Learning something new every day

Hello,

Well, I'll be darned; when you're right, you're right. I have that very document, but had no recollection of any such detail, and must admit I'm surprised. But there you are. And like so many other small bits of information in this most confused of campaigns, one must either accept it as meaningful, reject it altogether, or file it away as inconsequential. Obviously I did the latter. But anyway thank-you for bringing this to my attention.

We will, I assume, agree that the "14 knots" must be a typo for 24 knots.

Now, as regards what they were actually attempting to do, let's take a look at ComDesDiv 58's Action Report (March 4, 1942) in which Binford remarks in Para.3: "[On February 26, 1942]...that afternoon a conference was held at the Dutch Naval Headquarters by Rear Admiral DOORMAN, RNN. It was decided to make a sweep to the east north of MADURA ISLAND then turn back to the west and proceed towards Batavia. The formation to consist of the cruisers as main body, British and Dutch destroyers to form a screen ahead and U.S. destroyers to take station in column astern of the cruisers. In case of contact British and Dutch Destroyers to attack at once and retire, then cruisers attack and retire, then U.S. Destroyers come in and deliver a torpedo attack." (p.1)

I think this probably gives us as good a thumbnail explanation of the intentions of ComStrikFor as we are likely to get 66 years after the fact. Why were the flushdeckers not to pass the Dutch DDs? I can't say. Its oddness is what makes it seem so questionable. But I can tell you why I think the RNN & RN DDs were in the van, and that is because they were more modern, better equipped, and had better firepower than the four-pipers. Also the flushdeckers did have a potent torpedo battery (twelve tubes each) & this no doubt factored in as well. (And yes, I know they did not all have full complements of their MK VIII-3B 21" torpedoes that day...)

Binford goes on to say (Para.4) that after 1614 when the enemy was sighted & firing began, "Increased speed to 27 knots and maneuvered to obtain position on the disengaged side of cruisers. The cruisers continued firing and all destroyers continued on disengaged side, however the Dutch destroyers could not keep up and the British Destroyers were in no certain order." (p.2) I suppose one might say that is remarkable that the Striking Force did not devolve into more confusion than it did. Binford's ships made their torpedo attacks despite more contradictory & confusing signals...and it's a thousand wonders they weren't shot to pieces in that counterattack. Perhaps their low silhouettes helped in the poor visibility.
Additionally, re the initial disposition of the DDs, the Action Report of USS ALDEN (DD-211) dated 7 March 1942 says only, "At 1545 column reformed [after bombing attacks], course 320 true, speed 18 knots. Dutch and British destroyers formed distant screen ahead and on the bows."

In the final analysis, and as much as I admire H.E. Eccles, I still do not think this alleged directive to stay behind the Dutch DDs had any real bearing on the conduct of the battle. It's difficult to believe the Americans were somehow contorting their movements to stay behind WITTE DE WITH and KORTNAER yet simultaneously straining for maximum revolutions to keep up with the swifter heavy ships.

Re the Feb 4 photo of HOUSTON/EXETER, the jury is still out. I have a model of CA-30 and more than a few photos, and no matter how I angle the model or view the photos, something doesn't look quite right. But, enough good fun for now already.