. Then when the Japanese blow would come in the Philippines, the Asiatic Fleet would retreat to Singapore and/or the NEI pending the arrival of the Pacific Fleet battleships from Pearl Harbor. The British and the Dutch were counting on this plan as well, which was one reason (among many) that the British Far Eastern Fleet and the Dutch East Indies Squadron were not nearly large enough by themselves to stop the Japanese advance. The attack on Pearl Harbor might have been a strategic blunder, but it was also a tactical and indeed operational success, as it destroyed the war plans for Southeast Asia. The Asiatic Fleet, Far Eastern Fleet and East Indies Squadron were left on their own.
My understanding of the Combined Striking Force's intended formation is a bit different. The USN narrative (related in Sherman's Combat Command) suggests that the Dutch destroyers were trying to work up to the van with the British destroyers, and that the US destroyers had orders not to pass in front of the Dutch. Other sources reveal that the problem was the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer, who was having boiler problems that were apparently related to her grounding just before the Battle of the Badoeng Strait. That version of events has always bothered me, however.
If I am reading you correctly, your saying that Doorman intended to have three groups of destroyers -- the British in the lead, the Dutch on the flank and the US in the rear. That would explain Doorman's orders to the US destroyers not to pass in front of the Dutch -- he wanted to keep the three groups properly positioned. It certainly makes the criticism of Sherman, among others, sound like Monday morning quarterbacking after destroyer philosophy had changed. And it speaks much better of Doorman.
I do plan to continue my amateur research into the NEI campaign. I have had a dream since 5th grade to write a book about it; the fact that I'm a lawyer now should suggest how well that has worked out. But I do discuss it on my blog, like a few weks ago when they anounced the location of the wreck of the Exeter and the Encounter. I'm planning on doing a post defending Doorman from some of the bashing I've seen him take (Morison, Prados and others) and maybe discussing how weird it was to have the Java and the US destroyers go into battle without turrets. The USS Houston, Asiatic Fleet and NEI have had links on my blogroll since I started, and I just added the Royal Netherlands Navy Warships of World War II. (I still need to add the Exeter and the Perth's sites.) I have no intention of letting the sacrifice of our ABDA servicemen be forgotten.