This time around I wish to question how valid the conventional wisdom is that the IJN's Special Naval Landing Force personnel were NOT marines (although they were called thus by U.S. and perhaps other Allied forces when encountered on various islands during WWII). I have read the arguments and grasp them, but I remain unconvinced. After all, how does one define marines nearly 70 years ago? In virtually everyone's navy, they had evolved substantially from the role of simply shipboard soldiers of the 18th and early 19th centuries, who at most had been involved ashore in relatively small-scale landing parties. Admittedly arbitrary and sometimes difficult to discern the difference, I would make these distinctions among armed naval personnel ashore:
1. Naval brigades: Armed sailors drawn from shipboard duty with the fleet, variously equipped. Photos of the final evolution in the 1890s-1910 period show sailors in standard naval uniform trudging along, pulling machine gun carts and--often in harness--6-pounder landing guns (though sometimes animal transport was provided). These men were generally not trained in infantry tactics or barely so, and thus were used for defensive purposes or to support the army. There are, one must concede, some notable exceptions to this distinction (see below).
2. Naval infantry: Sailors with moderate to extensive training in infantry tactics. An important distinction (and an essential one), at least in the 20th century, is their uniforms of olive drab or similar hue, rather than the blue or white naval uniform with gaitors or leggings and cartridge belt of men comprising a naval brigade. Naval infantry units usually differed from their army counterparts in the degree to which they were equipped, most frequently in artillery and other heavy weapons. They might have landing guns, pack howitzers, mortars, etc., but had to depend upon the army for heavier stuff. Dedicated naval artillery units, with sizable naval guns mounted on wheeled carriages, were something else again, e.g., seeing action in the Boer War and World War I.
3. Marines: Clearly a separate corps in the case of the U.S., U.K., Netherlands, etc., but other nations had naval infantry rather than marines per se. This is the crux of my question: what during WWII was definably a marine versus a well trained naval infantryman?
First, some well known historical exceptions to the old and familiar role of marines aboard ship:
# American (Union) marines and naval infantry attacked Confederate Fort Fisher, Wilmington, NC--and were repulsed with heavy losses--in 1865; six years later, similar forces attacked a heavily defended fort on the Han River in Korea. These efforts were clearly beefed up versions of the traditional landing and assault role, though in the former instance, both marines and bluejackets suffered from inadequate training and preparation for the attack.
# Both U.S. and British marines were present in the column relieving the international settlements in Peking in 1900. But again, such was little more than a long-distance version of their traditional deployment.
# A four-battalion Royal Marine brigade, plus eight battalions of trained naval infantry, comprised the Royal Naval Division that assisted in the defense of Antwerp, Belgium, in 1914. After the division's withdrawal (and loss of Antwerp), it saw action in the Dardanelles campaign. By the time the formation was redesignated the 63rd Division, British Army, and reassigned to the Western Front, wastage had reduced the presence of naval personnel to insignificant numbers. But perhaps of greater relevance, 700 Royal Marines (and 200 naval infantrymen) comprised the storming party for the Zeebrugge raid, clearly presaging the well known role of Royal Marines in the next war.
# Two USMC brigades, the 4th and 5th, went Over There in 1917 or 1918. Although the latter formation was broken up into small guard detachments hither and yon, the former brigade, consisting of the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments and a machine gun battalion, received arduous training and then went into the line. When the brigade's C.O., a marine colonel, fell ill and was returned stateside, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Harbord became brigade commander (and after acceptance, an honorary marine). U.S. marines in such strength on the Western Front also signalled what this corps would become in World War II.
# Little reminder is thus necessary of the great expansion in numbers of the U.S. Marine Corps in the next war, and its specialty role as a multi-division amphibious force, which either defended or captured numerous Pacific islands, often at great cost. Despite the USMC's aversion to elite units within the general Corps, raider and (briefly) parachute battalions saw effective, duration-only use. The Royal Marines on the other hand are perhaps best known for fielding a number of commando units during that war (completely distinct from army commandos).
So, the question still lingers, what WAS a marine in WWII? If we look toward combat application, we are left with the answer, it all depends whose marines they were. So, why weren't the IJN's SNLF personnel marines? Like most everyone's marines, they were well trained for their task, and one certainly cannot fault their dedication, physical courage, and tenaciousness. The most cogent--and admittedly somewhat persuasive--argument I have read is simply that the SNLFs did NOT constitute a single integrated corps. Rather, they were organized AND administered at various ports of origin--Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo, Shanghai, Yokosuka. On the other hand, they wore standard uniforms unique to the SNLF and although differing in unit size, they were identically equipped, except in heavy weapons--some units got landing guns, others AA guns, yet others AT guns, etc., depending upon application and assignment. And at least at first, they seem not to have been drawn from sailors in the fleet, but rather from direct recruitment, or from surplus personnel in barracks ashore, or from young men just out of boot camp. Their men were usually not randomly selected, but were tall, well muscled types. Whether they volunteered or were assigned to SNLF duty, I don't know. Despite the differences in organization from Brits and Yanks, why weren't SNFL members marines? Given the divergent evolutions of other nations' marines, the proclaimed distinctions between marines and well trained naval infantry in the instance of Japanese forces in WWII seem to me to be hair-splitting at best.
Now, 'tis possible to convince me yet. Question: Were there Japanese fleet marines aboard the larger warships--aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers--whose role was as traditional shipboard sea soldiers? If so, then there is the distinction in origin between such marines and the naval infantry of the SNLFs. I await response to this--IMO--still not settled but ever interesting question, so weigh in.
It's a strange distinction that I have never grasped clearly either, but to answer one question you pose: "Were there Japanese fleet marines aboard the larger warships--aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers--whose role was as traditional shipboard sea soldiers?" No, AFAIK definitely not.
Tokubetsu rikusentai were on occasion transported aboard such ships, but were not integral to their crews. Often they were transported aboard troopships/transports, etc. however. And their commanding officers were regular navy (kaigun), as far as I know. (By that I mean they had had shipboard assignments and/or commanded IJN vessels, etc.)
The two most knowledgeable guys on this area I am aware of are Alan Alsleben, who posts here occasionally, and Akira Takizawa in Japan, ditto. In ALL instances I would defer to their knowledge on this subject.
The subject of the SNLF is a rich and important one, however. They were involved in many significant actions throughout the war. Some extraordinarily efficient or valiant ones (in the NEI and at Tarawa), and others deplorably less so (a number of the most serious warcrimes).
"The two most knowledgeable guys on this area I am aware of are Alan Alsleben, who posts here occasionally, and Akira Takizawa in Japan, ditto. In ALL instances I would defer to their knowledge on this subject."
A website about the SNLF, credited to Allan Alsleben, Akira Takizawa and another fellow.
Once a Leatherneck, always a Leatherneck, I have great interest in this subject, and I too have wondered why the distinction has been made between Marines and Japanese SNLF personnel. After a little more snooping, I would add only that just like the brief experiment by the USMC with paramarines, so the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF were parachute units. They were pretty much decimated in the operations in which they were engaged at Menado, Celebes (1st Yokosuka SNLF) and Usua, West Timor (3rd Yokosuka SNLF). I don't believe these airborne units were ever reconstituted.
Alas, too late to join the extended debate tonight. But might I venture a guess that one reason the Imperial Japanese Navy did not have a separate, permanent Marine Corps, as did the Royal Navy, the Netherlands Navy or the United States Navy, is because the IJN was not in existence at the beginning of the Age of Sail where Marines were needed for shipboard security and snipers from the tops....
For your consideration, a list of Special Naval Landing Forces, assembled from various sources (including Al Alsleben). Note that most were disbanded or converted to other duties as the war progressed and that the sources aren't always consistent on the fate of each unit (and the MS formatting didn't stay put):
Roster and Assignments of IJN Special Naval Landing Force 1940 - 1945
by James A. Broshot
(22 January 2003 version)(revised thanks to information from Al Alsleben)
1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Kure and assigned to Combined Fleet 15 Nov 1940
Combined Fleet (attached)(Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/ 1401 men) Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Ambon 10 Mar 1942
(converted to 4th Guard Unit 10 Mar 1942)
campaigns: Philippines - Legaspi landing 12 Dec 1941
Philippines - Davao landing 16 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Netherlands East Indies - Ambon Island landing 20 Jan 1942 (31 Jan 1942)
2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Kure and assigned to Combined Fleet 15 Oct 1941
Combined Fleet (attached)(Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/ 1401 men) Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Balikpapan 10 Mar 1942
(converted to 2nd Guard Unit - 22nd Special Base Force 10 Mar 1942
campaigns: Philippines - Jolo Landing 24 Dec 1941
Netherlands East Indies - Tarakan landing 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Balikpapan landing 24 Jan 1942
3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Kure and assigned to Combined Fleet 1 Feb 1942
Combined Fleet 1 Feb 1942 - 10 Apr 1942
Fourth Fleet (attached) 10 Apr 1942 - 14 Jul 1942
Eighth Fleet (attached) 14 Jul 1942 - 1 Oct 1942
deactivated at Buin 1 Oct 1942
[absorbed by 81st Naval Guard Force Nov 1942?]
campaigns: landing on Tulagi 5 May 1942 (detachment)
Port Moresby Seizure Force as of 5 May 1942
Defense of Tulagi, Gavutu/Tanambogo 7 Aug 1942 (400 man detachment)
landing at Rabi, Milne Bay 27 Aug 1942 (detachment)
4th Kure Special Naval Landing Force
[no information, in existence as of Sep 1943 - Madej Volume II]
Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Kure as component of 2nd CSNLF 1 May 1942
Combined Fleet - 2nd CSNLF 1 May 1942 - 1 Jul 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 1 Jul 1942 - 1 Oct 1942
deactivated at Rabaul 1 Oct 1942
campaigns: Midway Invasion Force 5 Jun1942
landing at Rabi, Milne Bay 27 Aug 1942
Kure 6th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Kure as component of 8th CSNLF 20 Nov 1942
Combined Fleet - 8th CSNLF 20 Nov 1942 - 20 Dec 1942
Eighth Fleet - 8th CSNLF 24 Dec 1942 - 1 Dec 1943
(landed at Kolombangara - New Georgia with 2,038 men 9 Mar 1943)
(at Rice Anchorage, with a company at Vura Island (later destroyed) 30 Jun 1943)
deactivated 1 Dec 1943
[converted to 88th Naval Guard Force Dec 1943]
Kure 7th Special Naval Landing Force
Eighth Fleet (attached) 1 Apr 1943 - 20 Apr 1943
Eighth Fleet - 7th CSNLF 20 Apr 1943 - 1 Sep 1943
(occupied Santa Isabel Island 1 Jun 1943)
Eighth Fleet - 1st Base Force at Buin 1 Sep 1943 - Aug 1945
Kure 8th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Singapore 1 Sep 1943
Southwest Area Fleet (attached) 1 Sep 1943 - 15 Sep 1943
deactivated at Singapore 15 Sep 1943
Maizuru 1st Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Maizuru 15 Nov 1940
(Hainan Island with 746 men as of 7 Dec 1941)
China Area Fleet - Hainan Naval Guard District Dec 1941 - Aug 1945
Maizuru 2nd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Maizuru 15 Oct 1941
Fourth Fleet (attached)(Truk as of 7 Dec 1941 w/ 1069 men) Dec 1941 - 1 Feb 1942
(19 Nov 1941: HQ, two rifle companies, one heavy weapons company with one regimental gun
platoon and one regimental howitzer platoon)
deactivated 1 Feb 1942
(converted to 8th Base Force at Rabaul 1 Feb 1942)
campaigns: First Wake Island Invasion 10 Dec 1941 (one company 450 men)
Second Wake Island Invasion 23 Dec 1941
R Operation - Rabaul Invasion Force 24 Jan 1942 (two companies)
(identified in SR Operation 8 Mar 1942)
Maizuru 3rd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Maizuru and assigned to Combined Fleet 1 May 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 1 May 1942 - 1 Jul 1942
deactivated 1 Jul 1942
(converted to 5th Guard Unit on Kiska 1 Jul 1942)
campaigns: Kiska Island Invasion Force 6 Jun 1942
Maizuru 4th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Maizuru and assigned to Combined Fleet 5 Sep 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 5 Sep 1942 - 20 Nov 1942
Combined Fleet - 8th CSNLF 20 Nov 1942 - 20 Dec 1942
Eighth Fleet - 8th CSNLF 24 Dec 1942 - 1 Mar 1943
to Yokosuka Naval District
campaigns: Guadalcanal (Oct 1942 - Jan 1943)(landed 6 Oct 1942)
Sasebo 1st Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo as component of Sasebo CSNLF 15 Nov 1940
Combined Fleet - Sasebo CSNLF (Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/1622 men)
7 Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Makassar 10 Mar 1942
(converted to 3rd Guard Unit, 23 rd Special Base Force 10 Mar 1942)
campaigns: Philippines: Camiguin Island landing 10 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Philippines: Vigan landing 10 Dec 1941
Philippines: Lamon Bay landing 24 Dec 1941
Netherlands East Indies - Menado (Celebes) landing 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Kendari (Celebes) landing 24 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Makassar (Celebes) 8 Feb 1942
Sasebo 2nd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo as component of Sasebo CSNLF 15 Oct 1941
Combined Fleet - Sasebo CSNLF (Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/1437 men)
Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Makassar 10 Mar 1942
(became unit of 32nd Special Base Force at Makassar)
campaigns: Philippines: Camiguin Island landing 10 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Philippines: Vigan landing 10 Dec 1941
Philippines: Lamon Bay landing 24 Dec 1941
Netherlands East Indies - Menado (Celebes) landing 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Kendari (Celebes) landing 24 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Makassar (Celebes) 8 Feb 1942
Sasebo 3rd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo and assigned to Combined Fleet 1 Feb 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 1 Feb 1942 - 15 Feb 1942
deactivated 15 Feb 1942
Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo and assigned to Combined Fleet 15 May 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 15 May 1942 - 14 Jul 1942
Eighth Fleet (attached) 14 Jul 1942 - 15 Nov 1943
(at Rabaul as of 17 Jul 1942)
(with South Seas Detachment at Buna as of 21 Jul 1942)
Ninth Fleet (attached) 15 Nov 1943 - 1 Jan 1944
deactivated at Sio, New Guinea 1 Jan 1944
[absorbed by 86th Naval Guard Force at Rabaul Jan 1944]
campaigns: Goodenough Islands (Taupota Island), Milne Bay landing 25 Aug 1942
Rabi, Milne Bay landing 26 Aug 1942 (detachment)
Sasebo 6th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo 15 Aug 1942
Eighth Fleet (attached) 15 Aug 1942 - 30 Oct 1942
(arrived New Georgia 13 Nov 1942)
(returned to Buin, detachment at Keita - Bougainville 15 Dec 1942)
Eighth Fleet - 1st Base Force at Bougainville (Buin Area) 31 Oct 1942 - Aug 1945
Sasebo 7th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Tateyama with 1,559 men 1 Feb 1943
(for reinforcement landing on Santa Isabel Island)
Southeast Area Fleet (attached) 15 Feb 1943 - 1 Apr 1943
(arrived Tarawa 17 Mar 1943
HQ, three rifle companies, heavy weapons company, mobile antiaircraft battery,
special duty unit with tanks and flamethrowers; 27 Officers, 38 WO, 1,542 EM
4x Type 41 75mm mountain howitzers, 2x Type 92 70mm howitzers,
4x Type 88 75mm DP guns, 2x Type 94 37mm AT guns, 8x Type 93 13mm mgs,
12x HMG, 27x LMG, 36x grenade launchers, 8x flamethrowers, 4x Type 95 light tanks)
Fourth Fleet (attached) 1 Apr 1943 - 4 Mar 1944
deactivated 4 Mar 1944
campaigns: Tarawa Nov 1943 (destroyed)
Sasebo 8th Special Naval Landing Force
(Formed before the opening of hostilities)
(Sana - Hainan as of 7 Dec 1941)(746 men)
China Area Fleet - Hainan Naval Guard District Dec 1941 - Aug 1945
Sasebo 101st Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo 10 Jan 1944
Southeast Area Fleet (attached) 10 Jan 1944 - 20 Apr 1944
Combined Fleet (attached) 20 Apr 1944 - 5 Mar 1945
(Truk as of May 1944)
deactivated at Sasebo 5 Mar 1945
Sasebo 102nd Special Naval Landing Force
(no information in existence at Tateyama, Japan as of Mar 1944 - Madej Vol II)
Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Yokosuka as parachute unit (520 men) 20 Nov 1941 (20 Sep 1941?)
Combined Fleet (attached) (849 men as of 7 Dec 1941) Dec 1941 - 20 May 1942
(returned to Surabaya 16 May 1942)
Southwest Area Fleet - 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet 20 May 1942 - 10 Oct 1942
to Yokosuka Naval District
Combined Fleet (attached) 5 Sep 1943 - 1 Dec 1944
(to Saipan with 1,500 men Sep 1943; Jan 1944 detachments sent to Rabaul)
(as of Jun 1944: headquarters, three rifle companies, machine gun platoon, gun section, 800 men)
deactivated 1 Dec 1944
campaigns: Netherlands East Indies - Menado airdrop 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Occupation of the Lesser Sundas 8 May 1942
Saipan June - July 1944 (destroyed)
Yokosuka 2nd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Yokosuka as parachute unit (746 men) 5 Oct 1941
Combined Fleet (attached) Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated 10 Mar 1942
(converted to 1st Guard Unit, 10th Special Base Force)
re-organized at Truk 10 Jun 1943
Fourth Fleet (attached) 10 Jun 1943 - Aug 1945
(Nauru Island as of Dec 1943)(as 67th Guard Unit?)
campaigns: Miri (Brunei) landing 15 Dec 1941
Kuching (Sawarak) landing 24 Dec 1941
Yokosuka 3rd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Yokosuka as parachute unit (849 men) 20 Nov 1941
Combined Fleet (attached) Dec 1941 - 20 May 1942
Southwest Area Fleet - 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet 20 May 1942 - 3 Aug 1942
to Yokosuka Naval District
(absorbed by Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing Force Dec 1942)
campaigns: Philippines: Aparri landing 10 Dec 1941
Philippines: Calayan Island landing10 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Netherlands East Indies, invasion of Dutch West Timor (airdrop) 20 Feb 1942
Yokosuka 4th Special Naval Landing Force
(Formed before the opening of hostilities)
(Hainan Island as of 7 Dec 1941 with 746 men)
China Area Fleet - Hainan Naval Guard District Dec 1941 - Aug 1945
(one company [250 men] attached to 6th Base Force - Kwajalein Oct 1942 Feb 1944)
Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Yokosuka as component of 2nd CSNLF 1 May 1942
Combined Fleet - 2nd CSNLF 1 May 1942 - 1 Jul 1942
Combined Fleet (attached) 1 Jul 1942 - 24 Dec 1942
(at Buna 1 Nov 1942)
Eighth Fleet (attached) 24 Dec 1942 - 15 Feb 1943
deactivated at Lae 15 Feb 1943
(absorbed by 82nd Naval Guard Force, 7th Base Force 15 Feb 1943)
campaigns: Midway Invasion Force 5 Jun1942
Guadalcanal from 16Aug 1942 (500 man detachment)
(remainder decimated (1,000 men) when Kinryu Maru sank on 25 Aug 1942)
Yokosuka 6th Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Yokosuka 15 Aug 1942
Eighth Fleet (attached) 15 Aug 1942 - 25 Sep 1942
(sent from Japan to Gilbert Islands, Tarawa and Makin 15 Sep 1942
Fourth Fleet (attached) 25 Sep 1942 - 15 Feb 1943
deactivated 15 Feb 1943
(converted to 3rd Special Base Force (guard unit) at Tarawa 15 Feb1943)
Yokosuka 7th Special Naval Landing Force
Combined Fleet - 8th CSNLF 20 Nov 1942 - 20 Dec 1942
Eighth Fleet - 8th CSNLF 24 Dec 1942 - 1 Dec 1943
(landed at Kolombangara - New Georgia with 1,807 men 23 Feb 1943)
(on Kolombangara as of 30 Jun 1943)
Eighth Fleet - 14th Base Force 1 Dec 1943 - 5 Dec 1943
deactivated at Kavieng, New Britain 5 Dec 1943
(converted to 89th Naval Guard Force 5 Dec 1943)
campaigns: defense of New Georgia Jun - Oct 1943
Yokosuka 8th Special Naval Landing Force
Southeast Area Fleet (attached) 20 Jan 1945 - Aug 1945
Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force
China Area Fleet (attached)(746 men as of 7 Dec 1941) Dec 1941 - 20 Aug 1943
China Area Fleet - Shanghai Area Special Base Force 20 Sep 1943 - 10 Aug 1944
Interesting stuff, thanks! Just one query: Are you certain that 2nd Yokosuka SNLF was trained as a parachute unit? I have read accounts which contraindicate that. I know the unit never saw a combat airdrop, but that proves nothing about its original training and airborne capability, of course.
Taki will correct me if I'm wrong, but I have the following:
1st Sasebo SNLF was deactivated in March 1942 & became Guard Unit (keibitai) for the 24th Special Force at Ambon under RADM Hatakeyama Koichiro.
2nd Sasebo SNLF -- This unit was deactivated (as you noted) and then employed as Guard Unit (keibitai) for the 23rd Special Base Force at Makassar, Celebes in spring, 1942 under their old commander, RADM Mori Kunizo.
My additional understanding is that two platoons of men from 1st & 2nd Sasebo SNLF (about 40 sailors in all) had been attached to the 1st Kure Landing Party at Ambon, and fought against the Australians of GULL Force there at the so-called Lawa river battle. These SNLF were later implicated in warcrimes against Australian POWs committed in February 1942. The commander of 1st Kure Landing Party, CAPT Hatakeyama --not to be confused with the RADM of same name at Ambon-- was subsequently tried and executed after the war for his role in these atrocities. In this instance, it appears the Japanese murdered about 46 of their captives as revenge for SNLF losses in the battle.
"Taki will correct me if I'm wrong, but I have the following:
1st Sasebo SNLF was deactivated in March 1942 & became Guard Unit (keibitai) for the 24th Special Force at Ambon under RADM Hatakeyama Koichiro.
2nd Sasebo SNLF -- This unit was deactivated (as you noted) and then employed as Guard Unit (keibitai) for the 23rd Special Base Force at Makassar, Celebes in spring, 1942 under their old commander, RADM Mori Kunizo."
Thanks. I checked, one of the sources of my SNLF information is Allan Alsleben; this is what he (and I) have:
Sasebo 1st Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo as component of Sasebo CSNLF 15 Nov 1940
Combined Fleet - Sasebo CSNLF (Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/1622 men)
7 Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Makassar 10 Mar 1942
(converted to 3rd Guard Unit, 23rd Special Base Force 10 Mar 1942)
campaigns: Philippines: Camiguin Island landing 10 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Philippines: Vigan landing 10 Dec 1941
Philippines: Lamon Bay landing 24 Dec 1941
Netherlands East Indies - Menado (Celebes) landing 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Kendari (Celebes) landing 24 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Makassar (Celebes) 8 Feb 1942
Sasebo 2nd Special Naval Landing Force
organized at Sasebo as component of Sasebo CSNLF 15 Oct 1941
Combined Fleet - Sasebo CSNLF (Palau as of 7 Dec 1941 w/1437 men)
Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1942
deactivated at Makassar 10 Mar 1942
(became unit of 32nd Special Base Force at Makassar)
campaigns: Philippines: Camiguin Island landing 10 Dec 1941 (detachment)
Philippines: Vigan landing 10 Dec 1941
Philippines: Lamon Bay landing 24 Dec 1941
Netherlands East Indies - Menado (Celebes) landing 10 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Kendari (Celebes) landing 24 Jan 1942
Netherlands East Indies - Makassar (Celebes) 8 Feb 1942
Yes, I've seen that, too, and while I would generally defer to Al in these questions, I feel certain there was no 32nd Special Base Unit at Makassar in 1942. That's a typo, I'm almost positive. 32 rather than 23, that is.
The 23rd Special Base Unit was at Makassar, (with the 23rd kokusentai at Kendari) for the rest of the war, AFAIK.
What I did find--at a quick glance--in JACAR shows that 32nd Special Base Unit came into existence in August 1943. I do not know their whereabouts, but possibly Davao in the Philippines (?)
I am interested, as always, in any new details on SNLF history/operations.
The other material is based on firsthand documents (Australian warcrimes docs v. SNLF), so seems solid enough.
> Yes, I've seen that, too, and while I would generally defer to Al in these questions, I feel certain there was no 32nd Special Base Unit at Makassar in 1942. That's a typo, I'm almost positive.
Yes, 32nd is wrong. 23rd is right.
> I am interested, as always, in any new details on SNLF history/operations.
I introduce the following site. It has the history of Keibitais and Base Forces.
I dug out my copy of JAPANESE MONOGRAPH 79a & found that the 31st and 32nd Sepcial Base Force(s), as I suspected, were both in the Philippines. But, earlier in the war than I realized--spring, 1942. As of 1 March, 1942--and part of 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under VADM Sugiyama Rokuzo(?) (HQ Manila)
31st under RADM Kobayashi @ Manila
32nd under RADM Irufune (?) @Davao
The following Special Base units were part of VADM Ozawa Jisaburo's 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet (HQ at Singapore)
< The reason why the SNLF is not Japanese marines is that it was a part of the Navy and not independent force like marines of other country. >
But the marine corps in virtually every nation that maintains such an organization IS part of its navy, and has evolved only as a SEMI-independent force. Certainly during the World War II period, the U.S. Marine Corps was a part of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Marines were a part of the Royal Navy....and I'll wager the same is true of the Netherlands Korps Mariniers. In fact during WWII, the U.S. Marine Corps was substantially less independent of the U.S. Navy (though dependent upon the U.S. Army for MOST of its weapons development and procurement) than it is today. Marine 2nd lieutenants are still graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in what is termed the Marine Option. Most tellingly, it has been only in the past decade or two that a full general (four-star) of the Marine Corps may become chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such would not have been possible during WWII or the decades thereafter, because the American marines were a subsidiary part of the navy. Therefore, I fear that unless you can expand upon your answer (or I finally get the point), it is yet another straw of uncertainty in this tale.
Very interesting that Japan had a formalized marine corps in the 19th century. Approximately during what year span?
I would also like to iterate Paul's question: Was 2nd Yokosuka SNLF trained as a parachute unit? We are in agreement that it was never air-dropped into combat. One source I have read specifies it was NOT a parachute unit, but later in the text claims that it was! What is truth?
I am not familiar with marines of other country. But, I think that marines are independent of the navy somewhat in any country. On the contrary, SNLF was utterly a part of the Navy. It was only one of Navy units and it was equal to fleet on commanding or organization. I think that it is different from marines.
Japanese marines existed between 1871 and 1976. In Japanese, marines is called Kaiheitai and NLF is called Rikusentai. They are distinguished in Japanese.
Knowledgeable Sirs,
I accept then that the US Marines was a branch of the US Navy during WW2, but why the need for their own "air force"? US Marine Aviation squadrons were organised almost identically to Navy squadrons, used the same aircraft and also operated from carriers.
1. What is the history of Marine Aviation?
2. What was the intented role in WW2?
3. How did they differ from Navy squadrons?
Regards,
Jacques
I would not presume to speak for other countries, but in US service the Marines are most definitely not part of the Navy. They are a Naval Service separately organized under the Department of the Navy. That is not the same thing as being "part of the Navy" as any US Marine could tell you.
First of all, Taki's most recent posting has convinced me that the SNLF was not a marine corps, so I'm no longer arguing that issue. But you write, "HAVE [marine officers] commanded USN vessels?" In WWII, I suspect not, unless a marine officer aboard was the sole surviving commissioned officer during or after a battle, and thus the period of command would have been brief. In the 19th century, however, the answer is a very equivocal yes. During the War of 1812, marine Lt. John Marshall Gamble, commanding the marine detachment aboard USS ESSEX (Capt. David Porter), was given command of one of her prizes, the British armed merchantman GREENWICH. In the course of events, Gamble took GREENWICH against HMS SERINGAPATAM (sloop of war? armed brig?)--which had been attacking American whaling vessels in the Pacific Ocean--and bested her. Gamble soon thereafter became a P.W. courtesy of the Royal Navy, and postwar rose to lieutenant colonel. Yes, that happened during the age of sail and no, GREENWICH was not a commissioned U.S. man-of-war per se.
But marines traditionally manned main turrets (usually Y turret, often called the "marines' turret") aboard British capital ships of the 20th century, and aboard major American warships, though not in her main turrets (correct that point if I'm wrong), marines regularly crewed 5-inch gun mounts and smaller AA guns. So, marines progressively began to man standard naval ordnance aboard ship, and were no longer restricted to the fighting tops and such (as, say, they were aboard HOUSTON). I do concede that Euro-American marine officers aboard were/are not nominally in the regular chain of command to command the ship, and that certainly was NOT the reality of IJN officers assigned to command Special Naval Landing Force units. Consider my towel thrown in.
Just a minor correction to your 19th century history. The vessel SERINGAPATAM that Lt. John Gamble, USMC, captured in the Pacific was not HMS SERINGAPATAM, but an earlier whaling ship of that name. British and American whalers there were in direct competition for that very lucrative trade (we're talking a LOT of bucks/quid involved in spermaceti oil alone). Upon the outbreak of war, some of the previously well armed British whalers became privateers, and began preying upon their American counterparts. In early-mid 1813, USS ESSEX put a temporary stop to this business, capturing among several other British whalers SIR ANDREW HAMMOND and GREENWICH, and thereafter arming them or augmenting their armament. The latter was commanded by Gamble in subsequently taking the whaler/privateer SERINGAPATAM.
By early 1814, things began to unravel for the American "squadron" in the Pacific. Flagship USS ESSEX was defeated by HMS PHOEBE off Valparaiso. The American prize crew (with British PoW assistance) on SERINGAPATAM mutinied and put Lieut. Gamble, two midshipmen, and the loyal marines and seamen adrift in a boat. When Gamble and men returned to Nukuhiva Island in the Marquesas, they now faced hostile natives, who killed a midshipman and three other men, but Gamble and the rest of survivors made off in SIR ANDREW HAMMOND, subsequently recaptured by HM Sloop CHERUB (how Gamble became a PoW). GREENWICH was burned at sea to prevent her recapture by the Royal Navy. SERINGAPATAM was sailed to NSW, Australia, and surrendered (and soon returned to her owners), which is how I know about this obscure bit of naval history.
The actual HMS SERINGAPATAM, 46 guns, was a 5th rate frigate laid down at Bombay in 1817, launched in 1819, and completed (at Plymouth) two years later. Only eight of her near-sisters were also completed and served, two of them converted to steam-screw frigates, whereas the greater majority of this class were either not completed or outright cancelled.
American (Union) marines and naval infantry attacked Confederate Fort Fisher, Wilmington, NC
A question: What is the difference between the Marines and Naval Infantry? For me the Marines are the naval infantry. Infantry branch of the Navy. Amphibious corps of the navy, which of course is exactly the same what naval infantry's role is. Their names, methods and uniforms may be different, but the concept is the same, be that with Korps Mariniers in the Netherlands, Marine Infanterie in Kaiserliche Marine, Royal Marines in UK, Fusiliers Marins in France (*), Naval Infantry in Russia or SNLF in the Imperial Japanese Navy. So I personally see no problem when somebody says that SNLF were Japanese marines. Of course nobody expanded its marine force to such size like the Americans, like creating own air force for the Marine Corps, but then again nobody except the Americans could and can financially afford this.
I think the answers to these questions are bound NOT to be strictly clearcut, and thus to that degree unsatisfactory. Remember that I led with the caveat, "Admittedly arbitrary and sometimes difficult to discern the difference..." So to the three points you make:
1. The naval brigade assaulting Fort Fisher, NC, in 1865 consisted definably of both sailors and marines from Union warships, uniformed differently and armed somewhat differently (some sailors were issued rifles and bayonets, others with pistols and cutlasses; the marines of course had standard infantry kit). The brigade was given some assault training and did practice--my reason for terming the sailors naval infantry--but likely not sufficient to the task, given the strength of the Confederate defenses. The ultimate failure of the naval brigade's assault was that of the senior officers rather than of the men, and of course the army assault on the other side of the fort did carry the day.
2. In the case of the IJN's SNLF units, Taki points out that the officers commanding these landing forces were regular naval officers from the fleet, who could be assigned interchangeably to shipboard duty and naval infantry command ashore. Of course, that may not be quite as cut and dried as Taki infers. While I do accept his distinctions for these naval officers, two questions do immediately arise: (a) Did those officers assigned to duty with SNLFs have to undergo dedicated infantry training? After all, such a job was substantially different in nature from standing watches or commanding warships at sea. (b) How about the NCOs and enlisted personnel of the SNLFs: to what extent were they interchangeable with fleet personnel? I'll wager for the most part, once trained in infantry tactics, other ranks in the SNLFs stayed in such units and did not go back to the fleet (though perhaps in rare instances not true for experienced NCOs).
I agree with you that NOT calling the men of the IJN's Special Naval Landing Forces marines is entirely arbitrary and thus not entirely convincing. Only in the purest sense--and thus likely hair-splitting--were these excellent fighting men not marines.
3. As concerns the USMC's "air force", that tradition began back in the banana republic wars (though marine officers and men flew from the start of naval aviation, along with their naval counterparts). The argument to justify such marine air units is the special needs of marines storming beachheads, when the issue may well be in doubt, and thus only specially trained aviators--and fellow marines--can do the job. Well, of course during WWII and Korea, naval air units got pretty darned good at close air support, too. The USAF did, shamefully, fall down on allocation and training of close air support units for the army, but that changed with the reorganization of the TAC (Tactical Air Command) with new priorities, and I assume now the air force is capable of supporting army units to the satisfaction of all. Of course, mistakes happen and friendly fire incidents have occurred in all wars--the stuff that never-ending guilt and nightmares are made of.
Nelson
This message has been edited by Visje1981 on Nov 18, 2009 6:01 PM
1. The brigade was given some assault training and did practice--my reason for terming the sailors naval infantry--but likely not sufficient to the task, given the strength of the Confederate defenses. The ultimate failure of the naval brigade's assault was that of the senior officers rather than of the men, and of course the army assault on the other side of the fort did carry the day.
Yes, that's how I would define the marines - independently trained naval infantry or armed sailors who received infantrey training.
No comments to the rest of your answers as I agree with them completely. I believe that SNLF officers had to underwent some basic infantry training, because by not doing this this would be like sending a naval officer on a ship without proper training in seamanship.
I cannot answer all of these questions--they are beyond my expertise--but will try to reiterate a useful fact: SNLF were regular Kaigun officers, both before & after assignments as SNLF commanders. Thus CAPT Mori Kunizo, commander of Combined Sasebo SNLF [Rengo Tokubetsu Rikusentai], captor of Kendari, became RADM Mori, commander of 23rd Special Base Force [Tokubetsu Konkyochi-tai] at Makassar in 1942, & 7th Auxiliary Base Force at Lae, New Guinea in 1943, and later VADM Mori, senior commander of Chichijima Area Special Base Force ([Homen Tokubetsu Konkyochi-tai] including IJN) in the Bonins.
However, between these assignments he was attached to the Yokosuka Naval District (twice), and Assistant Staff officer of 8th Fleet (twice). His commands at Makassar, Lae, and Chichijima did not involve command of Special Naval Landing Forces, such as he commanded at Kendari--which had then been disbanded and reassigned as other types of units (e.g., Guard Units [Keibitai] for other Special Base Forces.)
Now, it may also be that the remarkable career of Mori Kunizo was a tokubetsu case...I don't know. I DO know, though, of regular Kaigun officers who ended up assigned to SNLF units (as, for example, happened at Tarawa) and died with them, having received no training whatsoever as infantry.
I suspect this is not as crystal clear as one might prefer, but most Japanese naval officers led extraordinarily diverse careers, with multiple assignments, throughout WWII. In fact, this subject itself, with its wide & fascinating ramifications, is one well worth serious examination by a dedicated student of the Pacific War.
When officers entered to the Navy, they were trained in basic skills of the ground combat as well as the vessel. After they were deployed at the unit, they underwent some special trainings about gunnery, engine, navigation etc. Through these trainings, they had their speciality as vessel officers, air officers and ground combat officers. But, in the Navy, officers, especially high-rank officers like admiral were required to be a generalist who is familiar with any duty of the Navy. So, it is not strange that some admirals commanded ground forces and fleet.
"When officers entered to the Navy, they were trained in basic skills of the ground combat as well as the vessel."
How old was that practice/tradition? A few or many decades, going back to approximately when?
It is understood that IJN officers, junior and senior, saw regular fleet duty, and might be posted to a Special Naval Landing Force, particularly if they had shown skill in infantry training. But to pursue Nelson's question of 16th November, how about the other ranks (enlisted men) in SNLF units? Could they expect regular rotation back to the Fleet? Or once part of a naval landing force, did they stay there until killed, wounded, or their unit became part of a Special Base Force?
> How old was that practice/tradition? A few or many decades, going back to approximately when?
To 19th century.
> But to pursue Nelson's question of 16th November, how about the other ranks (enlisted men) in SNLF units?
The period of the military service of enlisted sailor was three years. One year was used for training. So, actual service period was two years. Most sailors ended their service in the same unit or vessel.
"The period of the military service of enlisted sailor was three years. One year was used for training. So, actual service period was two years. Most sailors ended their service in the same unit or vessel."
Surely that three years was during normal times. For virtually every belligerent nation fighting in World War 2, once a man donned the uniform, it was for the war's duration. I must assume the same for Japan: soldiers and sailors, unless badly wounded, served throughout the war. So, would non-officers of SNLF units in 1941-42 have continued to serve ashore in whatever capacity--as naval infantrymen or in base force units--until killed or wounded or the war ended? I suspect that unlike IJN officers, other ranks serving, or once serving, in SNLF units were not routinely rotated to shipboard service with the Fleet.
< Yes, that's how I would define the marines - independently trained naval infantry or armed sailors who received infantry training. >
That seems to define the IJN's Special Naval Landing Forces nicely, but not really Euro-American marines, who were organized into formalized corps semi-independent of their navies, and this of course is the crux of the ongoing discussion/argument. The Japanese SNLF were trained naval infantry, generated independently at various ports in the home islands or in China, e.g., Kure, Sasebo, Yokosuka, Shanghai, etc. Although receiving standardized military equipment and uniforms, they were not organized into an overarching and semi-independent corps, as were the Yanks, Brits, Dutch, etc. Now does that preclude the members of the SNLF from being marines? That remains the question and I for one am reluctant to declare absolutely that they were not. However the Euro-American marines were organized and despite the fact that Japan did have such a corps briefly during the late 19th century, soon disbanded, to state categorically that the Japanese SNLF troops encountered on Guadalcanal and elsewhere were NOT marines may be applying Occam's razor too closely.
On the flip side, to define any trained naval infantry ashore as marines doesn't do it either. In the 19th century, World War I, and even into World War II, there were landing parties put on shore composed of both marines and sailors. Into the early 20th century, they were easily distinguished by their different uniforms--the sailors looked like sailors--although later, the naval personnel were divested of their too conspicuous sailor uniforms and given more sensible khaki or olive drab ones. An excellent example of the differently uniformed marines and sailors can be seen in the movie THE WIND AND THE LION, if you can find it, put ashore during what the film calls the "Pedecaris Incident", taking place during the early 20th century. The marines carrying rifles and the sailors pulling machine gun carts doubletime through the streets of Tangier to arrive at the steps of the sultan's residence....then without provocation or warning open fire and cut down his palace guard. The reason for this action, as the movie has it, was the kidnapping of Eden Pedecaris (Candice Bergen) and her two children by the Berber raiders of Sharif Raisuli the Magnificent, lord/lion of the Rif (nicely played by Sean Connery). From there, the movie tale diverges more and more from historical reality (see below), but the point I wish to make is that before World War I, marines and trained naval infantry ashore were readily distinguished. That written, IMO such a clear distinction for members of the SNLF did not exist, and arguments both pro and con have merit.
[The actual Perdicaris Incident involved the kidnapping of Greek-American expatriate playboy, Ion Perdicaris (1840-1925), and his stepson from their lavish home in Tangier by the Berber sharif known variously as Mulai Ahmed/Achmed/Hamid/Muhammad El Raisuli/Raisuni (d. c1925). Perdicaris's wife Ellen and her other children were neither harmed nor taken. The ever bully President Theodore Roosevelt ordered a flotilla of the U.S. Navy's South Atlantic Squadron, commanded by RAdm. French Ensor Chadwick (1844-1919)--previously president of the Naval War College--to the coast of Morocco. Although supposedly prepared to land marines to seize the custom houses and hold them for ransom, in order to pressure the Sulton of Morocco's government to take action against Raisuli, Chadwick was in reality under very tight rein from Washington and he put ashore only 12 men with sidearms to protect the American consulate and Mrs. Perdicaris, where they shot nobody. Belatedly, Roosevelt learned that Perdicaris had surrendered his American passport years before and was by then a Greek citizen. Eventually, negotiations freed Perdicaris, who had in fact become a friend and admirer of Raisuli. Back in the U.S. of A., Teddy's bombast, "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead!" won him great popularity and a second term in the White House.]
But for all that, THE WIND AND THE LION is great entertainment, with Connery at his best. The marines are good, too.
As a formerly active Leatherneck/Devil Dog/Jarhead, I must admit that despite all the historical nonsense you mention, "The Wind and the Lion" remains one of my favorite flicks (ain't Connery something else as Raisuli the Magnificent?). To put things into past perspective, the Perdicaris Incident took place in 1904, as you infer, just in time for "Teddy" to use it to his advantage in getting re-elected that year, and the movie version of the event came out in 1975. Now that you've whetted my appetite, I just have to find the DVD somewhere or join Netflix!
