I wrote this essay a while back and have continued to edit and develope it since then. Some here may be interested in it since it covers some WW II history that seems is not taught.
The Strategic Bombing of Imperial Japan
This is my own small attempt to set one little piece of the record straight.
By March 1945 the US had been at war nearly 3 1/2 years. The war in Europe was nearing its end but the cost had been high. It was already known that many of the veterans of the war in Europe would have to be shipped to the Pacific theater to fight the Japanese. On April 12th, 1945 FDR died. To most Americans at that time Franklin D. Roosevelt had been the guiding hand. He held more political power than any president of the 20th century. When he died suddenly during this fourth term as POTUS FDR had been in office so long that he was the only president that most of the Americans serving in the war had ever known. FDRs replacement, Harry S.Truman, was an unknown having been totally overshadowed by his boss and not allowed into his inner circle. Truman didn't even learn about the program to develop the atomic bombs until after he was sworn in as the 33rd President of the United States. Under these conditions Truman took up the reins of power to guide the US to the completion of the war. Among his many problems was an ever increasing pressure to end the war quickly. The American people wanted their boys home!
Most Americans seem to believe that it was the Atomic bombs that finally brought Imperial Japan to her knees in 1945. In my opinion this is not exactly correct, or at least a very simplified view of what actually happened. I view the use of those two bombs, "Little Boy", dropped on Hiroshima Aug 6th, and "Fat Man", dropped on Nagasaki Aug. 9th, as the final paragraph of a chapter that encompasses a destructive six months for which there is no parallel in the history of warfare. No six month period in the history of modern warfare compares to the destruction and death rained down upon Imperial Japan from March 9th through August 15th of 1945.
The stories of development of the B-29 Superfortress bomber and the Manhattan project which produced the first nuclear weapons, and the actual use of those super weapons are worthy subjects covered very thoroughly in various texts. However the story of the firebombing of Japan is one that has received less attention and needs to be told in more detail. This is unfortunate because the story of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan lends context to those other stories allowing us to better understand why they happened.
The strategic bombing campaign against Japan marks the only time in history that such a campaign ended a major war through destruction from the air. The allied strategic bombing campaign in Europe materially aided in the ultimate defeat of Germany but did not bring that country to its knees. It took an actual invasion of Germany to secure the defeat of that nation and the cost in lives for the allies who carried out that strategic bombing campaign in Europe was staggering with about 55,000 UK heavy bomber air crew killed, and about 33,000 US heavy bomber crew killed. (Though the RAF heavy bomber force was considerably smaller than US Army Air Forces and bombed at night while the US bombed during the day, the RAF Heavy bombers were in the fight against Germany almost 3 years longer than the Americans)
The very first successful incendiary raid against the Japanese homeland took place on Feb. 3rd, 1945 at Kobe Japan. 159 tons of incendiaries were dropped from high altitude with the result of more than 1,000 buildings being burned. This was an experiment ordered by the new commander of the 21st Bomber Command Maj. Gen. Curtiss LeMay. An earlier high altitude incendiary raid against Nagoya Japan had been a failure.
LeMay had been sent by Commander of the US Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold to take over the B-29 bombing campaign against Japan because of the poor results of high altitude precision raids. Hap Arnolds order to LeMay was simply get results. Arnold had been a driving force behind the huge and expensive program to develop and build the B-29 and thus his reputation, legacy, and the future of the strategic bombing force, and in fact strategic bombing as a viable method of making war was tied to its performance. In short the survival of the Air Forces strategic bombers in the downsized military of post war America was at stake and Arnold knew it.
Before the use of incendiaries B-29 bombers had been used in high altitude (27,500 to 33,000 feet) precision bombing raids using conventional explosive bombs. This was essentially the same tactic that was successful in Europe. The results of this type bombing against Japan were mixed but generally did not produce adequate results to justify the effort. A huge investment had been made in developing the B-29 Superfortress and the allied combined joint chiefs of staff were unanimous in their declaration that the B-29 was not living up to its potential. What had worked against Germany was not succeeding in the war against Japan even though the Japanese air defenses were less well developed and not nearly as effective as Germanys.
The failure of high altitude precision bombing of Japan can be attributed to a number of factors. The biggest problem the US bombers faced was the weather over Japan. The configuration of the jet streams which flow out of Siberia and Manchuria over Japan made the weather even more variable and less predictable than it was in Europe. The higher the bombers flew the more they were affected by the high speed winds of the jet streams. Weather forecasting for Japan was much poorer than that for Europe because neither the Soviets or Chinese to the west where the weather came from, would or could provide adequate data for US meteorologists to produce accurate forecasts. The OSS and US Navy did manage to get a couple of rudimentary weather stations working in the Gobi desert and though they were valuable they could not provide nearly the data that US forces in Europe enjoyed. Thus bombing accuracy was so poor due to the weather that the standard joke in Tokyo at the time (during the early B-29 missions) was that the US was trying to starve them by bombing the fish in Tokyo bay.
Other problems were a result of the long distances the aircraft had to fly to get to the target and back. Because of the distances involved the B-29s had to use auxiliary fuel tanks in the fuselage there by cutting the bomb load almost in half. Most of the long distance flown by the bombers was over vast expanses of open water. Prior to Iwo Jima being secured the chances of survival were poor for B-29 crews whos aircraft had to ditch due to battle damage suffered over Japan despite a concerted effort by the US Navy to station submarines along the route that the B-29s would take. So the pilots naturally tended to be very conservative when they experienced a mechanical problem and had to decide if they would abort or go on and fly the mission. This was particularly prudent because the early models of the B-29 suffered from engine fires and a considerable number of electrical problems.
Even worse, partly due to policy and partly due to necessity, Japans industry was not organized to be concentrated in particular regions as was found in Europe (such as the Ruhr valley in Germany), nor to be as centralize, so the targets were more diffuse requiring more raids. Much of Japans industrial complex was organized as a series of cottage industries run out of family homes feeding parts and components made there to small shops which in turn supplied sub assemblies to larger shops and factories.
In 1944 Harvard chemist Dr. Louis Fieser invented what we now call napalm. His invention was a result of a request for such a weapon by the US government. Up until this time most incendiary bombs used thermite or phosphorus. Thermite and phosphorus burned very hot but because they are solids and burned quickly neither propagated fire like the sticky viscous flowing liquid napalm could. Quickly, Dupont geared up for production of various versions of the new incendiary material while others invented bombs of various configurations to weaponize it.
The weapon used for most of the low level firebomb raids against Japan was a cluster weapon.
http://www.echigonagaoka.com/bomb/n06.htmlThe M-19 weighed 500 lb and consisted of 38 napalm filled cheese cloth M-69 bomblets strapped together with a tail assembly attached. Small charges on the straps could be set to explode at the desired altitude allowing the individually fused bomblets to spread over an area. It was much more effective than thermite and white phosphorous filled incendiary devices for causing conflagrations and particularly so in urban areas where most buildings were constructed of wood as was the case in Japan. Water did not extinguish the napalm fed flames but actually helped to spread the burning liquid.
Based on the information gained in the successful incendiary raid on Kobe LeMay proposed firebombing every major city in Japan to his superiors. Some, of the high command objected to the incendiary bombing of urban areas. Admiral Chester Nimitz, navy commander of the Pacific objected on moral grounds.
At this time the invasion of Iwo Jima was in its final planning stages. Previous invasions at other islands like Tarawa, Saipan, and Guam and made it clear that the Japanese defenders would be prepared and fight to the death causing huge American casualties. And now as the Americans approached closer to Japan the specter of the Kamikazes attacking the troop carriers of any invasion fleet became real. The longer it took to conquer an Island the longer the US fleet had to stay in order to support the invasion and thus the longer they would be very vulnerable to Japans super weapon. In the event a US/Allied invasion fleet had to lie off Japans coast it would not enjoy the forewarning of Kamikaze attacks that it enjoyed during the invasion of Okinawa. At Okinawa the Japanese aircraft had to fly over hundreds of miles of ocean where their presence was detected by radar long before they reached the fleet that where their targets were located. During an invasion of Japan proper the Kamikazes would come from over the mountainous terrain of the Japanese islands proper. This would mask the radar from early protection. It would also make the troop transports a much easier target since the warships with all of their heavy antiaircraft armament would not be between the kamikazes and their targets as they were at Okinawa.
Japans desperate strategy of causing maximum casualties to the invaders in order to buy time and gain a limited armistice was made possible by its perverted version of the Bushido code of the ancient Samari. It was the belief in this perverted code of honor which drove the Japanese solider to fight to the death even when the situation was hopeless, or failing that, to commit suicide.
And to make matters worse it had become quite evident during the invasions of the very Mariana islands that the B-29s were flying from that the Japanese civilians, or at least a high proportion of them, would also adhere to the code and fight to the death or commit suicide.
These facts raised the specter of the possible elimination of a whole culture in the event of an invasion of Japan. So during the initial planning for the invasion of Iwo Jima it was proposed in the Lethbridge Report to the allied high command that Iwo Jima be drenched with a Mustard gas like blister agent. Admiral Chester Nimitz along with most of the allied high command approved of this proposal but President Roosevelt vetoed the idea stating his fear of the use of such weapons against allied troops if and when an invasion of the home islands of Japan became necessary. Thus one must question if Nimitzs objection to the firebombing of Japans urban areas was based more on reasons of interservice rivalry than moral ones.
After getting the approval for the firebombing of Japans major cities, LeMay sat down with his staff to develop a plan. LeMay proposed flying in for mass incendiary raids at low altitude (5,000 to 8,000 feet) at night in bombers stripped of their defensive guns and minus all but one of the gunners. Most of his staff objected, fearing high casualty rates with one of his experts estimating losses of 75% of the aircraft. They had every right to be concerned because previous experience with low level raids, like the massive one against the Polesti oil refineries in Romania had resulted in terrible losses for the attacking bomber force. LeMay finally overruled them and said Well, if those figures happen to be correct, then well have to send for more B-29 combat crews, wont we? When the air crews got wind of the idea most thought it suicidal.
Thus it was decided. The first target was Tokyo, the capital of Japan, and the largest and relatively best defended city in Japan. 325 B-29 bombers would be stripped of all their defensive guns. The only gunner to go would serve as an observer. Removing the guns, their ammunition, and the gunners saved 3,000 lb. allowing the bomb load to be increased by that much so each B-29 could carry about 12,000 lbs incendiary bombs. This maximum load dropped at this altitude would result in each B-29 bomber dispersing 912 each M-69 napalm bomblets in a pattern ½ mile wide by 1 ½ mile long.
The bombers were to concentrate their bombing in a five square mile area of the city. It was hoped that by doing this a massive and uncontrollable conflagration would result and it would spread down wind through the city by its own accord.
At 6:00 PM on March 9th, 1945 the crews of 325 B-29s stationed on the hard won islands of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam climbed into their bombers for what would turn out to be the single most destructive air raid in history. Only a few aborted.
Many of the bomber crews flew over Iwo Jima where that bloody battle still raged and fellow Americans were dieing. By this time in the war, the crews were aware of the stories of Japanese atrocities in the areas they occupied and the murder and abuse of American POWs during the Bataan death march. And by this time the use of Kamikazes was known, and even some B-29s had been intentionally rammed over Japan. Thus few had any moral reservations about bombing the urban areas of Japan if it could possibly end the war more quickly. The crews main objection was that they feared they would not survive at low level over Japan. But they swallowed their feelings and flew the mission.
After the first few waves of bombers had dropped their loads the following crews could see the glow of Tokyo burning from 50 miles away. They flew over the conflagration in the smoke of the fires which reached 10,000 feet and some claimed they saw flames nearly that high. In the smoke they smelled the sickening sweet and nauseating smell of burning human flesh. Many a crewman missed a couple meals after the raid because they couldnt get the smell out of the noses. One crewman described what he saw as a nightmare out of Dantes inferno.
As they passed over the burning areas their bombers were cast about by the powerful thermals created by the super heated air. Several aircraft were completely flipped over by the those thermals and others described the blast of air that threw their aircraft upward as producing the highest G load they ever felt in their flying career. Their aircraft were driven upward as if they were a feather in a high wind. In some cases the G force was so powerful the pilots could not lift their arms to control the aircraft until the thermal updraft released its hold on them.
For nearly three hours the B-29s passed over Tokyo adding their incendiaries to the holocaust below in an area of the city with an average population density greater than 100,000 per square mile. The temperature in the heart of the conflagration is estimated to have reached 1,800 deg. F. and water in the canals boiled. Winds of super heated air reaching hurricane force raged through the streets of the areas about to be consumed. Many were killed by breathing this air before they were consumed by the flames. Bomb shelters were death traps because those in them not burned were asphyxiated as a fire sucked all the available air from the confined space they were in. There was no way of effectively fighting the fire.
When it was over 16 square miles of one of the largest and most populous cities on earth had been completely burned out. 25% of all buildings (more than ¼ million) in Tokyo had been utterly destroyed. Japans official casualty estimate was 83,783 killed and 50,000 wounded but there is reason to believe that it was actually somewhat higher. Nearly one million Tokyo residents were homeless. By any measure the destruction and death tolls from this single firebomb raid exceeded that wrought by either atomic bomb even when radiation casualties are included, and thus it is the most destructive and deadly single air raid in history.
And this was just the beginning of the most destructive and deadly 6 months in the history of aerial warfare. With the success of the raid all talk of the B-29 being a failure ceased for all time. Bolstered by the success of the Tokyo raid LeMay drove his crews hard and they participated in a bombing blitz that made the German version against Britain pale in comparison. In quick succession the industrial cities of Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe received their destruction by fire. In a fourteen day period starting with the Tokyo fire raid 32 square miles of hearts of Japans four greatest industrial cities were burned out.
This blitz resulted in the depletion of the M-69 incendiaries but raids using conventional bombs and the older thermite filled incendiary bombs continued until the stocks of the new incendiaries were replenished.
During this period Iwo Jima was secured and large numbers of fighter escort were then based there. Iwo Jima was close enough to most of the targets in Japan that starting on April 7th the B-29s enjoyed the protection of a fighter escort for their raids. And this, along with Japans military leadership to harbor their aircraft for resistance to future invasions made it safe enough to conduct the incendiary raids in daylight. In the end, more aircrews lives were saved than the Marines and sailors lost taking Iwo Jima.
By August 6th, when Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima, an average of nearly 50% of Japans 20 largest cities had been utterly destroyed resulting in the deaths of nearly a million of their citizens. This is was about twice as many killed as the Germans, Italians, and their forced labor forces suffered from strategic bombing during the whole war.
During this same period B-29s also dropped 10s of 1,000s of mines in the waters off Japan. This effort in combination with the efforts of the US Navy, and especially the silent service (submarines) resulted in the nearly complete shutdown of merchant shipping even before the war ended.
During 15 months of operation against the Japanese homeland the B-29s dropped almost 170,000 tons of bombs and incendiaries on Japan. They had flown 34,790 sorties. It had cost 414 B-29 bombers and 3,015 crew casualties.
That many of the leadership of Japan knew the war was lost before the atomic bombs were dropped is bore out by their post war statements. Prince Konoye of the Japanese Royal family said Fundamentally, the thing that brought about the determination to make peace was the prolonged bombing by the B-29s. The Japanese Premier Suzuki said I, myself, on the basis of the B-29 raids, felt that the cause was hopeless." Tojo, before his execution, said that he knew in his heart that Japan could not win the war after the loss of Saipan and the Marianas islands.
In the end, the Strategic bombing of Japan, including the use of the atomic bombs was the deciding factor in ending the war before the invasion of Japan proper was required. That invasion was to begin Nov 1, 1945 and the Combined Joint Chiefs had estimated allied casualties for just the first phase of the invasion to be 500,000. The US had suffered 12,520 killed during the invasion of the Okinawa as compared to about 110,000 Japanese soliers killed . For every American KIA there were almost 10 Japanese military KIA, and add to that another 2-3 Japanese civilians killed. This ratio of 10-1 military KIA was right on par with what had been the average result in nearly every US invasion of Japanese held islands since the first major one at Guadalcanal. Thus it is not unreasonable to estimate that had the allies invaded Japan and the Japanese had fought to the last as the Germans did, the defenders would have suffered millions both military and civilian killed. The numbers make it clear that in the final analysis the only reasonable conclusion is that the firebombing of Japan and use of the atomic bombs actually saved millions of lives in the long run.
Since those times some historians have tried to claim that Japan would have surrendered without the use of atomic bombs. As time passes and the memory of the nature of the desperate times of WW II when nations fought for survival fades, the judgmental voices of the morally self- righteous, or those that for some reason desire to find fault with the US begin to be heard as they always do. These voices almost always emanate from those who did not participate in the events and in fact never had to place their own lives on the line to fight for anything let alone make the life and death decisions they so arrogantly critique so critically. Their own analysis of such historic events is accomplished with a bias towards reaching conclusions to justify their own current social/political agendas or opinions, and so they avoid using inconvenient facts and analysis that does not agree with their own even if they cannot effectively counter it.
Some of these people point to the fact that Japan had diplomatic contacts with the Russians near the end of the war. They claim that these talks were started by Japan with the intent of getting the Russians to carry a message of Japans desire to negotiate peace to the allies. This is false. Those diplomatic discussions went on for over a month and Japans objective in these discussions with the Soviets, who had remained neutral in the war against Japan, was not surrender but was in fact an effort to get Stalin to ally with them and for the two countries to share the resources of China and Manchuria. The Soviets broke off the talks suddenly when the first atomic bomb was dropped and quickly declared war on Japan.
Others claim that the US only needed to blockade Japan and not use the atomic bombs to get the country to surrender. Based on the actions of the Japanese up to that time this is doubtful at best. However if that course had been chosen the casualty rate due to starvation could have been even more horrendous than those resulting from invasion and far worse than that resulting from any bombing. The average Japanese citizen had already suffered through years of semi starvation and by 1945 the average caloric intake was 20% under the estimated minimum needed for mere sustenance. In any famine the aged, women, and children suffer the highest mortality. And any Allied blockading fleet would be vulnerable to Kamikaze attacks from the home islands. Plus there were almost a million Japanese military men that had been isolated on their islands by being bypassed and most were starving. Allied airmen or other prisoners and even local natives that fell into their hands had ended up on the menu of some of these Japanese. Apparently those that argue now in hindsight that the blockade would have been more humane believe that starving a larger number of people to death is preferable to killing a lesser number by other means in order to achieve the same objective.
And then there is the claim that Truman and all the higher up civilians and military in the US were in on a conspiracy to use the atomic bombs to make a point to Stalin knowing that Japan was about to surrender. Never mind that there is no more evidence to back this claim than there is for the claim that FDR knew the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and that Truman had already given into Stalin at Potsdam, allowing the USSR a virtually a free hand in most of eastern Europe.
And of course there are those that claim that had Truman negotiated a peace instead of standing by FDRs policy decision that Japans surrender must be unconditional, the use of the Atomic bombs would never had been necessary. This of course ignores the fact that such a negotiated peace would leave the military leadership of Japan that had perverted the Bushido code, subverted civilian democratic leadership, and brought about its aggressive quest for an empire in the first place would have been left in power. Only through total defeat allowing an unconditional occupation could the changes be made to ensure the prevention of a military resurgence of an Imperial Japan.
The simple fact is that Truman faced a terrible decision. Either invade Japan knowing that even the civilians would fight to the death or kill themselves there by possibly destroying a whole culture and resulting in almost incomprehensible casualties for both sides. Or try to end the war with the atomic bombs.
De Oppresso Liber
