Chávez: One People, One Continent ... One Leader
June 28, 2006
Since taking power in 1999, Chávez has pushed a revolutionary socialist agenda that has included food subsidies, literacy programs and medical units for the poor, and excluded anyone categorized as an enemy of his government. In that vein, his administration purged the Caracas and national police forces of dozens of officers deemed loyal to the opposition and replaced them with loyalists. The result is that Chávez's government has been reluctant to criticize or fix any problems that might reflect poorly on the president. Last August, for instance, the attorney general's office reported that 5,997 police officers had been investigated for questionable killings in the line of duty between January 2000 and July 2005, but that only 88 were found guilty of any wrongdoing.
To his most ardent backers in Venezuela and among the international left, Chávez is a hero driven by humanitarian impulses to redress social injustice and inequality -- problems long neglected by a traditional political class intent on protecting its own position while denying the masses their rightful share of wealth and meaningful political participation. He's bravely fighting for Latin American solidarity and standing up to the overbearing United States. With charisma and oil dollars, he is seizing an opportunity to correct the power and wealth imbalances that have long defined Venezuelan and hemispheric affairs.
Chávez's opponents accused him of wasting the country's oil bonanza on politically driven projects abroad while neglecting infrastructure at home. His supporters, in turn, charged the traditional elite that governed before him with squandering resources and ignoring fundamental needs for decades. In fact, both sets of charges were nearly identical. And both were right. Venezuela's leaders, Chávez as well as his predecessors, have long been guilty of misplaced priorities. As with so many things today in Latin America's most politically polarized society, they all share the responsibility for failing to maintain what is arguably the most important stretch of road in Venezuela. To his opponents -- the embattled domestic opposition and many in Washington -- Chávez is a power-hungry dictator who disregards the rule of law and the democratic process. He's on a catastrophic course of extending state control over the economy, militarizing politics, eliminating dissent, cozying up to rogue regimes, and carrying out wrong-headed social programs that will set Venezuela back. He's an authoritarian whose vision and policies have no redeeming qualities and a formidable menace to his own people, his Latin American neighbors, and U.S. interests.
Chavez's leftist "Bolivarian revolution" has significantly influenced the changes in the political scene in Latin America. The recent re-awakening of the indigenous population of regional civilizations has started to profoundly reshape Latin America’s political landscape. As this new awareness peaked, indigenous communities began to retroactively say “no” to presidential candidates who, once in office, reneged on their glib commitments and proceeded to repudiate campaign pledges to their Aymara and Quechua-speaking altiplano constituents. They then countered these acts of treachery by ousting leaders in Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia after the presidents had revealed themselves to be anything but bona fide servants of the people. This process ran conterminously with the increasing political involvement of those indigenous groups, who, with an increasingly powerful voice, began rejecting neoliberal reforms with roadblocks and other rejectionist public manifestations. As Latin American populations were spurning traditional politicians and their dusty programs, different actors emerged to capture the discontent by offering new solutions. These were most visible in 1998 with Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s 2002 triumph in Brazil and in Evo Morales’ defining victory in Bolivia last March. While the May 28 triumph in Colombia of Álvaro Uribe, Washington’s favored South American leader, produced great joy at the State Department, it had to be disheartened by the strong showing by left-leaning candidate Carlos Gaviria. Even with Uribe’s big vote, Washington
is still a bit disenchanted by his strong sense of nationalism and his querulous reaction to any display of U.S. sentiments of mastery over Colombia’s public policy, the war against drugs or Uribe’s desire to maintain close business-like ties with Chávez.
Chávez had come to be seen by huge numbers as being the movement’s spiritual leader, as well as its sage, just as the staccato-like peppering of the political scene by Chávez’s ADS-like interventions in other countries weakened thereby their already only loosely common front. Chávez is sometimes belied by what his critics see as his buffoonish outbursts and raffish personality, and could well be seen as perhaps the most dynamic leader in the region today – though his power is more with the streets than the diplomats of other Pink Tide countries.
Chávez appears to embody the region’s greatest hope for the future and the growing despair over his irrepressible style. His myriad social programs, ranging from medical services for the nation’s poor through an innovative oil exchange arrangement with Cuba, to a meaningful land reform and educational project, to a broad pattern of disconnected oil sales to many neighboring countries as well as directly to deprived neighborhoods within countries, have given luster to his revolutionary credentials. In exchange, he has not asked for tribute, but merely called upon other leaders to do what is best for their own countries.
Chávez has had the sort of leverage that Allende grievously lacked: with oil at around $70 a barrel, the Venezuelan leader isn't only flush with petrodollars but ready and able to fund revolutionary domestic and regional projects. He holds the additional trump card of an increasingly important strategic resource that has yet to be exploited on a major scale the heavy crude yielded from the Orinoco’s tar sands. Furthermore, with a widening slate of regional allies, theoretically including venues like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia, with several other potential candidates in the wings and Mercosur as his bride, Chávez, theoretically has the geopolitical heft to stand up to the U.S. At the same time, the already fragmenting loose knit Pink Tide alliance is suffering from some important viperous tendencies, including Chávez’s habit of self destructively intervening in the local affairs of other Latin American countries.
Why Has Chávez Succeeded in Gaining Power?
Chávez's appeal can't be explained without acknowledging the deep dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic order felt by much of the population in Venezuela and throughout much of the rest of Latin America. Chávez's claims that he could remedy Venezuelans' legitimate grievances won him the support of many in the region. But Chávez's policy ideas are mostly dubious. Despite the record oil profits that are funding social spending, his initiatives have yielded only very modest long-term gains. His autocratic and megalomaniacal tendencies have undermined governance and the democratic process in Venezuela. Still, his seductive political project has offered a measure of hope to many, and his critics have proved chronically inept: every effort to challenge him, both domestically and internationally, has failed, and usually ended up making him stronger in the process. Chávez's opponents in Venezuela and abroad have spent much time and effort condemning the model he claims to represent, but far too little time and effort putting forward a model of their own. Until they do, Chávez will likely continue to have the upper hand.
Venezuela was ripe for major change when Chávez was elected president in 1998. For 40 years, an alliance of two parties -- Democratic Action and the Christian Democratic Party -- had dominated the political order. By the 1970's, both were rightly considered guilty of chronic corruption and mismanagement; the exclusionary political system they managed was wholly
divorced from the central concerns of most Venezuelans. The fact of ample oil wealth only deepened the population's rage.
During the 1980's and 1990's, no South American country deteriorated more than Venezuela; its GDP fell some 40%. In February 1992, with unrest already widespread, Chávez, a lieutenant colonel and former paratrooper, led a military coup against the government. Although the coup failed and Chávez spent the next two years in prison, his bold defiance catapulted him onto the national political stage and launched his career. When Chávez entered politics six years later, his combative style and straight-talking populist charisma served him well in a country marked by pervasive discontent. His fierce indictment of the old political order -- and his promise of a "revolution" in honor of South America's liberator, Simon Bolívar -- held wide appeal among poor Venezuelans. Unlike the "out of touch" politicians, Chávez projected a sincere concern for those living in poverty. In Venezuela, that meant three-quarters of the population.
Chávez's Ideology.
Chávez's political project has been masked by a blend of populism, nationalism, militarism, until he started promoting 21st century socialism a couple of years ago. It's for the time being a very mild edition of Castro-communism, combined with a "Bolivarian" emphasis on South American unity. Chávez sees himself as the embodiment of the popular will. There's "participatory democracy", providing that the person wants to promote Chávez's ideas. Taking advantage of his communication skills, Chávez, a consummate showman, speaks directly to the Venezuelan public through his Sunday television program, Aló Presidente, thereby cementing his bond with the masses. The government has been spending heavily in starting "community" radio and TV stations, as a counterweight for the private media, hostile to his government.
Behind democratic trappings and a fig leaf of legitimacy, Chávez has concentrated power to an astonishing degree. Although he benefited considerably from the complete collapse of the old order, he has also proved to be an astute and skilled politician, despite being frequently dismissed as a mere buffoon by some (uninformed) circles in the U.S. He has constructed his edifice of power through a succession of elections, including a 1999 referendum for a new constitution. That new "Bolivarian" constitution allowed consecutive reelection for the president and set up an electoral council that is a fourth branch of government.
The election is scheduled for Dec. 3, and the regime has mounted the absolute guarantee of its triumph based on a mainly inscrutable system, of which voters' register books are no more than the tip of iceberg. So, it may seem amazing to those who oppose Chávez, or maintain neutral position, that nothing produces more paranoia to the government circles than the massive absence of voters in the last year's parliamentary elections, when fewer than 20% of people cast ballot, which showed considerable lack of support among chavista voters.
The contours of Chávez's "illiberal" regime have become increasingly better defined over the past seven years. Virtually all key decisions are in the hands of the president. The rule of law is at best peripheral. The Electoral Council and the National Assembly have become mere appendages of the executive. In May 2004, Chávez took advantage of majority support in the National Assembly to have a measure passed that increased the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32, thus allowing him to pack the court with handpicked political loyalists.
To be sure, dissent is permitted, and the largely privately owned media still frequently criticize Chávez. But instruments have been put in place to clamp down, if deemed necessary, on critical voices. According to the criminal code, it is now an offense to show disrespect for the president
and other government authorities, punishable by up to 20 months in jail. A December 2004 Social Responsibility Law comes close to censorship by imposing "administrative restrictions" on radio
and television broadcasts. The measure has been strongly condemned by various groups, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a body of the Organization of American States (OAS). By raising the disturbing possibility of arbitrary enforcement, such restrictions have had a chilling effect on the press. There is also credible anecdotal evidence of the existence of lists of individuals' votes that have been used to deny Chávez's opponents jobs and services.
The prostitution of the Venezuelan Electoral system started with the naming of the Board of Directors of the National Electoral Council, done in violation of the Venezuelan Constitution. The Board was made up of 5 members, only one of whom was truly independent, the other four being totally servile Chávez followers. This National Electoral Council went on to plague the electoral processes with numerous irregularities, most of which have well documented. As a result of these irregularities, the increasing frustration of the opposition culminated in the massive abstaining in the December 2005 legislative elections mentioned above. The reports of observers to that process from the Organization of American States, OAS, and of the European Union, EU, coincided that the National Electoral Council was not a transparent body and did not enjoy the trust of Venezuelans. They recommended that this Board should be removed and replaced by an impartial group. The Board was removed and replaced by five new members, four of whom are as shamelessly loyal to the Chávez regime as the previous ones. This farce is little known to international public opinion, too busy watching the critical situations developing in Iran, Iraq or Palestine. As a result of this farce the doors to a transparent Venezuelan presidential election next December have been essentially closed, moving Venezuela several steps closer to a violent solution to its political problems.
What are the two main components of the electoral system that illustrate its corruption? One is the Electoral Registry. This registry is a black box. The National Electoral Council has resisted all attempts by the opposition to have proper access to it. The registry seems to have more than 17 million voters, a statistical impossibility in Venezuela, that has a population of 25 million and at least 55% of this total are younger than 18 years old, therefore unable to vote. Worse still, the registry has increased to this new level in the last three years, a rate of growth 8 to 10 times faster than the historical rate. Who are these "new" voters? No one knows. Many of the registered voters don't have addresses and can't be located. No one in his,her right mind would go to vote in these conditions of uncertainty.
The Levers of Power
To rule, Chávez depends chiefly on the military, the institution he knows best and trusts most. Thanks to a specially tailored law, Chávez remains an active military officer, and more than one-third of the country's regional governments are in the hands of soldiers directly linked to Chávez. As the editor of the daily Tal Cual, Teodoro Petkoff, has noted, "For all practical purposes, this is a government of the armed forces." The military institution, by definition, isn't democratic. Obedience, rigid hierarchy, total subordination are of supreme importance; in a free society controversy, respect for other people's opinion, the search of consensuses and the equality of the citizens prevail. This contradiction forces a democratic society to have clear rules to regulate the relations between them. The armed forces, as a non-democratic segment, can be of service to the society, only if it's put under the civilian, democratic control. It's
emblematic that a huge Chavez's picture was placed on the facade of the Armed Forces University building with the following words: One people, one continent ... one leader.
Moreover, the government has been organizing private unarmed militias and developing plans to mobilize up to two million reservists in the name of national defense. Citizen power, as reflected in such groups as government-sponsored neighborhood "Bolivarian Circles," helps undergird the regime (and represents the fifth branch of government, according to the 1999 constitution).
Chávez has shown little desire to build a coherent party, relying instead on the heterogeneous political grouping he calls the Fifth Republic Movement.
Chávez's strategies have been particularly effective in the face of an opposition that has been consistently inept and is now weaker than ever. It has used various tactics -- a coup, a national strike, and a recall referendum -- in a quest to unseat Chávez but has never had a viable strategy, an alternative program, or effective leadership. In April 2002, a failed coup not only raised questions about the democratic credentials of the opposition; it also gave Chávez the perfect pretext to take full control of the armed forces, purging any dissidents. The strike at the end of 2002 enabled Chávez to establish control over the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). And the August 2004 recall referendum ended up enhancing his legitimacy when he won. Last December, the opposition's decision to boycott elections for the National Assembly left Chávez's coalition with control of all 167 seats. Looking ahead to the December 2006 presidential vote, it is hard to see how the opposition could regroup to mount a serious challenge. Although polls vary, they suggest Chávez is in a very strong political position, with popular support hovering around 50%, placing him far ahead of his closest challenger.
Social And Economic Programs
The opposition's lack of success stems from its past unwillingness even to recognize -- let alone devise solutions to -- the deep social problems that Chávez has identified. Chávez's government, meanwhile, has undertaken important social programs and launched workers' cooperatives in urban slums. Plans are under way to set up "social production companies" that would extend the state sector and seek to distribute earnings among workers and community projects. In a speech to small farmers on June 15 Chávez delineated his new economic objective: to end the usual trading practices, and to stimulate the barter trade. He instructed Oly Millán, the minister of popular economy -- yes, there's such a minister! -- to form "communitarian markets" where "the person who goes there isn't going to sell or buy anything, he's going to barter. That's the only way to break with Capitalism from the roots". Chávez thus wants to put into practice what the most important chavista project ideologue Heinz Dietrich, professor of the Metropolitan Independent University of Mexico (UNAM) advocates. Dietrich, a staunch Marxist, bases his economic proposal on partly eliminating the usual buying and selling process with the aim of forming the market where swapping the goods takes place. "Let me give you a simple example", Chávez explained, "I take a cachama [a fresh-water fish found in Venezuela] and exchange it with you for a cluster of plantains." So, barter isn't only practiced in non-literate societies. The government of Venezuela fosters barter trade. There are many examples: oil is bartered for agricultural products with several countries, cattle with Uruguay, people with Cuba.
Venezuela's oil wealth has made massive expenditures possible -- an estimated $20 billion in the past three years alone on programs to provide food, education, and medical care to underserved populations -- which have undeniably had some effect. Available data of these measures' effect are mixed and not altogether reliable. According to the Venezuelan government's National
Institute of Statistics, poverty rose from 43 to 50% during Chávez's first four years in office. The government blames this increase on the opposition's strikes and other efforts to destabilize the economy. A 2005 report of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean notes that poverty has started to decline in Venezuela, as the economy has registered impressive growth, fueled by consumption, in the past two years (18% in 2004, 9% in 2005). The government has also just changed its methodology for measuring poverty to reflect improvements in non-income criteria such as access to health services and education, which, it argued, were not reflected in past figures. The dozen or so community-based misiones, a Chávez innovation, have resulted in better basic services in poor communities. Literacy programs have been afforded high priority and have made some progress.
The Security Situation
Caracas' crime rate has traditionally rivaled those of the toughest cities in Latin America, and corruption among law-enforcement officers was commonplace. But in the last five years, the situation has markedly worsened, criminologists and security analysts say. Estimates vary, but most analysts agree that since 2001, kidnappings have increased at least fourfold and now number close to 300 a year, while homicides almost doubled. While Chávez remains a hugely popular figure and looks certain to win reelection in a December vote, an April poll by the local firm Datanálisis showed that crime had surpassed unemployment as Venezuelans' chief concern. The deepening sense that crime has worsened could help explain why the government has stopped providing statistics on robberies, kidnappings and car thefts. The national police virtually shut down their media office two years ago, and journalists and foreign diplomats alike struggle to obtain any data from the Justice and Interior ministries, keepers of the official crime statistics. Analysts say that the lack of official data or response is only fueling the fear that law-enforcement officers are part of the problem.
According to official figures 68,926 Venezuelans were killed by common criminals or in violent confrontation with the police since Chávez took over in 1998. Unofficial sources put the figure at close to 100,000. Compare that with the 23,700 killed in the seven years prior to Chávez being elected the first time and nobody can even begin to blame the current levels of homicides to the previous Governments or the "40 terrible" years of the 4th. Republic. As with so many things in Venezuela today, like corruption, poverty or inefficiency, things are simply worse with Chavez, even if they were already pretty bad before him.
A Successful World Leader?
As Latin America elects more and more presidents who lean to the left and the Bush administration's standing in the region slumps, experts say Castro is enjoying his warmest relations with his hemispheric neighbors in decades. We are seeing a revival of Fidel Castro, a resurgence of his presence; there's been a reinvigoration of the Cuban revolution, and all of it because of one person -- Hugo Chávez. Castro is feeling better than ever, because things are going his way in Latin America when they hadn't for year. His support is certainly higher than it was a decade ago and he is less isolated.
During the Cold War, Cuba's economy and revolution were pumped with billions in aid from the Soviet Union. That aid collapsed at a time Cuba was cut off from much of Latin America, which was then generally following U.S. economic policies. But those policies failed to enrich Latin
American masses, and now voters in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have turned toward leftist leaders who are far more likely to maintain friendly relations with Castro. Bolivia's Morales has joined Chávez and Castro in what they dubbed ''an axis of good.'' Fueled with Venezuelan oil profits, Chávez has embarked on Cuba-style social programs he learned from his elder mentor to benefit Bolivia's disenfranchised poor. With two critical elections coming this year in Mexico on July 2, and Nicaragua in October, Chávez's and Castro's standing will improve, since we believe that both Lopez in Mexico and Ortega in Nicaragua will be elected
Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva didn't become the leftist firebrand and Castro cohort as feared when first elected, experts point out. But even Colombia, which recently elected conservative Alvaro Uribe to an unprecedented second term as president, has cordial relations with Cuba. Peace talks with one of Colombia's leftist rebel groups, the National Liberation Army, are in Havana. Caribbean countries have always maintained good relations with Cuba, relations that
have grown only deeper with the brigades of Cuban doctors who work in neighboring nations and the scores of low-income Caribbean students who attend medical school in Havana. That goodwill extends beyond Latin America, as Cuba befriends countries around the world with its medical missions. Cuba's foreign minister recently announced that about 60 nations would participate in the next summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, to be held in Havana in September. The president of Iran is also expected to visit.
From the outset, it has been clear that Venezuela, with a population of 25 million, is too small a stage for Chávez's ambitions. Chávez has taken full advantage of a confluence of favorable factors -- lots of money, Latin America's political disarray, U.S. disengagement from the region, widespread hostility to the Bush administration -- to construct alliances throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. He has skillfully managed to establish himself as a global and regional leader, using oil money and brash anti-Americanism to attempt to construct a counterweight to U.S. power.
Chávez accuses the U.S. government of being imperialist. He may be right, but then he should act as an example of anti imperialism. Let us give several examples that show Venezuelan imperialism. Chávez withdraws unilaterally from the Andean Pact, because he doesn't like their commercial links with the U.S. Openly supports Humala in Peru and announces that if the Peruvians vote for Garcia he will break up diplomatic relations - isn't that direct interference in the domestic affairs? Spends money in Bolivia to help Morales win, then goes there and lends support in repeating the way he established his own rule in Venezuela, through a constitutional assembly. Ships cheap oil to Sandinista mayors to promote Ortega's candidacy in November elections. Isn't that imperialism? No, according to Chávez, it's simply fraternal cooperation.
Recent setbacks in Peru and Colombia were tactical and not strategic defeats. Fidel and Chávez have a continent-wide plan, and they aren't going to retreat in the face of such minor snags. For them, these are nothing but two battles lost in a war that is still ongoing. They are waging a war to expel any U.S. economic, political and military influence in the Caribbean and Latin America. They had a good initial plan, if we note that they intended to neutralize and isolate Colombia by having other Chávez's ally cordoning it off. An obvious strategic target, Colombia is the main stumbling block for any pro-Cuba integration agenda. From the geographical standpoint, Colombia can block any Venezuelan move to spread the "Bolivarian Revolution" throughout South America.
That is the reason why Ollanta Humala's defeat is painful, but not final. Alan García's Government may end up facing as many governance problems as the three Bolivian Presidents that preceded Evo Morales. García will have to deal with a similar situation, as his administration could face destabilization and serious hurdles. Uribe's case is different. He enjoys popularity because he has proven to be a wise, efficient president.
Venezuela's withdrawal from the Group of Three (G3) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) is a political rather than economic move. The decision to leave such groups and join the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) has no economic benefits for the private sector, but it does favor Chávez's plans against the private sector. Colombia is Venezuela's largest export market for non-oil products. Therefore, leaving oil sales to the United States aside, Colombia is Venezuela's largest export market and trade partner. Second in the list is Mexico, with a trade balance favorable to Venezuela. Immediate consequences of Chávez's move to leave CAN and G3 are loss of jobs in Venezuela, as well as closure of industries and companies. The automobile spare parts industries will be the most seriously hit.
Regarding the cattle-raising sector, Brazil is the world's largest exporter of beef, followed by Argentina. Venezuelan beef and dairy producers can't compete with their Brazilian and Argentine counterparts. In the middle term, the Venezuelan Cattle-raisers Federation will face a crisis. Joining Mercosur involves eliminating customs tariffs on all products imported from those member countries. This means Mercosur products will enter Venezuela unrestrictedly and, as they are cheaper, they will face no competition from domestic products. Venezuelan companies and industries will go bankrupt.
Chávez's close friendship with Castro has been integral to this project. In exchange for Cuban teachers and doctors, Chávez furnishes the financially strapped island with at least 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Castro, in turn, provides Chávez with strategic advice, along with some military support and intelligence. Cuba and Venezuela are important referents for each other.
Chávez's aggressive oil diplomacy has also enhanced his influence. Last year, he inaugurated Petrocaribe, under which Venezuela provides 198,000 barrels of oil a day to 13 Caribbean nations with "soft" financing for up to 40% of the bill. Chávez has also given high priority to the countries of the continent's southern cone, especially Argentina and Brazil, which are central to his plan to launch Petrosur, another regional energy initiative that he has pledged to largely bankroll. He has bought $2.8 billion in Argentine bonds and $25 million in Ecuadorian bonds and has substantially underwritten Telesur, a Latin American alternative to CNN.
At the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in November 2005, Chávez joined with the summit's host, President Néstor Kirchner, and leaders from the other members of the Mercosur trading group (Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) to block the U.S.-led proposal to restart talks on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In its place, Chávez put forth the vaguely defined Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA - a cleverly invented acronym which in Spanish means "dawn"). Chávez has also succeeded in making Venezuela a member of Mercosur, with the aim of boosting the trading bloc's political role in hemispheric relations. But, at the same time, he promises to restructure the trading block according to his 21st century socialism vision.
Chávez's supporters and opponents have both attributed to him considerable responsibility for the resurgence of Latin America's left -- most recently with the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia. There is no question about the affinity and mutual admiration among Morales, Chávez, and Castro; there are signs of cooperation among them on social and economic issues. Although no hard evidence has yet come to light, critics often charge that Chávez has helped fund the rise of like-minded political figures, such as Morales. It's not a secret that particular groups throughout the region -- and presidential candidates in Ecuador (Rafael Correa), Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega), and Peru (Ollanta Humala) -- regard Chávez with admiration.
But even as Chávez can help shape a regional environment favorable to such populist politicians, it's inaccurate to blame the rise of left-wing candidates on his influence or his scheming. Those figures are products of particular circumstances, and they would be contenders without Chávez. Chávez's shrewd use of resources, calls for social justice, and fierce attacks on an unpopular U.S. administration have had such resonance in Latin America precisely because leaders such as Morales are responding to many of the same frustrations that gave rise to Chávez in Venezuela. Chávez's adherents include not only remnants of the region's unreconstructed left, but also many who are simply frustrated by failed economic and political models and are searching for answers. Accordingly, many Latin American leaders, such as Lula and Kirchner, indulge him and accept his attractive economic deals without really endorsing his agenda.
Is Chavizmo A Sustainable Model?
Chávez's influence will continue to be felt in the near future. Countering that influence would require recognizing that it originates not only in his ability to shape Venezuela's and the region's agenda, but also in the failure of other governments to do so. His legitimate and well-expressed concern for social questions strikes a chord in Latin America, especially in view of the rather dismal condition of education and health care in many countries in the region. Against such a backdrop of unattended needs, Chávez's appeal is hardly a mystery. Offsetting his influence would require confronting the acute social problems that Chávez has shed light on. His diagnosis of social ills may be on the mark, and his intentions may be sincere. But Chávez has been unable to devise a sustainable model to address social problems effectively. Although some of Venezuela's poorest citizens are better off today, Chávez's record has been disappointing given the opportunity presented by the oil windfall. More important, Chavismo comes with an unacceptably high cost.
Regardless of whether the conditions of Venezuela's poor have marginally improved or marginally worsened under Chávez, his "Bolivarian Revolution" is hardly a sustainable model for Venezuela's or the region's predicament. Its approach is fundamentally clientelistic, perpetuating dependence on state patronage rather than promoting broad-based development. Random land-reform measures and occasional confiscations of private property have had less of an economic than a political and symbolic rationale. Crime, a dominant concern for Venezuelans, has gotten worse.
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