SOMALIA’S HOSTILE NEIGHBOUR
1. Ethiopian Armaments For Warlords
In January this year, a serious diplomatic tension rose between the newly formed Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) and the Ethiopian government over the presence of this latter’s troops inside Somalia. Somalia had denounced the Ethiopian transgression at a UN Security Council special meeting held to discuss on lifting the international embargo against arms sales to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia had also brought to the international community’s attention that Ethiopia was providing weapons to the Somali warlords to combat the TNG. The hard facts presented by different parties, including Somalia, convinced the Security Council that the matter had indeed a regional dimension and that it was still too premature to allow a free flow of arms in this troubled region.
Since its inception in August 2000, the TNG and its parliament have been trying to adopt a strategy of developing good neighborhood rapprochement with the Ethiopian government through direct dialogue and establishment of close ties. In this spirit, the TNG had engaged itself in a series of talks with the Ethiopian authorities at different levels and forums. The President’s Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs went on the TNG’s first trip abroad to brief the Ethiopian government on the political situation in Somalia and the new administration’s plans. In November, just less than three months from his election, the Interim President himself led a high profile delegation to Addis Ababa to address openly issues of serious concerns to both countries, including the security along the common border. The seemingly fruitful endeavor was aborted by the arrival of an Ethiopian shipment of armaments to one of the Mogadishu-based warlords just within a week from the Addis Ababa meeting. This had marked a shift in the TNG strategy of downplaying its divergences with Ethiopia.
The TNG had seized the UN Security Council meeting as a diplomatic opportunity to go public on its soured relations with the Ethiopian government. The influential role played by the TNG in that international debate and the considerable media attention it had generated had surprised and incensed the Ethiopian government at the same time. Ethiopia had miscalculated the Somali reaction to its policy of lip service to the restoration of peace and political stability in Somalia. It had planned to continue its military occupation in Gedo (1996) and Bakool (1999) and maintain control over the ‘buffer zone’ of Bay. It counted, too, on its apparently positive public statements it gave on the Djibouti initiative and the results of its process to misguide naďve observers. It also regarded the TNG too young and too weak to assume a challenging role. The reality is that Ethiopia had been ambiguous on its stand on the TNG. It had shielded its reservations under the pretext of arguing for a complete settlement of the crisis with the accommodation of the warlords; warlords that now thrive, mainly, on the military, economic and political support it provides. This support ensures their adamantly uncompromising position, and puts the government in the difficult situation of coping with an externally driven alliance of opponents.
The Ethiopian government has dismissed the TNG accusations as baseless, and has vehemently denied both the Ethiopian presence in the Somali territory and the support it is giving to the Somali warlords that are opposed to the TNG. We will here examine the evidence for Ethiopia’s current involvement in Somalia and its political strategy of destabilization towards the TNG.
2. Evidence For Ethiopian Army Inside Somalia
· The first reports of Ethiopian incursion into Somali territory came to light on 9 August, 1996 when they had invaded the Gedo towns of Luuq, Doolow and Buulo Xaawo; deploying a huge infantry backed by artilleries and gunships that were used against the town populations. At the time, the Ethiopians had openly declared that they had crossed the border to annihilate the Al-Itixaad organization, which they had accused of launching attacks in the Ethiopian Somali region from their Gedo base. The Ethiopians installed an SNF control, to replace the Al-Itixaad administration, and armed their militia after brief training. This had led to the first political split within both SNF and its clan constituency, followed by a fighting between pro and against Ethiopia groups in Gedo. Gross human rights violations were committed by the Ethiopian troops during their operations; the death toll was estimated at 500 civilian victims, while thousands were forced to flee to Mandera (Kenya), Bardera, Baidoa and Mogadishu. Captured Al-Itixaad fighters and other suspects were summarily executed.
· Almost five years later, the Ethiopian troops were still in full control of those towns until the Interim Government of Somalia denounced their occupation and demanded their complete withdrawal. In February, 2001 the Ethiopians have moved their troops to the Dolow-Ethiopia side of the border to avoid an imminent fact-finding mission of the UN requested by the Interim government and a group of interested journalists.
· In June 1999, the Ethiopian forces had participated, in conjunction with RRA, in a military offensive to conquer Bay and Bakool from Aydeed’s SNA militia, which has been occupying the area since 1995. The Ethiopians had been providing arms, military advice and training for RRA for almost three years when this military operation was precipitated by the presence of an Eritrean-backed Oromo armed group. Unlike the Gedo case, the Ethiopians have never admitted their involvement in the Baidoa (220km from the border) operation. Initially, the Ethiopian contingencies were stationed in the famous former Labaatan jirow prison and later moved to Xuddur; currently the troops are re-located beyond the border.
· The Ethiopian military presence in Somalia has always been well known and documented in the humanitarian circles serving Somalia, including UN agencies, International NGOs and donor and diplomatic missions based in Kenya. Reports from resident relief workers and occasional field visitors had indicated the presence of Ethiopian military camps in Gedo. A UN inter-agency mission had actually had the experience of being meticulously checked at a Luuq control point manned by Ethiopian troops. With a pragmatic approach relief organizations accepted the Ethiopian control over the region and even occasionally sought the assistance of the commanders to provide escorts for food aid distributions or to police on related looting incidents. WFP, UNICEF, FSAU, Trocaire, AMREF, Intersos, Terra Nuova and Care are some of the independent witnesses of that overwhelming military presence of Ethiopia in Gedo.
· Ethiopian incursions into Somali villages along the extended border have been the norm since 1996. Communities in Somaliland, Puntland and Central regions have in many occasions been shocked by the sudden appearance of heavily armed Ethiopian troops, sometimes causing casualties. Just last September, the Somaliland has complained to the Ethiopian government on the attack their troops had leashed on Xaaji Saalax village killing a communication radio operator whose equipment they had come to confiscate.
3. The post-Djibouti Pact Between Ethiopia and Warlords
· Despite Ethiopia’s official endorsement of the Djibouti Initiative and the attendance of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to the inauguration of the Interim President of Somalia, warlords close to Ethiopia such as Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, General Gabiyow, Genral Mohamed Said “Morgan” and Muse Sudi had categorically refused to participate in the reconciliation process or accept its outcome.
· Two of the few important warlords that had fully taken part in the works of the Djibouti conference and later became members of the legislative assembly had withdrawn their support to the TNG in circumstances indicating the strong influence of the Ethiopian government in their decisions. Colonel Shatigadud of RRA had announced his change of heart while in Addis Ababa after just returning from the President-led tour to the Millennium Summit, the UN Annual General Assembly and visit to friendly countries. General Omar Haji Masalle declared his break with the TNG in a warlord meeting held at the end of January in the border town of El Berde under the auspices of Ethiopia.
· The El Berde meeting which was attended by Col. Abdullahi Yusuf (Puntland), General Aden Gabyow and General Morgan of SPM, , Shekh Adan Mohamed of RRA, General Omar Haji Masalle and Abdullahi Sheikh was a follow up of the Garoe meeting that was held at the end October last year. Two political advisors from the Ethiopian government took part in the discussions to assist in the formulation of an anti-TNG warlord strategy.
· In December, a shipment of Ethiopian arms had arrived for Muse Sudi in Mogadishu. The three truck-trailers have come through the border under RRA control.
· In early January 2001, a joint SPM-RRA militia, allied to Ethiopia, attacked the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly while he was on a peaceful mission to Bakool region. At the end of the same month, SNF and Ethiopian forces violently reacted to the visit of the Minister of Transport to Garbaharrey. The ensuing fighting caused several deaths. In February, Ethiopian soldiers opened a fire on a demonstrating crowd killing two men, two women and a child.
· In mid February, Ethiopia called a meeting in Addis Ababa for Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, Col. Mohamed Nur Shatigadud, General Omar Haji Masalle and Hassan Qalad.
· In early March, famous Mogadishu-based warlords, Hussein Aydeed, Osman Ato, and Muse Sudi had an unprecedented meeting with the Ehiopian government in Addis Ababa. An initial twelve-member team they were leading had a stopover in Nairobi between 22 February and 3 March, with the Ethiopian government sponsorship.
4. The Undesirable TNG : The Ethiopian View
The Ethiopian government has never issued an official statement of outright rejection of the Transitional National Government. They have not, however, kept secret that they have strong reservations on offering a full diplomatic recognition from their side. In fact, in the last meeting of the IGAD Head of States held in Khartoum they have even tried to block the TNG to resume the Somalia seat in IGAD. Directly as well as through diplomatic channels they have made known that they cannot accept the TNG because of two reasons. Firstly, they argue that powerful warlords that are important forces to reckon with are still outside the TNG framework. Secondly, they consider this government an Islamic fundamentalist one that constitutes a threat to the security of Ethiopia.
The minimum restructuring needed to render the Djibouti process, acceptable to both Ethiopians and warlords, would, according to them, be the incorporation of the warlords in the transitional power structure. But this proposal has yet to come from the warlords themselves whose official stand has so far been a call for a return to the drawing board by reopening new reconciliation talks along “building blocks”, a different Ethiopian favoured approach.
4. Ethiopian Arguments Examined
The two arguments put forward by the Ethiopian government to discredit the TNG need to be scrutinized closely.
4.1 Accommodation Of Warlords
We need to put one point straight: the warlords were not excluded from the Djibouti process; they had simply decided to stay out, probably in consultation with their Ethiopian ally. Accustomed to being the sole negotiators in reconciliation meetings, they had failed to recognize that times had changed in favor of a broader people’s participation. Those warlords who came to share took part in the process; those who defied people’s will were not allow to alter the peace course.
The power of the warlords has changed throughout the civil war and has now reached its lowest level. All the warlords can command now is destabilization. However, the Djibouti process and its product, the TNG, have been realistic in their approach to the warlords’ issue. To avoid warlords involvement in further deterioration of the security situation in the country, the TNG has planned to continue the dialogue with them, as mandated by the Djibouti meeting, in order to achieve a complete reconciliation. The Ethiopian interference is making that plan difficult to implement; and is attempting to retard the extinction of warlordism. The Ethiopian armaments to the warlords do not, certainly, serve to create an environment that promotes reconciliation between the TNG and the warlords. On the contrary, it is meant to divide the Somalis so that the country is not settled on terms independent from Ethiopia’ grand design for Somalia.
4.2 Religious-based Insecurity Claims
The Ethiopian government argues that it is opposed to the TNG because this latter’s Islamic religious links are a threat to the security of Ethiopia. This logics is in contradiction with Ethiopian political actions. Let us consider the following three examples:
A key Ethiopian warlord ally, Muse Sudi, was the first to establish an Islamic Sharia Court in Somalia in the early nineties; and his current rule over Medina of Mogadishu is still based on that structure.
The Ethiopians have recently made rapprochement with Hussein Aydeed whom they have for so long antagonized because of his association with the religious organization Al-Itixaad and his support for the Oromo armed organization. He is the only warlord that has gone that far to open an Eritrean-backed front in Somalia.
If look at its inter-state diplomacy, Ethiopia has not only restored its diplomatic relations with Sudan but has even signed a broad development cooperation agreement with this country that they have been accusing not long ago of promoting and hosting Islamic terrorism, and that it was an enemy supporting Ethiopian armed dissidents.
5. The Real Reason For Ethiopia’s Hostility
The TNG reflects the Somali people’s will to revive. Meles Zanawe ‘s Ethiopia has nostalgia of the Imperial era. Its concerns are not for the well-being of the Somali people whether in the Republic or in region five of Ethiopia. It is obsessed with the risk of loosing its direct rule on the Somalis under its jurisdiction, and believes that the only way to avert that risk is to hold a powerful grip on the Republics affairs through manipulation of its political leaders.
The OAU and IGAD mandate given to Ethiopia has ceased when the responsibility for the mediation of the Somali reconciliation has moved to Djibouti. The TNG is the product of the Djibouti Initiative that was endorsed by the UN, OAU and IGAD and widely acclaimed by the Somalis inside the country and in the Diaspora. Ethiopia has no more business in the Somali reconciliation. Its involvement with the warlords is a breach to the international protocol on conflict resolution as laid down in UN, OAU and IGAD appropriate frameworks.
6. Looking Forward
Our Horn of Africa region had had more than its share of political misfortunes, misery and famine. It is time for peace to be given chance to flourish and real development for our peoples to take roots. Somali nationalism and its Islamic religion are not a threat to either Ethiopia or others. Real democratization of the Ethiopian life is the guarantee for Ethiopia’s security. The Somalia of today has a regional perspective in terms of cooperation for peaceful coexistence and development. The Interim President captured this spirit in his speech at the world leaders’ Millennium Summit when he said: “ The message we bring is one of peace for Somalia, peace for the Horn of Africa and for Africa as a whole. Let bygones be bygones and let us start a new relationship among ourselves, with our neighbors and the international community.”
7. What Should Somalia’s Friend Do?
Somalia is in a crossroad from chaos to recovering missed development opportunities. Its people are tired of war and division. Ethiopia should not be allowed to a have a free hand on Somali affairs under today’s fashionable arguments of containment of religious fundamentalism. It is now that the people need genuine friends who can extend effective moral, political and economic support.
aweys_yusuf@yahoo.com
Eng. Aweys W. Yusuf, Msc.
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