Interesting Discussion

Hi Guys...

From everything I've ever seen, heard and read, the IJA (and many post-war historians) considered the Pacific Campaign (at least the first phase) to be the (Imperial Japanese) Navy's war. Indochina aside, the IJA's main strategy for war was to move north against the USSR. That was the focus of their training, planning and operational doctrine when it came to war strategy; for decades the IJA had planned for a traditional set-piece campaign on the Chinese mainland against the Soviets. They really didn't start training for a jungle war until just a short while prior to Pearl Harbor.

Given the traditional push by the Army for action against the USSR I'm just not very convinced that the junior-level officers had that much influence on war planning against the Western colonial powers. I think support for the IJA "hawks" advocating war with the Soviets had cooled considerably after 1937-38 when the IJA received a series of bloody noses in short but spirited border clashes. In light of this I'm inclined to think that the IJA was content to sit back (for lack of a better term) and let the IJN lead the way in planning.

A very short and under-developed rational I know, but it's late and I'm tired and don't really want to spend a lot of time of developing a thesis!

Thoughts?
Tom